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 Title: 
 
Problematising: ‘Victim’s Justice: Political Reform in Postgenocide Rwanda 
 
Research Question: 
 
Can “Victims Justice” pursued by Transitional Justice in Rwanda, allow for the 
political reform required to break the cycle of violence? 
 
Key words: 
 
Postgenocide Rwanda, victims’ justice, colonialism, race, institutions of rule, political 
identity, citizenship, political reform, national reconciliation, survivor’s justice 
 
Abstract 
 
In this dissertation, I problematize ‘victim’s justice’ in post-genocide Rwanda. I argue that 
the kind of justice that was meted out in post-genocide Rwanda, namely victors’ justice and 
complementary to it – victims’ justice, does not allow for the political reform required to 
break the cycle of violence in Rwanda. In the aftermath of the 1994-Rwandan Genocide, both 
state and society were faced with a moral and political dilemma, because the popular agency 
or mass participation of perpetrators derived from the Hutu majority, who targeted the Tutsi 
minority, with intent to annihilate them. There were massacres of both Hutus and Tutsis, but 
Hutus were targeted as individuals, whereas Tutsis were targeted as a group. It is the specific 
‘intent to annihilate’ Tutsis as group, that makes this a Genocide against Tutsis. I draw and 
develop arguments made by Mahmood Mamdani, elaborating on the specific question of 
‘victims justice’ for political reform in Rwanda. Both kinds of justice were outcomes of the 
logic of the Nuremburg Trials. Since its inception, the legacy of the Nuremburg Trial is 
demonstrated in how it was idealized at the end of the Cold-War by international law and 
human rights regime. In essence, the historical and political context of the Nuremburg trial 
has been removed, as it has been produced into a template- the ‘Nuremburg-styled criminal 
trial’. ‘Criminal justice’ has come to define how we think of justice after mass violence, as 
the most morally acceptable form of justice for the victims, and the most politically viable 
response for constituting a ‘new political order’ after mass violence. This dissertation 
addresses the argument made, that victors’ justice and victims’ justice in Rwanda, has 
constituted two categories, which collectivise Tutsis as victims and Hutus as perpetrators. In 
the context of a genocide, where the perpetrators are derived from the Hutu majority and the 
victims from the Tutsi minority, this present both a moral and political dilemma for 
Rwanda’s state-building and national reconciliation project. Criminal justice also frames 
mass violence as being criminal, rather than addressing it as political violence. This has 
troubling consequences for intervening into the cycle of violence in Rwanda. The ‘cycle of 
violence’ in Rwanda, refers to the continuation of political violence, in which ‘every round of 
perpetrators has justified the use of violence as the only effective guarantee against being 
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victimised yet again. Thus, intervention into the cycle of violence would mean thinking out 
of the logic of victimhood and pursuing an alternative kind of justice. To think of the 
genocide as political violence, redirects the attention to the issues that made the genocide 
possible. I establish the importance and necessity of critically interrogating ‘victims justice’ 
in Rwanda, by placing the 1994-Genocide in its historical and political context, with a 
particular focus on the legacy of colonialism. The post-colonial regimes in Rwanda, inherited 
the colonial institutions of rule; and the politicisation of Hutu and Tutsi into racial categories, 
which have shaped particular meanings for power, justice and citizenship. I demonstrate in 
this dissertation that critical issues found in post-genocide Rwanda today, are symptomatic of 
the inherited colonial legacy. I address the prevailing political crisis through an analysis on 
post-genocide governance; national reconciliation; the ‘land question’; and the Great Lakes 
refugee crisis. Furthermore, I found that it was critically important for my research question, 
to also adopt a regional perspective, because Rwanda lies at the epicentre of the Great Lakes 
regional crisis. This dissertation concludes with returning to the question of political reform, 
and breaking the ‘cycle of violence’. My suggestion is that we need to think of Mamdani’s 
concept of survivor’s justice, rather than victims’ justice or victors’ justice, which assist in 
confronting the needs of political reform that address colonial legacies. 
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Introduction 
 
___________________________________________________ 
 
"Many Hutu families have returned to the hills, even though their men are in prison. Some completely 
disagreed with what happened, others fully supported it. 
 
These families work their plots amongst themselves; they hardly speak to us, they do not return anything 
that they looted, they do not ask for pardon. Their silence makes me feel very uncomfortable. 
 
I am sure I have recognized some criminals' faces amongst these families working in the fields. They have kept 
muscular arms fit for cultivating. My sister and I have only slender arms to feed the orphans. I do not think it's 
realistic to only entrust time and silence with the difficult mission of reconciliation.”  
- Angelique Mukamanzi, 25-year-old Rwandan farmer 
1
 
 
 
In those hundred days of slaughter, beginning on the 7
th
 of April 1994, Hutus were 
summoned on a “national duty” to exterminate the Tutsi population in Rwanda. The national 
call came after the presidential plane carrying President Juvenal Habyarimana and Burundian 
President Cyprien Ntaryamira was shot down, leading to a coup d’état. The government did 
not carry out the killings, rather, the agenda was imposed from above and became a gruesome 
reality carried out on the ground by ‘ordinary Rwandans’. We know now that the killers were 
derived primarily from the Hutu population, and that women and children, religious leaders, 
teachers and friends or married partners, turned on one another and participated in the horrific 
violence. One of those killers, Adalbert, describes their targets as cockroaches, and later as 
‘dogs’, ‘snakes’, or ‘zeroes’.
2
 As the massacres swept through the Provinces/Secteurs of 
Rwanda, taunts were used to trick and lure victims out of the marshes and hills, and were 
accompanied with insults, that as Adalbert remembers as being “invigorating… made the job 
easier. The perpetrators felt more comfortable…because they seemed less like us in that 
position.”
3
 The perpetrators used weapons, such as machetes, that were familiar to Rwandan 
culture and identity. Killing was an exhausting act, often involving several killers for every 
single victim. Sexual violence targeted Tutsi women, for their gender and ethnicity, with 
propaganda calls to ‘dehumanise and subjugate’ all Tutsi, but particularly Tutsi women who 
were accused of ‘infiltrating the Hutu community’ through intermarriages.
4
 Unlike the 
typified example of the Nazi German-Holocaust, the Rwandan genocide was an intimate 
affair.
5
 People were killed openly on the streets, often witnessed by hundreds and thousands 
of Rwandans. Estimates of those killed range between: 500, 000 - 1 million Tutsis, and 
between ten to fifty thousand Hutus.
6
 Absent from the official narrative of the genocide, is 
that many Hutu political opposition, wealthy Hutu property owners, and ‘moderate Hutus’ 
(who refused to participate) were killed. Hutus were killed as individuals; Tutsis were 
targeted as a group. It was the explicit goal to eliminate Tutsis between March and July that 
make this genocide. 
 
The genocide began to wind down as quickly as it has begun. In part, this owes to the 
perpetrators becoming exhausted from killing, but the genocide also dissipated through the 
advancement of the armed wing of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which was securing 
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areas as they made their way to Kigali. The RPA consisted of the exiled Tutsi diaspora from 
Uganda, as well as some Hutu dissidents and political opposition to the Rwandan regime. 
Four years earlier, in October 1990, the RPF organised an armed repatriation from Uganda 
and invaded Rwanda, triggering a civil war between 1990-1993. The civil war was 
interrupted by a ceasefire agreement, and the political negotiations began through the Arusha 
Peace Accords. President Habyarimana made little effort to implement the stipulations of the 
Arusha Accords. Against the backdrop of increasing anti-Tutsi violence taking place in the 
countryside and the RPF’s obsession with providing security to the Tutsi population, thus 
they broke the ceasefire agreement and the civil war resumed. The escalation of massacres 
evolved into a full-blown genocide by April 1994. The RPF claimed military victory in July 
1994; it also meant a political victory, in light of the terms of the Arusha agreement. 
 
In the aftermath of the genocide, there was a great sense of guilt felt by the international 
community, for failing to intervene. The only offering deemed fit for the victims; and the 
most morally acceptable and politically viable response to mass violence, was to seek 
retributive justice (criminal justice). The aim was to hold every perpetrator, and military and 
political leader, criminally accountable for the crimes they committed under international 
law. Therefore, the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda was conceived and operated 
in Arish, Tanzania. Belgium and Switzerland also lent their support by pursuing prosecutions 
in their national courts (third-party courts). The Rwandan government embarked on an 
ambitious judicial pursuit of its own, through its ‘policy of mass accountability’. The 
Rwandan state made use of the national judicial system and resurrected a ‘traditional’ 
mechanism- the Modernised Gacaca court. The Modernised Gacaca Court combines both 
retributive and restorative justice, argued to be necessary for reconciliation in post-genocide 
Rwanda 
 
Statement of the research problem: 
 
Two decades later, and the sheer magnitude of the violence during the 1994-genocide, as 
well as its popular agency, and the socially binding gruesome act of killing, continues to 
capture the imagination of the world. The genocide attracted a great deal of attention and 
writings from various kinds, such as from the international humanitarian community, 
transitional justice scholars, diplomats to journalists. Little was known about Rwanda before 
the genocide, which led to an obsession with the case, and it being looked at through a 
‘genocide lens’. The genocide also took place during a period of significant developments 
being made in the human rights regime discourse and international law, which drew a host of 
post-conflict analysis and particularly transitional justice policy suggestions. Much of the 
initial work on the genocide lacked historical background, political context, and 
understanding of the social dynamics, because most of the literature on African conflict was 
focused on macro-explanations that mirrored the rise of liberal-democratic agendas. There 
was also limited quality research and empirical data. Initially, most of the information came 
from humanitarian aid workers/agencies and journalist that were in Rwanda. Moreover, the 
literature was constrained by epistemic hierarchies and boundaries of knowledge that reflect 
the colonial and neo-colonial experiences on the continent. 
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 Today, Rwanda is still predominantly thought through the ‘genocide lens’, but there has been 
a significant developments in the scholarship, and in more recent years, we have seen a 
growth of ‘Rwandan scholars’, that are also specialising in the geo-political region- the Great 
Lakes region. These scholars are conducting invaluable fieldwork research and producing 
empirical data that is acutely necessary for the current debates on Rwanda. They have 
assisted the shift from simple-explanations and bias interpretations by providing evidence on 
the specificities of the Rwandan case study. Rwanda has a complex historical and political 
context that requires the support from these kinds of research studies that can break away 
from meta-narratives and explanations. The ‘genocide lens’ emerged out of the international 
guilt- the outright failure of the international community to respond, and act timelessly on the 
initial reports that genocide was fully on its way. The post-genocide ruling party, the RPF, 
has been vociferous about the international community’s indifference to the on-going 
massacres of Tutsis, especially in the context of Yugoslavia and the envisioned principle 
“Never Again”. ‘International guilt’ plays a crucial role in Rwanda today, as the post-
genocide regime has garnered support in its nation-building project, from s important 
international actors (“Friends of Rwanda”: U.S, U.K, Netherlands…etc.). However, these 
highly influential ‘Friends of Rwanda’ that have embraced the current regime, have also 
contributed to obscuring historical background and the perception of current political and 
social dynamics. Lastly, transitional justice in Rwanda has had a powerful impact on the 
interpretation of the genocide and its explanation. 
 
The type of justice that was meted out in response to the genocide was born from the logic 
and legacy of the Nuremburg Tribunal. A central critique of the justice dispensed was that it 
was essentially a ‘victors justice’. ‘Victors justice’ is an outcome of a historical tradition, 
which argues: after the war has ended, there is clear victor who has the power to determine 
justice and administrate it. This victor is most often referred to as the ‘military victor’. 
Complimentary to ‘victors justice’ is ‘victims justice’, which operates on the logic, that only 
the ‘victor’ can determine and secure justice for the victims. Rwanda is argued to be the 
more recent example of ‘victor’s justice’ and operating on a ‘victims justice’ rationale. This 
dissertation draws on arguments made by Mahmood Mamdani. I develop points made by 
him, whilst elaborating on the specific question of ‘victims justice’. Mamdani’s argument 
has informed my discussion on political reform in Rwanda, in the wake of the genocide. 
 
This dissertation addresses the argument made, that ‘victors justice’ and ‘victims justice’ in 
Rwanda, has constituted two categories, which collectivise Tutsis as victims and Hutus as 
perpetrators. In the context of a genocide, where the perpetrators are derived from the Hutu 
majority and the victims from the Tutsi minority, this present both a moral and political 
dilemma for Rwanda’s nation building project. It also has troubling consequences for 
intervening into the cycle of violence. The ‘cycle of violence’ in Rwanda, refers to the 
continuation of political violence, in which ‘every round of perpetrators has justified the 
use of violence as the only effective guarantee against being victimised yet again. Thus, 
intervention into the cycle of violence would mean thinking out of the logic of victimhood 
and pursuing an alternative kind of justice. 
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Elaborating on arguments made by Mamdani and in the literature, my research investigates 
the political crisis that made the genocide possible. I depart by exploring the relationship 
between history and politics, particularly problematizing the legacy of colonialism by 
critically interrogating Rwanda’s political record. The post-colonial regimes inherited the 
colonial institutions of rule; and the politicisation of Hutu and Tutsi into racial categories, 
which have shaped particular meanings for power, justice and citizenship. I demonstrate in 
this dissertation that critical issues found in post-genocide Rwanda today, are symptomatic of 
the inherited colonial legacy. I address the prevailing political crisis through an analysis on 
post-genocide governance; national reconciliation; the ‘land question’; and the Great Lakes 
refugee crisis. Furthermore, I found that it was critically important for my research question, 
to also adopt a regional perspective, because Rwanda lies at the epicentre of the Great Lakes 
regional crisis. 
 
This dissertation comprehensively ties together these various themes to produce a political 
explanation for the Rwandan genocide and a more complete picture of the political crisis. My 
specific contribution is to look at these areas and the dimensions of the problem. This is with 
the hope of contributing to the current debate on Rwanda, and to the discourse on post-
conflict political reform, transitional justice (national reconciliation and justice) and 
resolutions addressing the Great Lakes refugee crisis. A broader aim of this dissertation is to 
also participate in the critical discussions and discourse that are seeking alternative and more 
suitable theoretical frameworks for approaching political questions in relation to political 
violence in Africa. 
 
Organisation and scope: 
 
This dissertation is divided into six chapters. As a primarily literature-based study, and 
because this is a complex research problem, I provide a literature review in each chapter, 
that contributes to the overall argument that I make. 
 
Chapter one elaborates on the specific question of justice. I am specifically addressing how 
we have come to think of justice and how it is meted out, in response to mass violence. Our 
contemporary understanding of ‘justice’ has been framed by contemporary legal, political 
and an ethical vocabulary. Thus, through a literature review, I trace the genealogy of the 
origins of ‘justice’ and explore how previous practices of ‘successor justice’ have become the 
most appropriate response to mass violence. This allows the chapter to critically interrogates 
the ‘logic of Nuremburg’ by thinking about the historical and political context that shaped the 
justice debate amongst the victorious allies (World War II). This chapter addresses the 
central critiques of Nuremburg, particularly ‘victors justice’ and ‘victims justice.’ 
The second part of this chapter explores the legacy of Nuremburg, particularly its 
contribution to the field of transitional justice. I also address the dilemmas born of 
the practice of criminal justice and its limits for political reform and nation building. 
 
The third, and final part of this chapter, introduces Rwanda’s transitional justice project. This 
chapter situates the dissertation’s research question and provides a foundation for the 
following chapters. 
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 Chapter two focuses on the genocide, and places it in its historical and political context. I 
depart with a discussion on the interpretation of the genocide, particularly questions around 
mass participation or popular agency. I address this through the ‘official narrative’ sanctioned 
by the post-genocide state. The Rwandan government has pieced together a historical record 
that is derived from the judicial record. I will problematize the limitations of this approach to 
historical inquiry. I also introduce the current debates and interpretations provided by key 
Rwandan scholars, who have conducted extensive fieldwork and make invaluable 
contributions to the literature on the Rwandan genocide. This chapter will provide a critical 
review of Mahmood Mamdani’s theoretical framework and interpretation of the genocide. I 
will also present my justification for drawing on arguments made by Mamdani and his 
theoretical framework. To situate my research question and argument, I critically interrogate 
the post-colonial political record. This discussion includes the argument that the political 
crisis is an outcome of the failure for post-colonial Rwandan regimes, to disinherit the 
colonial legacy. The colonial legacy has shaped particular meanings for power, justice and 
citizenship (rights and belonging) premised on the politics of indigeneity. Through this 
discussion, I demonstrate how law, politics and history are inextricably linked and contribute 
to the political crisis. Finally, I address the Arusha Accords (1993), and the negotiated 
agreement. The Arusha Accords interrupted the civil-war (1990-1993). I argue that due to its 
failures to include all constituencies in the negotiated agreement, it paved the way for the 
resumption of war, which evolved into the 1994-Genocide. A central critique made by ‘Hutu 
Power’, the government and other radical Hutu parties was that they it was a ‘victors deal’ for 
the RPF. This is an important discussion, because the final agreement was institutionalised in 
the post-genocide government. 
 
Chapter three investigates the post-genocide political record and governance. I depart this 
chapter by exploring the post-genocide gains, and the two radically different perceptions of 
Rwanda today. I approach post-genocide governance by addressing the RPF’s experience of 
exile; its ideological influences; and the Rwandan perceptions born from the RPF’s October 
1990 invasion, which triggered a civil war. As the military-victory of the genocide, the RPF 
were seen as being primarily an outsider to Rwanda’s social and political relations, and it was 
representative of an even smaller community than the Tutsi minority- it came from the Tutsi 
diaspora in Uganda. The RPF recognised that it would have to strategically address these 
perceptions in order to gain legitimacy. This chapter investigates how the ruling-party (the 
RPF) has taken up political reform in Rwanda, specifically through the following indicators: 
transitional government; policy prioritisations; election processes; internal and external 
political opposition; the media and civil society. I look at two periods: 1994-2000 and 2000-
present. I elaborate on the argument that post-genocide Rwanda has seen a ‘Tutsification of 
the state’; closing of the social and political space; the RPF has monopolised power by using 
law as a political tool. Finally, I explore the political opposition, which today primarily 
operates in exile due to state-repression and violence. However, both Hutu and Tutsis 
political personalities are engaging in an inter-ethnic dialogue in exile, which has had an 
impact on internal debates. 
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Chapter four looks at the national reconciliation and unity project in post-genocide 
Rwanda. Rwanda’s reconciliation project is premised on justice, socio-economic 
development, and re-education of the population and eradication of ethnicity. The state has 
also centred ‘traditional’ mechanisms (Gacaca courts and Ingando re-education camps) to 
guide and implement the reconciliation project. I address reconciliation through the three 
main instruments that the state uses: politics, law and history. I also situate the experiences of 
‘ordinary Rwandans’ with the state-sanctioned reconciliation project. I make the argument, 
that the post-genocide state has politicised reconciliation; ethnic-discrimination; and 
disciplines ‘truth’, ‘memory’ and ‘history’. 
 
Chapter five addresses the ‘Land Question’ in Rwanda. Land reform in Rwanda 
demonstrates the failure of political reform in post-genocide Rwanda, through the ‘land 
question’. Land has played a central role in state formation in pre-colonial, colonial and post-
colonial Rwanda to today. In a predominantly agrarian society, and in the political historical 
context of Rwanda, who governs the land determines who has rights, who belongs, and who 
will develop from it. Land is the most important material benefit that gives meaning to 
citizenship and rights in Rwanda. Thus, I explore political and social relations in Rwanda, 
which has evolved with state-formation. I also describe how the colonial intervention used 
pre-colonial land systems and activities, to add claim to their ‘ideology on race’, which 
would be used to reconstruct Hutu, Tutsi and Twa into political identities. The political 
identities gained meaning through the separate institutions of rule that governed them. The 
colonial intervention has had a devastating impact. Land association became markers that 
further shaped the different political identities, and produced a hierarchical system amongst 
the races, which saw the degradation of Hutus and genesis of Tutsi privilege. This chapter 
discusses the colonial legacy and the implications it has for rights and citizenship in post-
colonial Rwanda, and in post-genocide Rwanda. The argument I make is that the institutions 
of rule continue to retain political identities. Finally, I discuss the confluence of the post-
colonial political crisis in Uganda, and its own one in Rwanda, that led to the armed 
repatriation of the RPF in October 1990. The political argument made by the Tutsi diaspora 
was based on a ‘right of return’. This argument continues to be made today, as the post-
genocide state encourages ‘Rwandans’ to return from the diaspora. The manner in which the 
RPF has addressed the returning population is telling of the political crisis. 
 
Chapter 6 explores the implications of ‘victims justice’ for the Great Lakes region. I address the 
logic of the post-genocide power, which sees a moral obligation to protect Tutsis within Rwanda 
and the diaspora. The logic is an outcome ‘victors justice’ and ‘victims justice’ rationale, and has 
driven the RPF to seek justice for Tutsis beyond Rwanda’s borders. The RPF has relentlessly 
targeted Hutus in the region, and as a result Tutsis in the diaspora have been victimised in 
Congo. Both Hutus and Tutsis have become victims caught up in the political crises, which has 
displaced millions of people. Thus, the cycle of violence in Rwanda has taken on a regional 
dynamic. Central to the political violence, is the politics of indigeneity, which contributes to 
communities being excluded from making a claim on rights and citizenship. I approach the Great 
Lakes refugee crisis, by returning to the unresolved 
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political crisis in Rwanda. Specifically, I address the limitations that ‘victims justice’ have 
placed on political reform, democratisation and is an obstacle to inclusive-citizenship. 
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Chapter One: 
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter will elaborate on the question of justice. I am specifically addressing how we 
have come to think of justice and how it is meted out, in response to mass violence. Our 
contemporary understanding of ‘justice’ has been framed by contemporary legal, political 
and an ethical vocabulary. Thus, through a literature review, I trace the genealogy of the 
origins of ‘justice’ and explore how previous practices of ‘successor justice’ have become the 
most appropriate response to mass violence. This allows the chapter to critically interrogate 
the ‘logic of Nuremburg’ by thinking about the historical and political context that shaped the 
justice debate amongst the victorious allies (World War II). I address the critiques of 
Nuremburg, particularly the kind of justice that was dispensed was seen to be ‘victors justice’ 
and complementary to it was a ‘victims justice’ rationale. The second part of this chapter 
explores the legacy of Nuremburg, and its contribution to the field of transitional justice. 
Stripped of its historical and political context, the Nuremburg Tribunal has since its 
conception, been shaped by international criminal law and international humanitarian law, 
into a popularised legal standard. Criminal justice is considered within the transitional justice 
field, to the most morally acceptable and politically viable response to mass violence.
1
I will 
also address the dilemmas born of the practice of criminal justice and its limits for political 
reform and nation building. The third, and final part of this chapter, introduces Rwanda’s 
transitional justice project. This chapter situates the dissertation’s research question and 
provides a foundation for the following chapters. 
 
1.2 Just War and Justice: A Brief History of Justice 
 
The Nuremburg Tribunal has become a ‘template’ through which we have come to define 
mass violence in the post-Cold war period.
2
 One of its central critiques is that it serves as a 
significant example of ‘victors justice’ and since WWII, the “vision of successor justice is 
dominated by the legacy of Nuremburg.”
3
 However, both ‘victors justice’ and the logic that 
led to the formulation of Nuremburg, is rooted in a long established tradition of how we 
have come to think of justice and how it has been meted. 
 
There is a historical presumption, that after a military victory (either from a war between 
states or a revolution between classes) there is a clear victor, under whose power justice is 
administrated.
4
 This is understood as ‘victor’s justice- a term coined by Richard Minnear in 
1971 as a political critique of the justice dispenced at Nuremburg and Tokyo, but which is 
derived from an age-old practice of ‘successors justice’. The term is closely linked to ‘vae 
victis’, which is is latin for “woe or suffering to the conquered”.
5
 Historically, the victor has 
based their punishment on “what is right or wrong for their own forces and for those of the 
(former) enemy”.
6
 In the cases of ‘successor justice’, seeking punishment trumped the 
rights of the defeated enemy. 
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 All ancient cultures have dealt with the question of ‘justice’ and whether to prosecute 
(punish) or to grant amnesty (impunity). In todays normative expectation of justice, which 
frames much of our “contemporary legal, political and ethical vocabulary”, our understanding 
of ‘justice’ is derived from Christianity and Western modernity.
7
 Determining the ‘proper 
response to a wrong’ or justice, is traced to the latin term lex tallions, which relates to the 
biblical notion of “an eye for an eye”.
8
Wheras today, most of the world does not literally 
comply with the principle of an “eye for eye”, as Suren Pillay asserts, it has been ‘intergrated 
into the secular rationality of modern juridical discourse.’
9
 Pillay argues that “Today the 
concept of lex tallions has a wider meaning in that it is more often used to refer to a set of 
legal categories of punishments proportionate to a crime committed, an approach described as 
‘retributive justice’.”
10
 
 
It is necessary to mention in the discussion on ‘criminal justice’ as the preferred mechanism for 
justice, that the application of amnesty has also been practiced for as long as ‘humankind has 
existed’. Amnesty derives from the greek term amnestia, which means “forgetting”, and choses 
to rather restore the political and civil rights of the former enemy.
11
 Through either 
‘unconditional or conditional amnesty’, the state effectively wipes the slate clean of past criminal 
injustices, with the hopes that it will prevent revenge, consitute national unity, and enable 
political order.
12
Thus, amnesty ‘obliterates the crime itself’. The suggestion that it is an act of 
‘forgetting’ has stigmatised the historical practice, and has left practices of amnesty to exist in 
the shadows of retributive justice. It also goes against our ‘human nature’ and the rich historical 
influences of religion and philosophy, that has determined what is ‘wrong or unjust behaviour’. 
Kingsley Chiedu Moghalu argues that “the popular fixation with the idea of justice actually 
springs from a certain duality in human nature.”
13
 There exists a “strong instict towards 
injustice”, and although unjust acts may provide temporary value or benefits for the perpetrator 
who commits unjust acts, the suffering of the victims and the injustice, far outweigh those 
temporary benefits.
14
 Moghalu asserts that “the instinct to be unjust has come to be checked by 
law and moral precepts.”
15
 This rationale has been adopted at the level of the state, where there 
is a tendency to view war crime trials as “somewhat romantically, as mechanisms for neutral 
impartial justice meted out to the really nasty fellows who commit egregrious violations of 
human rights.”
16
 The problem is that war crime justice is framed and carried on in a political 
context of sovereign state, “War crimes are frequently committed to advance political agendas” 
and thus the response to them is different than ‘justice applied to ordinary times’ but rather war 
crime justice is a deeply political act.
17
 
 
The argument that war crime justice is political holds for all expressions justice, whether 
they be to prosecute in the form of a criminal trial or to grant amnesty or padon. However, 
the ‘victors justice’ critique, is concerned with the whether criminal justice is an effective 
response to state wrongdoing, and secondly, there is a suspicion that criminal justice is 
merely a “function of power” that is disgusised by its persuasive argument that advocates for 
justice and liberalising the repressive regime.
18
 
 
William A. Schabas argues that prosecutions of the war criminals has taken place since even  
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prior to the Ancient Greek era, and the early laws and cutoms of wars can be found in the 
writings of classical authors and historians.
19
Formerly, prosecutions of war criminals were 
entrusted to the state and would only take place through the national courts. However, 
over time in the context of the states wrongdoing in the international realm, the ‘national 
justice systems’ proved to be “incapable of being balanced and impartial in such cases”, 
and concerns were raised over the fact that victims remained subjugated to their powers 
and impunity prevailed.
20
 
 
Since the Middle Ages, international legal norms have related justice to unlawful political 
violence, and successor trials have long been used to express condemnation of unjust 
behavior. Ruti G. Teitel asserts “the attribution of criminal responsibility to prior political 
leadership for waging unlawful war, or other similar bad state rule, is the thread running 
through the ancient successor trials of the tyrants of the city-states described by Aristotle 
and the trials of Kings Charles I and Louis XVI, to the trials in the contemporary period: the 
Nuremburg trials, the Tokyo war crimes trials…”.
21
 In each case the logic to pursue 
punishment through retributive justice, has been formulated in a counterfactual response to 
the questions “what result if not punishment?” and “To what extent are broader rule-of-law 
values jeapordised without punishment?”
22
 Furthermore, as Teitel asserts “this early 
understanding of the relation of law to justice yields yet another formulation at Nuremburg, 
where trials were used to express a much broader normative message, going beyond the 
judgement of a defeated foreign regime, to distinguish ‘just’ from ‘unjust” violence.
23
This 
has attracted a long-established critique in the practices of justice, which argues that the 
‘war criminal is that who happens to have lost the war’, a determination that is made by the 
‘victors’.This is where the ‘political circumstances of the transition play a role’ because the 
dilemma of whether to seek ‘punishment or impunity’ is framed within its liberalising 
prospects for the state, and the counterfactual arguments posed have historically made it 
difficult to undermine the foundational arguments for criminal justice.
24
 
 
‘Modern legality’ was formally introduced at the end of the era of feudal rule or ‘monarchical 
state’. It also introduced the early remnants of ‘transitional justice’- which is “commonly 
linked with punishment and trials of ancien regimes.”
25
 The ‘ancien regime’ was 
characterised by its ‘unpredictable violence and executive preroragative’, which 
demonstrated a weak ‘rule of law’, where the principles of “equality before the law” and 
“equally subect to it” were not upheld.
26
 The trials of the ancien regime centralised the 
argument that it is acutely necessary to (re)establish the rule of law, and to use the trial to 
delegitmise the former violent identity of the repressive regime and transition the state to a 
more democratic order. The French Revolution bore a “human rights movement’ that looked 
at the ‘human rights of man, the citizen-it sought to empower the victim and to focus on 
issues.”
27
The idea that even the ‘King’ was not above law, and the shift from the 
monarchical state to Republican rule, where equality before and subject to the law was a core 
principle of the state, became symbolic of modern legality.
28
It also introduced the idea of the 
‘civilised state’, that would become part of an international “horizontally organised system of 
sovereign states” and contribute to the universalising notion of justice.
29
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In 1648 the Treaty of Westphalia was introduced as a desperate solution for peace in a period 
characterised by the ‘religious wars being fought’ and worrying escalation of wars because 
of foreign inteventions.
30
 The Westphalia Treaty affirmed: “the right of rulers to determine 
the confessional allegiance of their states and subject…and the corresponding secular 
supremacy of territorial rulers over their dominions.”
31
 This raised an important scholarly 
debate between advocates for natural law and those opposing them- advocates for positivist 
law. It also raised questions concerning the practice of ‘successor justice’ and the historical 
experiments with international justice. With the sanctitiy of state re-affirmed, there was shift 
that had to recognise national trial policy and respect that ‘national justice’ can determine 
who is rightfully accountable and what is considered a crime within the territory of the 
soverign state. Despite the Westphalia Principles, there were encouraging developments that 
took place in international law which also introduced the beginnings of international 
humanitarian law. Lastly, it lent to much political theorizing about the ‘laws of war’ (jus ad 
bellum and jus in bello), as well as the jus post bellum. 
 
The ‘just war tradition’ has historically tried to create a set a mutually agreed rules of combat, 
and this often takes place between two culturally similar enemies.
32
 
The ‘just war’’ is divded by two principles; ‘Jus ad bellum’ which refers to “when we may 
justly resort to war”, meaning the rules that govern the justice of war; and there is ‘Jus in 
bello’ which describes “how the war may legitmately be fought”.
33
 The aphorism- ‘War 
should always be the last resort’, provides the very basic premise of ‘just war’, and can be 
advocated from a military, ethical, political or philospophical view. Secondly war should not 
be excessive. Just war theorist’ argue that there are three possibilities that emerge after the 
cessation of war: “either the army has been defeated, has been victorious, or it has agreed to 
a ceasefire.”
34
 Thus, sometimes a third dimension is discussed- “Jus post bellum” which 
refers to the responsibility and accountability of warring parties after the war.
35
 ‘ “Jus post 
bellum” recognises that discrimination and punishment against the civilian population or 
non-combatants should be avoided at all cost, and that the ‘victors’ must respect the rights of 
the defeated, and apply justice proportionally to the ‘war’s charcter’.
36
 
 
The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 represented the first codifications of the ‘laws of 
war’ in an international treaty, and it centred the ‘protection of civilian populations’.
37
The 
intention of the Hague Conventions was to influence states through obligations and duties, 
by establishing certain acts as illegal, but not necessarilly though of as criminal.
38
It did not 
intend to seek criminal liability from individuals and was wary of aggressively meddling in 
the ‘internal affairs of the soverign state’. In the aftermath of WWI, it became distinctly 
apparent that idea of ‘obligations and duties’ had failed to comprehend the interests of the 
state and prevent violations of ‘unjust war behaviour’. This coincided with the brith of the 
Humanist tradition, which was responsding to the discourse by religions, the Pagans, the 
Greeks…etc, and expanded on the arguments made Marcus Tulius Cicero (106-43BC), who 
wrote “no war is just, unless it is centered upon after an official demand for satisfation has 
been submitted or warning has been given and a formal declaration made.”
39
Humanist make 
an appeal to ‘reasoning’ that centres an ethical philosophy of humankind and human nature, 
and values agency of the individual and collective in its understanding of settling disputes  
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and living under the ocndition of the rule of law’.
40
 There has been a critical theorising of the 
inter-war period concerning the relationsip between the state and the international system, by the 
schools of Liberalism and Realism, and other key scholars as that of Hedley Bull. 
 
Karl von Clausewitz, who is a ‘realist’ to some degree, wrote a key response to the common 
belief in the early 20
th
 Century, that war represented a “breakdown” or “malfunctioning” of 
the state and its people, instead he argues war is a “normal feature of international relations” 
and “is not the end of political activity, is is conducted for political purposes.”
41
In one of 
Clausewitz’s key texts, Politik, he writes that, “War is simply the continuation of political 
intercourse with the addition of other means, We deliberately use the phrase ‘with the 
addition of other means’, because we want to make it clear that war in itself does not suspend 
political intercourse or change it into something entirely different. In essentials that 
intercourse continues, irrespective of the means it employs . The main lines along which 
military events progress, and to which they are restricted, are political lines that continue 
throughout war into subsequent peace.” 
42
 Filip Reyntjens paraphrases Clausewitzs notion 
(“War is the contiuation of politics by other means”) into “ “lawfare” though less 
conspicuous, than warfare, can be a continuation of politics by other means.”
43
 ‘Lawfare’ is a 
controversial term, because it is in some cases used as a political critique of the unversalism 
normativity of law and assumption that law it neutral/impartial. However, it can also provide 
an inwards that justifies the violations of law and continutaion of political violence. It is an 
important debate, that is central to the discussion in this chapter, because it explores the 
relationships between domestic and international law, and the limitations for political and 
social reform. 
 
WWI placed immense pressure “to go beyond violations of the laws and customs of war 
and to prosecute…”.
44
However, the political and strategic considerations that go into the 
processes of establishing an international criminal tribunal and following through with 
prosecutions processes, failed to capture the commitment of the so-called international 
community to would hold Germany accountable. Instead they left Germany’s transitional 
justice in the hands of national trial policy, with the hope that it would hold its leaders 
accountable to national justice and transiton Germany towards a long-lasting democratic 
order.
45
 Finally, despite the theorising on minority-rights and the protection of human 
rights, the German-Holocaust took place, which exposed a crisis for state-sovereignty and 
internaitional law. 
 
1.3 The Logic of The Nuremburg Trials: 
 
In the aftermath of World War II there was a strong conviction that the Germans must be 
punished for war crimes committed, and the extensive loss of civilian lives. The Allies feared 
that the post-WWI treaties failed to restrain Germany’s aggression and vision for establishing 
itself as the superpower (political, military and industrial strength), which was formulated 
through a racialised identity based on a belief in a ‘superior Aryan race’. Joseph Stalin had 
proposed the execution of 50,000 German leaders as a “suitable deterrent”.
46
 Winston Churchill 
thought the execution of 5000 leaders would suffice. In the end the Allies decided 
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to pursue a criminal judicial mechanism, as espoused by the Declaration of St James: “the 
punishment, through the organised justice, of those guilty and responsible for these crimes, 
whether they ordered them, perpetrated them or in any way participated in them, [and to] 
determine in a spirit of international solidarity to see that (a) those guilty and responsible, 
whatever their nationality, are sought for, handed over to justice and judged, (b) and the 
sentences carried out.”
47
 Guenael Mettraux argues that the decision to implement a tribunal 
was based on a lack of an alternative option that could appease the Allies, as well as out of 
urgency for peace and justice.
48
 The Nuremburg trials must be understood in its ‘full 
historical and political contexts, of how the understanding of ‘justice’ has been shaped, and 
by returning to Post-World War I, where the failure of accountability and liberalising 
Germany subsequently led to the failure to prevent German aggression.’
49
Furthermore, the 
national justice system proved to be hopelessly political. American statesman Henry Stimson 
expressed, “We gave to Nazis what they denied to their opponents-the protection of the law”, 
thus arguing that Nuremburg would not be a case of vengeance, “but the reverse”.
50
 
 
The Nuremburg trials codified existing and new war crimes. The accused were charged with, 
“1. Conspiracy to wage aggressive war; 2. Waging aggressive war (together these charges 
were referred to as ‘crimes against peace’); 3. War crimes (violations of the rules and 
customs of war, such as mistreatment of prisoners or war, abuse of enemy civilians) and 4. 
Crimes against humanity (the torture and slaughter of millions on racial grounds).
51
 For the 
Allies, the crime of aggression was considered to be the major crime. Leila Nadya Sadat 
argues that when the tribunal established the wrongfulness of aggression, “In this way, not 
only the jus in bello was criminalised, but the jus ad bellum too, which represents a quantum 
leap forward from the steps taken at the Hague Convention half a century earlier.”
52
 The 
latter crimes gained significance once violations of international humanitarian law were 
made punishable, and once the human rights regime and international criminal law united to 
express its loud abhorrence towards political and military leaders who commit such crimes. 
Today, these crimes remain contentious because of the relationship between national and 
international law and the rise in ‘humanitarian intervention’, but what has changed is that 
they are now recognised as being crimes that can be committed during both war and 
peacetime. 
 
1.4 Critique of Nuremburg: Victor’s Justice and Victims’ Justice: 
 
Nuremburg re-established the legacy of ‘successor trials’, but the Allies were determined to 
prove that ‘the trial’ was the only- ‘most suitable’ response for achieving accountability for the 
principle crime of aggression. They argued that the punishment of the accused would be 
regulated by the core principles of international law, which are to provide ‘free and fair trials’, 
uphold ‘due process’, and that formal international justice is strictly impartial. As articulated by 
Supreme Court Judge Robert Jackson, the principle that “you must put no man on trial under 
forms of a judicial proceeding if you are not willing to see him freed if not proven guilty…the 
world yields no respect for courts that are organised to convict.”
53
Despite its ambitious vision to 
establish once and for all an international justice forum, it was apparent that from the onset, the 
technicalities of the Tribunals was beset with problems. The 
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outcome is that it has compromised the legal process and justice, and garnered the 
critique this was simply a political opportunity for ‘victors justice’. 
 
One of the first critiques of the Tribunals was that it replaced ‘national justice’ in order to 
administrate international justice.
54
 Premised on a moral and legal justification, the 
sovereignty of the defeated regime was suspended. It was designed to re-introduce and 
maintain international peace. Moghalu argues, “In this sense law is brought into the service 
of what it essentially a political goal.”
55
 Eyebrows were raised concerning the political 
intentions, when the ‘victorious powers’- the Allies established the rule of law under which 
alleged perpetrators were tried. They also appointed the judges and prosecutors who would 
establish the charge-sheet and criminal responsibility for these crimes.
56
 Thus, it is difficult 
to contest, the argument that ‘war crime justice’ is described as “political justice.”
57
 
 
The second critique, relates to a core principle in transitional justice. Nuremburg marked the 
shift in ‘successor justice’ from national justice to international justice, but also from 
‘collective responsibility’ to ‘individual responsibility. The argument made, is that by holding 
individuals accountable to international criminal law, these trials can hold the higher echelons 
of the state accountable, diffuse the defence that they acted under “superior orders” or ‘state 
immunity’, and to support the (re)establishment of the ‘rule of law’.
58
It also argued that it 
would prevent further aggression by avoiding a world of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. The trials 
hoped to prosecute as many individuals as possible, so that in that way the transitional 
process can delegitimise the former regimes political identity, without burdening the state by 
categorising a ‘group or nation’ as criminally responsible.
59
 In 2003 the UN affirmed that 
individuating crimes “can save whole communities from being held collectively guilty…It is 
the notion of collective guilt which is the true enemy of peace, since it encourages 
communities to nurture hatred against each other from one generation to the next.”
60
 In 
response to this principle, the Realist school of thought argues that punishment 
problematically “looks backward towards past action of the enemy” and instead what is 
perhaps more useful is “Politics and negotiation looks forward to constructing international 
order.”
61
 Realists also argue, “turning international politics into moral ethics and legal 
processes simply complicates matters and gets in the way of a genuine (and practical) 
political solution for peace.”
62
 
 
The third critique, is that only the ‘losers’ were placed on trial, which as discussed, comes from a 
historical tradition of how justice has been conceptualised and administrated. Tojo Hideki 
(General in the Imperial Army and Prime Minister of Japan) stated in a critique of the 
international Tokyo military tribunal: “In the last analysis, this trial was a political trial. It was 
only victor’s justice.”
63
 Hermann Goering (leading member of the Nazi Party) shared Hideki 
sentiments when he stated that “The victor will always be the judge and the vanquished the 
accused.”
64
 Moreover, the Allies received complete prosecutorial immunity, and their crimes 
such as atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, rape...etc, became known as the ‘forgotten 
crimes’ that were not prosecuted.
65
 It re-affirmed the argument that justice can be very selective, 
because the “winning side” is never placed on trial, and because the ‘victors’ continue to 
determine the process and outcomes. Moghalu asserts, the tribunal  
25 
 
 
 
 
administers ‘external selectivity’ and it “puts limits on where and to whom accountability for 
violations of international humanitarian law can apply.”
66
 
 
The fourth critique was raised by Indian Jurist for the United Nations International Law 
Commission- Justice Radhabinod Pal, who argues that the “rules of evidence were biased in 
favour of the prosecution; aggressive war was not a crime; and the judgments were illegal 
because they were based on post facto ground” thus in Pal’s view they were “sham 
employment of the legal process.”
67
 In international law this is referred to as retroactivity. 
Retroactivity relates to the principle of “nulla poena sine lege (no punishment of a crime 
without a pre-existing law on which punishment is based)”, which was disregarded in the 
Nuremburg trials when Nazi-Germany was charged and tried for crimes, that although were 
atrocious and morally repulsive, they could not effectively be tried because no domestic or 
international law had existed prior.
68
 Moghalu argues that the Allies were aware of this 
conundrum, and ignored the principles of positive law by adopting a course of action that 
was premised on international morality and indignation.
69
 The Allies had to search for 
creative solutions in positivist law to charge individuals who were part of the larger Nazi 
machine. Such legal exceptionalism was made tolerable by the forceful nature of seeking 
international criminal accountability, but as already discussed was greatly indefensible and in 
many cases illegal. 
 
The final critique, which has shaped transitional justice, and justice in Rwanda’s adaptation 
of the Nuremburg-styled criminal trials, is the birth of ‘victim’s justice’. Justice at 
Nuremburg was shaped by two pre-requisites; the political requisite: the “military victory”, 
and the second requisite: which is the “distinct political logic that shaped the thinking of the 
Allies.”
70
 Mahmood Mamdani proposes the notion of ‘victims justice’ which complements 
‘victors justice’. ‘Victim’s justice emerged from the assumption that “there would be no 
need for winners and losers (or perpetrators and victims) to live together in the aftermath of 
the victory.”
71
 Mamdani asserts that “there was very little justice for victims at Nuremburg. 
When it came it was political and it was obtained outside of the court.”
72
 He continues “the 
Allies carried out the most far-reaching ethnic-cleansing in the history of Europe, not only 
redrawing political boundaries but also moving millions across state boundaries. The 
overriding assumption was that there must be an Israel for survivors…”
73
 Thus, the post-
Nuremburg state of Israel was constituted as the homeland for the Genocide-Holocaust 
victims, a sovereign territory that the ‘survivors’ are entitled to, and whereby the state 
governs in the name of protecting the ‘victims’. 
74
 Furthermore, the term ‘survivors’ is a 
category that is itself an innovation of “post-Holocaust language” because it reserves the 
identity of ‘survivors’ as being “yesterday’s victims”.
75
 
 
1.5 The Legacy of Nuremburg: 
 
‘The Nuremburg-styled criminal trial’: Criminalising the Political 
 
 
 
Nuremburg became the template in which “we have come to define responsibility for mass 
violence in the post-Cold War period” and ‘criminal justice’ became the ‘gold-standard for 
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transitional justice’.
76
 Nuremburg set the precedent that “violence must be criminalised 
without exception, its perpetrators identified and tried in a court of law” if justice is to be 
achieved.
77
 Its redeeming argument is that criminal justice is different to ordinary justice, 
and can transcend politics during the transition. Thus, ‘justice’ became to be understood as 
being ‘criminal justice’, and accountability for the mass violence is pursued by 
individualising responsibility (identifying the perpetrator based on the ‘crime’ and 
prosecution). The problem is that criminal trials operate on a ‘zero-sum logic’, and whereby 
one is with the loser/victor or the victim/perpetrator, and is it driven by the preoccupation 
that one is either innocent or guilty.
78
 The tendency is also to think of the perpetrator (the 
psychology, the culture of the perpetrator) as having agency, but not the victim.
79
 
 
This practice ultimately ‘demonises the other’ and denies both victims and perpetrators the 
opportunity to reconcile and conceive a new single political community together.
80
 
Moreover, the consequence of seeing the violence in terms of criminals and crimes, is that 
‘criminal justice’ obscures the focus on social justice and political justice. It does this by 
focusing on individuals rather than constituencies and the actual state, which would allow 
one to trace the context that made the violence possible. Nuremburg also produced a single 
formulaic response to mass violence, which is after the military victory; justice and 
accountability must take place through a ‘criminal justice forum’ and that multi-party 
elections would signal the establishment of a democratised state (quipped with ‘law and 
order’/’rule-of-law).Thus, it poses critical limitations on reconciliation and political reform. 
 
The period immediately following WWII was the heyday for international criminal justice.
81
 
However, international law lay dormant until the end of the Cold War period, which saw the 
human rights regime emerge and forcefully impose “the duty to prosecute human rights 
violations of a prior regime.”
82
 There was a shift from the old human rights movement born 
of the French revolution, towards a ‘new human rights movement’ that sought to “empower 
saviours and salvage the helpless victims.”
83
 Moreover, the post Cold-War period breathed 
life into ‘victor’s justice and ‘victims justice’. The moral, political and legal vocabulary that 
accompanied these ‘regimes’, universalised and normalised the traditional presumption that 
justice for the victims can only be realised by the victor who will determine that ‘justice’. The 
‘new ethical language’ had also produced new categories of victims which further supported 
their desire to protect them. It was a significant step for the long-established foundational 
argument for criminal justice. It is important to note that this development in criminal justice, 
this took place in the midst of a rise in intra-state civil wars, where attention was drawn to the 
cyclic nature of civil war, and the way war was being fought was having troubling 
consequences for human right and civilian life. Therefore, both regimes returned to the case 
of Nuremburg as the success story, which demonstrated that the only politically and morally 
viable response to mass violence is the Nuremburg-styled criminal trial.
84
Together with 
increased humanitarian intervention, it also re-surfaced the debate on state sovereignty, 
because surrendering state sovereignty became normalised based on moral and legal 
justifications. There was a marked shift from national policy response to mass violence to an 
international response, introducing a virtual universalism that allows “the “international 
community” claimed authority to suspend state sovereignty to protect individuals or to 
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impose norms, thereby holding individuals directly accountable to this same “international 
community”.”
85
 This would later serve to legitimise the capitalist prospects in the 
transitional justice discourse after the Cold-War. 
 
By the early 1990s international law was focused on human rights and fighting the ‘culture of 
impunity’, a scourge that had led to many more inter and intra-state wars, and affirmed the 
urgency for an international legal standard.
86
 Constructivist scholars argue that as a norm, 
‘accountability’ underwent the processes of “emergence, broad acceptance and internalisation”- 
the latter of which asserts that the executive power of the state must justify their actions, face the 
consequences, and be held accountable to its people.
87
 Lars Waldorf shares that ‘accountability 
as a norm’ was legalised through “domestic law, regional courts, international law and soft law 
(such as UN Principles on Combating Impunity)”.
88
 Through this legalising process, Nuremburg 
was stripped of its historical and political context, and became the international legal standard 
and a prototype for ‘victims justice’. Criticism of ‘victors justice’ and ‘victims justice’ had fallen 
way and was temporarily forgotten. Instead, Nuremburg led to the creation of the ad hoc 
tribunals of Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR), which have become temporary expressions 
of international law, and they have paved the way for the signing of the Rome Statute (1998) and 
the establishment of the International Criminal Court (2002), which is a permanent expression of 
international criminal justice. 
 
In the post Cold-War context, the ‘Global South’ responded to the predominance of Western 
visions of ‘justice, security, sovereignty and rights’. The 1955 Bandung Conference has 
come to signal the critique of the ‘Western-imperial project’ as the various African and Asian 
nations situated the discussion on their demands for self-determination from colonials; rights 
to equal sovereignty; and en end to racialism and imperial industrialisation.
89
African and 
Asian states were navigating through the turbulence of the Cold War, and the principles of 
the ‘West’. Richard Nathaniel-Wright (American Poet and anti-racialism author) wrote “the 
Bandung Conference had introduced something new, something beyond Left and 
Right…there were extra-political, extra-social, and almost extra-human aspects to the 
Conference.”
90
The Bandung Conference was a critique on international order as well as 
formulating their own understanding of areas such as ‘fundamental human rights’; 
recognition of nations/groups and minorities; territorial intervention and sovereignty; 
international dispute settlement and resolutions; and a revival of South-South 
internationalism: a mutual understanding and cooperation for justice and peace in conformity 
with U.N principles.
91
 This was very much a political discussion that challenged the process 
of ‘norm-making’ which by this time, had begun to produce a particular quantitative 
understanding of justice, transition, state-formation and what are the ‘norm’, deviations from 
the ‘norm’ and how those deviations are responded to. This has important consequences for 
the field of transitional justice. 
 
1.6 Transitional Justice: ‘A Second Opportunity’ 
 
The legacy of Nuremburg has raised fundamental questions about ‘justice’, and its 
relationship to law and politics during times of political transitions. Historically speaking, 
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punishment and ‘criminal justice’ has had a close relationship to transitions or political 
changes. In the traditional sense, transitions can take on two paradigmatic forms, “transitions 
from war to peace and transitions from authoritarianism to democracy.”
92
 The contemporary 
filed of transitional justice emerged as a response to the historical tradition of legal 
absolutism or retributive justice, and the dilemmas it poses.
93
 Whilst transitional justice has 
a focused view on justice and finding solutions for ‘wrongs’ committed, the field has 
undergone significant changes and led to it being open to both legal and non-legal 
mechanisms. 
 
Teitel refers to three events or ‘phases’ that have contributed to the development of 
transitional justice as a theorised field of study. These are; Phase I: Post-War II Transitional 
justice (primarily legal responses premised on international law); Phase II- Post-Cold War 
transitional justice (addressing political fragmentation and acceleration of the ‘Third 
Democratic Wave’ and reflect the globalising of politics); and Phase III: Contemporary 
transitional justice (as persistent, and which reflects the normalisation of law in a period of 
post-conflict, despite supposed peacetime).
94
 
 
Phase III is associated with the universal rights discourse which has heightened the call for 
transitions towards a now-predestined goal of establishing a liberal democratic state. 
95
This 
current phase has centralised ‘nation-building’ and has acknowledged that the Western 
model of justice can at times be abstract, therefore it now includes local or indigenous justice 
mechanisms that best suit the unique circumstances of each case. Today we have “truth 
commissions, war crime tribunals, special courts, amnesties, reparations and indigenous or 
traditional processes” that are available to us.
96
 The ‘ideal types’ are prosecution, amnesty 
and truth and reconciliation commissions. The South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission has a similar status to Nuremburg. ‘Truth commissions assert that they are 
different because they “do not ignore the past, but instead grant amnesty selectively.”
97
 In 
contemporary practices of transitional justice, these three ideal types are not fixed, and more 
than one variation for justice can be pursued.
98
 Moghalu asserts that “political considerations 
condition the choices that states make when confronted with two possibilities, that of 
prosecuting or supporting prosecutions pardons or political responses that do not invoke 
criminal trials, such as amnesties and truth commissions…tensions, in primarily domestic 
contexts, between order in its most basic sense as a pattern of social activity that guarantees 
the provision of the primary goals of social life (in this context, stability) and justice.”
99
 
 
The central question in transitional justice literature is ‘how can a new government address the 
atrocities and human rights violations of the previous period?’
100
 Responding to this dilemma 
requires reconciling two needs; “the need to look backward so as not to allow human rights 
violations to go unnoticed; and the need to look forward, enabling all sides to participate in the 
new peace process or the new democracy.”
101
 Yasmin Louise Sooka argues that the type of 
questions states should be asking themselves in the search for finding the most suitable solution, 
are: “Where is the transition leading? When does the transition begin and when does it end?; and 
‘Is an end to the conflict enough?’.”
102
 Thus, the transition must consider the goal, the 
sequencing of events, and the time frame. For example, when conflict resolution practitioners 
address the goal of the transition, they prefer to speak of ‘negative  
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peace’ (the transition secures end of conflict, but does not necessarily address root causes, 
and seeks solutions to prevent further conflict) or ‘positive peace’ (which addresses root 
causes, and advocates for democracy in order to intervene in the cycle of conflict).
103
 In 
contemporary ‘western visions’, there is a common pre-destined goal and that is to establish 
a liberal democratic order, because it espouses principles of ‘rule of law’, constitution 
making, and nation building. The imposition of ‘globalisation’ after the Cold-War added a 
liberal-economic goal for transitions to incorporate. 
 
The experimental and evolving nature of transitional justice has attracted various disciplines, 
resulting in an explosion in the literature. The shift from traditional schools of thought to 
more nuanced readings by ‘non-traditional’ scholars and inter-disciplinary approaches in the 
last two decades has led to what is commonly referred to as ‘the new inquiries in transitional 
justice’. In the following section of this chapter, I will explore two central dilemmas that are 
reflected in the debates in transitional justice and are important to the investigation into 
Rwanda’s transitional justice. These are the ‘rule of law’ dilemma and the ‘Peace versus 
Justice’ dilemma. It must be noted that these two dilemmas are not mutually exclusive, but 
both dilemmas are said to be mutually re-enforcing. 
 
1.7 The Dilemmas of Transitional Justice 
 
The redeeming quality of transitional justice is that it poses itself as a ‘second opportunity’ 
for the state to establish order and long–lasting peace through functioning institutions. The 
most important foundation is universally argued to be the restoration of the rule of law. The 
rule of law can be an ambiguous term that varies by context, and can mean different things 
according to different political agendas.
104
Broadly speaking, the ‘rule of law’ can imply a 
variety of goals and require measures that ensure: “adherence to principles of the supremacy 
of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, the impartiality of justice, the 
separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, the protection of 
human rights, and procedural and legal transparency.”
105
 The ‘rule of law’ must also regulate 
the arbitrary abuse of power and contribute to constitution making that institutionalises social 
value for the law by re-instating that “no one is above the law” and that everyone is ‘equally 
subject to it’. The “defining feature of the rule of law in periods of political change is that it 
preserves some degree of continuity in the legal form, while it enables normative 
change.”
106
Thus, the ‘rule of law’ can be socially constructive and transcend the past 
politicisation of the law. This has led to the assumption in contemporary transitional justice 
discourse that during transitions the (re)establishment of the ‘rule of law’ is imperative for 
transitional goals, and that law is independent of politics, which is why the ‘rule of law’ gains 
primacy.
107
 
 
The role and meaning of the ‘rule of law’ in times of transition, continues to return to a 
well-known Anglo-American debate between Lon Fuller and H.L.A Hart, which provides a 
suitable departure point for critically interrogating the role of the ‘rule of law’ in transition 
towards the liberal state. The debate took place in 1958, as a response to the prosecutions of 
Nazi-Germany laws, but in the context of a “new moment of world transition”.
108
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 Hart, an advocate for legal positivism, argues “adherence to the rule of law included 
recognition of the antecedent of the law as valid. Prior written law, even when immoral 
should retain legal force and be followed by the successor courts until such times as it is 
replaced.”
109
 Therefore, in times of political transition, written law should proceed as it 
would in ordinary times and not be radically altered or revolutionary. Only when the “rules 
have pernicious content, the adherence to the rule of law amounts to enforcing those 
rules.”
110
 Hart does not focus on the link between morality and law, but rather on the “Rule 
of Recognition, Rules of Change and Rules of Adjudication.” The arguments of positivist 
law, are premised on a. having certain assumptions about the legality of the law in the 
predecessors totalitarian regime, b. believing that adherence to the prior law is necessary for 
transition, and c. “The response to past tyranny is thought not to lie in the domain of law 
at all but in the domain of politics.”
111
 
 
In response to Hart, Fuller argues that “law meant breaking with the prior regime” and that 
moral right can override putative prior law.
112
Fuller is an advocate for natural law, which 
proposes legal discontinuity because the nature of the prior regime is understood by its past, 
which is authoritative or tyrannical, and violates the ‘customs of war’ and morality through 
criminal acts.
113
 Natural law “highlights the ‘transformative role of law in the shift to a 
liberal regime” and brings morality into the consideration of law in the prior regime and its 
value for the new regime.
114
 For Natural law advocates, violations of moral content “may 
later be judged illegal.”
115
 The importance of the Hart-Fuller debate for contemporary 
transitional justice and ‘the rule of law’ dilemma lies in the prevailing debate over the 
relationship between the predecessor regime and successor regime- the “degree of legal 
exceptionalism that is tolerable to transitional justice”, and for its contribution to thinking 
about the consequences of retroactive justice. 
116
Both natural law and positivist are 
concerned with the illiberal nature of the prior regime, and differ on their view as to the 
degree of legal (dis)continuity for the purpose of establishing legality in the new regime. 
 
In spite of the Hart-Fuller debate’s contemporary significance, both sides fail to respond to 
the failures of post-WWI, which framed the logic of Nuremburg.
117
Secondly, the Hart-Fuller 
debate negated a major objective of implementing Nuremburg, which was to establish and 
further the developments of international law and create a permanent international judicial 
forum. The Hart-Fuller debate also neglects to incorporate in its discussion alternatives or 
acknowledge that since Nuremburg there has been considerations for “full continuity with the 
prior regime, discontinuity, selective discontinuities and moving outside of the law 
altogether.”
118
 Since the debate, in modern Western-legality, the cases of Nuremburg/Tokyo 
(Phase I); East Germany and Hungary (Phase II); and South Africa (Phase III) have become 
key reference points in the discussion on the role of the rule of law during transitions. 
 
After the Cold-War (Phase II) there was a wave of political transitions, and particularly a 
“proliferation of political democratisation and modernisation” which ushered in principles of 
 
 
 
 
liberalisation.
119
Within this phase, the rule of law was seen to be central to the development 
of the ‘nation-state’ and its liberal democratic identity.  
 
The ‘rule of law dilemma’ distinctly emerged during Phase II in the development of 
transitional justice, and out of the debate concerning the ‘human rights regime’ and the 
‘transitional justice field’. The ‘human rights regime’ argues that in response to the 
proliferation of ‘civil-wars’ and intra-state wars resulting in mass human rights violations, the 
only way forward is to hold ‘perpetrators’ accountable through some kind of justice forum, 
and particularly by seeking criminal accountability. This argument was bolstered by the 
integration and prioritisation of international criminal law and international humanitarian law. 
 
However, the post-Cold War period proved that despite a ‘Third Democratisation Wave’ and 
a demand to protect and centre ‘human right values’, intra-state and civil wars continued to 
erupt in part because the ‘rule of law’ failed to transcend domestic politics. This was 
poignant in cases of post-colonial states, which were gaining their independence but failed to 
disinherit the colonial systems of rule. Moreover, the appeal to political will and a united 
front against the ‘culture of impunity’ had failed to materialise. This rendered calls for 
‘justice’- as the vehicle for restoring the rule of law as being problematic, and it became clear 
that Western-liberal principles were somewhat abstract to the nations political process and 
were not translating in the local context of the state.
120
 
 
Within the ‘New Inquiries into the field of transitional justice’ political and legal scholars 
began to rethink the role of justice for the purpose of the rule of law gaining legitimacy 
(meaning) and adherence. Advocates for ‘legal absolutism’ in transitional justice, were 
confronted by the arguments made, that in some contexts, justice might have to be set aside 
in order to achieve either a short-term goal (to end the immediate violence, political 
settlement, cease-fire) or for the long-term goals (advancing political transformation and 
national reconciliation). Laury L. Ocen argues that “There is a sense in which the rule of 
law can be retranslated in a non-conformist trajectory that allows former rebels, losers and 
perpetrators, to have a voice in the postconflict processes of trial, restitution and 
transition.”
121
This demonstrates the ‘Peace versus Justice’ dilemma. Thus, the ‘rule of law 
dilemma’ is inextricably linked to the ‘Peace versus Justice dilemma’. 
 
The ‘Peace versus Justice dilemma’ emerges in the aftermath of violent conflict, in which 
‘victims and their families are entitled to demand justice.’
122
 Victims are wary of ‘national 
reconciliation’ or ‘calls for unity’ replacing justice in the form of punishment and seeking 
responsibility. As already discussed, this supported the foundational argument for criminal 
justice, and the criminal trial, which are seen as the most suitable justice forum for victims. 
 
Moreover, the rise of local and international NGO’s in recent decades, has seen an increase in 
support and centring of victims voices in transitional processes.
123
 The ‘Peace versus Justice 
dilemma’ deals with the “critical policy decisions made about accountability in the context of 
peacemaking and peacebuilding.”
124
It looks at the relationship between ‘political settlement and 
justice’. The transitional government has to be mindful of the risks that prosecutorial justice may 
have. ‘Justice, peace and democracy’ are mutually reinforcing imperatives that rely on “strategic 
 
 
 
 
planning, careful integration and a sensible sequencing of events” in order to advance in fragile 
post-conflict societies.
125
There are various dimensions that facilitate the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
implementation processes of ‘integration, settlement and reconstruction of postwar 
societies’.
126
Furthermore, within this context, ‘societies emerging from war go through their 
own processes that interrogate the logic of transitions, peace and justice’; and this process 
will change depending on where the state is on its timeline between war and peace.
127
These 
considerations impact the political settlement and will determine the nature of peace and 
justice. For example, in some contexts the government may have achieved political power but 
may not have control of “either security forces of certain perpetrators of gross human rights 
violations” and attempting to hold them accountable may have a destabilising effect for the 
society.
128
This doesn’t mean that accountability is not a significant goal, but peace-building 
advocates are concerned with whether the “pursuit of peace is compatible with the pursuit of 
justice” and can they intervene into the cycle of violence, and secure a political settlement 
that will sustain peace.
129
 This is the ‘Peace versus Justice dilemma’ that states are faced 
with. Chandra Lekha Sriram argues that “the dichotomous dilemma is often overstated. In  
reality the choice is seldom simply ‘justice’ or ‘peace’ but rather a complex mixture of 
both.”
130
 
 
1.8 Justice Politicised? 
 
I argue, that one can approach both dilemmas by returning to the ‘intersection’ between law and 
politics during transitions, and re-evaluating the formulations and limitations of universalised 
norms and practices. Transitional justice argues that the rule of law can operate independently 
because it can effectively mediate politicisation of the transitional process through the 
‘judicialisation of politics’.
131
There are however a few problems with conflating ‘justice’ with 
the ‘rule of law’, in the context of the political transition of the state. 
 
To begin with; the very (re)establishment of the ‘rule of law’ is motivated by politics, and 
takes place in a highly politicised context, where national sovereignty is suspended by 
transitional jurisprudence, and the ‘line of legitimacy’ is drawn between the prior and new 
regime. Teitel states, “In periods of substantial political change, a dilemma arises over the 
adherence to the rule of law that relates to the problem of successor justice.”
132
 The state in 
transition needs to ask itself- to what extent is bringing the ‘ancien regime’ to trial imply an 
inherent conflict between predecessor and successor visions of justice?’
133
 And is criminal 
justice compatible with the political goal of the state? The process of establishing the rule of 
law can be an exclusionary one, and it is important that divided societies think critically 
about the ‘rule of law’ in relation to integration in the post-conflict processes. 
 
The second concern, which is a feature that both the human rights regime and transitional justice 
share, is that it constitutes the violence as an event that is read through a moral and legal lens. It 
‘freezes the violence’ and essentially removes its historical and political context. Then it attends 
to the mass violence as a criminal problem, as David Luban argues international criminal law 
works to “reconceptualise political violence…as mere crime.”
134
Moreover, ‘criminal justice’ 
inscribes the categories of ‘victims’ and ‘perpetrators’ whilst it legitimises the one and 
delegitmises the other. These are all deeply political acts. Bronwyn Leebaw argues that ‘criminal 
trials’ are “inherently depoliticising to the extent that 
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they condemn politically authorised violence and actions in accordance to legal criteria, and 
evaluate the systematic patterns of violence by isolating the guilt of the individual 
perpetrators.”
135
 Leebaw continues by stating that when a trial deviates from this in an 
effort to teach a history lesson or stage a political drama, then it sacrifices its integrity and it 
becomes a show trial.
136
Depoliticising trials, may fail to reveal that the violence is in fact 
political.
137
 In opposition Gerry Simpson states, “when we treat our enemies as criminals, 
when world-historical evils are proceduralised…we end up with political trials.”
138
In this 
case, politicising the trials may mitigate the atrocity of the actual crimes. Mamdani has 
framed the problem by posing the question “is the question of justice to political violence, 
criminal or political?”
139
 
 
For Hannah Arendt, her response to Nuremburg and the question of punishment is: “We are 
simply not equipped to deal, on a human, political level with a guilt that is beyond 
crime…”
140
This is an important consideration to make, especially in the case of Rwanda’s 
genocide. Despite this, international law continues to make its case that the “the worst 
political crimes are subject to law”.
141
 It returns to the age-old question of “what result if 
not punishment?” and “To what extent are broader rule-of-law values jeopardised without 
punishment?”
142
 
 
The third consideration is whether the new regime should replace or retain the former 
personnel from the old regime. A dilemma arises over the state having to remain immune to 
political pressure and it being considered to be undemocratic to politically exclude the 
former regime in the transition. In the Rwandan case, there was an urgent need to “rebuild 
human capital” at a rudimentary level and to administer the rule of law principles, but its 
transitional justice process has legitimised the marginalisation and mostly exclusion of Hutus 
in the post-genocide transitional process state.
143
A central problem to inscribing the 
categories of ‘victim/victor’ and ‘perpetrators/loser’, is demonstrated in African case studies, 
whereby in addition to the problem of dictatorships and authoritarian regimes, some states 
have experienced ‘protracted, recurrent and regional conflict’ whereby perpetrators and 
victims have traded places.
144
Thus, by sanctioning one side as ‘good’ and therefore 
legitimised as being included, and the other as ‘evil’ who should be excluded, inscribes a 
practice of ‘othering’, which may lead to the transitional process as being seen to be 
exclusionary and as benefitting one locale over another. This can reconstitute the old 
political problem that fuels further violence and renders questions about “who exactly bears 
responsibility for past repression?”
145
 Transitional justice argues that equality (including 
marginalised groups: social, economic, political and gender-based) is a condition for state 
building and reconciliation, and inclusion will be the first test to the rule of law.
146
However, 
there are conditions upon which perpetrators/the defeated are included in participation of the 
new regime. 
 
The fourth consideration for the regime to make, is that the “wheels of justice turn slowly”.
147
As 
discussed, a central problem of ‘victors justice’ is that it operates on the presumption that only 
the ‘victors’ can realise and administer justice for the ‘victims’. Charles Villa- Vicencio 
emphasizes that the judicial infrastructure of countries in transition is 
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invariably such that not all alleged perpetrators can be prosecuted in the wake of conflict and 
it is frequently essential to ask whether it politically wise to attempt to do so.”
148
This relates 
to both dilemmas. In some cases the judicial structure has to be reconstructed, and it has to 
adhere to liberal-democratic principles whilst dealing with the former regime, and forging 
the new regimes political identity.
149
This slow, complex process can also be constrained by 
factors such as resource restrictions, and as Neil Kritz argues, may seem “to leave the old 
regime unpunished, and injustices unaddressed. The new government will not seem to have 
brought about much change.”
150
There is also the significant issue of ‘ill-gotten gains’. 
Finally, it is important to think critically about what justice means for the specific society, 
some have asked ‘Is justice only related to human rights abuse? or Can justice extend itself 
to other areas, such as social and economic inequality’? This dissertation is concerned less 
with criminal justice, and more with social and political justice. 
 
In After Evil, Robert Meister critiques the human rights discourse in transitional justice, 
arguing that “a new discourse of global power that supersedes the cruelties perpetrated…this 
discourse creates false temporal divided between historical periods of “evil” on which gross 
violations of human rights are committed and post-conflict periods of justice during which 
parties are presumed to move beyond evil through various mechanisms of transitional 
justice.”
151
For Meister the contemporary human rights discourse fails to implicate the 
beneficiaries of oppression in the former regime, which does not dismantle structural 
inequalities and injustice (instead “evil still exists”) and thus genuine justice is unattainable in 
response to political, social and economically violent systems of the state.
152
 Meister argues 
that ‘victims’ are forced to accept a minimal definition of justice, and those former 
beneficiaries continue to strive in the so-called ‘new regime’ where they can rationalise their 
‘on-going privileges in the transition.
153
Kritz agrees, and points out that in the cases in which 
states are reconstructing their role in the market economy, the new regime is going to have to 
consider the demands for restitution and compensation for the victims, and redistribution of 
material resources as a form of justice for the victims. 
 
Transitional justice can have a variety of goals, such as “creating a reliable record of human 
rights abuses; setting up functional, professional bureaucracy and civil services; helping 
victims restructure and repair their lives; and stopping violence and consolidating 
stability”.
154
 These are all politically important goals, but it isn’t difficult to see that 
tensions may arise between law and politics and impact the long-term restoration of the rule 
of law. Finally, if the rule of law is understood in transitional justice as being a combination 
of ‘institutions and cultural norms’ derived from a strictly western-style of the rule of law, 
then what risks and limits does this present for states which do not have a rich historical 
pedigree of the rule of law to draw from? The lack of interrogation regarding this conflation 
only further places pressure on reconciling the political, during regime transitions in post-
colonial societies. 
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1.9 Transitional Justice in Rwanda 
 
This chapter has thus far explored the logic and legacy of Nuremburg, and its contribution 
to the developments in international law, human rights and the shaping of transitional justice 
as a field. The following section will address the Rwandan transitional justice case study. 
 
The Rwandan case study has become a landmark ‘test case’ for legal and peace policy-
makers addressing genocide for the first time; for transitional justice practitioners; and has 
prompted a rethinking around ‘theories and practices of accountability- as universally 
understood. 
155
 Rwanda serves as the first real case whereby genocide was adjudicated and it 
has led to a growth in ‘genocide studies’ as well as the realisation that each “genocide is 
unique” which has complex ramifications for transitional justice.
156
The Rwandan genocide 
shares all the important characteristics of recent mass atrocities such as; “civil war, malleable 
identities, intimate violence, high levels of complicity, and hazy lines of command 
responsibility.”
157
 It has resurrected the historical tradition of ‘successor justice’, because the 
post-genocide power, which is held by “extraterritorially based Tutsis”, came into power 
through a military victory, and pursued a ‘criminal trial’ process to place the former regime 
on trial and seek ‘mass accountability’.
158
Finally, Rwanda’s civil war and genocide, as well 
as its policy for mass accountability, has had terrible consequences for the Great Lakes region 
that has led to a devastating regional war, which has killed more people than the genocide 
and led to the Great Lakes refugee crisis. Therefore, Rwanda’s peace is critically important 
for the regions peace and for the intervention into the cycle of violence. 
 
In response to the mass scale brutality of the violence and determined by the logic of 
genocide, Rwanda embarked on a ‘policy of mass accountability’ as its foundation for 
establishing the rule of law and reconstructing the statehood. The judicial response consists 
of the ICTR (based in Arusha, Tanzania), third-party national courts (Belgium and 
Switzerland), the National Judicial system, and the Modernised Gacaca Courts.
159
 As a 
result, Alison des Forges and Timothy Longman argue that Rwanda has received the 
“greatest judicial attention than any other case of mass atrocity in recent history.”
160
This 
section in the chapter will address the question: does the solution fit the problem? I will 
depart by exploring the context, which led to institutionalising a ‘policy of mass 
accountability for mass atrocity’. Addressing the ‘solution’ provides the foundation for this 
dissertations central investigation, and frames the discussion relating to the problem of 
‘victors justice’ and ‘victims’ justice’, as well as the ‘genocide lens’, which Rwanda’s 
reconstruction project has come to be viewed through. 
 
1.10 Genocide against the Tutsis: Failing to Intervene 
 
The mass slaughter of Tutsis, that commenced after President Habyarimana’s plane was 
shot down (6 April 1994), was an organised intended act aimed at eliminating the maximum 
numbers of Tutsis in order to gain political power. Des Forges et al argue “while often 
portrayed as a spontaneous mass slaughter by machete-wielding peasants, the genocide was, 
in fact highly planned and remarkably modern in its organisation, making extensive use of 
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the administrative structure of the state.”
161
Hutu Power depicted the ‘killers’ as being the 
legitimate owners of the state and this was merely a political “programme of civilian self-
defence.”
162
The logic of Hutu Power is shaped by the view that Hutus have eternally been 
the victims of Rwanda’s politics since the conception of the modern Rwandan state. 
 
The genocide was able to commence for 100-days because it was fuelled by the failure of the 
UN, key signatories as the UK and US; and the OAU to respond. In fact during the genocide, 
the delegates of the Rwandan regime who were present at both the UNSC meetings and OAU 
conferences, together with their supporters (Djibouti, China, Nigeria...) were denying that the 
violence that was taking place, amounts to genocide, and that it was being wrongly 
“sensationalised”.
163
From the beginning, the U.S urged officials not to intervene, and 
completely avoided using the term ‘genocide’ in policy documentation, because of the 
previous years disastrous military intervention into Somalia (1993). They also recognised the 
Hutu regime as a valid interlocutor that would not surrender unless the RPA/RPF put down 
its arms first.
164
 Philip Gourevitch argues that the “desertion of Rwanda by the UN force was 
Hutu Power’s greatest diplomatic victory to date, and it can be accredited single-handedly to 
the United States.”
165
On 21 April, despite irrefutable evidence of genocide or at least mass 
slaughter, UNAMIR ‘slashed its forces by 90%’.
166
This removed 1700 personnel that were 
needed to enforce the 1993 Arusha Peace Agreement, and bring an end to the civil war that 
evolved into a full-blown genocide. 
 
On the ground in Rwanda, the head of UNAMIR, General Romeo Dellaire was witnessing 
the massacres first hand and was fortunate to have a strategic advantage because he was in 
communication with both sides. General Dellaire warned “Unless the international 
community acts, it may find it is unable to defend itself against accusations of doing nothing 
to stop genocide”.
167
 By early May, General Paul Kagame (who commanded the RPF force) 
had voiced his sentiments towards the international community, when he boldly stated that 
the “time of UN intervention is long past. The genocide is almost 
completed…Consequentially the [RPF] hereby declares that it is categorically opposed to the 
proposed UN intervention force and will not under any circumstances cooperate in its setting 
up and operation.”
168
A key player during the genocide was France, whose relationship with 
the Hutu regime in Rwanda remained “constant, cordial and downright conspiratory” 
throughout the genocide, because France had political and military interests in the Hutu 
regime remaining in power.
169
Initially, the French blamed the RPF for the mass slaughter of 
Tutsis, because it was as a result of the RPF’s October 1990 invasion that sparked the civil 
war.
170
 Thus, the French were interested in restoring order to the Hutus and claimed that the 
RPF were the “greater defender”.
171
However, by mid-June, the French government 
‘changed’ its foreign policy and volunteered to lead a “humanitarian mission” into Rwanda 
under the UN flag and with the support of Senegalese troops.
172
Through a military operation 
the forces could strategically ‘sweep’ across Rwanda gaining military control of the state and 
create “safe zones” or ‘Zone Turquoise’ for protecting Rwandan civilians, which would also 
provide a more feasible avenue for humanitarian aid and security. 
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There is also the critique on the ground, that the RPF did not let “humanitarian considerations 
or humanitarian law stand in the way of achieving its military and political goals.”
173
Local 
and international humanitarian organisation convened to find creative solutions (e.g. block 
RTLM) to intervene and stop the genocide machine. Dellaire reported that he had asked 
Kagame for more help in saving Tutsi to which Kagame responded, “If the [Tutsi] refugees 
have to be killed for the cause, they will be considered as having being part of the 
sacrifice.”
174
Lars Waldorf argues that the RPF publicly opposed any efforts by the UN-
Peacekeeping forces to assist in saving Tutsi civilians.
175
Alison des Forges who was also on 
the ground working on behalf of HRW, expressed being “shocked by the RPF opposition to a 
force that could save Tutsi lives” and blames the RPF, US and UN member states for failing 
to galvanize an effective military response. 
176
 
 
By the time the international community properly responded, the genocide was coming to 
end. In early July the RPF had entered Butare and Kigali, and driven out Hutu’s 
(civilians/non-combatants and the Interhamwe), which lead to the “largest and speediest mass 
flight across an international border in modern history.”
177
 The RTLM was forced to shut 
down its studios in Kigali, but a popular Radio-host, the Italian-born Belgian citizen Georges 
Ruggiu- who had worked for the Hutu propagandist, found ways to encourage Hutus to start 
fleeing Rwanda, blaring that “Hutus that even those without blood on their hands that staying 
was not an option.”
178
Hutus were warned that if they stayed they will by killed, the regime 
and paramilitary could no longer protect them and there was a real sense of fear that the RPF 
would do to them what they had done to the Tutsis. The logic of Hutu Power operates on a 
fear and rationale that claims Hutus have been the eternal victims of Rwandan politics. 
 
The RPF were incensed by the ‘safe zones’, which they viewed as failing to demilitarise the 
Interhamwe and essentially providing refuge, food, and arms to an estimated 1.2 million, 
including Hutu genocidaires that were using the camps as ‘armed zones’ to re-organise 
themselves.
179
 These ‘armed camps’, particularly Kibeho camp, demonstrated to the RPF 
that the international community deserved little to no recognition for ending the genocide, 
that it was the RPA who single-handedly defeated the genocidaires, and that only they could 
guarantee Tutsi survival and Rwanda’s peace in the future. The failure to intervene and its 
accompanying guilt has been a key to shaping and legitimising Rwanda’s transition that is 
monopolised by the RPF. 
 
1.11 Debating Justice: “what result if not punishment?” 
 
The civil war and genocide, radically re-inscribed the division between the Hutu majority and 
Tutsi minority.
180
 Once the RPF claimed outright military victory in 1994, they outlawed all 
ethnic references. This would be reflected in the constitution writing of the state and in all 
practices. The second urgent problem, is the risk that political liberalisation poses for the 
protection of Rwanda’s Tutsi minority.
181
 By coming to power militarily, the RPF was in a 
position to compromise on its promise of upholding all the mandates of the Arusha Accords, 
specifically by denying “political accommodation with the prior regime”.
182
Filip Reyntjens 
argues that their position allowed them to impose their view on how to deal with the past.  
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Furthermore, with immediacy the RPF pushed to place the former regime- the “defeated 
opponents” on trial. The RPF logic operated on the historical tradition of ‘successor trials’-
“what result if not punishment? To what extent are broader rule-of-law values jeopardised 
without punishment?”
183
 Thus, the transitional government enacted a ‘policy of mass 
accountability for mass atrocity’, which would be the foundation for (re)establishing the rule 
of law, reconciling the Rwandan society, and reconstructing the political infrastructure. This 
eliminated the ‘third possibility’ in the Arusha Accords which would have been to re-
negotiate a more inclusive political settlement, that did not exclude major stake-holders, 
who clearly felt left out and sought political power through violence (genocide). 
 
1.12 National Judicial System: A Policy of Mass Accountability 
 
Violence against Tutsis has been a ‘recurring theme’ since Rwanda’s decolonisation, and the 
Hutu dominated regimes have always used the law to sanction it.
184
To the RPF-led government, 
this historical fact, together with the breached Arusha Peace agreement, said that the Rwanda 
state (and Hutus in particular) have long enjoyed prosecutorial immunity for their violence, 
despite there being ‘humanitarian laws in place’. The first impulse after the RPF captured Kigali 
(July, 1994) was for military and local RPF cadres (abakada) to begin arresting suspected Hutu 
perpetrators without any lawful procedures or even creating case files. 
185
 By 1996, 87 000 
people were in custody and the government had to work towards establishing the crime of 
genocide, so that these perpetrators would “never benefit from any prosecutorial status, even 
under existing humanitarian law.”
186
The Rwandan government was 
 
determined to adjudicate them according to ordinary criminal law. The transitional regime 
ambitiously set out to prosecute 30 000 of the accused by the end of July 1994.
187
 The then-  
Rwandan Prime Minister, Faustin Twagiramungu confidently affirmed that “Our laws cover  
this type of crime, and we cannot wait for the international court…we can start by 
creating our own tribunals.”
188
 
 
Lars Waldorf argues that Rwanda “is a clear outlier in the Great Lakes region and Sub-
Saharan Africa, where amnesties and truth commissions are the norm, and trials are the 
exception.”
189
 For purposes as mentioned above, and in the name of national reconciliation, 
amnesty was viewed as an injustice to the victims, and downright inappropriate given the 
‘magnitude of the crimes and the scale upon which they were committed.’
190
The interim 
governments Prime Minister Faustin Twagiramungu, began visiting ‘western capitals’ 
making appeals for financial aid assistance to see the Rwandan judicial project through. 
Schabas argues that between 1994-January 1995, “very little of the promised bilateral and 
multilateral aid for the judicial system had been delivered” and the Rwandan government 
made the decision that “it did not want foreign jurist to work within its judicial system as 
judges or other officers of the court.”
191
Thus, in November 1995 the government organised 
the “Genocide, Impunity and Accountability” conference to wrestle the manifold problems 
of prosecuting the perpetrators of the 1994 genocide.
192
 However, the interim governments’ 
enthusiasm to adjudicate the genocide was interrupted by realities that faced the daunting 
judicial task. 
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The pre-genocide judiciary delayed the process of adjudicating the genocide. Nicholas Jones 
states, “The History of Rwandan judiciary tells a story that is antithetical to the promotion of 
the rule of law and justice.”
193
 The pre-genocide ‘judicial system’ lacked concepts of fair 
treatment, impartiality; justice as independent to executive power; and it was riddled with 
accusations of corruption and political tampering.
194
 Jones claims that proximately 80% of 
the judges were politically appointed and had no legal qualification or formal training.
195
 
Schabas states that “even well-meaning lawyers and judges within the system were powerless 
to prosecute numerous atrocities during the years that foreshadowed the genocide.”
196
Also, 
there isn’t a physical judicial infrastructure to speak of because of a lack of resource 
investment, and whatever there was the genocide ended up completely destroying it. Of those 
former judicial personnel, most of them were either murdered or fled the genocide. In July 
1995, the Rwandan government ‘refused a loan of foreign judges, arguing the it is 
“unconstitutional and a breach of the sovereignty of Rwandese people.”
197
 
 
Another significant hurdle to overcome for the judiciary is that the former regimes judiciary 
was ‘complicit’ in the political violence, in creating a ‘culture of impunity’ and “created an 
environment in which the concept of individual accountability did not exist.”
198
Instead 
those who supported the regime enjoyed ‘judicial immunity’ (violence with no punishment) 
under the sporadic re-institutionalising of “Amnesty Laws”, which had a role to play in the 
mass participation of Hutus in violence. Jones states, “If crimes of this magnitude can 
proceed without attracting any form of judicial intervention, the entire system is called into 
question.”
199
 
 
Arguably, very few national judiciary systems could withstand and remain immune to a 
genocide, and in the case of Rwanda, it didn’t exactly have a historically rich legal pedigree 
to inherit. Schabas asserts that “[T]he term rebuilding is often used to describe the challenge 
facing Rwandan justice, but it is not well chosen”.
200
Instead, Rwanda would have to 
overcome inherited practices and completely reconstruct an independently run judicial 
system, that is separate to the executive power, and gain legitimacy under the exceptional 
circumstances that the genocide presented.
201
 Thus, it chose to legally discontinue with the 
prior regime, in order to eradicate the ‘culture of impunity’ and establish the rule of law 
based on a ‘new political identity’. 
 
The immediate concern after the genocide was the establishment of order and prevention of 
further political violence. The Rwandan government did not have the luxury of time on their 
hands, and their solution was to arrest as many suspected perpetrators and get them off the 
streets.
202
After two years, local and international human rights groups starting focusing on 
the Government of Rwanda, because of its unlawful arrests procedures, detention conditions 
(some detentions were merely containers), lack of nutrition and health services to the 
prisoners, and documented reports of torture and killings. 
203
 Peter Uvin estimated in 2000, 
that “currently more people die in prison every year than were judged.”
204
Interestingly, 
Rwanda had already ratified International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well the 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (in 1975).
205
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The Government argued that:“[They] could not respond to the crisis by ordering the release 
of all the genocide suspects in detention. We were, and still are, of the view that the failure 
to respect procedural requirements for the arrest and detention of the suspects was the result 
of a very grave and unprecedented national crisis which could not, and had not, been 
foreseen. We took the view that the legislation should be passed to extend the period within 
which prosecutors could complete formalities legalizing the detention of these suspects.” 
206
 
 
Until trials could proceed, the Government would alter existing laws that would 
“retroactively regularise detention on remand” which extended the time of imprisonment 
without be brought before a judge.
207
Reyntjens argues that this has set a dangerous 
precedent for Rwanda’s judicial reform. Lastly, despite Rwanda’s signatory status in 1976 to 
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the Rwandan 
government hadn’t “established the requisite legislation regarding crimes of genocide or 
crimes against humanity.”
208
Without this foundation to prosecute, Rwanda ignored the 
doctrine of nullum crimen sine lege (no crime without law) that has haunted the Nuremburg 
Tribunal, and chose to proceed with the trials.
209
 
 
After many consultations, the law that would provide the foundation for adjudicating the 
genocide was the Organic Law (August, 1996), which underwent changes in 2003/2004. The 
new judicial structure would include elements of Anglo-American judicial law along with the 
existing remnants of the Belgian-judicial system. The Organic Law assisted in developing the 
judicial infrastructure, by creating a Supreme Court, a High Court and for the purpose of 
adjudicating genocide crimes, it created a Special Court, with four Chambers. Head of 
Rwanda’s Genocide Fugitives Tracking Unit, John Bosco Mutangana stated, “The eyes of the 
world are all focused on Rwanda; to see how justice is developing and to see how the 
personnel working in justice are really developing”.
210
 
 
There were four crimes on the charge sheet: ‘Category 1: includes the leaders of the 
genocide, those who planned/organised and supervised the killings at a national to a local 
level, and with particular cruelty (Category 1 would later be amended to include the crime of 
rape defines as being used to further the goals of genocide); Category 2: includes people 
who killed or intended to kill under the orders or direction of others; Category 3: involves 
those who caused serious bodily harm; and Category 4: are individuals who committed 
property crimes.’
211
 
 
Even after establishing these four categories, the national trial process was very slow. The 
RPF feared political and security consequences if large numbers of Hutus were found 
falsely accused, acquitted and released, which would destabilise their Tutsi support base, 
and they were also concerned about alienating the Hutu majority, which may incite Hutu 
revenge.
212
The latter was a numerical concern because Hutus posed a threat to Tutsis in 
positions of power. 
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1.13 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
 
A main feature of Rwanda’s postgenocide transition is the inception of a “liberal-legalistic 
model” that would support the judicial process, constitution making and rule of law. From the 
very beginning, the rule of law and constitution made an implicit case for “creating 
conditions that are conducive to the principle of justice.”
213
 It is important to note here that 
the constitution reflects Rwanda’s state of transition, and has always stipulated that regardless 
of ethnicity or position of power, one will be held accountable for violating the law.
214
 The 
problem with this, and is of key concern to the transition and creating a culture that adheres 
to the rule of law, is that the judicial system has failed to prosecute the crimes of the RPF. 
The RPF has tested the limits of tolerance and unfortunately one of the greatest critiques of 
the ICTR is that it paved the way for ‘victor’s justice’. 
 
The debate on whether to establish the Tribunal took place under extraordinary circumstances 
despite it also being after genocide. Premised on its public disdain for the international 
community, the Government of Rwanda initially rejected the establishment of a Tribunal. 
However, this needed to be reconciled. If the government wished to pursue a “policy of mass 
accountability for mass atrocity” it would need the support of the international community, but 
on Rwandan terms. There was also the fact that the ICTY was in existence, and as des Forges et 
al argue, “failure to create a mechanism comparable to the ICTY would almost certainly have led 
to accusations of racism.”
215
 Although ‘fed by their sense of guilt’, the international community 
was reluctant to establish a second ad-hoc tribunal because of the very failures and expenditure 
waste of the ICTY, thus there were many signatories in favour of a “less expensive forum for 
prosecutions.”
216
Respectively, the UNSC could not deny Rwanda and its victims the legal 
obligation and moral duty to at least investigate the crime of genocide and the crimes against 
humanity. In the meantime, victim groups were adding pressure by seeking justice abroad from 
third-party courts in Belgium and Switzerland. 
 
Two major UNSC members reiterated the logic of the Allies convening on Nuremburg- the 
UK and US argued “a tribunal would fix the responsibility on those who have directed these 
acts of violence. In doing so, we can transform revenge into justice, affirm the rule of law 
and, hopefully, bring the horrible cycle of violence to a merciful close.”
217
 In late- 
September 1994, the U.S and New Zealand, through the UNSC, provided a proposal for the 
establishment of the Tribunal. Shortly afterwards in October 1994, before the Government of 
Rwanda could respond to the proposed mandate, the UN Commission of Experts for Rwanda 
released its reported findings, which outlined its investigation into the crime of genocide. 
 
The report established that; “(1) ..Individuals from both sides to the armed conflict…have 
perpetrated serious breaches of the international humanitarian law…; (2) …crimes against 
humanity in Rwanda; and (3) that there exists overwhelming evidence to prove that acts of 
genocide against the Tutsi group were perpetrated by Hutu elements in a concerted, planned, 
systematic and methodical way.”
218
 The report also proposed, “to enhance the fair and 
consistent interpretation, application of international law on individual responsibility for 
serious human rights violations…the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for  
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the former Yugoslavia should be expanded to permit the cases concerning the situation 
in Rwanda to be brought under it.”
219
 
 
The consequence of labelling the conflict as a genocide, is that genocide is universally 
acknowledged as the ‘crime of all crimes’, and as condemned by the UN and ‘the civilised 
world’, genocide must ignite ‘international co-operation that will punish the perpetrators 
in order to “liberate mankind from such odious scourge”.
220
There is a great sense of 
urgency that is shaped by a moral indignation and a legal obligation to pursue universal 
criminalisation in order for the lesson to be learnt- “Never Again”.
221
 
 
Thus, for the international community, the ICTR would mark a new development in international 
law by establishing a court which could try the ‘crime of genocide’. This would be distinctly 
different to the ICTY.
222
 Rwanda would prove that ‘genocide’ could be investigated/proven, and 
thereafter set a legal standard for adjudicating genocide. However, the ICTR would represent a 
difference in focus regarding responsibility. Former Chief of Appeals and Legal Advisory 
Division to the ICTR, Alex Obote-Odora states, “there will be a differential examination on the 
concept of ‘superior responsibility’ as opposed to ‘command responsibility’ as outlined in 
various conventions depending on the case.”
223
 This will allow further investigation on ‘mass 
participation’ and their relationship to ‘superior responsibility’. The third distinction, and which 
contributes greatly towards the conceptualisation of the ICC, is that unlike the ICTY (group 
trials), the ICTR will focus on ‘single-accused trials’.
224
 
 
The release of the UN commission of Experts on Rwanda report challenged the RPF’s 
vision for Rwanda and it used its political leverage to challenge the dominant liberal 
conception of accountability. Before the UN Resolution 955 could be adopted which would 
establish the Tribunal, the Rwandan government strongly contested most of its mandates. 
 
Briefly: A) The Rwandan government wanted the Tribunal to take place in Rwanda as opposed 
to the Hague, and later rejected Arusha, Tanzania, arguing that the judicial process should take 
place in “the country where they committed their crimes.”
225
 B) The RPF proposed that the 
Tribunals ‘temporal jurisdiction’ should be from October 1990 (rather than 7 April 1994) so that 
crimes committed by the prior regime during the civil war would be prosecuted. They also 
wanted the ‘final-date for the temporal jurisdiction’ to be on 15
th
 July 1994, when the RPF 
defeated the genocidal regime.
226
The Tribunal kept to the dates of 7 April 1994- 31 December 
1994, significantly so that it could hold RPA soldiers accountable for ‘crimes against humanity’. 
The RPF were forceful in prioritising the ‘crime of genocide’ because they did not want it to be 
compared to the other crimes. C). The postgenocide government wanted convicted perpetrators 
to be publicly executed, which the government argued that it would send a message of deterrence 
to those organising to exact revenge, and the act of witnessing public execution will contribute to 
Rwanda’s healing process. This was denied because capital punishment goes against 
international humanitarian law principles. D) The ‘Tutsi-led’ Rwandan government emphasised 
that Rwanda must remain the authoritative figure in these processes, and that Rwandan citizens 
and state will not allow the Tribunal to 
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hijack and dictate ‘their transition’, nor will they be ‘second-class’ citizens to the 
construction of the legal and political identity of the new regime. 
 
After many delays and postponements in November 1994, the S.C Legal Counsel met with the 
Vice-President and defence Minister- General Paul Kagame, who refused to accept the Tribunals 
final mandate.
227
 Acknowledging that an impasse had been reached, Kagame reluctantly 
indicated that Rwanda would cooperate if the Tribunal “were to set up over Rwanda’s 
objections.”
228
Thus, with this ‘somewhat promise to co-operate’, the ICTR was finally 
established for the “Prosecution of Person’s Responsible for Genocide and other Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and 
Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the 
Territory of Neighbouring States, Between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994.”
229
 
 
In the final voting (8 November 1994) on Resolution 955, 13 states voted in favour of 
the ICTR, and 1 (Rwanda) voted in opposition.
230
 
 
1.14 Modernised Gacaca Courts: ‘Justice on the Grass’ 
 
In 1999 President Pasteur Bizimungu organised a series of meetings (referred to in 
Kinyarwanda as Urugwiro) to discuss the grievances regarding the ICTR. Eugenia Zorbas 
states it is “nearly impossible to overstate” the failure of the will for the tribunal to deliver 
justice.
231
 The RPF’s central critique concerns the ‘question of ownership of the Tribunal’, 
and the resources that were ploughed into the Tribunal instead of the national Rwandan 
judicial system. The RPF has also publicly ridiculed the failure to expedite the adjudication 
of the genocide, and has felt that the Tribunal lacked a core objective to seeing justice for 
Tutsi survivors. Of the 93 accused who were indicted only 61 sentences were handed down 
over 20 years. 
232
Rwanda was also struggling to meet its own expectations and succeed in 
its ‘policy of maximum accountability’, and thus began for an alternative transitional justice 
mechanism. The RPF strongly opposed the suggestion for a South-African styled truth 
commission.
233
 For the RPF, they were searching for a ‘Rwandan solution to Rwandan 
problems’ where Rwandans could take back ownership and have a more participatory role 
in their post-genocide reconstruction. 
 
Within this context the post-genocide regime embarked on an “extraordinary experiment in 
transitional justice” and the result was the ‘re-birth’ of the traditional Rwandan conflict 
resolution mechanism- The Modernised Gacaca system (2003). ‘Gacaca’ is Kinyarwanda for 
“lawn- justice” or ‘justice on the grass’.
234
 It is a pre-colonial practice, whereby an elected male 
elder/honourable person (Inyangamugayo) would reside over community disputes and provide a 
resolution.
235
 Helen Scanlon and Nompumelelo Motlafi argue, “the much-extolled gacaca court 
system is considered to be a positive resurrection of the use of indigenous African understanding 
of justice and reconciliation.”
236
 Waldorf argues that “what actually made gacaca so radical was 
not its re-invented “traditionalism” but rather its challenge to the Nuremburg paradigm which 
has dominated international criminal law, and its principles of “liberal-legalism, individual 
criminal responsibility, and cosmopolitan values.”
237
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 The Gacaca court would be very different to the Tribunal; it would be more ‘local, 
participatory and promised to be more restorative.’
238
The “Rwandan government outlined 
five ambitious objectives for the gacaca system: to enable truth-telling about the genocide; to 
promote reconciliation amongst Rwandans; to eradicate the culture of impunity; to speed up 
the trial of genocide suspects; and to demonstrate Rwanda’s own problem- solving 
capacity.”
239
 It was compulsory for Rwandans to gather weekly to participate by listening to 
both the accuser/ victims and to the accused, hearing confessions and trying cases, with the 
hope that this process of ‘truth –telling’ and public forgiveness could somehow lead to 
Rwandans becoming better neighbours.
240
 Even though it deviated from the liberal legalism 
model of accountability, the Gacaca courts incorporated the “central nostums of transitional 
justice: truth would lead to justice, in turn, justice would lead to reconciliation.”
241
 
 
From its conception, there were 9000 Courts installed and 100 000 judges employed, who 
had only received four days of training.
242
 As a direct challenge to universal notion of 
accountability, this modernised mechanism was originally designed to try 120,000 accused 
perpetrators but in the end (2012), the courts had tried close to 1.8 million people.
243
Waldorf 
argues that the gacaca court “put much of the nation on trial”.
244
 Delivering mass-justice 
that was not individualised, disobeyed fairness and due process, which unleashed both a 
“tsunami of accusations” that led to more and more trials, and replaced ‘legal quality with 
quantity’.
245
The Gacaca court had also re-conceptualised ‘genocide’ in some ways by 
“removing the special intent requirement” in order for prosecutions to move more quickly. 
Furthermore, by introducing the practice of confessions, which was linked to ‘forgiveness’, 
perpetrators could either receive lesser sentences, community service or return to their 
communities.
246
 Of the perpetrators of Category 1 crimes, 37% of them confessed, which 
essentially diminishes the crime of genocide from being considered the “crime of all 
crimes”. 
247
 Lastly, collective guilt was placed on the Hutu majority, whilst the RPF and 
Tutsis as a whole received immunity for their war crimes, this ultimately led to the Gacaca 
court being seen as impartial and a court created for the purpose of prosecuting and 
criminalising Hutus. Thus in the end the Gacaca Court undermined genuine ‘truth-telling, 
justice and civic trust’.
248
 
 
1.15 Judicial Pursuit of Hutus: ‘Victors Justice’ and ‘Victims Justice’ in Rwanda 
 
It is evident that there is a need for justice in Rwanda that can have meaning for individuals 
and permeate all aspects of Rwandan society and state. This is complex task because the 
scale and gravity of the crimes were gigantic, and the number of victims and perpetrators 
were enormous.
249
 The regime’s decision to exclusively pursue a judicial approach has 
complex ramifications for how the regime deals with the ‘past’ especially since “the past is 
not the past, that Rwanda was not a post-conflict state, and that gross human rights abuses 
continued after the regime seized power.”
250
 Stef Vandegintse argues that dealing with the 
past and violence committed “cannot solely be a judicial issue, it is a political challenge and 
challenge for society as a whole.”
251
 In order to advance the ‘rule of law’ the established 
doctrines of liberal-legalism must be protected. Principles of ‘due process, respect of  
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individual rights, and ‘equality under the law and subject to it’ are all important for creating a 
culture that adheres to the rule of law, and for preventing the politicisation of justice. Also, as 
Jones asserts that “For there to be a realisation of justice, there must be accountability on the 
part of all who were involved in the violation of law regardless of their position, ethnicity, or 
the other factors.”
252
Rwanda has reached an impasse in its establishment of the rule of law, 
because the courts of genocide have been perceived as being impartial and unfair towards 
Hutus and granted immunity to Tutsis as a whole but to the RPF in particular. I will now 
address the judicial solution and particularly focus on the critique of ‘victors justice’. 
 
Similar to the case of Nuremburg, the architecture of the Rwandan Tribunal was configured 
in its historical and political context, together with high expectations for it to have a cultural 
and normative impact on Rwanda, and international law. Moghalu argues that the Tribunal 
gave life to the Genocide Convention, and the idea that the “crime of all crimes” can be 
prosecuted.
253
 It did have significant impact on international law (inclusion of rape as a 
crime and contributed to the creation of the ICC) but it struggled from the beginning to 
overcome the political tensions it had with the RPF-led government. Its core function was 
to prosecute crime of both genocide and crimes against humanity, but failed in that it 
created a hierarchy of the crimes for the practical reason of resources prioritisation and 
because morally and legally there was an obligation to adjudicate genocide crimes. The 
overall credibility of the Tribunal, from a political justice point of view, is based on whether 
it can hold the RPF/RPA soldiers accountable for crimes against Hutus and Tutsis that they 
have committed. 
 
The political and legal factors greatly effected the decisions and outcomes of the Tribunal. 
Victor Peskin argues that it is important to look at the relationship between the Tribunals 
prosecutors and the RPF-led government.
254
 Peskin writes that the first Prosecutor, Richard 
Goldstone (1994-1996), was focused on “securing the cooperation of a testy Rwandan 
government and avoided opening the volatile issue of investigating the RPF.”
255
The tenure 
(1993-2003) of the second Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte, was marked by her “vocal and ultimately 
unsuccessful confrontation with Kigali over the bid to investigate RPF crimes.”
256
 
 
In 2002, the former ICTR prosecutor Carla Del Ponte met with President Kagame, to discuss the 
investigation into RPF crimes, and requested Kagame’s ‘co-operation.’
257
Kagame initially 
pledged his cooperation but once there was pressure emanating from Rwandan military 
hardliners, he had to retract.
258
 After the genocide, the RPF had incorporated several Hutu 
soldiers from the former RGF into the post-genocide national army. 
259
Moghalu argues that if 
they had to now start prosecuting the RPF than they would have to prosecute the Hutu leaders in 
the national army, and this would threaten the order.
260
Moghalu also makes an important point 
by arguing “In the continental political context, a coup by disgruntled Tutsi soldiers who felt 
threatened by ICTR indictments could not be ruled out. And such a scenario would be 
profoundly destabilising to the RPF’s hard-won victory- and the country itself. Kagame had to 
keep his troops pacified by not giving into the chief prosecutor’s demand.”
261
 In the BBC 
documentary ‘Rwanda’s Untold Story’ (2014)’, Del Ponte shares that when she met Kagame 
again in 2001 with a list RPF massacres, Kagame was completely  
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incensed.
262
The tensions had peaked in 2002, with Rwanda temporarily ending the Tribunals 
jurisdiction and preventing trial witnesses from travelling to Arusha thus effectively hindering 
trials to continue. Moreover, the states disdain for the Tribunal reverberated to ‘grassroots level’ 
organisation, such as the ‘genocide survivors organisation’- Ibuka (‘Remembrance’) who the 
RPF appealed to in 2002, calling on the “genocide survivors to boycott the tribunal.”
263
Finally, 
in 2003 Madame Del Ponte was removed from the ICTR, for her rigorous commitment to 
seeking RPF war crimes, both within Rwanda and across the  
borders particularly in Congo, where she has argued that the lobby against her was greatly 
supported by the US- an ally to the RPF who aided the ‘cover up’ of RPF crimes. 
264
 
 
When the third Prosecutor Hassan Jallow begun his tenure in 2003, his focus was on working 
towards a ‘conciliatory’ relationship with the Rwandan government, and ultimately he 
remained largely silent on RPF crimes, refusing to address the issue of RPF indictments.
265
 
In 2008 Jallow reached a “understanding” with the government, “to forgo tribunal 
indictments if it conduced a fair trial of RPF suspects who ha been under the ICTR 
investigation.”
266
 Pesking would allow four of the main RPF leaders indicted to be tried in 
the Rwandan military court. Peskin argues that in seeking to find an arrangement with the 
government, it initially looked as though Jallow was giving the Rwandan government a fair 
chance to follow its own prosecutions through the domestic legal system (a notion that is 
principle in the ICC).
267
 However, in the end Jallow proved that he was merely ‘avoiding 
becoming a target of Kigali’s wrath’ and by averting the political crisis that may rise if he 
tried to prosecute the RPF.
268
Jallow had abdicated the ICTR’s responsibility to ensure that 
individuals from both sides of the Rwandan conflict face international trial for violations of 
humanitarian law, and together with the strategic opposition of Rwandan government, it 
made it very difficult for the Tribunal to move pass the ‘victor’s justice paradigm’.
269
This 
‘strategic opposition’ is bolstered by three factors; 1. “the Tutsi-led RPF government has 
garnered significant international backing for its self-declared status as representative and 
rescuer of Tutsi victims”; 2. “the government has likened calls for RPF prosecutions to 
genocide denial and genocide ideology”; and 3. “the government has intimidated the tribunal 
by blocking prosecutions of witnesses from testifying in genocide trials.”
270
 
 
Technically-speaking the Arusha Tribunal’s mandate was re-enforced by the UNSC through 
Resolution 1503, which would allow the UNSC to forcefully hold the RPF accountable. But 
as ICTR registrar Dr Agwu U. Okali argues “it is a little optimistic to think that the world is 
ready yet for international criminal adjudication of the conduct of victorious forces in armed 
conflict.”
271
Former deputy Chief Prosecutor Bernard A. Muna, argues that “Prosecutions 
cannot happen in a vacuum” meaning that the political construction of the Tribunal, doesn’t 
allow for it to just establish a force (like NATO’s SFOR in Yugoslavia) that can go into 
Rwandan territory and just hand over RPF soldiers.
272
 Moghalu argues that in the end the 
Tribunal activities are limited as they reflect the political support of Rwanda, and its 
“political master-The Security Council” who provides that muscle to pursue cases.
273
 
Arguably the security, and socio-economic terrain as well as political instability that is 
founded on decades of Hutu regime rule, challenges the outright critique of ‘victor’s 
justice’, but there is also overwhelming evidence that demonstrates ‘victors justice’ and the  
47 
 
 
 
 
politicisation of the judicial system. What transpired in the Del Ponte controversy, 
demonstrates this as well as the various unlawful practices by the court. 
 
Charles T. Taku, who was appointed as counsel in the ICTR, raises some interesting points in 
response to what he refers to as the Tribunal as being nothing short of a “victors court”.
274
To 
begin with, Taku critiques the compromise of ‘Article 1’ (equality before the law), which has 
been replaced with a policy that criminalises Hutus collectively as “genocidaires”.
275
Taku 
asserts that the policy of adjudicating the Genocide against the Tutsi has “eternalizes the 
“Judicial Genocide of the Hutus” on the basis of their Hutu ethnic identity” and which has 
become a forum for ‘shaming and humiliating the Hutus’.
276
This has allowed the RPF to 
settle its political scores. Secondly, Article 11 stipulates the policy for selecting prosecutors 
and judges and their responsibilities as representatives of the court. What has instead 
transpired are question regarding the ‘transparency’ of their appointments, and the critique 
that “there is a real possibility of many finding themselves nominated and appointed as a 
result of political rather than judicial process.”
277
Arguably this doesn't question the 
bias/impartiality of the prosecutors and judges, but the political voting does shape the 
composition of the courts and influences which cases they will prosecute. From the 
beginning the prosecutor framed the violence by characterising two categories of crime, 
Hutus crimes and RPF crimes (which broadly encapsulates any Tutsi crimes), and since their 
has been no prosecution of RPF (and Tutsi) crimes, the Tribunal has become a “victors 
court” or as Taku states resulted in the “Judicial Genocide of the Hutus.”
278
 There isn’t 
recourse in the judicial system for Hutus and thus this has allowed for the preservation of 
‘victims justice’. Prosecutors of all the courts are well aware of RPF war crimes due to the 
testimony of witnesses and investigations for the trials. 
 
A commonly used motto is, “Justice must not only be done, but seen to be done” and this 
includes the impartiality of the courts.
279
 The tribunal has deflected efforts to exact 
individual responsibility by only prosecuting Hutus.
280
This has re-enforced the regimes 
imposed view that seeks justice for Tutsis, and denies it to Hutus based on an impartial 
rationale. The RPF’s view can be summed up Kagame’s statement: 
 
“Whilst some RPF elements committed crimes against civilians during the civil war after 
1990, and during the anti-genocidal campaign, individuals were punished severely…To try 
to construct a case of moral equivalency between genocide crimes and isolated crimes 
committed by rogue RPF members is morally bankrupt and an insult to all Rwandans, 
especially survivors of the genocide. Objective history illustrates the degeneracy of emerging 
revisionism”
281
 
 
Thus, the RPF-states way of addressing the political injustice is to minimise the crimes, 
blame it on individual ‘rogue elements’ and to threaten those as being genocide deniers for 
equating their crimes to the Hutu genocidaires and former regime, or downplaying the 
genocide for political exploitations.
282
The UNHCR estimates between 25 to 45 000 Hutus 
killed by the RPF between April and August, a report that has never been officially 
released.
283
 There is also the infamous ‘Gersony Report’ which I will discuss in later 
 
48 
 
 
 
 
chapters. One of the most damning sources of evidence comes from former RPF members, 
who have detailed witnessing and in most cases participated in the ‘disappearances, 
assassinations and mass killings of various political and civilian Rwandans who have gotten 
in the way of the RPF’s political project. Seth Sendashonga (former high-ranking RPF 
official who now lives in exile) claims that Paul Kagame knew about some of the killings 
taking place and did nothing to stop it.
284
 This is supported by the now exiled Theogene 
Rudasinga (former General Secretary of the RPF) and General Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa 
(former Chief of Staff to the Rwandan Army, and former Intelligence head for Rwanda) who 
claim that for Kagame- “who was dying was not an issue”, whether it were Tutsis or Hutus 
because they were considered collateral damage in the war to seek power for the RPF.
285
 
The HRW reported that 
 
“The killings were wide-spread, systematic and involved large number of participants and 
victims. They were too many and too much alike to have been unconnected crimes executed 
by individual soldiers or low-ranking officers. Given the disciplined nature of the RPF 
forces and extent of communication up and down the hierarchy, commanders of this army 
must have known of an at least tolerated these practices.”
286
 
 
Visible signs of ‘government-sponsored violence’ began to re-emerge in 1995, after the 
well-documented RPA killings of a UNAMIR estimate of 4000 internally displaced people 
in Kibeho camp.
287
 Lastly the Rwandan government has even refused to sign the 1998 
Rome Statute and has supported the US in its efforts to weaken the ICC and universal 
jurisdiction so that it can avoid prosecution for crimes committed both within Rwanda and 
abroad. 
288
 In her seminal book (Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda, 1999) 
Alison des Forges states that “Revenge killings by soldiers-or other crimes of passion- as 
well as unintentional killings of civilians in combat situations could never account for the 
thousands of persons killed by the RPF between April and late July 1994”
289
And this was 
because accounting for the RPF’s crimes was a politically volatile act. I will discuss the RPF 
crimes in other chapters of this dissertation. 
 
The impact of failing to move pass the ‘victor’s justice paradigm’ complemented the long-
held advocated position of the Rwandan government, to have most prosecution take place 
through the domestic judicial system. Peskin argues that the government was supported by 
the most ‘powerful allies’, the US and Britain.
290
 Again, I must emphasise that this was 
taking place in the context of the construction of the ICC and its formulations to map out 
the relationship between international law and domestic courts. 
 
Kagame has always argued that the Gacaca Court was resurrected for the purpose of “uprooting 
the culture of impunity” and through active participation it would ‘ensure justice is visible’.
291
 
Rwandans must feel like they are holding people accountable for crimes, and are taking 
ownership of their healing processes. The Gacaca Law stipulates that it has jurisdiction to try 
crimes of genocide and crimes against humanity that took place between 1 October 1990-31 
December 1994. However, in response to national pressure to prosecute RPF crimes, the 
government amended the Organic Law in 2004, and deleted all references to 
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war crimes.
292
 Similar to the National Courts, the government only appointed Tutsi judges 
and prosecutors, thus Hutus felt they were being prosecuted by Tutsis and sentenced by Tutsi 
judges.
293
In preparation for the Gacaca Courts, judicial personnel were taught that they 
would not handle RPF crimes. In one ‘pilot session’, the Gacaca president clarified “who 
would be inscribed on the list of victim”… “these are the victims of genocide only. That is to 
say, the list does not concern those killed by the inkontanyi [the RPF]. Do not confuse 
things”.
294
 The RPF made it clear from the beginning that it does not want to be considered 
morally equivalent to Hutus. 
 
This raises the question- what exactly then does the RPF mean by ‘combatting the culture of 
impunity’. Waldorf argues that the RPF understands it to be that which allowed the anti-Tutsi 
violence to take place since 1959, and does not apply to ‘Hutu victims’.
295
 For the 
government it is enough that the Rwandan military court has prosecuted 32 soldiers for 21 
crimes committed against 91 civilians during 1994.
296
There were no RPA crimes prosecuted 
during 1998-2008 (during the two Great African Wars), and since only 2 high ranking 
officials have been tried, and later acquitted, and 2 low-ranking officials were sentenced to 6 
years in prison.
297
 In other chapters I will discuss the social ramifications of both the 
‘Tutsification of the judicial system’ and the ‘judicial pursuit of only Hutus’. For here it is 
important to note that these practices have a detrimental impact on the ‘rule of law’, because 
of impartiality, continuation of the culture of impunity, complete exclusion of Hutus from 
being apart of the infrastructure, and calls into question the states idea of justice and its 
legitimacy. The heroic Rwandan Priest and human rights activist Andre Sibomana 
poignantly articulated that “Impunity is always in the interest of the state, and the current 
state in Rwanda is no exception.”
298
 Waldorf asserts that the “Gacaca court was an 
expression of victor’s justice- that is, accountability for the losing side and impunity for the 
winning side…victor’s crimes are dwarfed by the loser’s crimes.”
299
 
 
Reyntjens argues that the genocide credit afforded to the RPF-government, has led to “victim 
turned bully” and a “conspiracy of silence”, induced in part by an international feeling of 
guilt that has allowed the RPF to continue committing crimes with impunity.
300
The 
‘genocide credit’ has also supported the constitution of a good guys-bad guys dichotomy”, 
which started out premised on the fact that everyone knew the Hutu militia and its mass Hutu 
support were the “bad guys” of the genocide, and then of course the ‘good guys’ had to be the 
RPF.
301
 Furthermore, ‘victor’s justice’ in Rwanda has led to the presumption made by the 
post-genocide power that only the RPF-victors can secure justice and the survival of Tutsi 
victims.
302
The genocide-experience demonstrates the consequences if they don’t. 
 
Mamdani makes a few interesting distinctions, which are consequences of ‘victor’s justice and 
‘victims justice’ in Rwanda. Mamdani states “The victims are said to be both Tutsi and Hutu- 
the latter victims of the massacres of the internal political opposition.”
303
The genocide was 
aimed at Tutsis; therefore only Tutsis are “survivors”. The consuming judiciary process, which 
provides the foundation for reconciliation and practices of remembrance/ ‘official history’, has 
further associated “living victims” to be only “Tutsi genocide survivors”.
304
Based on this view, 
Hutus that are alive today are looked at with suspicion for 
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either ‘getting away with perpetration of crimes’ or were onlookers during the genocide, the 
postgenocide regime rejects the notion of ‘Hutu moderates’ or ‘Hutus who helped Tutsi’. Thus, 
the final distinction to be made is that Hutus today are “presumed perpetrators”.
305
 These 
categories have framed the political violence by strictly judicial terms, and has taken the focus 
away from the historical and political context that made the genocide possible. This dissertation 
research question is informed by an alternative argument to ‘victor’s justice and victims justice’, 
that Mamdani proposes “Rather than arguing that no one be held responsible for violence, I 
suggest we suspend the question of criminal responsibility to arrive at a new political 
imagination, a new state for, a more inclusive political space for reform so as to re-establish the 
sovereignty of a reformed political order and an associated criminal law.”
306
 
 
1.16 Conclusion 
 
The Rwandan transitional justice case study, demonstrates a long established tradition of how 
we think of justice and how it should follow after political conflict. This being, after the 
military victory, a ‘clear victor’ is identified, whose power allows for it to administer justice. 
Rwanda also serves as a lesson to be learnt from, because of the acute challenges that it faced 
from not having a rich historical pedigree of the rule of law, to inherit. Similar to Nuremburg, 
the logic that has formulated Rwanda’s transitional justice instruments is shaped by legacy of 
a historical and political context, and a mixture of ‘norms’ and ‘politics’. There is an 
overarching universalising impulse that has redirected the focus from the historical and 
political context/reality of the Rwandan genocide. Whereas there have been marked shifts in 
the analysis on transitional processes, the specificities of the case study can often be 
overshadowed by the goal to develop international law and a universal culture that adheres to 
human right values and the ideals of peace and justice. These challenges have been theorised 
through such debates as those on the ‘rule of law dilemma’ and the ‘Peace versus Justice 
dilemma’, and it is refreshing to see a growth in inter-disciplinary and alternative approaches 
that are addressing processes and institutional designs. The challenges that Rwanda faces, 
have urged key Rwandan scholars to rethink Rwanda’s ‘policy of mass accountability’, and 
in more recent studies, the historical intersection between law and politics is being critically 
interrogated. This chapter has demonstrated that by framing the genocide as an ‘event’ that is 
read within the framework of contemporary legal, political and moral vocabulary, has stood 
in the way of Rwanda pursuing a more inclusive transitional process that could achieve a 
post-ethnic society. Unfortunately, the guilt felt by the international community over its 
failure to intervene and prevent the genocide, has granted the RPF-led government a 
‘genocide credit’ that has significant political purchase. In this chapter, I addressed the 
failure to move pass the ‘victor’s justice paradigm’, which has called into question the state 
of the ‘rule of law’ and the impartiality of justice because it has failed to hold both sides of 
the conflict responsible. This compromise on justice is more damning because it was further 
bolstered by the legal and political factors that effected the decisions and outcomes of the 
Tribunal, which allowed the RPF-led government to strategically oppose and opportunity for 
real justice for both Hutus and Tutsis. Finally, the Tribunal, national courts and Modernised 
Gacaca court system, have constituted the post-genocide Rwandan society into categories of 
‘Tutsi victims’ and ‘Hutu perpetrators’, and has legitimised the ‘military victor’- the RPF 
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political vision for Rwanda’s transition and post-genocide statehood. The purpose of this 
chapter is to set the foundation for the following chapter’s discussion on the research 
question, which is ‘Can “victims justice” pursued by Transitional Justice in Rwanda, allow 
for the political reform required to break the cycle of violence?’ This dissertation frames 
the genoicde as political violence, that requires political and social justice, rather than a 
stirct preoccupation with criminal justice. 
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Chapter two: 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter critically interrogates Rwanda’s political record, anti-colonial project to the 
Arusha Accords (1993). My objective is to place the genocide in its political and historical 
context, and problematise the post-colonial institutions of rule; mode of power and 
citizenship, that retained political identities, and which made the genocide possible. As a 
departure point, I address the historical record pieced together from the justice process.The 
legacy of Nuremburg has led to the presumption that when violence is committed on such a 
large-scale as in the Rwandan genocide, the violence must be criminalised in order to seek 
responsibility and justice, and also provide a historical record which reflects the victims 
suffering, the human rights violations, and severs the past political identity from the ‘new 
regime’. In the transitional form, ‘criminal trials’ are deployed to frame a broad 
understanding of responsibility. It mediates between individual and collective responsibility, 
as it works towards establishing a historical record of the past evil legacy, which we can 
learn from. The problem is that this then frames responsibility as criminal responsibilty and 
individual responsibility. It also individualises and isolates the violent acts into crimes that 
can be prosecuted. Furthermore, the logic of victor’s justice gives the victor power to not 
only determine and administer justice, but to This is further complicated by ‘victors juctice’ 
and a ‘victims justice’ rationale, which works hand-in-hand to demonise one side, the 
perpetrators, and exclude them from participating in the new political order. Furthermore, it 
allows the ‘victor’ to shape the historical inquiry based on Tutsi ‘victimhood’, and exlcudes 
both victor and victim from responsibilty. This chapter puts forth the argument, that 
responsibilty for the genocide needs to thought of as primarily being political. This shifts the 
preoccupation with seeking responsibilty from perpetrators, to addressing the issues that 
drive the conflict. It will also allow all constiutencies to be included in the new political 
order. In order to do so, I place the genocide in its historical and political context. Secondly, I 
address the popular agency or mass participation of Hutus during the genocide. I particularly 
focus on the contributions made by Rwandan scholars: Omar McDoom, Lee-Ann Fujii and 
Scott Strauss, who all attend to the ‘why/how’ question regarding participation. This 
dissertation has made use of Mahmood Mamdani’s critique of ‘victims justice’ and his 
theoretical framework for thinking about Rwanda’s political crisis, which is the post-colonial 
citizenship crisis (institutions of rule). The political crisis in Rwanda has led to cycles of 
violence, fuelled by calls for justice to correct past injustice, and marked by the struggle for 
power. Thus, I will also present a critical review of Mamdani’s theory, and provide my 
justification for adopting his theoretical framework in this dissertation. 
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2.2 The Judicial Record: Seeking Justice and Writing History 
 
There is an assumption made in transitional justice that the ‘judicial record’ will provide the 
most accurate account of the political violence. It mediates between individual and collective 
responsibility, as it also works towards establishing a historical record of the past evil legacy, 
which we can learn from. Hopefully, the ‘historical record’ will also “pierce the distortions 
generated by official propaganda, before the guilt could reinvent the truth” and prevent the 
cycle of revenge killings or future acts of aggression.
1
 The logic that underpins the criminal 
trial derives from the Enlightenment Period, whereby theorists Karl Marx and Immanuel 
Kant wrote that “history is teacher and judge, and historical truth in and of itself is justice.”
2
 
Thus ‘history’ is seen as having the potential to be liberalising whilst serving the justice 
project. Moreover, ‘historical record’ assists the new regime in making a ‘clean break’ or to 
discontinue with the past immorality of the predecessor regime, and to delegitimise it as it 
constituted the new regime’s identity. 
 
In Rwanda, the judicial record has been pieced together through the testimonies and 
narratives of Tutsi witnesses, and particularly Tutsi victims. Moreover, the process is focused 
on “cataloguing atrocities”, by ‘identifying perpetrators and demanding that they be held 
criminally accountable.’
3
Legal scholar, Dr Regina E. Rauxloh, argues that neither judges, 
nor prosecutors, nor defence counsels are trained in historical research and rarely are 
historians invited to give expert testimony.
4
 Instead, the courts use strict evidential rules and 
apply a forensic approach to investigating ‘historical facts’.
5
 Thus, establishing the historical 
record is contingent on the criminal trial process. 
 
The problem is that the capacity of the courts to create a comprehensive picture of the past, 
where the violence is placed in its historical and political context, is compromised by both 
logic that underpins criminal justice and practical or resource limitations. In the Rwandan 
case, the failure to move past the ‘victor’s justice paradigm’ has had crucial implications for 
how the ‘past’ has been recorded and how we understand the political violence. Briefly, a 
few factors that compromise the impartiality of the record are: a. temporal/and or territorial 
jurisdiction of the courts which has excluded RPF crimes; b. limited resources which lead to 
prioritising prosecution of the ‘most responsible’, that concentrates on certain events and 
locations; c. only individuals are put on trial and not the political project of the predecessor 
regime, and all evidence is related to the relevant charges rather than the general historical 
background; and finally d. the prosecution is dependent on the co-operation of the state.
6
 
Thus, the trial process selectively decides what is valuable and what is not for the historical 
record. Unfortunately, the process also tends to think about agency and motivation as either 
owing to ‘individuals psychology of the culture of the perpetrator’.
7
 In an ideal world, the 
criminal trials can add value to the work of historians by validating their findings with 
thoroughly investigated evidence and through expert witnesses.
8
 
 
Between 1994-1995, the transitional government recognised all Hutu and Tutsi as being 
victims, but once the judicial system began to develop and take on a directive position in 
the transition, the historical discourse became more “accusatory” towards Hutus.
9
The Hutu- 
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identity has since been linked to criminal guilt. There are two important points in the 
narrative that the post-genocide power subscribes to. First, the ‘official narrative’ represents 
Hutu Power in an exclusively negative way, that has de-contextualised their historical ideals 
and agency, and provided a superficial account for why Hutu Power chose genocide as the 
most viable option for their political project.
10
 The second narrative is characterised by a 
curious paradox in its treatment of the genocide itself, “both privileging it as the central 
event in Rwandan history but at the same time removing it from historical scrutiny.”
11
 The 
post-genocide government has also purged and illegalised ‘ethnic references’, operating on 
the logic that “if awareness of ethnic differences can be learned, so too can the idea that 
ethnicity does not exist” and that “ “divisionism”-ethnic, regional, and political- has been the 
bane of Rwanda and indeed the root causes of the genocide.”
12
The government expresses a 
fear that opening up the ‘memory’ of the genocide will strip it of its prime evil character and 
allow for re-interpretations by Hutu ideologues that will invariably be an injustice to Tutsi 
victims. Lemarchand argues that “The imposition of an official memory purged of ethnic 
references, is not just a convenient ploy to mask the brutal realities of ethnic discrimination; 
it institutionalises a mode of thought control profoundly antithetical to any kind of 
interethnic dialogue aimed at a rethinking of the atrocities of mass murder.”
13
 
 
In thinking about the relationship between ‘criminal justice’ and historical inquiry, it is 
important to ask questions about the particular role that the ‘historical record’ will play. In 
the Rwandan transition, history making has taken place in a highly charged political context-
where the past is not exactly the past because political violence continued. I focus on its 
implications for reconciliation in Chapter 4, but for here I want to focus on the political 
purchase that ‘history-writing’ has in Rwanda. Ruti G. Teitel makes an interesting argument, 
that the “assumption that “truth” and “history” are one and the same evinces a belief in the 
possibility of an autonomous objective history of the past belying the significance of the 
present political context in shaping the historical inquiry…When history takes a 
“interpretative turn” there is no single, clear, and determinate understanding or ‘lessons’ to 
draw from the past, but instead, recognition of the degree to which historical understanding 
depends on political and social contingency.”
14
 
 
Primo Levi has written a penetrating commentary on what he calls “the memory of the 
offense”, where he responds to the selective process that produces a ‘convenient reality’.
15
 
There is also Paul Ricoeur’s work, which has greatly contributed to the work on the ‘politics 
of memory’ through his categories of “Thwarted Memory, Manipulated Memory and 
Enforced Memory.”
16
 ‘ 
 
‘Thwarted Memory’ responds to the repression of memory that takes place in Rwanda, and what 
Lemarchand refers to as the “many blind spots” in Rwanda’s official memory, which has 
become ‘formulaic’.
17
By attaching criminal guilt to the Hutu identity, the memory of those 
generally referred to as Hutu “moderates” has been ‘thwarted’ by what Nigel Eltringham refers 
to as the “ubiquitous, undefined phase.”
18
 Eltringham argues, “These Hutu, both those who 
killed and those who survived, demonstrate that the genocide perpetrator’s binary construction of 
Rwanda (‘the Hutu vs. the Tutsi’) was not natural, but had to be  
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imposed. While one must recognise the opportunism and personal politicking were prevalent 
among the political class in 1990-1994…the acknowledgment of Hutu who resisted ‘Hutu 
Power’ remains a powerful rejection of the vision of Rwandan society proclaimed by the 
perpetrators of the genocide.”
19
Eltringham makes an important argument that challenges the 
term ‘Hutu moderates’, arguing that it does not do justice to many Hutus who showed 
“proactive resistance” (negates their agency).
20
 As one Tutsi escapee explains, “Anybody 
who was against Habyarimana and his regime was targeted as an enemy of the 
Hutu.”
21
Lemarchand asserts “Summoning a de-ethnicised, victims-centred memory is not 
enough; what has to be given proper recognition is that Hutu and Tutsi were victims of a 
calamity for which responsibility is shared by elements of both communities. This sharing of 
responsibility is what Rwanda’s official ideologues refuse to acknowledge. Instead, every 
effort is made to manipulate memory so as to exonerate the ruling elites of all responsibility 
in the circumstances that led to the abyss.”
22
By excluding evidence, the ‘official memory’ 
fails to make an important distinction between ‘Hutu Power’ as a political ideology and the 
Hutu civilian population. 
 
‘Manipulated Memory’ has taken place by establishing the genocide as ‘the event’ in 
Rwanda’s history’. This leads to what Ricoeur refers to as “culpable indifference” and in 
Rwanda responds to how the RPF has received ‘historical immunity’ for the crimes they have 
committed and for their responsibility in invading Rwanda, which triggered a civil war that 
evolved into a genocide.
23
 Lemarchand argues, “there would be no genocide had Kagame 
not decided to unleash his refugee warriors on October 1, 1990, in violation of the most 
elementary principle of international law.”
24
 Furthermore, Lemarchand clarifies that he does 
not deny the very obvious culpability, organisation and pre-meditation of the genocide, but 
that nothing is officially said about the “climate of fear and paranoia created by the civil war 
[which] did at least as much as Radio des Milles Collines to heighten the receptivity of Hutu 
extremist to a ‘final solution’.”
25
 He continues by stating that during the civil war, over one 
million Hutu were forced out of their villages when the RPA arrived, and into inhumane 
conditions within the makeshift refugee camps, provoking many Hutu men to join the killing 
spree.
26
 Fanie du Toit argues that this does not mean that one needs to ‘dissolve’ the 
genocide into the war itself…Yet the implication for the agenda of transitional justice is that 
while the ‘official narrative’ posits the genocide as ‘prime evil’, it has ensured that the 
underlying causes…have been inadequately investigated and addressed with important 
consequences for the post-genocide reconciliation.”
27
 
 
The third of Ricouer’s category – ‘Enforced Memory’, importantly discusses the ‘ritualistic’ 
practices of remembrance through annual genocide commemorations. These ‘rituals’ re-
enforce ‘Tutsis as victims” and Hutus as guilty” which not only nurtures ethnic enmities, but 
gives “ideological legitimacy to the consolidation of Tutsi power.”
28
This relates back to 
Reyntjens’ notion of ‘genocide credit’. The canonical work of Friedrich Nietzsche and 
Michael Foucault has explored the “intimate relationship between the imposition of power 
and the control of knowledge”.
29
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The mode of Rwanda’s historical inquiry presents acute challenges for post-genocide 
Rwanda. The ‘judicial record’ has not sufficiently addressed the sets of troubling question 
that the genocide poses. In Chapter 4, I will address the historical limitations that this has 
for reconciling a common understanding of the past for Hutus and Tutsis. The following 
section of this chapter examines the complicity of history making with the organisation of 
power. Therefore, I will explore Rwanda’s political record and place the logic of the 
genocide in its historical and political context. As Mamdani asserts “political violence is 
seldom a standalone incident, it is part of the cycle of violence.”
30
 
 
2.3 Making Genocide Thinkable 
 
The scholarship on the genocide tends to focus on three broad explanations for the genocide, 
these are: (i) a focus on external influences, both colonial and neo-colonial (macro-
economic/macro-political trends); (ii) a focus on domestic causes including demographic and 
‘ethnic’ conflict (tribal-hatred argument); (iii) role played by important individuals and the 
elites acting within key institutions of the state (military and civilian); and (iiii) a 
psychosocial account based on the presumed social conformism and obedience of 
Rwandans.
31
Helen Hintjens argues that each explanation tries to draw comparative parallels 
with other cases of mass slaughter (particularly the German-Holocaust), or from existing 
theoretical paradigms, and although they may have a basis in reality, they also have blind 
spots that cannot successfully explain the mass participation of ‘ordinary Rwandans’.
32
 
Thus, in order to explore the political violence, I have turned to the theoretical work of 
Mahmood Mamdani, as well as other key Rwandan scholars. 
 
2.3.2 Mahmood Mamdani: A Theoretical Framework for the Genocide in Rwanda 
 
Mamdani asserts that Rwanda has became a “metaphor for postcolonial political violence”, 
which provides a vantage point from which to think through the African post-colonial 
political crisis, and specifically the ‘post-colonial citizenship crisis’ which fuels cycles of 
political violence.
33
He makes the following argument: “History in Rwanda comes in two 
versions: Hutu and Tutsi. Ever since the colonial period, the cycle of violence has been fed 
by a victim psychology on both sides. Every round of perpetrators has justified the use of 
violence as the only effective guarantee against being victimized yet again. For the un-
reconciled victim of yesterday’s violence, the struggle continues. The continued tragedy of 
Rwanda is that each round of violence gives us yet another set of victims-turned 
perpetrators.”
34
 
 
At the time of writing, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the 
Genocide in Rwanda, the initial scholarship on Rwanda’s genocide, had shied away from 
the most troubling questions. Together with the current research conducted by key Rwandan 
scholars, Mamdani has chosen to frame the discussion on Rwanda by attending to the 
questions concerning the ‘mass participation’ or ‘popular agency’ of ‘ordinary’ Rwandans. 
The ‘gruesome reality is that the genocide “was a result of both planning and participation”, 
and the agenda that was imposed from above had to resonate with the perspectives of 
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below.
35
 This presents Rwanda with both a moral dilemma and political crisis that needs to 
be thoroughly investigated.
36
 For Mamdani, the genocide has posed a set of troubling 
questions, such as: ‘Why did hundreds of thousands of Hutu, who had never before killed, 
take part in the slaughter? ; Why did such a disproportionate number of the educated—civil 
leaders, doctors, nurses, judges, human rights activists, etc.—play a leading role in the 
genocide?; and ‘Why did places of shelter—hospitals, churches, and schools—turn into 
slaughterhouses?’
37
These ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions aggregate several other questions, 
such as, “why did Rwanda’s hardliners choose genocide as a strategy for power?”
38
 
 
Mamdani’s stated objective for writing this book is to “make the popular agency of the 
genocide thinkable.”
39
 Mamdani rethinks existing suppositions and separates himself from 
existing methodological and theoretical frameworks used in the analysis on the genocide. 
In critique of ‘Western scholars’ (which he does not specify) Mamdani aims to generate a 
theory that can attend to the logic of the genocide, which he believes requires a political 
explanation. It must be noted that the objective of his analysis is to contribute towards 
developing his main pertinent theoretical point, which is what he calls ‘the post-colonial 
citizenship crisis in Africa.’
40
Thus, Mamdani casts the Rwandan genocide as being a 
‘Native’s genocide’, attributing the logic of the genocide to the logic of colonialism, whose 
perverted historical legacy was inherited in the politics of the post-colonial regimes. Saskia 
Van Hoywegen argues, “Whilst most of the analysis of violence in the post-colonial period 
has focused on the concepts of ethnicity, Mamdani brings race back into the picture.”
41
 
 
It is important to acknowledge Mamdani’s intellectual development that shaped his 
preoccupation with finding a political explanation and generating a theory. The rationale for 
developing a theory that could apply to Rwanda emerged from a growing discontent 
Mamdani had with the methodological underpinnings of ‘Area Studies’. Mamdani argues 
that ‘Area Studies’ sees “state boundaries as boundaries of knowledge therefore restricting 
the political with epistemological boundaries.
42
 Furthermore, ‘Area Studies’ sees 
‘knowledge as being about the production of facts coupled with a stubborn resistance to 
theory.’
43
Thus, Rwanda needed a coherent explanation and a theoretical framework in order 
to understand the genocide and its political and historical context. This would also allow us 
to think differently about political violence. 
 
Mamdani departs his discussion on Rwanda by asserting that misinterpretations of the 
genocide are generated by three silences in the literature on Rwanda, which represent salient 
features that have contributed powerfully to the logic of the genocide. These are: 1. The 
history of genocide (he pushes back on the temptation to view the genocide with no history); 
2.The agency of the genocide (which sees the genocide as a ‘state-project’ but also the 
agency of the ‘subaltern’); and 3.The geography of the genocide (Mamdani attributes the 
timing of the genocide as owing to the post-colonial citizenship crisis in Uganda.).
44
He also 
asserts that the genocide is complex, and there isn’t a “one size fits all” explanation that 
captures the regional differences in Rwanda. 
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The second concern Mamdani addresses, responds to the ‘defined enemy’, the genocide 
target, arguing that before one can eliminate the enemy, one must first define it.
45
Urasora 
Alice Karekezi asserts, “There is a widely held perception that African civil wars are simply 
modern manifestations of age-old tribal animosities.”
46
This has led to a preoccupation in 
search of ‘ethnic differences’ and popularizing ‘tribal-based arguments’, as well as focus on 
origins. The tribalism argument tends to focus on forces from below. The other popular 
explanation looks at ‘external forces’ and how they generate violence. In response to these 
explanations, Mamdani argues that the “preoccupation with origins, reflects how colonial 
power sketched the boundaries of colonial and postcolonial scholarship.”
47
 Furthermore, the 
discussion on ‘ethnicity’ tends to swing from one extreme to another. There is the colonial 
view that sees the ethnic groups as being static and primordial; which has given way to an 
instrumentalist notion that views Hutu and Tutsis as being easily manipulated by special 
interests or elites seeking political power.
48
 He also rejects the post-genocide regimes 
historical narrative, which says that prior to colonialism, Rwanda was a “centralised 
monarchy ruled under the succession of Tutsi kings from one clan” and although the Tutsi 
king was ‘supreme’, “the rest of the population, Bahutu, Batutsi and Batwa lived in 
symbiotic harmony.”
49
 Mamdani argues that this then sees state formation and ethnic 
differences as beginning with the colonial intervention, which he rejects. Instead, Mamdani 
argues that the colonialist (Belgian power) used the pre-existing socio-political distinctions 
between Hutus and Tutsis and racialised them into political identities in order to serve their 
political project and hold on power.
50
 
 
The other viewpoint sees Hutu and Tutsis as ‘market-based identities’ or ‘cultural -
identities’. Mamdani argues, “In the decade that followed African political independence, 
militant nationalist intellectuals focused on the expropriation of the native as the great crime 
of colonialism.”
51
This led to a host of ‘underdevelopment theorist’ historicizing the 
‘construction of colonial markets, and, thereby market-based identities.’
52
 ‘Political 
Economy theorist’ emerged with a popular explanation that understands political violence as 
result of a clash between market-based identities (either class or division of labour) and as 
being revolutionary or counter-revolutionary.
53
 In the instances where violence was purely 
non-revolutionary, their explanations failed to account for clashes that cut across social 
classes. This provided an opening for the resurrection of Cultural Theorists (conflict emerges 
because of cultural differences- “The Clash of Civilisations”) and their explanations on 
violence in Africa.
54
 
 
Mamdani asserts that the studies conducted on the African colonial and post-colonial 
experience, have been relatively silent on the question of race, and the relationship between 
identities and state-formation. In Central and East Africa, the ‘politics of indigineity’ has 
become a powerful factor in political developments, and in many counties the need to 
identify who is ‘alien’, ‘non-citizen’ and who is a ‘migrant’ is conducted with significant 
fervour, encouraging marked levels of violence.’
55
 As a follow up to his canonical work-
Citizen and Subject (1996), Mamdani re-introduces and centralizes ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ in 
the political discussion on Rwanda and within the context of the colonial experiences in the 
African Great Lakes region. He clarifies that this method does not deny that identities can be 
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also economic or cultural, but allows one to understand that political identities are as a direct 
consequence of state formation.
56
 He conceptualizes political identities as being “historical 
rather than primordial, and institutionally durable as opposed to being available to instant 
manipulation by those who are seeking power.”
57
 As political identities, Hutu and Tutsi 
have changed over time with each marked shift in the institutional development of the 
Rwandan state. Thus, Mamdani prefers to focus on the political institutions that breathe life 
into political identities and have ‘naturalised’ them, rather than focusing on political agency 
per se. 
 
In his critique on the colonial intervention and state formation, Mamdani explains that the 
colonials used the Hamitic myth to constitute Hutus as a native group, and Tutsis as a 
foreign settler race. Furthermore, the “Belgian colonialist not only racialised the Tutsi into a 
politically privileged settler class but also “victimized” the Hutu by consigning them to a life 
of political inferiority.”
58
Mamdani thus argues that the origins of violence, is connected to 
how Hutu and Tutsi were constructed as political identities by the colonial 
state.”
59
Moreover, he asserts that “the great crime of colonialism went beyond expropriating 
the native, the name given to the indigenous population…The greater crime was to politicize 
indigeneity in the first place; first negatively, as a settler libel of the native; but then 
positively, as a native response, as a self-assertion.”
60
 
 
The problem in Rwanda is that the dialectic of the native and the settler did not just end with 
colonialism.
61
The 1959 Social Revolution inherited the racial categories, failing to 
deconstruct them, which enabled Hutu leadership in both post-colonial Republics to operate 
on the logic of colonialism. The President of the First Republic- Gregoire Kayibanda 
breathed life into the racial categories, as he argued that justice for the indigenous Hutu 
majoritarian, means establishing a ‘Hutu state’ and preserving rights, privileges and 
citizenship for Hutus. Thus, the politicized racial identities continued to have political 
relevance, and the political institutions reflected that it merely turned the logic of colonialism 
on its head.
62
 For the Tutsi, the violence leading up to Rwanda’s Independence, marked the 
first ‘genocide’ against the Tutsis and an ‘anti-Tutsi sentiments’ that has since seen them 
excluded from all spheres of state and society. Whereas the colonial intervention and its role 
in identity formations has been exhausted in the literature, Mamdani’s work is merited for his 
analysis on the post-colonial institutional state development, which has reproduced the 
political identities and contributes to the post-colonial citizenship crises. 
 
For Mamdani, there wouldn’t have been a genocide had it not been for the legacy of 
colonialism and post-colonial politics. Essentially, he makes two important arguments in his 
theory. First, the ‘logic of the genocide’ must be thought through the ‘logic of colonialism’, 
which set into motion a particular political world. He argues that the “horror of colonialism 
led to two types of genocidal impulses. The first was the genocide of the native by the settler; 
the second was the native impulse to eliminate the settler.”
63
In order to deconstruct the 
genocidal ideology, one must explore the historical dynamic, which led to Hutu being 
synonymous with ‘native’ and Tutsi with ‘settler’, and he argues that the ‘truth’ lies in 
Rwanda’s political record and political institutions. The second argument he makes is that the 
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Rwandan genocide must be understood as a “Native’s genocide’, because “It was a genocide 
by those who saw themselves as sons-and daughters- of the soil, and their mission as one of 
clearing the soil of the threatening alien presence.
64
 This was “not “ethnic” but a “racial” 
cleansing, not of violence against the one who is seen as a neighbour, but against one who is 
seen as a foreigner; not a violence that targets a transgression across a boundary into home 
but one seeks to eliminate a foreign presence from home soil, literally and physically.”
65
 To 
support his political explanation, Mamdani describes three types of killings that took place 
during the genocide. These are: ‘the killing of combatants (and civilians) on both sides 
which was a direct outcome of the civil war; the killing of Hutu by Hutu (whether for 
political reasons, for example ‘moderate’ Hutus killed by nationalist Hutus); and the killing 
of Tutsi civilians by the Hutu mobs- this last category of killings is what precisely makes it a 
genocide.
66
 He argues that whereas Hutus were killed as individuals, between March-July 
1994, Tutsis were killed as a group. 
67
 By introducing the logic of the genocide through his 
theory of race, Mamdani exposes the principle nature of Rwanda’s violence, which is its 
political dimension. 
 
2.3.3 A Critical Review of Mahmood Mamdani 
 
The following section of this chapter will address the critical engagements with Mamdani’s 
theoretical framework. Mamdani situates his book, ‘When Victims become Killers…’ by 
departing with a critique on ‘Area Studies’, arguing for it to be decolonised, and delineates 
himself by pointing out the predominant practices of “history by analogy.”
68
 Where as he is 
lauded for interrogating the empirical with the theoretical, his deductive approach (“whereby 
he takes the theory from his previous book on post-colonial citizenship in Africa and applies 
it to Rwanda”) has led him into conflict with the specificity of Rwanda’s empirical record. 
69
There are two concerns specific to this commentary. Firstly, Mamdani’s methodology can 
sometimes lead to him being narrowly committed to generating his theory. Secondly, as 
Karekezi highlights in his final chapter, which offers many suggestions for the post-genocide 
regime, Mamdani neglects to acknowledge the ‘real world experiences’ and acute challenges 
that the post-genocide regime and transitional justice process has encountered, some of which 
I addressed in chapter 1.
70
Mamdani “tends to evaluate deductively Rwandan efforts 
according to the extent to which they mirror abstract models or other historical manifestations 
thereof (whether they are analogous to the Rwandan context or not).
71
 Karekezi thus argues 
that the “number of conceptual, empirical and methodological elements of Mamdani’s work 
merit closer scrutiny.”
72
 
 
Pal Aluwhalia and Francis B. Nyamnjoh share similar critiques of Mamdani’s mode of inquiry. 
Both argue that in as much as Mamdani attempts to break free of the predominant modes of 
inquiry, as Nyamnjoh asserts, “Although critical of simplistic dichotomies and ‘history of 
analogy’, he fails to remain consistent to the idea that sees ‘history as a process’.
73
By pointing 
out Mamdani’s over-reliance on the structure of the state rather than the social realities on the 
ground, he produces this world of neat ‘dichotomies’, whereby one is either ‘citizen’ or 
‘subject’, and cannot be something in between. 
74
Instead, as Nyamnjoh states, “we find 
individuals…who are both citizens and subjects (who straddle the ‘ethnic’  
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and ‘civic’ citizenship highlighted by Mamdani, but who would not accept sacrificing either 
permanently); sometimes they are more citizen than subject and sometimes more subject than 
citizens, but certainly not reducible to either”
75
 Nyamnjoh further argues that it is important to 
look at the sociology and anthropology of living Africans, which is quite something else.
76
 
 
For Aluwhalia, his issue is that whereas Mamdani successfully demonstrates that during 
decolonisation, revolutionary and nationalist movements successfully attacked the system of 
rule, and that in this emancipatory or liberated exercise decolonisation of the mind took 
place, however, he does not demonstrate how ‘recolonisation of the mind has taken place’.
77
 
I do not completely agree with Aluwhalia’s point, because the objective of Mamdani’s 
argument is to demonstrate how colonisation created a political world, which was inherited 
by the post-colonial political institutions of rule and governance. The 1959 ‘Social 
Revolution’ in Rwanda failed to deconstruct Hutu and Tutsi as political identities, and 
instead inherited them into the political project for what would come after independence, thus 
maintaining the logic of colonialism. I do agree that it is not always clear as to how the 
‘political identities’ continued to have life over time in order for it to have a causal 
relationship to the genocide. I will explore this point later. Lemarchand argues that it is 
difficult to follow Mamdani’s theory if one looks to the fifties in Rwanda, a marked point in 
Rwanda’s history, where Lemarchand describes the 1959 ‘great nativist revolution’ as being 
better described as a ‘revolution teleguide’, owing more to the ‘tutelle authorities than to 
Hutu nativism’. 
78
 Lemarchand continues by stating the ‘Hutu jacquerie were not directed 
against the Tutsi monarchy, much less the Tutsi as a group, but against the chiefs and sub-
chiefs, who were seen by the Hutu masses as the principle source of their misery, thus to 
speak of ‘nativism’ in this context is singularly inappropriate.’
79
Lemarchand also argues it 
was ‘regionalism’ rather than ‘nativism’, which placed power firmly in the hands of the 
south-central region (the Banyanduga) which paved the way of revenge of the northerners 
(Bakiga) and provided the platform for the North-South Hutu divide that led to the 1973 
coup.
80
 
 
Karenzi argues that whilst Mamdani has privileged the political dimensions of the genocide, 
which is certainly the strong point of his contribution, it has come at the “expense of an 
adequate consideration of other factors and the interconnected nature of these factors with 
the political.”
81
Whereas Mamdani presents ‘economic, social historical, and cultural 
realities, he assumes that they were ‘co-opted and manipulated for political purposes.’ 
82
 In 
response, Karekezi argues that this is a “simplistic assumption” to make, and owes it to 
Mamdani being conceptually biased rather than being open to Rwandan realities.
83
This view 
is reflected in many of the engaged critiques with Mamdani’s thesis, where it is expressed 
that Mamdani makes certain leaps between ‘facts’ on the past and present in order to make 
his argument, whilst relegating other contributing factors in to the genocide as insufficient 
causes. Such as, the RPF invasion took place after the crash in coffee prices (late-1980’s), 
which had a devastating impact for the Rwandan peasantry, and coincided with the start of 
World Bank/IMF “structural adjustment policies”.
84
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Saskia van Hoyweghen has posed an important question, which is inextricably linked to the 
queries and critics above, and has troubled my own inquiry. Hoywegen articulates, “the flaw 
of the book lies in the weak link made between the elaborate (race) theory which is presented 
in it and the actual research question which it begins (namely, why so many ordinary people 
participated in the genocide).
85
Karekezi argues that this is due to the conceptual 
shortcomings in the way Mamdani equates correlation with causation, and contribution with 
determinism.
86
 Both Karekezi and Lemarchand agree that, where Mamdani is on solid-
ground when it comes to his analysis on the contributions of the colonial administration to 
politicisation of identity, and how the native/settler dialectic takes root, it does not complete 
the causal link, by devoting equal analytical attention to the related question of how the 
native/settler dialectic was subsequently transformed into individual decisions to kill or not to 
kill.
87
 Mamdani asserts that “for the Hutu who killed, the Tutsi was a settler, not a 
neighbour”, but Mamdani does not offer empirical evidence to suggest that in the minds of 
the ‘ordinary Rwandans’, this was the case.
88
 Thus, Mamdani merely assumes, rather than 
proves that the ‘native/settler’ narrative is ingrained in the consciousness of ordinary 
Rwandans.
89
 Lemarchand expresses, “But where the settler metaphor applies to the case at 
hand, either at a conceptual derivative of the Hamitic myth, or as an overarching explanatory 
framework to account for the killings of Tutsi, is where the questions are likely to rise.”
90
 
 
Lemarchand argues that “It is one thing to try and make sense of the strategies pursued by 
the organiser of the killings, but it is quite another to grasp the motives of the grass-roots 
killers.”
91
Furthermore, Lemarchand points out that Mamdani’s frame of the murderous logic 
neglects the fact that “The killing of the Tutsi did not happen at one fell swoop, as the sudden 
explosion of the native’s Fanonesque rage against the settler, but as a series of calculated 
mass murders by a small group of Hutu extremist (of Hutu power obedience) that steadily 
increased in scope and intensity….The turning point came on 6 April 1994…It was at this 
point that the decision was made to apply the full force of genocidal violence against every 
Tutsi in sight as well as every Hutu whose political affiliation or physical appearance made 
them suspected of Tutsi sympathisers.”
92
Lemerchand frames the motive as a “security 
dilemma”, and that the straightforward rationale was forcefully articulated by Radio Mille 
Collines; “either we kill the first, or else be killed ourselves.”
93
 
 
Paul Magnarella has similar concerns, as he reiterates, “In response to Mamdani, one might 
add that there is no necessary connection between racial differences, immigration and 
genocide”, and by his own rationale, “humans shape their world based on human 
consciousness and capacity”, meaning “political identities should not be given much 
weight as the cause of genocide in Rwanda.”
94
 Magnarella also poses the following 
question to Mamdani- “why did Hutus then kill Hutus?”. In agreement, Lemarchand argues 
that Mamdani hasn’t systematically dealt with critically important questions regarding the 
variations in agency, such as “Why did some Hutu choose to protect their Tutsi neighbours, 
while others turned against them?”
95
 Magnarella argues Mamdani’s racial hypothesis is too 
narrow when it cannot account for mass killings on both sides. Lemarchands asserts that 
the dramatic ‘north-south split’ brought to light a “wholesale massacre of southern 
opposition politicians during the genocide.”
96
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2.3.4 Why did so many ‘Ordinary Rwandans’ kill? 
 
In response, to the above critiques, and my own queries, I chose to supplement the arguments 
made by Mamdani, with more recent empirical research conducted by key Rwandan scholars. 
In response to the political violence, and the questions raised around mass participation of 
‘ordinary’ Rwandans, I explored the work of Omar McDoom, Lee Ann Fujii and Scott 
Strauss. Similar to Mamdani, these scholars have centralised the question of mass 
participation and used it as a departure point for their individual inquiries. 
 
All three scholars have made seminal contributions to the study of genocide and mass 
killings, the study on political violence in Africa (and specifically the Great Lakes region) 
and have put to rest many of the tropes that have troubled the Rwandan genocide. Omar 
McDoom conducted empirical research (2002-2001) at both a meso-level (Ruhengeri and 
Butare prefectures) and at micro-level (in four communities) using survey-research, oral 
testimonies and semi-structured interviews, involving 296 participants. 
97
 McDoom chose 
these northern and southern prefectures to capture both the Hutu/Tutsi divide and the Hutu 
North/South divide. Lee Ann Fujii’s work has provided a framework for social theorising the 
Rwandan genocide. Fujii has used the theoretical framework of “social embeddedness” 
which understands ‘human action as being embedded in networks of social relations.’
98
 
Through this methodology Fujii found that the categories (victims, perpetrators, 
bystanders…) are not remotely distinguishable, but that ‘ordinary Rwandans’ frequently 
moved between all of them in the span of the genocide. Over nine months, Fujii conducted 
231 individual interviews with 82 participants, and two group-interviews in each of her sites 
(Ngali and Kimanzi). Scott Strauss has used his English and French proficiency to pour over 
both primary and secondary source collections. With a background in journalism, Strauss 
demonstrates a methodological conscientiousness in his findings from the interviews he 
conducted with 210 confessed killers. His journalistic instinct to be sceptical, has led him to 
triangulate his data, for example he “compares periods in Rwandan political history for 
common dynamics driving episodes of past violence at Tutsis; he situates the testimony of 
the confessed killers within the that of the other witnesses and survivors to probe the veracity 
of the killers’ words.”
99
 And Strauss doesn’t just stop there, he probes his own argument 
with precise attention to methodological detail each step of the way. Strauss interestingly 
found that although Rwanda was the most “mass-participatory of genocide” ‘only’ 14-17% 
(175,000 to 200,000) of the Hutu male population participated.
100
This statistic challenges 
the account and narratives drawn by the post-genocide Rwandan government. 
 
McDoom, Strauss, and Fujii share the belief that people who participated in the genocide did 
not reveal a “higher degree of ethnic hatred, did not subscribe to racist values more strongly, 
and indeed, in general did not particularly consider the Hutu-Tutsi divide a crucial part of 
daily life.”
101
These scholars however differ in their discussion on what led ‘ordinary 
Rwandans’ down the pathway to participate in the violence. 
 
McDoom asserts that it is important to think out of the popular assumption that the Rwandan 
genocide was this “widespread state affair”. Rather, through empirical data collection (the 
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most appropriate methodology), he found that in different parts of the country, 
different routes to the genocide were taken, and local contexts produced different 
‘conducive conditions’. 
102
‘From his findings, Mcdoom argues that mass mobilisation, 
including collective violence, was contingent on two main conditions. 
 
The first condition is that mass mobilisation “required a mind-set: the prior internalization 
within the Hutu population of a particular set of historical-ideological beliefs”.
103
 By 
historical component, he refers to a Hutu collective memory of Hutu oppression in the hands 
of Tutsi that the 1959 Hutu Revolution had ended.
104
 The ‘ideological beliefs component’ is 
defined by the “external threat, the on-going war, in historical and ethnic/racial terms and 
rested on twin beliefs.”
105
The war was ethnic/racial because Hutus saw the collaboration 
between the Tutsi ‘within Rwanda’ and ‘Tutsi enemy outside of Rwanda’, as forming an 
alliance against the Hutu indigenous majority, with the specific intent to return Hutus to a 
past position of inferiority and subordination.
106
Thus, Mcdoom rejects the ‘instrumentalist 
view of ‘ethnicity’, and subscribes to Mamdani’s conceptualisation of ‘race’ (Tutsi as 
alien/foreign) and when Tutsi were briefly redefined as an ethnic group in the Second 
Republic. 
 
The second condition is the “commitment of state institutions, which still had authority 
and/or power in the eyes of the population, to the genocidal project.”
107
 McDoom rejects 
the ‘pure statist, elitist argument’ and the argument that ‘unquestioning obedience’ led to 
mass participation in the genocide.
108
 In the North, there had to be a pre-existing ethnic 
prejudice, which wad reinforced by the war, and which facilitated the “co-optation of the 
population into anti-Tutsi violence.
109
However this wasn't the case in the South, where 
there was a “gap in the State’s authority at the micro-level that allowed pro-violent elements 
to come to the fore.”
110
 This ‘commitment’ provided the initial trigger and initial legitimacy 
for genocidal violence, and the culture of impunity fuelled this further. However, McDoom 
clarifies that once the genocide was on its way, and its subsequent degeneration, 
participation came about more through “complex interaction of the individual motives, and 
not only the consequence of the state’s continuing authority and power.”
111
 
 
McDoom’s research has debunked many ‘myths’ and assumptions made about the 
relationships and perceptions between Hutu and Tutsis. I found that his methodology is 
transparent and not constrained by predestined goals, which allows McDoom to successfully 
capture the complexity of the Rwandan case study. For example, his findings demonstrated 
that there is a crucial difference between Hutus in the North and South, which is an outcome 
of the socio-political North/South divide. In the North, for the genocidal message to ring true, 
there had to be a “deeply embedded, of historical, essentialist differences”, but McDoom 
clarifies that this Hutu collective memory is not a ‘racist or prejudicial one.
112
 He rejects the 
assumption that all Hutus were racist or ethnic chauvinist towards Tutsis. This was confirmed 
by Hutus in the South who had a recent ‘Hutu collective memory’ in which Tutsis and Hutus 
had relationships (friendships and marriages) and cohabited together.
113
 With regards to 
“perceived ethnic inequality” Hutus in the North and South felt that Tutsis were more 
successful (owned more land or cows) but differed when asked about the ‘legitimacy of 
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Tutsis success’.
114
 Hutus in the North viewed Tutsi success as being due to historical 
socio-economic privileges rather than due to their own hard work.
115
Furthermore, the data 
also shows that Hutus in the North were more likely to feel aggrieved by ‘perceived Tutsi 
socio-economic superiority’, which contributed to some participating in the violence.
116
 
 
Lee Ann Fujii has offered a distinctly different approach to understanding the ‘popular 
agency of ordinary Rwandans.’ In her book, ‘Killing Neighbours: Webs of Violence in 
Rwanda’, Fujii departs by pointing out an interesting dynamic of the genocide, which frames 
her discussion. She states that “many Tutsi who did survive did so only because of the help of 
a Hutu friend, family member, neighbour, or stranger”, thus it is important to look at why 
some of the Interhamwe were helping the very people they were meant to target.
117
 Fujii 
clarifies that her objective in the study is to ‘fill in the gaps’ left by ‘ethnic-based theories’, 
that have the tendency to focus on mass participation through a narrow ‘ethnic-lens’, and 
occludes the variation that takes place within groups.
118
 Fujii argues mass violence such as 
genocide needs to be investigated through empirical research, because arguments of ‘ethnic-
hatred’ and ‘ethnic-fear’ tend to overlook the ‘agency of the ordinary killers’
119
. In her 
findings, Fujii argues that ethnicity is only a partial explanation, whilst people may kill under 
the pretext of ethnic ideologies (“ethnic- loyalties, ideologies, animosities, or fears…”) to 
essentialise the ‘ethnic-argument’ is a mistake, rather the “real motive and interest are often 
rooted in local relations and power structures”- other more immediate logics are at 
work.
120
Similar to McDoom, Fujii demonstrates that Rwandans had different motives and 
levels of involvement that led them into and away from the genocide.
121
Fujii clarifies that 
this does not mean ‘ethnicity’ is unimportant, but that it “operates as an organising principle 
during genocide, not as an automatic trigger for mass participation in violence.”
122
 
 
Fujii presents the process that led people to become complicit (whether fully or partially) 
through the concept of a “script”. The ‘script’ refers to the “rule of expectations for behaviour”, 
that was enacted by ‘scriptwriters’ or the ‘genocidal masterminds’.
123
 The ‘scriptwriters’ had a 
desire to hold onto power, and presented the civil war as an ethnic war, that all Tutsis are the 
“enemy within” and “mass murder under their leadership as the only solution.”
124
 Leading up to 
the genocide, there was a long-accepted historical ‘truth’ being taught in schools, to wit: “Tutsis 
were foreign invaders from Ethiopia who had stolen Rwanda from its rightful inhabitants: as 
Hamites, they shared no natural kinship with the Hutu majority, who were of Bantu origin and 
were therefore Hutu’s “natural enemy”.”
125
The ‘scriptwriters’ further argue that the 1990 
October RPF invasion, was proof that “the Tutsis long-held plan to re-instate a feudal way of 
life and to re-enslave all Hutu, but worse, it revealed their ultimate plan to annihilate Hutu 
completely and regain absolute power.”
126
Moreover, during the civil war, Fuji argues that there 
was a shift in the rhetoric. Rwandans were taught that in every way possible way (social, 
political, etc.) Hutus and Tutsis were fundamentally different. Fujii also argues that the 
genocidal message had to be normalized in order for it to resonate, and she identifies four key 
components- “repetition, reach, monopoly of the discursive space, and skillful use of evidence 
that lent credibility to the story.”
127
She states that in Kigali, by 1993 “genocide talk” had 
become common.
128
 The ‘scriptwriters’ had created this polarized world of “kill or be 
killed.”
129
Fur Fujii, local power 
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holders also played a significant role. She argues that for local power holders “the script does 
not represent a set of instructions they must follow to the letter, but rather an opportunity to 
apply their own interpretations to the text”.
130
Her findings from the interviews, 
demonstrated that local power leaders had different interpretations and their agency was 
determined by their local political needs, local circumstances, and local social dynamics.
131
 
 
Fujii focuses her analysis on what she calls the ‘joiners’ or ‘low-level participants’ (ordinary 
Rwandans) in the genocide. She makes an interesting argument, that ‘joiners’ joined the 
genocide one way or another, with the awareness of the objective (‘extermination of Tutsis’), 
but their logic was not always or even primarily shaped by ethnic imperatives, such as fear of 
the Tutsi-led RPF or of Tutsi hatred in general but by social dynamics that sometimes took 
precedence over ethnic considerations.”
132
 She focuses on ‘social ties’ and found examples 
in which; family ties served as conduits for recruitment (Hutu male relatives); or ties also 
formed among members of the killing groups through group activities and interactions that 
often took place before any killing began; or where in come instances friendship ties 
attenuated murderous actions, leading killers to help save Tutsis in specific contexts.’
133
In 
the presence of authorities, low-level participants tended to go along with the violence.
134
 
Therefore “which ties became salient depended on the context.”
135
 
 
Strauss has also focused on the local politics or local power holders, rather than the national 
politics as a driver for spread of the genocide.
136
 Moreover, similar to Mamdani, Strauss has 
approached the genocide with an intention of providing a political explanation. In addition to 
addressing the question of mass participation by ‘ordinary Rwandans’, Strauss is also 
interested in “why did the hardliners choose genocide as their preferred strategy for staying 
in power?” In response to these questions, Strauss identifies three variables that made the 
genocide possible. 
 
Strauss argues that the logic of the genocide was “predicated on eliminating a threat, on self-
protection and the reestablishment of order.” 137The first variable he attributes to the 
genocide is the ‘war’. Strauss argues that “without a civil war, the genocide would not have 
happened”– the war was a consequentialist factor, that “legitimised killing and justified 
extreme measures”, thus providing the logic of the genocide.138 Strauss challenges the ‘state-
centric’ view, and instead argues that the genocide was not “meticulously planned”, nor was 
it the first strategy, rather it was the ‘hardliners’ response to an increasingly threatening and 
dynamic situation.
139
The ‘hardliners’ felt a security threat that was shaped by the defeat of 
the civil war (which they perceived the armed enemy as not playing by the ‘rules’); the 
assassination of Habyarimana (which produced a rupture in state authority- that led to 
disorder and a temporary gap of authority); and an erosion of power.
140
 War created a threat 
that was also felt at the individual level, renewal of the war in April 1994 was perceived as 
securing themselves in a time of physical insecurity. Furthermore, local power struggles were 
able to exploit the temporary gap in state authority.
141
Strauss argues, “war alone did not 
cause genocide. Rather, genocide happened because Hutu hardliners decided to foment 
violence against Tutsis and because hardliners had control of the state.”
142
The Hutu 
hardliners attacked international peacekeepers forcing them to withdraw from Rwanda, and 
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consolidated “their loyal institutions, including the elite military units, paramilitary forces, 
political party networks, and broadcast media”- all of which were not yet seized by the Tutsi 
rebel forces and allowed them to gain dominance in a war that they were losing.
143
 The 
Hutu hardliners projected their plan as being “eliminating a threat, on self protection and the 
reestablishment of order.”
144
 Thus, Strauss argues that the “war underpinned the logic of 
genocide, war legitimised killing, war empowered hardliners, and war led specialist in 
violence to engage in the domestic political arena.”
145
 
 
The second variable refers to the design of state power in Rwanda. Strauss argues, 
“Rwanda’s state was unusually strong in sub-Saharan Africa…it had historically enduring 
institutions that had influence outside of the capital. The state could mobilise the rural 
population.”
146
 Moreover, the geography of Rwanda aided the state-power because the “The 
small, cultivated territory offered little ‘exit’ opportunities for individuals.”
147
 Strauss argues 
that the Hutu hardliners who controlled the state are responsible for the genocide, when the 
‘Hutu hardliners gained control of the state it became a “powerful tool for executing 
decisions and mobilizing citizens”.
148
 This allowed ‘Hutu hardliners’ coercive means to 
enforce their decisions countrywide, and also allowed them to associate killing Tutsis with 
authority, thus “equating violence with a de facto policy.”
149
 He states, “killing took on the 
force of law, and disobedience became synonymous with treason.”
150
 Strauss also does not 
find evidence of a ‘culture of obedience, but he does mention that his participants do say that 
they were following the orders to kill, that ‘Hutu-intimidation’ was a real problem, and in 
some participants cases it was easier to comply with the violence than to disobey.
151
 There is 
sufficient evidence to show that ethnic violence is the result of ‘intra-ethnic’ rather than 
‘inter-ethnic’ struggles. Strauss is able to link national-level events to local outcomes 
(macro-level to micro-level) and demonstrates that the ‘top-down argument’ misrepresents 
the complexity of the reality.
152
His findings showed that the “balance of power in these local 
communities tipped in favour of violence only if Hutu extremist prevailed over Hutu 
moderates in these places” thus sub-national variations are important. 
153
 
 
The third variable that Strauss includes as a key factor concerns categorizing Tutsis as 
“unitary ethnic or racial group”.154 Strauss argues that Hutus did not kill Tutsis because they 
believed Tutsis were no longer human or because they were committed to a Hutu 
nationalism- “ethnic utopia”, but because the hardliners had conflated the entire Tutsi 
population to be categorized collectively with the armed Tutsi enemy- the RPF. This, rather 
than historical ethnic differences was important for the motive to eliminate ‘the 
enemy’.155From his interviews, Strauss shares that whereas there is a tendency to focus on 
the “dehumanizing language” (inyenzi, snakes, rats) used before and during the genocide to 
describe Tutsis, most of his participants in the interviews used language of “threat, danger 
and war” and equated the Tutsis with the “enemy” (umwanzi) or with “accomplices” 
(ibiyitso) of “the enemy”.156 Strauss argues, “ethnicity mattered, but…mechanisms driving 
individuals to kill were not primarily about ethnic prejudice, pre-existing ethnic antipathy, 
manipulation from racist propaganda, or nationalist commitments.”157 
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Similar to McDoom’s finding, Strauss asserts that he found strong evidence of interethnic 
cooperation before the genocide. He states “Rwanda is a highly integrated country in ethnic 
terms, far more than most other countries in Africa. Hutu and Tutsi speak the same language, 
frequently intermarry, and live side by side, among other commonalities. Perpetrators 
cooperated on a daily basis with Tutsi before the genocide, and most perpetrators expressed 
generally good relations with Tutsi neighbours- even if many believed that Hutu and Tutsi 
were members of different ethnic categories and had different physical attributes.”
158
 He also 
emphasizes that past violence did not take across time in Rwanda, but that it took place in 
particular episodes and this has led to some switching from seeing people as a “racial 
category” and neighbours seeing each other as “enemies” but it isn’t a constant.
159
 In the 
aggregate of his study, Strauss explains that what underpinned the logic of the genocide, is 
what he refers to as “collective ethnic categorisation” that relied on the a. wartime uncertainty 
and fear; b. social pressure; and c. opportunity (obtain power or property).”
160
The category 
of “Tutsi” came to represent all individual Tutsi- it was not invented in the genocide but 
relied on pre-existing ‘ethnic’ and ‘racial’ categories and “awareness that those categories 
were widespread and resonant in Rwandan society.”
161
Many central political idioms, such as 
the ‘national identity cards’ had normalized these ethnic/racial categories, but what allowed 
the ‘switch’ for many ‘ordinary Rwandans’ was the re-categorisation of Tutsis as the 
‘enemies, and Strauss emphasizes that this only took place during the war, and was only a 
state claim rather than a pre-existing hatred.
162
 Finally, Strauss asserts that these three key 
variables were primary mechanisms for the genocide, but it is important to bear in mind that 
they varied in each participant’s experience.
163
 
 
2.3.5 My justification for making use of Mamdani’s theoretical framework 
 
The Rwandan genocide continues to capture the imagination of so many, which has led to a 
rapid growth in the scholarship and a marked shift from the initial accounts given on the 
genocide. Several popular theories and explanations, that the genocide was the outcome of 
the ‘failed-African state’, ancient-tribal hatreds, population pressure or ecological scarcity, 
propaganda/media indoctrination, pure ethno-ideology, etc., have been systematically 
rejected by the more recent empirical research being conducted by Rwandan scholars.
164
 A 
significant development has taken place in critique of the post-genocide political governance 
and its involvement in the on-going conflict in the Great Lakes region. For practical 
purposes, I have synthesised arguments made by key Rwandan scholars that are acutely 
necessary to include in the discussion on ‘why ordinary Rwandans participated in the 
violence’. This dissertation develops arguments made by Mamdani, whilst elaborating on the 
specific question on ‘victims justice’. 
 
This dissertation is drawn to the methodological claim that Mamdani makes, which allows 
for useful links to be made between the theoretical and empirical. His work provides an 
analytical framework and has generated a theory towards thinking about genocide violence 
(broadly mass political violence in Africa), which shifts away from universalising ‘grand 
theories’ or comparative research. Due to his focus on generating a theory, it was important 
for this dissertation to critically interrogate the arguments he makes and supplement them 
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with the contributions of other key Rwandan scholars. Arguably, although they have 
successfully provided evidence to support their explanations, they have not 
sufficiently undermined Mamdani’s political explanation and have chosen to read 
them alongside Mamdani’s thesis. 
 
By challenging the popular perception of ethnicity and it being a principle cause of violence, 
Mamdani has re-introduced ‘race’ and exposes the ‘highly political nature of the violence in 
the form of state action’.
165
This has comparative value for how we think of violence in 
Africa, and based on his argument, this suggests that this type of violence can take place 
elsewhere, especially in the context of the colonial experience. In an interesting twist, as 
much as Mamdani seeks to critique and decolonise ‘Area Studies’, he has in fact contributed 
significantly to its development. 
 
As this dissertation demonstrates, his ‘theory on race’ is refreshing and provides an analytical 
framework that can deconstruct many tropes that have troubled questions on the logic of the 
genocide and on its ‘popular agency’. Mamdani’s analysis redirects the preoccupation with the 
‘extreme violence’, that has sensationalized the violence accompanied with provocative legal and 
moral vocabulary, and which renders the violence as an ‘event’. This has enabled me to 
investigate the limitations of the ‘justice paradigm’ (policy of mass accountability) and to think 
through the post-genocide political project, which I believe has reached an impasse. I also 
appreciate that his analytical framework, has redirected and centralised the historical, political 
and regional context of the Rwandan genocide. 
 
One of the most important and original contributions he makes is through his rich 
descriptions and analysis on the regional political context. By making the link between 
Uganda’s post-colonial citizenship crisis and Rwanda’s, which led to the RPF political 
programme/strategy which saw them invade Rwanda (October 1990), Mamdani 
importantly highlights the ‘politics of indigeneity’ that has long troubled the politics in the 
region. As Lemarchand argues, this has filled a major gap in the literature on Uganda and 
Zaire/Congo.
166
 Arguably, it is unfortunate that Mamdani left out a more thorough 
investigation (a chapter on its own) on Burundi, whose politics is inextricably linked to 
Rwandan politics. Despite this, I find that Mamdani’s empirical contribution through a 
regional analysis provides a suitable analytical framework that can address the ‘shared’ and 
unique differences of each states colonial experience, in the region. This provides an inroad 
for thinking about the post-colonial citizenship crisis in the Great Lakes region. This has 
great practical value for thinking about a sustainable solution that will finally attend to the 
political crisis in Rwanda, and the on-going Great Lakes refugee (citizenship) crisis. 
 
Finally, in spite of Mamdani’s dim view of Rwanda’s post-genocide governance, his offering 
provides a powerful resolution for breaking Rwanda’s politics free of the stranglehold of 
Hutu and Tutsi politics. The critique of ‘victor’s justice’ and ‘victims justice’ has supported 
my work towards re-thinking Rwanda within a framework that attends to its long established 
political crisis. This is an important methodological step in this dissertation, to transcend the 
transitional justice paradigm which has a hold and re-enforces the categories of the ‘victor’/ 
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‘victim’ and ‘loser’/ ‘perpetrator’, and to re-centralise the political problem as being the 
heart of Rwanda’s crisis. This does ‘justice’ for all ‘survivors’ of the genocide, and dissolves 
the chasm that separates the ‘Tutsi political minority’ and the ‘Hutu political majority’, and 
has constrained the political landscape in post-genocide Rwanda. 
 
2.4 Contextualising the Genocide: The Historical and Political Record of Rwanda 
 
The following section in this chapter investigates Rwanda’s political record, and the political 
world that was set in motion by the bifurcated colonial state. Mamdani argues that Rwanda’s 
colonial experience was a ‘Halfway House’ between indirect rule and direct rule.
167
 The 
Belgian Power had created ‘customary law’ and the ‘Native Authorities’, which existed 
alongside ‘civic law’ and ‘civic authorities’. Neither authorities were ethnicised, but 
racialised. Between 1826-1936 the Belgian colonials administered reforms, which were 
institutionalised and would prove to cast a political crisis for Rwanda’s post-colonial 
regimes.
168
The reforms led to two outcomes, 1. Tutsis were redefined as their own race: the 
Hamitic race; and 2. Hutus were identified as the Bantu- indigenous race, and would be 
governed by Tutsi chiefs through the system of ‘Native Authorities’.
169
This created Hutus as 
native and Tutsis as non-native, and forms the basis for institutional changes that have “fixed 
the Tutsi as a race in relation to the colonial state.”
170
’Race’ has been central to the logic of 
colonialism, the 1959 ‘Social Revolution’, the First and Second Republic, and the logic of 
the genocide. In each of these moments there was a missed opportunity to transcend the 
‘politics of race.’ 
 
2.4.2 Decolonisation and the ‘fiction of race’ 
 
Rwanda had an interesting mode of decolonisation, which failed to disinherit the colonial 
political crisis, particularly the racialised political identities. Leading up to the decolonisation 
process, the 1950’s had marked a shift in colonial control of its two subjects, as Hutus and 
Tutsis were organising themselves in preparation for independence. Three types of groups 
amongst the Hutus started to converge and form an alliance: ‘the intellectuals’, local level 
Hutu leadership (workers alliances) and the ‘peasants’.
171
 The alliance formed around there 
shared grievances that came with colonial oppression, the question of race, and gaining 
political power for Hutus. Although, the co-ordination of an ‘inter-class’ alliance was 
important for a revolution, in Rwanda it placed the peasantries power in the hands of a small-
group of educated elites, which has set a political practice ever since. The Hutus in the north 
were independent until “militarily defeated by German and Tutsi-led southern German 
Schutztruppe between 1910-1912 to subdue them”.
172
 In spite of being incorporated into the 
early Rwandan state, the northern Hutus formed a distinct Hutu culture, and were 
‘representative of an independent Hutu tradition.’
173
Melvern argues that this led to 
‘considerable bitterness towards both the Tutsi and southern Hutu concerning 
subjugation.’
174
 The first Hutu and Tutsi political parties that emerged based their political 
ideologies on justice for their group. They are UNAR, which were Tutsi pro-Monarchist and 
anti-Belgian; and PARMEHUTU, a Hutu party who called for ending Tutsi colonisation 
before freedom from Belgium.
175
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 By February 1957, the Mwami (King) Mutara III Rudahigwa, who was the first Rwandan 
king to convert to Catholicism, together with Mwami’s High Council (Conseil Superieur du 
Pays) released a document called Mise au Point, which detailed an emancipation 
programme and for a “rapid transfer of power to the king and his council.”
176
This occurred 
during heightened expectations among Hutu intellectuals who at the time were beginning to 
formulate there political and economical grievances in explicitly political terms
177
The 
‘Hutu elite’ who were educated and now supported by the Roman Catholic Church, 
interpreted this call as an attempt to institutionalise an ‘elite Tutsi’ hegemony (Mwami, 
chiefs and sub-chiefs) in preparation for a Tutsi state after independence.
178
 
 
To prevent Tutsi power, the Hutu elites published a text, Notes on the Social Aspect of the 
Racial Native Problem in Rwanda, also known as the Bahutu Manifesto (March, 1957), as a 
counter-argument to Mise au Point. The Bahutu Manifesto strongly opposed the ‘nationalist 
position of the Mwami’ and the “double-colonialism” that Hutus experienced by the 
Belgian Colonials and ‘Hamites’ (Tutsis). 
179
The Hutu intellectuals took the political 
opportunity to publish the Bahutu Manifesto, shortly before the arrival of the UN 
Trusteeship Visiting Mission to Rwanda.
180
 The UN visiting mission is designed to 
facilitate the process of decolonisation, and to report its findings on the colonial experience. 
 
The UN visiting mission was very critical of the Belgian colonials, pointing to the 
“subservient status of the Hutu masses who were subject to forced labour and discrimination 
in all walks of life.”
181
Between 1948-1962, the UN sent five visiting mission to Rwanda, and 
each time they reported that the political situation was worsening. They critiqued Belgium 
for neglecting to address the growing nationalism, for failing to create a democracy and not 
educating the Rwandan people, in preparation for the transfer of power.
182
 The UN mission 
also recognised that there was an established Hutu elite in Northern Rwanda, which formed a 
distinct Hutu culture and felt considerably bitter towards all Tutsis and Southern Hutus 
regarding historical subjugation.
183
 Furthermore on its 1957 visiting mission, the mission 
recognised the Bahutu Manifesto represented a serious political challenge to the Tutsi 
oligarchy, and with great pessimism the mission stated that it had found “little hope for 
rapprochement between the races” and called on Belgium to accelerate its efforts to 
emancipate the Hutu, gesturing towards the creation of a democracy.
184
 Even, the OAU 
recognised that the demands of the Hutu elites were not particularly ‘unjust’. 
 
The Bahutu Manifesto challenged every conceivable feature of the feudal system.
185
 The 
central critique argues that: “The political monopoly of one race, the Mututsi. In the present 
circumstances, the political monopoly is turned into an economic and social monopoly…and 
given the de facto selection in school, the political, economic and social monopolies turn into 
a cultural monopoly, which condemns the desperate Bahutu to be for ever subaltern workers, 
even after an Independence that they will have contributed to gain without realising what is in 
store for them. The ubukhake has been legislated away, but the monopolies have replaced it 
with an even stronger oppression.”
186
 Gerard Prunier argues that the word ‘race’ used in this 
social context was an alarm-bell, even though it was constructed over years by the  
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Europeans, it showed that “the ideology had been swallowed whole and that a socio-political 
problem was now dealt with in ‘racial’ terms.”
187
 Lemarchand asserts “Never before had 
such a devastating critique of the ancien regime been publicly set forth by its 
opponents.”
188
Deborah Mayersen found that “the issues raised in the Manifesto became a 
staple news item in the local press and a prime subject of discussion on the hills.”
189
 
 
Both documents (Mise au Point and Bahutu Manifesto) dramatized a growing ‘ideological 
polarisation between Hutu and Tutsi.’
190
 Each document also rationalised their claim for power 
as doing justice for their group. The Tutsi elite made their claim based on a “traditional” (pre-
colonial) prerogative, that power should be restored rightfully in the hands of the Tutsis. 
191
The 
‘subaltern’- the Hutu demanded for power to be based on their claim that ‘they represented the 
indigenous majority’- that they were the natives, and they mobilised a popular nationalist support 
base from below to counter the Tutsi elite from above. 
192
 
 
Mamdani argues that the “Tutsi identity had long preceded the Hutu identity…Tutsi 
consciousness was a consciousness of power, while Hutu consciousness would come to be 
one of lack of power and of a struggle for power.”
193
 Colonialism and colonial power had 
just added to the pre-colonial realities and by the late nineteenth century it had sharpened 
contrast between Tutsi power and the Hutu absence of power, which accentuated it as a ‘one-
dimensional reality’ and “stigmatised Tutsi power as alien rule.”
194
 
 
2.4.3 The ‘1959 Social Revolution’ 
 
The Rwandan political landscape is often viewed as solely being a struggle between the Hutu 
elite and Tutsi elite. However, there were different cross-cutting political tendencies within 
each group, there was a healthy portion of moderate Tutsis and Hutus who were prepared to 
enter independence with a ‘power-sharing agreement’.
195
 An example of this was the 
reformist party- RADER, which was led by two moderate Tutsis seeking the economic and 
cultural development of both Tutsis and Hutus.
196
 APROSOMA was a Hutu-led party, that 
initially pursued improvements for both Hutu and Tutsis, but once tensions started to arise 
with the militarised Hutu party- PARMEHUTU who was broadening its constituency base 
that came to define the arena of Hutu politics, APROSOMA became an anti-Tutsi party.
197
 
However, as with many other colonies, the poisoned colonial legacy made a political 
settlement amongst moderates unattainable, it could not appease the popular and emerging 
‘radical Hutu elite,’ who sought justice for past brutality by the Tutsis.
198
 Historical justice 
would be sought after through political rights reserved for Hutus. Mamdani argues that “the 
development of a Hutu counter-elite and its growing self-assertiveness brought Tutsi under 
immense pressure. Those who questioned the basis of this unity took initiatives to go beyond 
its narrow and short-term orientation. In doing so they both crystallised the plurality of views 
within the Tutsi elite and gave it organisational expression.”
199
 In the end, the 1959 
revolution presented a “limited menu” of political choices for the Rwandan people.
200
 
 
It took a very small spark to ignite the violence that erupted after November 1959. The spark 
that fuelled this was a rumour that a prominent PARMEHUTU activist/and Hutu sub-chief 
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was murdered brutally by young members of UNAR. 
201
 Melvern argues that the Hutus 
acted on their ‘numerical predominance’ and a deep sense of injustice and inferiority.
202
 
 
The Belgian colonials viewed the violence as a clash between the races- Hutu and Tutsi, and 
placed Rwanda under Belgian military rule, led by Colonel Guy Logeist.
203
 Prunier argues 
that from the beginning the Belgians switched sides and showed extreme partiality towards 
the Hutus, even witnessing violence without intervening.
204
Hutus began burning houses, 
and attacking Tutsi authorities, which urged hundreds and thousands of Tutsis to flee. Some 
of those who fled infiltrated border guerrilla armed groups preparing for raids into Rwanda; 
the Hutus called them ‘inyenzi’ (cockroaches). The violence committed during the ‘Social 
Revolution’ serves as a significant point in the post-genocide narrative, which ‘confirms’ to 
the current government that Hutus have a deep-seated hatred towards Tutsis. But in actual 
fact it was hardly a ‘bloodbath’, the highest estimate of deaths is around 200-
300.
205
Secondly, it is clear that what touted as a ‘Social Revolution’ to restore socio-
economic justice to the peasants, and to the broadly for Hutus, was far from it, and what 
actually took place as Prunier argues, was less about economic and social gains, but rather 
resembled more of a power-struggle fought amongst the ethnic elites.
206
 
 
Belgium had very quickly realised that it had lost complete control of the situation. Colonel 
Logiest articulated, “Because of the force of circumstances, we have to take sides. We cannot 
remain neutral and passive” and thus by early 1960, the Belgians began to replace the Tutsi 
chiefs with Hutu ones.
207
 To add to the ‘political crisis’ and critical problems a ‘democracy’ 
would incur in the midst of majoritarian nationalisms, the colonial authorities held elections 
between June-July 1960, which PARMEHUTU had won by a long shot.
208
The new 
authorities were called ‘burgomasters’ based on the Belgian model, which ruled over 229 
communes.
209
 Colonel Logeist declared, “The revolution is over”, and in 1961 the new 
President Gregoire Kayibanda, declared Rwanda as being an autonomous Republic.
210
 The 
Hutus now found themselves being warmly embraced by the colonials who only just recently 
had scorned them.
211
 
 
Lemarchand argues that the Belgian administration had decided that the peasant uprisings of 
1959 was a revolution (which it was not) and effectively the “real revolution could no longer 
be averted.”
212
Prunier agrees and argues that this was a “Belgian-sponsored 
administratively-controlled phenomenon” and effectively allowed the new Hutu burgomaster 
to resume with the ‘old habits’ of feudal rule, only now the Hutus were the chiefs and the 
Tutsis were being oppressed.
213
Thus, the logic of the colonial world was merely turned on 
its head- ‘yesterday’s victims’ became todays perpetrators’. 
 
The 1959 Social Revolution failed to repudiate the ‘native/settler’ dynamic’ that was the 
institutional premise, and instead narrowly only focused on the consequences of colonial 
rule.
214
 Mamdani argues that “Instead of pioneering a way beyond colonially shaped identities 
and destinies, 1959 locked Rwanda’s fate within the world of political identities constructed by 
colonialism…1959 turned into a final act desperately trying to breath life into racialised 
identities born of the colonial state.”
215
Secondly, the events of 1959 ushered in a 
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pursuit for justice so focused that it turned into revenge.
216
Lastly, 1959 had led to an 
enormous wave of refugees- mainly exiled Tutsis that presented a troubling new reality in the 
Great Lakes region. In the OAU report ‘Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide’, it is argued 
that “Not all refugees remain passive victims; some turn into warriors. It was these guerrilla 
fighters who were famously called the “inyenzi” or cockroaches, by the Hutu, a label that 
would be resurrected with a vengeance 30 years later.
217
 Between 1961-1967, Tutsi 
commandos operating outside the country launched a dozen raids on Rwanda.”
218
The impact 
would be devastating for Tutsis in years to come, not only in Rwanda but also in 
neighbouring states. 
 
2.4.4 The First Republic: Justice and Power for the native Hutu majority 
 
The mode of decolonisation in Rwanda saw the country transition from Belgian colonial 
rule to a Tutsi Monarchy and into a Hutu Republic. This signalled the first of many failed 
opportunities to transition Rwanda into a post-ethnic society that could transcend Hutu and 
Tutsi as political identities. 
 
In the First Republic (1964) under the leadership of Gregoire Kayibanda (PARMEHUTU 
leader and key author of the Bahutu Manifesto) state formation operated on the logic that 
Hutu and Tutsi must be segregated as they were two separate nations, and that Rwanda 
belonged to the Hutu nation as it is the indigenous demographic majoritarian. Kayibanda’s 
ideology is understood as being “exclusionist” and faced tensions amongst Hutus and Tutsis 
who were “accomodationist”. 
219
 Prunier states that “In many ways the President was in 
fact the mwami of the Hutu. The same style of leadership applied, and his deliberate 
remoteness, authoritarianism and secretiveness…”
220
 Prunier also argues that Kayibanda 
instilled this principle of ‘unquestioning obedience’ that would play a tragic role in 1994, 
but as demonstrated by Mcdoom, Fujii and Strauss this argument is questionable. 
 
Tutsis presence was forcibly removed from the political arena, and thus Tutsi politics shifted 
from Rwanda- their ‘home’ into exile.
221
 Politics would be confined to Hutus and to serve the 
Hutu nation. This led to Tutsis being treated as “politically illegitimate” in the Hutu nation, and 
continued to be understood as the ‘alien/settler race’. Kayibanda had directed its ‘political 
ammunition’ towards APROSOMA- who had once considered integrating Tutsi into its political 
project. 
222
Hutu consciousness transcended politics and economics, and reflected in the social 
consciousness of the state, through the Church, newspapers (1955/56), and in social cultural 
movements for Hutus (Mouvement Social Muhutu). 
223
Mamdani argues that the crucial 
difference between being defined as an ‘ethnic group’ and ‘race’ is that an ‘ethnic group’ would 
be received as being separate but still indigenous, whereas Tutsis as a race had no grounds to 
make political claims as they were explicitly foreign to Rwanda.
224
 Moreover, the Hamitic 
hypothesis was able to retain political potency in Rwanda, was the notion that the “Tutsi as a 
race apart from the majority turned into a rationale for a set of institutions that reproduced Tutsi 
as racialised minority”.
225
 The ‘racial ideology’ had inspired institutional reform. The other 
significance, is that the Tutsis in exile were seen as a ‘political diaspora’ and not a ‘cultural 
diaspora’ and with each raid conducted by the Tutsi 
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diaspora (the inyenzi) Kayibanda used it to confirm that Tutsis were ‘the enemy’-seeking to 
overthrow power and establish Tutsi power in Rwanda. These two outcomes are the foundations 
for ‘Hutu Power’ and their permanently constructed security threat- Tutsi Power. 
 
In the late sixties an interesting dynamic began to take place, which threatened Kayibanda’s 
tight-grip on power. Kayibanda’s policy had isolated Rwanda from the rest of the world, and 
educated Hutus became increasingly critical of the ‘absolutism’ of his policies. The Hutu 
critique focused on Kayibanda’s policies on education and employment, where Hutus felt that 
not enough had been done to advance Hutu representation.
226
Hutu school-leavers who 
couldn't find employment formed an alliance with university students, which appealed to the 
Hutu ‘middle-class’.
227
This re-ignited the ‘racial tensions’ within the middle class, and 
political violence targeted both Tutsis and the ‘rich’.
228
 Kayibanda had introduced a quota 
stipulating 9% Tutsis representation in the economy and education.
229
To keep the quota in 
check, students in Butare would conduct bloodline tests on all university students, which 
became a popular anti-Tutsi practice and which ‘blacklisted’ Tutsis scholars.
230
This soon 
started to take place in places of employment. The early remnants of “Hutu Power” used 
Radio Rwanda to call upon Hutus to rise up and avenge themselves- framing the discussion 
as the ‘the Final Solution’ to the Tutsi question.
231
 
 
‘Racial tensions’ had a ripple effect throughout the country, between the ‘rich and poor’, but 
also brought to the surface, the tensions between the Hutus in the north and south which 
caused a major rift in the pursuit for power.
232
 In 1973 Northern Hutu, Major General 
Habyarimana led a bloodless coup that toppled the First Republic, killing Kayibanda, and 
installed the Second Republic of Rwanda under his presidency. 
 
2.4.5 The Second Republic: Reconciliation based on Justice for Hutus 
 
Many Rwandans received the coup as a great relief for Rwandan politics. General 
Habyarimana asserted that he was “the custodian of the revolution and the protector of all its 
children, Hutu as well as Tutsi.”
233
There are three significant changes that took place that 
signalled differences between the two Republics Firstly, there was a shift in political 
identities, as the Second Republic reconstructed the Tutsi from ‘race’ to an ‘ethnic group’, 
which is considered a ‘indigenous’ group to Rwanda.
234
 This would allow Tutsis to ‘enter’ 
the civic sphere, and participate in the ‘political sphere’. However, the Second Republic also 
viewed Tutsis as being a “historically privileged group” as well as being a minority, and this 
allowed for them to be continuously discriminated against in the civic, political and 
economic spheres.
235
 Mamdani argues “The political distinction between a majority and a 
minority had little relevance within the domain of “race.”
236
Habyarimana had also 
introduced two state policies that would regulate Tutsis in Rwanda’s political life and hoped 
to correct the historical injustice, which led to Hutus being the ‘eternal victims of Rwanda’s 
history and politics’. These policies are; a. “to redistribute through affirmative state action”, 
and b. “to limit political participation.”
237
 This introduces the second significant change. 
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The Second Republic promoted the idea that it would ignite a ‘moral’ and ‘national’ 
revolution.
238
It spoke of both ‘reconciliation’ and ‘justice’, meaning reconciliation with 
the Tutsis, so long as it was in the ‘context of justice for the Hutu’.
239
This logic has 
alarming similarities with the post-genocide logic, where reconciliation with Hutus is 
formulated through the context of justice for Tutsis who are seen as the ‘eternal victims of 
Rwanda’s history and politics.’ 
 
The third significant change came in the late eighties-early nineties, were Habyarimana began 
considering the prospects of transitioning the Rwandan Hutu nation towards becoming a 
multi-party democratic system. General Habyarimana had initiated the transitional process 
towards a ‘multi-party’ democracy. In September 1990, Habyarimana established the 
Commission Nationale de Synthse, which was a charter that would direct the democratic 
process over two years.
240
 Political parties became legalised in 1991 during a time of great 
political tension. When democratic political reforms were taking place after 1991, it must be 
noted that “political divisions in Rwanda did not coalesce along ethnic lines”, it was only 
after the dismantling of the ‘one-party state’ that the tensions between the North/South Hutu 
elites had resurfaced.
241
Hintjens argues that the “myth of an on-going ‘racial struggle’ was 
revitalised with a vengeance during election campaigns. Ordinary Bahutus who lived 
peacefully next to ordinary Batutsi were now expected to realise how dangerous their 
neighbours could be.”
242
Thus it is important to note that even prior to the October 1990 RPF 
invasion, there were internal reforms taking place. Secondly, as Mamdani notes, “the 
immediate impact of the invasion was to accelerate the reform process” and Habyarimana 
tried to remain committed to establishing a ‘multi-party’ system for as long as he could 
withstand the internal pressure.
243
 Habyarimana also was beginning to have discussion with 
Uganda, concerning the return of Rwandan refugees, including the Tutsi diaspora. 
 
In response to these three significant changes, there was a growing internal and external 
critique of the central government. The policies of ‘affirmative action’ and “justice for 
Hutus’ led to an internal critique from Tutsis (because of appropriation and redistribution as 
well as civic and political exclusion) and an internal critique from the Hutus based on 
‘regional affiliations’. 
 
Habyarimana rejected the First Republics’ policy to exclude internal Tutsis, and instead 
argued that it was bringing Tutsis back into the political fold. Between the late 1970’s and 
1980’s, Rwanda experienced relative calmness and stability, and only a few massacres had 
taken place on both sides. Hutus and Tutsis started to socially and economically engage with 
one another, there was also an increase in inter-ethnic marriages, strong relationships forming 
and cohabitation. Several projects (such as Umuganda and ‘animation sessions’) were 
institutionalised and made compulsory, in order to reconcile communities.
244
 Tutsis were 
allowed to prosper in the Church and private sector (due to international business 
investments) but not in education, civic or political sphere. Habyarimana had expressed that 
“hatred cannot dissolve overnight” and arguably he possessed qualities that were far more 
politically productive than his predecessor.
245
Habyarimana clarified what he means by 
‘reconciliation’, he asserts, “It is not a question of bringing Tutsis back to power, which 
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would be the equivalent to re-establishing the pre-1959 situation; but each ethnic group has 
its place in the national fold. There is a Tutsi minister in my government; there are Tutsi 
senior civil-servants in the administration and Tutsi officers in the army.”
246
In reality, 
Tutsis felt that they were being legally discriminated against, they could have rights but had 
to give up all possible thoughts of having meaningful participation in power.
247
As the 
majoritarian, power must remain Hutu. Amiable Twagilimanga argues that the central 
message to Tutsis was to “avoid politics” and this made them feel like they were strangers 
in their own country.
248
 Surprisingly, in Lemarchand’s analysis of the Second Republic, he 
articulates “If power in Rwanda is still the monopoly of a specific ethnic segment, identified 
with the Hutu sub-culture, the prospects of a Hutu-Tutsi rapprochement, both within and 
outside Rwanda, have never been brighter since independence.”
249
 
 
The policies of ‘affirmative action’ had also led to a regional redistribution along Hutu 
affiliation lines, which produced an internal critique from Hutus. Habyarimana had organised 
politically to topple the concentration of power that was held by Kayibanda who was a 
southern Hutu. Habyarimana was from Gisenyi and neighbouring Ruhengeri, which are both 
in the north. Tutsis and Hutus in the south central argued that northern-Hutus were strongly 
‘overrepresented’ in “resource allocation, positions of leadership and power, and access to 
goods and services” and were covered by the majority of the state-budget.
250
Moreover, 
northern Hutus occupied all senior positions in the security forces and military. In 1979 the 
former security chief, Theonaste Lizinde attempted to overthrow the government. Although 
it failed, it signalled that the common enemy (the monarchy) of the 1959-Social Revolution 
was long gone, and the long-standing struggle between the northern and southern Hutu elites 
had re-surfaced to take centre stage in Rwandan politics.
251
 The northern Hutus saw 
themselves as ‘ethnically purer’ than the ‘mixed’ southern Hutus.
252
In this context, the 
akazu (small house) of senior military and civilian officials emerged, centred on the powerful 
clan of Agathe, the president’s wife.’
253
By the early 1990’s the akazu, who made a claim for 
power based on a historical legitimacy of their line of kinship, started to infiltrate the central 
government and regional base through patronage networks.
254
 
 
The greatest problem that dogged the Second Republic was that Habyarimana was 
contradictory in his politics on race and ethnicity, which provided room for an internal and 
external critique. Moreover, he failed to redefine the Tutsi diaspora as being a ‘political 
diaspora’, which would allow for the Tutsi diaspora to be seen as a security threat- the 
external ‘enemy’ (inyenzi). Eltringham argues that the “inyenzi raids” and subsequent anti-
Tutsi violence (massacres) were used by Hutu politicians as a pretext to launch violence 
against the Tutsi in Rwanda and to defend the Hutu majority.
255
 Thus, the Southern Hutu 
elites and a majority peasantry were reminded again and again, that ‘class, region and 
politics’ were superficial problems, compared to the profound difference of ‘race’ between 
the Hutu and Tutsi.
256
 During the civil war, Habyarimana’s hopes for ‘ethnic 
reconciliation’ had completely eroded.
257
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2.5 Arusha Peace Accords: A Failed Political Agreement 
 
The “great paradox in Rwanda” is whilst democratic reforms were being introduced in 1991; 
a civil war was being waged.
258
 Central to the dramatic political events, was the question of 
power. The civil war brought this question to a critical juncture- a place in which the Arusha 
Accords had the opportunity to remedy, but instead it had weakened the central governments 
bargaining power, and was seen as a ‘victor’s deal’ for the RPF. This only served to fuel the 
internal and external opposition. 
 
The Arusha talks took place between the government (MRND), the government opposition 
parties- MDR, PSD and PL, and the RPF. It was impossible for the government coalition to 
be cohesive because each political party was representing their “different centres of 
power”.
259
The CDR (‘far right-wing’ party) saw the negotiations as making a deal with the 
devil (the RPF), and they opposed most of the process. The other parties were more moderate 
and were interested in a new political order. The RPF entered the negotiations from a 
position in which it was still willing to continue the war in order to have their demands met 
by Habyarimana. This is a key objective that the Arusha Accords neglected. As expressed by 
Paul Kagame in 1992- “the best way to fight is protracted war, because the ultimate solution 
is political. War is to create pressure to force the government to break down completely or 
realize the need for a negotiated settlement.”
260
 The RPF had gained confidence through its 
raids into Rwanda and as Lindsey Scorgie argues, they “decided to use that strength in 
fighting to demonstrate that they had an alternative to the negotiations- an alternative so 
strong, in face, that at times it was more advantageous to fight than bargain.”
261
 
 
The Arusha Accords/Peace talks began in July 1992, and can be viewed as having undergone 
six key phases before it was signed on the 4 August 1993. The initial phase of the Accords 
was arguably successful, which hastened the progression of the second phase. In the 
beginning there was very little consensus between each stakeholder, but the Accords 
managed to open up the dialogue between the RPF and Government of Rwanda during a 
stalemate in the midst of a civil war (1990-1993), and to have both stakeholders agree on a 
ceasefire.
262
 Formally, the two parties agreed on “the principles of law, power-sharing, the 
repatriations of refugees and the integration of the military” as well as end the culture of 
impunity.
263
 Further provisions included centralising a ‘human rights agenda’, which 
included the ‘right of return for refugees’, the removal of ethnic identity cards and the 
stipulation that there would be no amnesty granted for “previous wrong-doing or human 
rights abuses” and anyone including the President could be investigated and charged.
264
 
During the fifth state of the processes, the RPF demanded that the CDR party be excluded 
from the negotiations and the future political government
265
 The Arusha Accords conceded 
to the RPF’s demands, and by excluding the CDR, it “severely weakened” the Government’s 
leverage in negotiations.
266
Scorgie argues that this further reduced numbers in voting power, 
and marginalised them from the ‘new order’. 
267
From the onset, the Arusha Accords was 
about ‘state ownership’- political power. Hutu Power portrayed the negotiations as a 
complete national betrayal, and that essentially it became an internal discussion between the 
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RPF and the internal opposition- who were ‘sympathetic towards the RPF’.
268
The exclusion 
and silencing of constituencies in Rwanda would prove to have grave consequences. 
 
The negotiations concluded in the midst of public protest, organised by the CDR. 
269
The 
agreement stipulated that: 1.) The two armies would merge and the RPF would provide 40% 
of the soldiers in the new national army, thus 35, 000 of Habyarimana’s soldier plus 20 000 
RPA soldiers would be reduced to a single force of about 19,000 soldiers; 2.) The power-
sharing agreement stipulated that the RPF was in charge of the Ministry of the Interior and 
would have decisive control of all forces of coercion in the new state; 3.) The RPF would 
hold 11 of 70 seats in parliament and 5 of the 21 ministries; 4) the agreement recognised the 
‘right of return’ of all refugees.
270
Under the terms of the Arusha Accords, Rwanda’s 
political landscape was finally means to be democratised.
271
 However, the Accords also 
stipulated that all parties in the new regime couldn’t be representative of an ‘ethnic identity’. 
This would effectively exclude most of Rwanda’s political parties. 
 
The final agreement that was signed in August 1993 was viewed as a ‘victors deal’ that 
legitimised the RPF as the ‘victors’- “The RPF had won at the conference table what it had 
yet to win on the battlefield…Arusha sealed the political fate of the opposition.”
272
 The 
RPF themselves were quite dissatisfied by the final settlement. 
273
 The government 
expressed that in the end they were the ‘losers’, and two weeks after signing the Accords, 
Habyarimana with the support of CDR and smaller political parties, collectively 
“disavowed” the agreement (“a scrap of paper), calling it “plan for treason” which “we must 
prepare to defeat.”
274
 
 
Habyarimana showed a lack of decisiveness when he stated that he was still open to re-
negotiations, but he was also still supporting the MNRD and CDR’s mobilisation in protest of 
the Accords. This allowed political parties and soldiers to demonstrate their political 
leanings, especially in the north where many soldiers with northern-Hutu origins expressed 
their loyalty to the President above all else.
275
 Publicly, officials of the army and 
Habyarimana-loyalist began fostering fear and threats by condemning against Tutsis and 
Hutu soldiers and civilians who opposed the President. Hintjens states that there were ‘moves 
to include the political opposition parties in the interim government, but no steps were taken 
to incorporate RPF forces into the army’, which was a major condition of the peace 
settlement.
276
 Des Forges indicates that during the peace talks and immediately afterwards, 
the Rwandan army was preparing (buying armed weapons and military training) for the 
resumption of war.
277
 For ‘Hutu Power’- who was completely excluded from the future 
make-up of Rwanda, the Accords confirmed their suspicions that Hutu control of power and 
the state was in imminent danger, and that the current government had sold out the Rwandan 
(Hutu) nation.
278
 Mamdani argues, “When the first and second coalition government failed, 
moderate fractions in the opposition, who opposed the coalition government’s leaders, were 
absorbed into a rapidly expanding Hutu Power base.
279
It is important to note that the 
“devastating economic consequences of falling commodity prices and IMF and World Bank 
policies were not confronted” and instead the “woes of the country were blamed squarely on 
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the RPF and their allies, the Batutsi ‘enemy within’, who together were charged with 
full responsibility for Rwanda’s woeful condition.”
280
 
 
The political landscape in Rwanda was progressively defining ‘the enemy’, through the 
formulations of ‘historical injustices committed against the Hutu majority’ and thus taking 
action was framed within the framework of ‘justice’. In September 1992, Colonel Deogratias 
Nsabimana sent a ‘top-secret memorandum’ to his commanders that identified the ‘the 
enemy’ (the ENI), and how to defeat the enemy.
281
 The document also recommended that 
former posts, which were held in the akazu by virtue of connections to the President, be 
replaced with those who possessed military abilities. This marked the shift from engaging 
and counting on political negotiations towards being militarily vigilant of ‘the enemy’. Des 
Forges asserts that the document divided the enemy into two categories: the “principle 
enemy” and the “partisans of the enemy”- which was “anyone who supported the principle 
enemy”.
282
 The ‘principle enemy’ was described as “the Tutsi inside or outside the country, 
extremist and nostalgic for power, who never recognised and will never recognise the 
realities of the 1959 social revolution and who wish to reconquer power by all means 
necessary, including taking up arms…”
283
 Tutsi hegemony was seen as the single political 
ideology and political will. Des forges argues that the document did not caution against 
confusing ‘the RPF as political group with Tutsi as an ethnic group.’
284
 Although 
ambiguous, the document did recognise the transition towards ‘democratic openness’ as it 
states, “Political opponents who want power or the peaceful democratic change of the 
current political regime of Rwanda are NOT to be confused with the ENI [enemy] or with 
the partisans of the ENI.”
285
However, it listed the “establishment of multiple political 
parties as an advantage for the enemy and warned that infiltrators had convinced these 
parties to support the RPF”, it was even accused of infiltrating and corrupting government 
officials the government and businesses. It blamed the loss of Hutu solidarity on the enemy, 
rather than the ‘corruption and repression of the Habyarimana regime. 
286
In the end ‘enemy 
list’ expanded to include “Tutsi refugees, the NRA (Ugandan Army), Tutsi inside the 
country, Hutu dissatisfied with the regime in power, unemployed people inside and outside 
the country, foreigners married to Tutsi wives, the Nilo-Hamitic people of the region, 
criminals in flight (from the law).”
287
 
 
There were other important documents (The ‘Ten Commandments of the Hutu’, the 
Bahima Conspiracy, ‘17 Rules of the Tutsi’…etc.), which further contributed to Tutsis 
being reconstructed back into being a ‘racial identity’. In one of the ‘Ten Commandments 
of the Hutu’, it encouraged “Bahutu to stop feeling pity for Batutsi” and advised them to 
‘seek support from all “fellow Bantu” people in the Great Lakes region for their racial 
emancipation.’
288
In ’17 Rules of the Tutsi’ there were references made that Uganda is the 
Tutsi Homeland, and it points to the ‘Bahima plot’ as proof of Tutsi intent to annihilate 
Hutus.
289
 This sophisticated type of disinformation fed the propaganda machine and to 
shift all blame for why Rwanda’s was not flourishing, onto the Tutsi scapegoat. 
 
In early February 1993, the RPF violated the ceasefire agreement, and were rapidly 
advancing across northern Rwanda towards Kigali.
290
It is important to note that when the 
81 
 
 
 
 
RPF had invaded Rwanda in October 1990, it has created a great sense of fear amongst 
Hutus as well as Tutsis; in particular Hutus were reminded of the Hutu massacres by Tutsis 
in Burundi (1972, 1988 and 1991), which fuelled their fears of the RPF.
291
 Mamdani argues 
that the genocide must be seen as an outcome of the civil war. Secondly, that the Arusha 
Accords failed as a political settlement because it failed to recognise Hutu and Tutsis as 
political identities, and that the problem of Rwanda is first and foremost one of political 
power.
292
Therefore, when the RPF invaded Rwanda, Hutu Power could exploit the 
opportunity and as they argued “power sharing was just another name for political suicide. 
History had ruled out political coexistence.”
293
The more successful the RPF was on the 
battlefield, the more this view resonated and came to define the political centre stage, thus 
“bringing Hutu Power back from a fringe preoccupation to the mainstream respectable 
politics.”
294
Mamdani argues that, “At the core of Hutu Power ideology was the conviction 
that the Tutsi were a race alien to Rwanda, and not an ethnic indigenous group…For Hutu 
Propagandist, the Tutsi question was not one of rights, but of power. The growing appeal of 
Hutu Power propaganda among the Hutu masses was in direct proportion to the spreading 
conviction that the real aim of the RPF was not rights for all Rwandans, but power for the 
Tutsi. This is why one needs to recognise that it was not greed-not even hatred- but fear 
which was the reason why the multitude responded to the call of Hutu Power the closer the 
war came to home.”
295
 Seeing Hutus, as just the ethnic majority did not drive the ideology 
and political will of Hutu Power, it was that Hutu were the nation.
296
The war had 
fundamentally shaped the daily lives of all Rwandans, and it was propagated that the RPF 
would take their land and rights, and return Rwanda to the former Tutsi Feudal state of Hutu 
oppression.
297
 In this dynamic, Tutsis and moderate Hutus became hostages in Rwanda’s 
political crisis. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
Part of the legacy of Nuremburg is that has depoliticised mass violence, it sees the violence 
as a catalogue of crimes committed by perpetrators, who should be identified and criminally 
prosecuted for the purpose of justice. Secondly it became the prototype of ‘victors justice’ 
and ‘victims justice’, contributing to the presumption that justice for the victims can only be 
secured by the victor who also determines the ‘rule of law’. In Rwanda, the critique of 
‘victors justice’ is more troubling because of Rwanda’s political record, and the failed 
political settlement (Arusha Accords) that preceded the genocide, and which had excluded 
major stakeholders in the political settlement. As it was back then, today there remains a 
popular view that the Arusha Accords was a ‘victors deal’. The historical investigation of 
Rwanda’s political record, demonstrates Rwanda’s political crisis, and illustrated that 
‘justice’ and ‘history-writing’ have historically been tools for political power, and their 
conceptualisations are formulated by the ‘politics of indigeneity’. The 1959 ‘Social 
Revolution’ propelled the logic of colonialism, which had established Tutsis as a ‘race’- thus 
‘non-indigenous’, and Hutus as the ‘native’-‘indigenous’. The anti-colonial struggle was 
never about democratisation, it was about Hutu emancipation and liberation from ‘double-
colonialism’; it targeted Tutsi privilege and defined ‘justice’ as a native prerogative for 
Hutus. The same ideology underlined state-formation and the national identity of the First 
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Republic, and provided a pre-text that justified anti-Tutsi violence. When Habyarimana 
reconstituted Tutsis as an ‘indigenous ethnic group’, it threatened the notion of ‘justice’ and 
meaning of ‘rights’ and privileges (citizenship) that has come to define Rwandan politics. 
Met with an internal Hutu and Tutsi critique and an external critique from the Tutsi diaspora, 
the Rwandan state was reminded that race continues to have a political purchase for power 
and rights. It is within this historical and political context, that one realises the critical failure 
of the Arusha Accords. The resumption of the civil war that evolved into genocide, 
demonstrated that once again Rwanda’s attempt at a transition or regime change had 
miscarried because of a failure to address the epicentre of Rwanda’s political crisis. Political 
power and rights continue to be framed by the ‘politics of indigeneity’. By selectively 
piecing a narrative of Rwanda’s past, the post-genocide power is denying Rwanda the 
opportunity to reconcile with its past, and to understand the genocide as being a linked a 
historical cycle of political violence, which keeps returning to the question of indigeneity. 
The empirical research conducted by key Rwandan scholars have contributed significantly to 
theorising ‘why ordinary Rwandans participated in the genocide’, and how the question of 
‘race’ features in relationships, interactions, collection of memories, and importantly how it 
differs in different locales, regions and at the level of the state. I have used the work of these 
scholars to read alongside Mamdani’s ‘theory on race’ (post-colonial citizenship crisis) and 
his suggestion to rethink Rwanda’s political crisis as being embedded in its political 
institutions. I argue that this is productive for redirecting the preoccupation with political 
agency and criminal responsibility back to the question of the political. Finally, it cautions 
the transitional project to be more careful with how it deploys certain terms (justice, history, 
reconciliation and political identity) that have different the conceptual meanings in 
contemporary transitional discourse to that of the historical and political discourse of the 
Rwandan state. 
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Chapter Three 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Post-genocide governance in Rwanda is confronted with a moral and political dilemma that 
haunts Rwanda’s political record. The perverse popular character of the genocide, presents a 
critical challenge for building a democracy that can reconcile the ‘guilty Hutu majority’ with 
the ‘fearful Tutsi minority’ into a single political community. The categories of the ‘guilty 
Hutu majority’ and ‘fearful Tutsi minority’, have been constituted by the ‘policy of mass 
accountability’; the ‘genocide lens’ that shapes the narrative of Rwanda’s past and future; and 
the genocide-credit afforded to the RPF by the international community. The stated goal for 
the post-genocide state is to evolve towards a post-ethnic society and eventually have a multi-
party democracy devoid of sectarianism. However, the state has shaped its political priorities 
and governance-strategy, based on a ‘genocide-framework’. This chapter analyses the post-
genocide political record, focusing on governance and the outcomes of the political priorities. 
I address two distinct periods: 1994- 2000 (interim government) and post-2000. I am 
concerned that the current political settlement demonstrates a failure to disinherit the past 
struggles for political power and the institutions that re-enforce Hutu and Tutsi as political 
identities, in order to make a purchase for power. I will also address the independence of the 
media and press, civil society, and the experiences of the opposition, which today primarily 
exists in exile. My argument is that this is a direct consequence of ‘victors justice’ and a 
‘victims justice’ rationale that informs politics today. Lastly, this chapter will explore the two 
radically opposed perceptions of post-genocide governance in Rwanda, held by external 
observers. 
 
3.2 Inheriting Genocide: Prioritising Policies 
 
When the RPF took power in 1994, it “inherited a country it hardly knew”.
1
 Rwandans view 
the armed group as being representative of an even smaller constituency (the Tutsi diaspora) 
and as an outsider to the social and political relations of Rwanda. After 18 July 1994, 
Kagame and his troops- who are mostly Tutsi and had grown up in exile in Uganda, were 
occupying “a mostly hostile, mostly Hutu country”.
2
However, the ‘lukewarm welcome’ they 
received, didn’t seem to distract the RPF, whose experience in exile has shaped a determined 
hierarchical organisation that is both self-reliant and can thrive in isolated conditions. With 
the ‘genocide-credit’ afforded to them by the international community and their military 
victory, the RPF projects itself as having a superior political acumen. They pride themselves 
as being a disciplined organisation, driven by an ambitious vision, and perfectly suited for the 
task of Rwanda’s nation building and to lead the country into a post-ethnic society. 
 
The RPF inherited a monumental task, that should not be underestimated, but it also should not 
hinder critical engagement. In the aftermath of the genocide, the interim government had to face 
the realities, that the military and police could not be trusted because they participated 
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in the genocide; the treasury was looted; national infrastructure and service delivery systems 
was destroyed; economic productivity had ceased and adherence to the rule of law was 
virtually non-existent.
3
 Moreover, most of the personnel required to run a country, were 
either murdered, fled Rwanda or had participated in the genocide.
4
The activities civil-society 
organisations, political parties and religious organisations were devastated by the genocide, 
and the RPF treated with suspicion and distrust.
5
Thus, the RPF project had little internal 
opposition. A long-history of corruption in governance, and the absence of the rule of law, 
and a strong culture of impunity, meant that there weren’t any independent institutions to 
speak of, let alone salvage. The RPF also had to centre the reality that those who survived the 
genocide were incredibly traumatised (psychological, physical, and extensive rape-trauma). 
Survivors were feeling vulnerable and fearful of revenge attacks and the resumption of war. 
Distrust amongst Rwandans and towards the state had reached its peak, and in the midst of 
their fragility as individuals and communities, Rwandans yearned for strong leadership, to be 
acknowledged and have their dignity restored. 
 
The RPF used these challenges to shape its main political priorities. An interviewer once 
asked Paul Kagame about his ‘political philosophy’, his response was “Pragmatic, doing 
what is doable…Even with all the hardship and hunger, war is straightforward and clear-
cut, but building a nation from nothing? A nation that has just experienced genocide? There 
is no strategy manual for this. There is nothing that is not a priority, and the priorities are 
always conflicting…”
6
 Arguably, post-genocide state’s policy domain, has always contained 
a hierarchy of priorities. The priorities are shaped by the following factors: 
 
To begin with, by achieving an overwhelming military victory after the civil war and 
genocide, the RPF gained “moral authority, political power and the military means to 
refashion Rwanda” according to its vision.
7
 As I have mentioned above, the devastating 
impact of the war on civil society and political parties, meant that the RPF didn't have a 
unified internal opposition that in the beginning could effectively block their policy 
proposals. Moreover, the international communities failure to stop the genocide and the view 
held by the RPF that it did nothing to contribute to its victory, meant that the RPF were not 
prepared to appease them. Secondly, as Lars Waldorf asserts “Kagame could not possibly 
hope to win support from the Hutu majority in free and fair elections, particularly not after 
killing tens of thousands of Hutu civilians both in Rwanda and in neighbouring 
Congo.”
8
This would prove to be highly influential in prioritising securitisation of the state 
and society, and pursuing extensive judicial mass-accountability. It was also a significant 
factor that shaped a particular politics, law and institutions. Thirdly, the foundational 
ideology that has shaped the RPF’s vision is derived from their experience in Yoweri 
Museveni’s National Resistance Movement (NRM) and the Ugandan-revolution. I will 
discuss this in chapter 5, but what the experience has shaped, is a notion that power rests on 
an “informal intelligence network, then the intelligence services, next the army, and only 
then the party” thus a mixture of military and revolutionary influences, which as I will 
discuss later has born a “coercive, security state and nation-building.”
9
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It is within these dynamics, that the hierarchy of political priorities were proposed. They 
are: 1. The extreme political, military and social situation meant securitisation of the state 
was top-priority (goal: durability of long-term peace); ‘policy of mass accountability 
(justice); 3. Re-building (in this order) judicial institutions, political institutions, economic 
institutions, and national infrastructure; and 4. Social engineering using socio-economic 
development to achieve ‘national reconciliation and unity’.
10
 
 
The interim-government asserts a strong-political will to transform the economy, through 
taking strong action against corruption, liberalising the economy, lowering taxes, attracting 
foreign investment, stabilising inflation, enhancing international and regional trade, 
impressive environmental policies, modernisation of the agricultural sector, as well as 
education and skills development.
11
 The strategy is to shift Rwanda from being a “low-
income, agricultural based economy, to a middle-income, knowledge-based economy by the 
year 2020.”
12
 These goals are envisioned through the “Vision 2020” project, which is an 
 
ambitious pro-growth and developmental programme that is seeking to re-structure 
Rwanda.
13
 
 
The post-genocide government has also embarked on a bold experiment in social 
engineering, through eliminating ethnic-identity and the re-education of the entire population. 
The latter is discussed in depth in Chapter 4. The logic of the state it to eradicate ethnic 
references, and to completely move pass ‘thinking, acting and voting’ along ethnic 
lines.
14
Thus, the government has legally eradicated Hutu, Tutsi and Twa as political 
identities, and now only speaks of Rwandans. There are two prongs to the governments 
approach: 1. It has a paternalistic view of ‘ordinary Rwandan’ (one politician referred to them 
as “babies”) that need to be re-educated and guided with rules and ordering, and a strong-
leadership; and 2. It bases the notion of the Rwandan identity and relations, on its pre-
colonial narrative of ‘national unity and social harmony.
15
To accompany these views, it has 
introduced laws which criminalise and prohibit discussion on the ethnic discourse, these laws 
include prohibit “genocide ideology”, “genocide denialism”, and “divisionism”.
16
 These laws 
and Rwanda’s ‘official narrative’ of history is taught in primary and secondary schools, 
universities, itorero programme (civic education training) and adults are required to attend the 
Ingando re-education programme.
17
 In 2013, the government also introduced a public 
education campaign called Ndi Umuyawanda (“I Am Rwandan”).
18
 This campaign works in 
conjunction with Paul Kagame’s conceptualisation of the term “Rwandicity”, a term that 
features in policies and institutions that work towards creating a unified nationalism/ national 
identity. The pronounced goal is to achieve a post-ethnic society, and the logic of the state 
argues that security and development are the foundation upon which to achieve this goal. 
 
In 1997 the government introduced the National Habitat Policy and Human Settlement 
Policy, which would implement the ‘villagisation project- Imidugundu’. The mission for both 
policies is to change the traditional layout of the Rwandan landscape, and construct ‘villages’ 
that would decentralise governance, provide security (7000 police patrolman and military 
protection against genocidaires activity and reprisal attacks) and a redirect humanitarian 
assistance, social services, infrastructure, co-ordinate socio-economic projects, all towards a 
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central hub that would become urbanised. These villages would also provide land and 
housing to Rwandan survivors and the returning populations. By 1999, 40% of Rwandans in 
Kibungo, and 60% in Butare, 94% of the populations in the north/north-west 
(predominantly Hutu areas) were relocated closer to Kigali.
19
 Lastly, the ‘constructed 
village’ were to also shift the associations that Rwandans had with the landscape- a site of 
trauma due to protracted historical political violence. 
 
3.3 “Never Again” 
 
An initial glance of the ‘Rwandan-story’ one is struck by the paradox between positions 
and opinions in the media, literature and reports on Rwanda. It is apparent that there exist 
two radically different positions. The first perception was prevalent in the first few years of 
Rwanda’s transition from the genocide. Shaped particularly by international-guilt and the 
overwhelming shock that the ‘Genocide of the Tutsis’ symbolised an outright failure to 
prevent another genocide, as enshrined by the proclamation- “Never Again”. As Reyntjens 
asserts, the “genocide credit” has informed this view.
20
 
 
The first position views Rwanda as a ‘success story’ within the African Great Lakes Region. 
The RPF’s military victory and its ability to prevent the resumption of a civil war another 
genocide can be seen as a serious achievement. Furthermore, the post-genocide state is 
viewed to have kept the spirit of the Arusha Agreement, and has reintegrated former 
combatants and refugees through an “extensive demobilisation scheme.”
21
 It also 
presumably showed courage and leadership to enter into a power-sharing agreement with 
Hutus. This perception also focuses on the political will and visionary leadership that has 
implemented ‘technocratic/bureaucratic governance’. By creating ‘villages and housing’ 
through the imidugundu project; providing agricultural assistance across ethnic lines, 
improved health-care services and education; and in response to land scarcity, and being the 
most-densely populated country in the world, the government is lauded for its “substantial 
economic growth in the last two decades.”
22
 By 2010, Rwanda had achieved an average 
poverty reduction rates of 12%, and has over 90% of Rwandans have access to health care, 
as well as one of the worlds highest health-insurance access to ordinary citizens that aren’t 
employed in the formal sector.
23
This has doubled former life expectancy rates. Economist 
Paul Collier argues that Paul Kagame has pulled off an economic “hat trick” by 
implementing a policy agenda, which can reduce poverty and promote high growth and 
equality.
24
 The government places a great deal of pressure on the youth, to educate 
themselves, take responsibility for Rwanda’s development, and acquire technical and 
entrepreneurial skills.
25
 Rwanda has achieved “the highest school enrolment rates in Africa 
as 95% for boys and 98% for girls, with overall completion rates as 72.7%.”
26
 
 
Its vision to achieve a self-sufficient and robust economy through modernisation, and by 
prioritising transport networks, roads, internet cables, electricity, and adopting a globalised 
and regional trade approach, are some of the reason that have attracted foreign investment. 
Major trading partners include China, America and the U.K. Richard Grant reported “the 
coffee business is booming, thanks in no small part to Starbucks, and tourism, unimaginable 
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after the genocide, has grown into a $200million a year business.”
27
The World Bank 
named Rwanda as “top business reformer of the world, and the region’s most-friendly 
business country.”
28
 
 
Since the late-eighties, and particularly during the post-genocide Congolese-Wars, there has 
been illegal trafficking of Congo’s raw materials (gold, coltan, diamonds) to Kigali, as well 
as formal trade routes between Congo to Kigali and Kampala and onto the global market. I 
discuss this dimension in greater detail in Chapter 6, but what I would like to highlight here, 
is that this has attracted great foreign and regional interests to Kigali. Analysis on Rwanda in 
comparison to its neighbours, and as one British think-tank- Legatum Institute describes, 
“Rwanda’s neighbours are “less than ideal”…Uganda is a corrupt; Burundi a basket-case; 
Congo worse.”
29
 However, Kagame’s vision is funded largely by mineral wealth 
accumulated from Congo, which has also been funnelled into the government and military 
budget. The UN HDI still ranks Rwanda relatively low (November 2013), but compared to 
neighbouring states Rwanda has stabilised its socio-economic growth plans in order to make 
improvements.
30
 The Tutsi diaspora has slowly been trickling back into Rwanda, and today 
there is quite a prosperous business elite found in Kigali. Moreover, Rwanda’s environmental 
policies have been successfully adopted throughout the country, such as outlawing of 
plastics, and monthly compulsory national ‘clean-ups’ by Rwandan citizens.
31
 In reference to 
his vision for Rwanda’s future, Kagame has often referred to Rwanda as the “Singapore of 
Africa.”
32
 The praise Rwanda has received is understandable because in many ways you can 
physically see the growth in infrastructure and Kigali is clean and safe.
33
 Grant notes, “No 
one is watching the Rwandan experiment more closely than other Africans on the continent. 
Kagame is widely admired and respected on the continent, and considered a shoo-in for 
presidency of the African Union if he ever wants the job.”
34
 
 
Across the globe, and within Rwanda, the Rwandan government holds annual 
commemorations of the genocide, where it is known to invite various foreign-dignitaries and 
the foreign press, and in addition to honouring the victims the government uses the platform 
to re-iterate its progress.
35
 One such area noted, is that of women and children, both within 
the formal sphere of the Rwandan state, and with regards to land ownership. Rwanda is the 
only country in the world where women make up the majority of parliament.
36
 Women 
occupy 64% of seats in Parliament. 
37
VIP’s such as Bono, Pastor Rick Warren, Bill Clinton, 
and Tony Blair…all “Friends of the New Rwanda” have demonstrated a moral compulsion to 
use their influence to attract aid and donor investments for the re-making of a new Rwanda.
38
 
In 2009 President Kagame received a Global Citizen Award, the statement read by the 
Clinton Foundation reads as follows; “From crisis, President Kagame has forged a strong, 
unified and growing nation with a potential to become a model for the rest of Africa and the 
World.”
39
Johan Pottier asserts, “the rewriting project, a high priority in Kigali, has benefitted 
from empathy and services not only of journalist unfamiliar with the region, but also 
newcomer academics, diplomats and aid-workers. All have helped, although to varying 
degrees, to popularise and spread an RPF-friendly but empirically questionable narrative.”
40
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Recovering from war and a looted treasury, Rwanda’s national budget is hugely dependent 
on financial and technical resources from outsiders and donor agencies. Rachel Hayman 
asserts this “means that donors are inherently and intricately entwined in the policy process, a 
situation which has deepened with moves to improve aid effectiveness by aligning around the 
government poverty agenda, harmonising donor procedures, and providing more aid in the 
form of direct budget support.”
41
Interestingly, due to its extensive prevalence, one can gain a 
picture of the shift in policy priorities, democracy and governance through the different 
phases of donor funding. Within the first phase of Rwanda’s democracy (1994-1998), 
Rwanda was preoccupied with establishing an interim ‘emergency’ government that was 
focused on security and response to the refugee, IDP and returnee migration crisis. This 
meant funding was pumped into the “institutional infrastructure, justice, and security 
sector.”
42
 The interim government was to also prepare Rwanda for the first local elections 
(1999), a constitutional referendum, and the first national elections (2002-2003). This led 
into the second phase of donor funding, although donors did not fund the local election 
process the elections were closely watched by foreign observers. Rwanda’s democracy 
entered into a third phase in 2010, when Rwanda was preparing for national elections (2010). 
Within this third phase, the international community focused on “strengthening 
accountability between citizens and government at all levels” and “strengthening the capacity 
of civil society to demand this accountability.”
43
 
 
Rwandan political scientist, David Kiwuwa argues that the international community 
calculates the prognosis of Rwanda’s transition and reform, by its liberal-democratic sums 
and deficits.
44
 Within transitional justice, the prescribed end-goal is ‘liberal-democracy’, 
and the problem is that it operates on a single formula where elections become the markers 
of ‘true-democratic form’ and signals the end of the transition. However, as Kiwuwa notes 
“rapid liberalisation and political reforms” can sometimes instigate political violence 
especially in societies that are deeply divided.
45
 Again, because of international-guilt, the 
international funders are still reluctant to critique Rwanda’s progress, and its democratic 
deficit, and there are still many donors who are still reluctant to “apply conditionality on 
Rwanda’s democratic change…” which tends to then undermine those who are challenging 
the post-genocide state.
46
With this being said, between 2012-2015, Germany and the UK 
have chosen to suspend aid, whilst the Netherlands is held back on paying out in 2015.
47
 
 
At the Meles Zenawi Foundation Symposium on Development, Kagame shared his views on 
democratic- conditionality. Kagame asserts “…The orthodoxy of shrinking the state to the 
bare minimum, and replacing it with externally-funded-non-state actors (NGOs), left Africa 
with no viable path out of poverty…While there may be some examples of developmental 
states, they should not be the example for Africa, will all its diversity…Yet lately, the word 
‘democracy’ has been twisted to bring developing countries, our own, to some kind of order, 
especially, which have sought to liberate themselves from these prejudices, Our democratic 
advances are constantly negated, and in fact subverted…Ours is the true democracy of 
citizens, not the false ones of institutionalised corruption and divisions. We cannot be bullied 
into accepting policies that misrepresent us and do us harm in the end, as we have seen over 
many years.”
48
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 The Rwandan government needs external support, and as Hayman notes, this often leaves 
them having to play to two audiences: the people of Rwanda and the donor agencies and 
NGO community.
49
 However, from the onset, the government has also been very vocal 
about its own priorities and agenda and asserting its national-sovereignty to safeguard its 
independence in decision-making. The post-genocide government has emphasised that in 
order for Rwanda’s reconstruction policies to succeed, Rwandan citizens have to feel a sense 
of ownership, pride, be consulted with, and participate in the processes. The meaning of 
‘ownership’ is debatable, and I will explore this later. Secondly, the government is invested 
in embracing grass-roots level and home grown traditional practices, as opposed to imposed 
‘Western-values and practices’. 
 
In December 2012, the Government hosted the 10
th
 National Dialogue, or Umushyikirano in 
Kinyrwanda.
50
 The Umushyikirano “brings together close to 1000 participants including 
representatives of local government and grass roots organisations, cabinet members, 
members of both chambers of Parliament, the judiciary, army, police, members of diplomatic 
corps and representatives from the private sector.”
51
 The theme that year was “Agaciro: 
Aiming for self-reliance”, and on the agenda was moving away from aid, and developing 
Rwanda by Rwandans.
52
 As mentioned, throughout Rwanda there is a strong foreign aid and 
NGO presence, an estimate 200 international NGO’s descended on Rwanda in the aftermath 
of the genocide.
53
In response, Kagame has since ‘kicked out’ 80 of those organisations 
because they refused to register and abide by government regulations.
54
 He states, “Of the 
rest, you would be lucky to find five in 100 that are doing it altruistically. The others will 
choose for you where you should put their money, and try to control what you do in other 
areas. They come here knowing almost nothing, understanding almost nothing, and they 
judge and criticize and tell you what you should do. A big part of the misunderstanding is 
that they expect us to be a normal country, like the ones where they are from. They do not 
understand that we are operating in a very different context.”
55
 Speaking at Meles Zenawi 
Foundation Symposium on Development Kagame stated that he ‘likes governments but does 
not like non-government organisation.’
56
 
 
This kind of outspoken rhetoric has earned Kagame enemies but interestingly has also 
bolstered his support-base on the continent, internationally, and amongst Rwandans 
themselves. In the beginning analysis of Rwanda was thought through a genocide-framework. 
One cannot overstate the preoccupation with ‘justice and accountability’ and ‘security’ in the 
first decade. The foundation for support, was also laid during a time where the international 
humanitarian community and state-leaders were reflecting on their failure to prevent, 
intervene and stop the genocide and the subsequent humanitarian crisis that was also a 
security crisis. The international community met in April 2015 to discuss their role in the 
1994-Genocide, looking at causality and the Arusha Peace Accords, particularly the 
synchronisation between policies and implementation. The report reiterated Kagame’s 
critique of the international community’s late response to the genocide and in devising a 
common policy plan for going forward. The RPF-led government has used the international 
communities recognition of its failures to establish relations with the U.S., U.K., and 
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Netherlands (‘Friends of Rwanda’), specifically over ‘aid, intelligence, and 
diplomatic relations.’ 
 
Hintjens argues that the state has succeeded in gaining the respect and support of the U.K. 
and U.S. because the RPF speaks the ‘common language’, which the Anglo-Saxon 
community can appreciate and both sympathise with. 
57
The scale of violence, and the 
targeting by one group against the other, allows “Kagame and RPF to present themselves as 
fighting an invisible enemy, which means that peoples attitude towards race and ethnicity 
must be policed and some civil and political rights sacrificed if genocide is not to reoccur.”
58
 
Furthermore, since the tribunal and Modernised Gacaca Court do not equate the crimes of the 
RPF to genocide, the RPF can overshadow them with the argument that it was acting out of 
“self defence”, and that it single-handedly was “battling its genocidal legacies, trying to 
grapple with lawless killers across the border, whilst fighting backwardness and poverty back 
home.”
59
 This narrative appeals to its alliances and aids Rwanda’s Anglo-Saxon business 
and foreign policy relations, and Rwanda is exactly where it wants to be, which is in 
opposition to the Francophone world. 
 
Rwanda’s relations with France have been very strained since Kagame has accused France of 
facilitating the genocide by providing military support and financial aid to both the then-
Rwandan government army and Hutu militia, and for its continued military operations in the 
Congolese-wars. France has been very accusatory towards the RPF, blaming them for the 
1990 October invasion that triggered the civil war; suggesting the RPF is responsible for 
shooting down General Habyarimana and Burundian President Cyprien Ntarymira’s plane; 
and for committing major atrocities during the genocide and afterwards in the two 
Congolese-wars. Rwandans have pleaded with France to reveal information recovered from 
the black box of that plane, and politically the RPF has used this to gain leverage by arguing 
that it will not cooperate with France. In April 2015, the French government said it would 
begin to declassify documents regarding the genocide, and make them publicly available in 
order to assist Rwanda’s reconciliation. 
60
 This comes at the peak of the post-genocide 
disassociation with the Francophone identity, as the state promotes an Anglophone culture 
and the English language as part of the new identity. This is reflective in education, business, 
the media, as well as the genocide memorials and museums, which present a harsh critique of 
Belgian colonial influence on the genocide ideology and French involvement in the 1990s.
61
 
An oppositional party, the Democratic Green Party of Rwanda (DGPR), filed a lawsuit 
against the state, citing that by eliminating French as an official language, the RPF is further 
marginalising the majority of the population who speak French in addition to Kinyarwanda, 
which effects national reconciliation and unity.
62
 Moreover, when state institutions are solely 
in English and Kinyarwanda, the population cannot hold these institutions accountable if 
there is a language barrier.
63
DGPR argues the RPF emerged from English-speaking Uganda, 
and uses English as a means to continue ties with fellow East African countries. 
 
The opposed perception of Rwanda is highly-critical of ‘post-genocide governance (which 
denounces autocratic-rule), the type of polity that has emerged after the genocide, repression 
and closing of the political space, compromised civil and political rights, gross human rights 
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abuse, growing inequality and rural poverty, structural violence, and the victimisation of the 
Hutu majority.
64
 These critiques are largely made by academics and especially Rwandan 
scholars- a ‘reserve’ that is expanding. There has also been a significant shift in critique from 
the French-speaking world to the English-speaking world. Little was known about Rwanda 
until to the genocide, drew enormous attention from ‘journalist, aid workers, diplomats, 
academic researchers, the media…etc. Hintjens writes in the immediate aftermath of the 
genocide, “the RPF was given the full benefit of the doubt by many scholars, journalists and 
human rights organisations”, some of which would be now blamed as being optimistic and 
naïve.
65
 Phil Clark asserts that scholars and researchers from the international community, 
tend to “overstate the case” of Rwanda, or exaggerate the difficulties in partaking in the 
dialogue because it adds claim to the important contribution of their work.
66
 
 
As an outcome of the dominance of international law and human rights regime, the initial 
analysis on the genocide and Rwanda’s political history, was hindered by the ‘genocide-lens’ 
and caught up in the hierarchies and power that determines production of knowledge. There 
are also vested interests, which shape research, reports and policies. This led to reductionist 
and redundant conclusions being drawn in the initial analysis. Reyntjens argues, “While 
many initial publications suffered from lack of historical background, fell into the trap of 
simple answers, or even showed outright bias, the quality of research dramatically improved 
over the years.”
67
 The huge presence of outsiders in Rwanda has been culpable in its 
contribution to epistemological hierarchies of knowledge, and this had an impact on the work 
of domestic thinkers, regional scholars or the contributions from the ‘Global-South’. There is 
a presumption made, that sees ‘local views’ as being bias, politicised, and ‘too close to the 
problem’. Rather, I would argue that all work produced on Rwanda is political and should 
not be cause for being dismissed or silenced. There are many Rwandans operating in 
different spaces, who are contributing productively with their insights into the historical and 
political context of Rwanda, and whose intimate knowledge/experiences of the complexities 
have included invaluable information of both the positives and negatives found in Rwandan 
landscape. 
 
The following section of this chapter will proceed with a discussion on Rwanda’s post-
genocide governance and political record. I am particularly interested in how the ‘victor’s 
deal’ achieved at the Arusha Accords, and military and political victory after the 
genocide, has shaped political practices today. 
 
3.4 ‘Rwandicity’: Engineering a ‘New Rwanda’ 
 
The Government of Rwanda’s notion of ‘Rwandicity’ underlines the spirit of governance and 
national reconciliation. The logic of the government is that imported models of democracy will 
not work for Rwanda; the new leadership of Rwanda has to formulate a model of ‘democracy’ 
that adapts to the inherited socio-political history of Rwanda.
68
 Moreover, before Rwanda can 
speak of ‘democracy’, pluralism, and multi-party elections, it needs to construct a unified single 
national identity that will hold both political agents of the state and Rwandans, accountable to 
Rwanda’s vision for a shared common future, that is a post-ethnic 
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state and society. The civil war and genocide “powerfully re-inscribed the division between 
Rwanda’s ethnic Hutu majority and ethnic minority. It was a divide that had been activated 
on several other occasions in Rwanda’s history to violent effect…”
69
 Thus, the current 
regime relies greatly on the lessons of history, as an instrument that accompanies law and 
politics. Prime Minister of Rwanda, Dr Pierre-Damien Habumuryemi, asserts, “In Rwanda, 
political pluralism has ceased to be an ethnic and regional pluralism to become a framework 
of participation and integration of all Rwandan children…Rwanda needs adequate political 
and social cohesion.”
70
 ‘Rwandicity’ provides that foundation for the new nation-state, and 
will facilitate the cohesion of socio-political and economic classes under the government’s 
principles for building a Rwandan national-identity. Habumuryemi states that ‘Rwandicity’ 
came about through consultations, participation and a lively debate held by the government 
in the Urugwiro village (May-June 1999). 
 
As Habmuryemi shares “These debates which were chaired by the then Head of State 
included a panel of actors of political life during the crucial period of 1957-1961, leaders 
and high officials of the first and second republics, personalities involved in the management 
of the State after the genocide of 1994 and representatives of scientific and academic society. 
The results of these debates played a big role in determining the fate of Rwandan society and 
provided guidance on the political management of the country. Two key political orientations 
emerged from the debates held in Urugwiro Village: the reshaping of the Rwandan national 
identity instead of secular identities of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa and the consolidation of a 
pluralistic democracy of consensus and integration.”
71
 
 
An important part of achieving a collective ‘Rwandan national identity’ and to promote the 
narrative of a single national identity was the eradication of ethnicity. Omar McDoom 
argues “The remarkable character of this strategy becomes apparent when one remembers 
that the paradigm usually favoured by international mediators is to explicitly balance the 
interest of ethnic and sectarian groups on the constitutional re-design of the nation.”
72
 
Rather, the government sees eradication of identities, as a short-term solution for ‘inter-
ethnic healing’ and in the long-term for ‘minimising ethnicity as force in public life.’
73
It 
acknowledges that Rwandans may still identify themselves as Hutu, Tutsi and Twa, but the 
purpose of the prohibition it states is “…to remove ethnic labelling as the basis for 
discrimination, denial of service and policy-making...to calm down ethnic passion and to 
silence ethnic identification and promote a narrative of national identity in order to nurture 
an environment for inter-communal peace and dialogue...’
74
From his research, Mcdoom 
asserts that this prohibition has extended to the private sphere, noting that Rwandans 
consciously avoid using the terms Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa. 
75
 
 
It is apparent in the Constitution, that the ‘Rwandan identity’ is thought through the 
‘genocide framework’. For Example, it is stated in various points in the Preamble of the 
Constitution: 
“…We the people of Rwanda,  
 In the wake of the genocide against the Tutsi that was organised and supervised by unworthy leaders 
and other perpetrators and that decimated more than a million sons and daughters of Rwanda;
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 Resolved to fight the ideology of genocide and all its manifestations and to eradicate ethnic, 
regional and any other forms of division…
 Emphasizing on the necessity to strengthen and promote national unity and reconciliation, which 
were seriously shaken by the genocide against the Tutsi and its consequences.”
76

 
The RPF presents itself as a ‘bulwark against the forces of genocide, including tribalism, 
ethnicity and race ideology.’
77
The 2003 Organic Law introduced new “thought and speech 
crimes”.
78
 These include “divisionism”, “ethnic ideology”, and “genocide mentality”.
79
This 
ties in with the significant emphasis throughout the Constitution on ‘Genocide Laws’, which 
seeks to fight genocide ideology and prevent genocide.
80
 Furthermore, in the Constitution: 
Chapter I: Fundamental Human Rights Article 13 stipulates: “Revisionism, negationism, and 
trivialisation of genocide are punishable by the law.”
81
 “Discrimination and sectarianism” 
both imply “divisionism” and are criminal offences. Article 1 defines discrimination as “any 
speech, writing, or actions based on ethnicity, region or country of origin, the colour of the 
skin, physical features, sex, language, religion or ideas aimed at depriving a person or group 
of persons of their rights…”
82
 Sectarianism “means the use of any speech, written statement 
or action that divides people, that is likely to spark conflicts among people, or that causes an 
uprising which might degenerate into strife among people based on discrimination mentioned 
in Article 1.”
83
 
 
Rene Lemarchand argues, “Exactly how the ‘freedom of thought and opinion’ guaranteed by 
the same article is to be reconciled with the prohibition of discrimination, as defined by the 
law, remains unclear.”
84
 The penalties for violating such constitutional provisions are 
enshrined in the law of December 2001. Article 5 states, “Any person guilty of the crime of 
discrimination or sectarianism... is sentenced to between three months and two years 
imprisonment and fined between 50,000 and 300,000 Rwandan francs or only one of these 
sanctions.”
85
 Moreover, if the offender happens to be a “government official, former official, 
a political party official, an official in the private sector or an official in a non-governmental 
organization, he/she is sentenced to between one year and five years of imprisonment and 
fined between 500,000 to 2,000,000 Francs or one of those two sanctions.”
86
Another piece 
of legislation relevant to the discussion in the chapter is the stipulations of Article 6: “any 
association, political party, or non-profit making organization found guilty of offences of 
discrimination, in which case penalties are raised to a fine of between five and ten million 
Rwandan francs and a suspension of between six months and a year… the seriousness of the 
consequences of that act of discrimination on the population, the court may double the 
penalty, or decide to dissolve the concerned association, political party or non-profit making 
organizations.”
87
In this chapter, I discuss the implications of these laws for open-dialogue 
and having a competitive, democratic political space. 
 
3.5 The Political Record of Post-Genocide Rwanda 
 
Analysis on Rwanda’s post-genocide political record distinguishes between two crucial 
phases, between 1994-2000 (which formally concluded the transitional process) and from 
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2000 – present, where the cracks in the logic that drove the transition have 
become pronounced. 
 
In order to understand post-genocide governance, I argue it is important to return to the 
agreement at the Arusha Accords, and to review which stipulations were salvaged and which 
were excluded in the aftermath of the genocide, and what that might tell us. Frederick 
Golooba-Mutebi and David Booth put forth an interesting argument in relation to the type of 
governance after 2003, which can be traced to the RPF’s political vision at the Arusha 
Accords negotiation. They argue in the aftermath of a historical bloodletting, “a crucial step 
was the decision of the winning forces in the 1990-1994 Rwandan civil war to share power 
with other national political forces considered to be opposed to ethnic sectarianism.”
88
 They 
go on to note, “The RPF and the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) did have overwhelming 
military power at the end of the war in 1994. To this extent, the RPF’s rejection of the 
principle of “winner takes all” was a choice and not inevitable. Inclusiveness was also wise 
and pragmatic in the circumstances. The victorious military forces were also taking charge of 
a country and an economy in ruins. In diplomatic terms, they were also bound by the terms 
of the internationally brokered Arusha Peace Agreement, which visualised the immediate 
formation of a Government of National Unity.”
89
 
 
In their study “Bilateral Cooperation and Local Power Dynamics: The Case of Rwanda”, 
Golooba-Mutebi et al, have based their arguments on ‘confidential interviews with members 
of the ruling party and other parties.’ From these interviews they found that the ideas of 
anti-sectarianism and power sharing have deeper roots in the RPF’s experiences in the Tutsi 
diaspora network, influenced by the debates and struggles on the ideology of Rwandese 
Alliance for National Unity (RANU).
90
 Golooba-Mutebi et al state that the “majority view 
decisively rejected the establishment of either a purely Tutsi organisation or an ideologically 
exclusive ‘vanguard party’ ” and this was reflected when the RPF invaded Rwanda, where 
the RPF developed “friendly relations” with political parties (such as predominantly 
southern-Hutu party, the Social Democratic Party).
91
This was on the basis that they shared a 
similar vision for Rwanda, which is a “ethnically and politically inclusive political 
project”
92
The authors then critique made by ‘external observers’ that the ban on ethnic 
identities is restricting the political space and freedom of speech. 
93
I will come back to this 
point later on. 
 
Proceeding from the discussion in Chapter 2, it is clear that the Arusha Agreement compromised 
the transition, because it failed to incorporate all political constituencies, and prevent a sentiment 
amongst Hutus that viewed it as a ‘victors deal’ for the RPF. Reyntjens argues “in addition to 
being a peace accord, it was a fundamental shuffle of political cards…from the executive, the 
presidency became ceremonial. The transitional government and assembly were to be put in 
place by main political parties including the RPF, along consociatonal lines…”
94
This meant that 
decisions made by the “broad-based transitional government” needed a two-thirds majority vote, 
and the support of at least four parties was needed to attain a majority in the “Transitional 
National Assembly.”
95
The new national army must be made up of 60% government army and 
40% RPF army. When the RPF broke the 
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ceasefire agreement in 1993, the political landscape quickly dwindled from being “tripolar 
(the former single-party- the unarmed opposition- the RPF)” to a bipolar system (MNRD an 
allies versus the RPF), which both destroyed the balance and increased political organisation 
along ethnic lines.
96
The October 1993 coup d’etat in Burundi which led to the assassination 
of the Hutu president by a predominantly Tutsi army, also had a compounding effect on the 
polarisation of the political struggle in Rwanda and demonstrated to Hutus that the RPF 
“would never accept genuine democracy.”
97
 Thus, rendering the Arusha Accords a failed 
dead process. 
 
3.5.2 Transitional Government: Power-Sharing or Consolidating Power? 
 
After declaring military victory on 18 July 1994, the RPF installed a transitional 
government, as envisioned by the Arusha Peace Agreement. The interim government is 
referred to as the ‘Broad-Based Government of National Unity’, which was put in place for a 
five-year transitional period (but extended to nine-years) that would conclude the transition 
by holding national democratic elections. At a second glance, it is apparent that the new 
interim government was considerably different to what was proposed by the Accords. 
Through the Declaration of the RPF, a consensus was reached that decided to install a Hutu 
President Pasteur Bizimungu, and Vice President Paul Kagame. As Vice-President, Kagame 
was the ‘minister of defence, general of the army, and represented Rwanda in important 
meetings with foreign heads of state.’
98
This allowed Kagame to have influence on Rwanda’s 
domestic policies and also its foreign policies. Faustin Twagiramungu (of the Mouvement 
Democratique Republican- MDR) was made the Prime Minister. In accordance with the 
Arusha Agreement minister positions were held by four ministers from the MDR, three from 
the PL (Parti Liberal), three from PSD, and eight from RPF, with one other from an 
independent party.
99
 This meant twelve ministers were Hutu and nine were Tutsi. 
 
There were a few significant modifications made to original Arusha Agreement, and were 
informed by the Declaration of the RPF. To begin with, the President shifted from having a 
‘ceremonial role’ to having an ‘executive’ one, thus the President gained significant power 
and dominance in his/her position, because it stipulated that the President be consulted with 
and have to approve the composition of the government, and if decisions by the government 
can not be reached than the “President of the Republic decides in a sovereign way.”
100
This 
becomes critically important. Moreover, as Reyntjens notes “the RPF took three of the five 
seats previously allotted to the former ruling party MRNDD, thus ensuring a blocking of 
one-third plus”, the RPF also took eight of the twenty-one portfolio, which would placed the 
RPF in a position to prevent decisions from being taken.
101
 Finally, the RPF secured a 
majority in Parliament. The final arrangement of the transitional state was in direct violations 
of the proposals for “power-sharing” and “national unity” and instead allowed the RPF to 
exercise complete monopoly of power.
102
 
 
Given the colossal task to reconstruct Rwanda from the perspective of genocide and from a 
historical point of view of the political inheritance meant that early analysis on Rwanda’s 
progress was relatively positive, even though there were red flags. For example, in 2000, 
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President Bizimungu resigned, and was charged and sentenced to 15 years for 
‘embezzlement, inciting violence and associating with criminals’- crimes of 
“divisionism”.
103
 He was also charged with a very serious crime- ‘endangering the state’, 
where Bizimungu was charged based on an interview he had given, where he “predicted Hutu 
violence and civil war unless the RPF started sharing power in a genuine way”.
104
This 
charge would later be dropped, but the damage was done. Bizimungu was very critical of the 
governments ‘growing and unnecessary crackdown on dissent.’
105
As a ‘moderate Hutu’ 
(married to Tutsi) who came from Gisenyi, the ‘home of Northern Hutu politics and Hutu 
extremism’, Bizimungu joined the RPF in 1990 after Hutu radicals assassinated his 
brother.
106
 His resignation and criminal charges came in a sensitive time in Rwandan 
politics, because although seen as a ‘peripheral figure’ he represented a ‘different’ kind of 
politician who strongly opposed ethnic-politics and authoritarianism. In 2001 Bizimungu 
started his own party (Party for Democracy Renewal- PDR also known in Kinyarwanda as 
Ubuyanja) but with immediate effect the government banned the party, citing that it 
‘preached ethnic hatred’ and he was stripped of all former-heads of state privileges and 
placed under house arrest.
107
 After his resignation, Kagame became the president of 
Rwanda’s transitional government, and as discussed the position of the president was 
designed in a way that allows him/her to hold great power and control of the state. 
 
I would like to also note a few other examples that support Bizimungu’s claim. Reyntjens 
asserts that driven by the guilt of the international community and the outcome of the judicial 
influence, the “Friends of the New Rwanda” has constituted this idea of the “bad guys” and 
the “good guys”, the latter is naturally understood to be the RPF.
108
 The consequence is that 
it fuels the governing-party’s suspicions, and supports accusatory claims against anyone or 
organisation it deems as being against the ‘new Rwanda’ (“divisionism”). In January 1995, 
Colonel Kayumba Nyamwasa informed Kagame that there is a “lack of contentment among 
opposition politicians especially those from the MDR and naturally from other extremist who 
have taken hiding in other political parties…These MDR politicians are, like always, making 
it a tribal issue and are holding secret consultations…”
109
In 1995 (January-March), the 
Internal reports of the Intelligence and Security Department of the National Gendarmerie 
produced a report on the “Enemy internal activity”.
110
 The report pointed to ‘non-RPF’ and 
particularly MDR politicians, civil servants and diplomats as being “subversive” and “enemy 
agents” that were meeting in secret which were considered “clandestine”. 
111
Furthermore, 
the report emphasised that it has evidence of the MDR being “pro and anti-Tutsi” and were 
increasing its strength at the grassroots level, which the report stated, “will affect the RPF 
hold on the local population.”
112
The report also signalled out six parliamentarians and two 
prominent Hutu RPF Ministers- Seth Sendashonga and Alexis Kanyarengwa, arguing that 
they were organising meetings with the aim of “fighting a way for the rights of the (Hutu) 
majority.”
113
 
 
These sentiments are particularly worrying for the ‘national unity’ project, but also because it 
revealing of the political strategy of the RPF. In 1992, a report surfaced which challenged the 
claim that the RPF invasion was a ‘liberation struggle’, as it provided a record of Kagame 
claiming, “Since there was no possibility of winning local support the population was to be 
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viewed as a security risk and so areas need to be cleared.”
114
 This has been supported by 
well-documented evidence of mass killings between 1991-1993. It also raises questions about 
the RPF treatment of local electoral processes. An internal RPF document that was produced 
in February 1994, had re-surfaced, it stated “The strong foundations put in place during the 
transitional period must allow the Front to organize the timely departure of Habyarimana 
Juvénal, with or without elections (these need to be organized at the moment of the RPF’s 
choosing, in the light of the situation in the country).”
115
This document is most revealing for 
the argument that the RPF’s overall goal has been to secure monopoly of power in Rwanda. 
 
By 2001, the transitional government had decentralised the state, creating 11 provinces and 
106 districts that would be governed by the Ministry of Local Government. The first ‘local 
elections were held in 1999, and district elections in 2001.’
116
 The RPF asserts that 
decentralisation is important because it allows Rwandans to elect their leaders, and be able to 
monitor and hold their leaders accountable.
117
 In addition to re-arranging the traditional 
landscape of Rwanda by relocating citizens into the district-communities, there was also a 
military strategy that would serve state-security by interrupting and monitoring armed 
mobilisation networks.
118
 The Local Government was given the task of introducing order 
through a functioning bureaucratic-system, and to educate the population on political 
processes (e.g. civil-society, workings of the judiciary, legislative and executive, 
consultations, constitution, rule of law, and electoral processes), which would inspire a 
participatory citizenry. However, mostly Tutsi RPF-loyalists were placed in the leadership of 
the Local Government, and these districts were strictly monitored by the policy and in some 
places the military. David Himbara, former Chairman of the Rwandan Development Board 
who worked closely with Kagame and has spurred Rwandan’s economic growth, asserts, 
“penetration of the administration to the village level facilitates a comprehensive surveillance 
 
system whereby local functionaries are enlisters as watchers, and almost everyone in Rwanda 
is watched.”
119
 
The RPF also took the opportunity to use the district communities to expand and employ 
a “new RPF “cadre” in the countryside, to build the party’s base ahead of presidential and 
parliamentary elections in 2003.”
120
 
 
It was also in 2001, that proceedings of a Constitutional Commission got on its way. The new 
constitution proposed to ensure the balance between central and local government. 
121
In its 
report, End of a Transition in Rwanda: A Necessary Political Liberalisation, International 
Crisis Group (ICG) stated that the drafting of the constitution “should ensure a balance 
between central and local government... It should also provide an institutional framework to 
consolidate the RPF’s political platform.
122
 Moreover, it noted that the draft “does not 
envisage the immediate arrival of democracy, but proposes the framework in which this 
would be achievable.”
123
 This is premised on the view that the interim government does not 
see Rwanda as being ‘ready’ for a democracy, and requires the ‘re-education of politicians 
and population on the respect for political liberties.’
124
In the meantime, it asserts that a 
“strong” and “enlightened” leadership is required to maintain the country’s unity.
125
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The Constitutional Commission would be the first process of consultations with the 
Rwandan population in the constitution making, and provides an open debate on Rwanda’s 
future, by combining “popular consultation” with the governments “participatory 
approach”.
126
However, where as it was meant to be consultation process, ICG reported that 
it “…has not really opened up the debate on the future of Rwanda” and has “highly 
supervised popular participation.”
127
Furthermore, the president of the Commission, Tito 
Rutamera was appointed by the National Assembly of Transition (NTA), who was also a 
significant “RPF’s ideologist” and previous president of the ‘Forum of parties’, head of the 
RPF group at the National Assembly, as well as being s first deputy in the RPF in 1993. 
128
This is deeply concerning because the Commission is charged with drafting the 
constitution and the president of the Commission selects the members, which as ICG reports, 
“exactly mirrors the political make-up of the NTA.”
129
Technically the electorate in Rwanda 
does not elect the parliament and legislators, which means it cannot hold the Commission 
accountable. Moreover, the RPF have shown to have a paternalistic attitude towards the 
population, as demonstrated by one of the Commission members, Jacques Kabale “the 
Commission has the merit of asking opinions of an uneducated population.”
130
 
 
After ‘590 meetings’ that were attended by 2000 people, the first draft of the constitution 
was adopted by parliament and published in 2002. New versions followed in 2003. A 
referendum was held that year, and the results showed that 87% of voters participated, and 
93% voted in favour of the new constitution.
131
 Whereas, it strongly negates Hutu and Tutsi 
power, and calls for strict adherence to the rule of law, President Kagame took as decisive 
step by declaring that the “presidential and legislative elections would be held by direct 
universal suffrage and secret ballot” which his opponents accused the government of wanting 
to impose ‘indirect elections’ that would allow the “control of the selection of local 
representatives and be assured of their support.”
132
ICG also reported “soldiers and certain 
RPF politicians (including Tito Rutaremara) also advocated a mode of indirect elections, 
fearing the “Buyoya” syndrome and the RPF’s inability to find popular support among 
Hutus.”
133
The International Federation of Human Rights found that “the constitution offers 
the image of a virtuous façade, opposed to the reality of strong restriction on freedom and 
democratic principles.”
134
 
 
The constitution was published and adopted in time for the 2003 national elections, which 
would mark the end of the transition, and the first election since the civil war began, and 
the first multi-party elections in Rwandan history. Its vision for ‘political liberalisation’ is 
questionable, given that the government has used the constitutional laws- “prohibiting 
genocide ideology” and “sectarianism” to crush competitive democracy practices and 
‘constrain its political opponents.’
135
The government has effectively ‘limited the range of 
allowable ideas among politicians.’
136
 Omar McDoom argues “the regime equates 
competitive politics with ethnic violence in Rwanda, and does not know how resistant 
Rwandan society would be to extremists’ appeals to mobilize along ethnic lines.”
137
 
 
In May 1998, President Bizimungu, President of the interim government, held the “Forum for 
National Orientations”. This seminar brought members of different political parties together 
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to discuss unity, reconciliation, justice, policies, the economy…etc.
138
 Some parties 
mentioned that the seminars were “serious and useful”. 
139
However, most telling was 
an incident occurring with the (MDR). 
 
The MDR formed in 1998 with the objective of being an independent opposition. At the 
seminar meetings the MDR presented its mandate, which differed in its account of history to 
that of the RPF’s ‘official narrative’. Succinctly, the text stated there was no pre-colonial 
unity, the 1959 ‘social revolution’ was the true revolution aimed at achieving democracy, 
and that it was the Tutsi monarchy that posed a threat to this democracy.
140
 Furthermore, it 
stated that the “allegation considering all Hutus as genocidaires, contributes to the 
insecurity.” 
141
 The RPF expressed complete outrage by the MDR’s proposal, and ordered 
the party to “rewrite its homework” and submit a new manifesto. 
142
Shockingly, the re-
submission was devoid of all former critique, and marked the beginning of fallout with the 
RPF, that successfully led to the MDR’s marginalisation and later political ban from 
operating. The same fate befell on the PDR. In 2002, the government was pressured into 
following up on the ban of PDR in 2001, which it did, and pressured prominent Tutsi 
members to resign, which allowed the government to then label the PDR as a “radical Hutu 
Party”.
143
Following their ban, other parties were also banned, including main opposition 
(CDR) and political leaders were increasingly harassed, placed on house arrest or put on 
‘show trials’.
144
In May 2003, Amnesty International criticised the government for banning 
the two main opposition parties.
145
 
 
Reyntjens asserts, “despite having control of all instruments of local, provincial and national 
management, and the reinforcement offered by its constitutional engineering” the decision 
was abruptly made by Kagame to prematurely close the poll-count.
146
In a bold 
unconstitutional move the RPF declared itself the winner, and rationalised its decision based 
on the argument that was based on a security concern of the consequences of political 
liberalisation and competitive politics where the ethnic demographic is drastically uneven. 
 
In March 2003, President Kagame addressed the opposition in a post-election, a telling sign 
of a radical move to close the political space. Kagame stated “if they come with the objective 
of hindering our programmes, they will be injured…Our clemency decreases…To whoever 
prides himself of having harvested sorghum or maize, we will say that we have mills to 
crush them...”147 He then goes onto to assert “I can tell you that the result of the elections is 
known…I can tell you for 100 percent that the elected will be those who follow the policy of 
reconstructing the country.…those who want to bring divisionism…have no place in this 
country.” One of the RPF supports declared “Rwandans are reconciling, the vast majority of 
Hutus voted for a Tutsi.”
148
Whilst cheering at Kagame’s victory parade, another youth 
supporter of the RPF complained, “There’s no freedom of speech”.
149
 
 
Kagame is said to have won 95% of the votes, and his main opponent, Prime-Minister 
Twagiramungu received 3.7%. On the eve of the elections, Twagiramungu admitted that “he 
had no chance of winning the presidency”, his party (MDR) had been banned, his campaign 
leaflets seized, and his supporters were terrified.
150
Moreover, some of his provincial 
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campaign managers were arrested, and twelve of them were “paraded on television, 
denouncing their former leader.”
151
Twagiramungu shared a letter that he received form 
one of his campaign members. In it, the member stated, “I’m sorry, but I have to stay  
alive.”
152
Soon after the elections, Twagiramungu fled into exile (Belgium) citing that 
the RPF was “too dominant and undemocratic.”
153
 
 
Former chief-of-staff to Kagame, and former general-secretary of the RPF, 
 
Dr Theogene Rudasingwa gave a ‘post-mortem’ analysis of the 2003 elections. Rudasingwa 
asserts, “Since 1995, the trend has been towards progressive consolidation of RPF’s 
monopolistic control of the machinery of the state…since, then, striven for unrivalled 
political supremacy. The organization exercises absolute control over all organs of the 
state…and it has achieved political supremacy not through open and free process of 
competition with other political forces, but through repressive laws, administrative practices 
and the use of the security services to frustrate the exercise of the civil and political rights of 
its opponents…Rwanda is far less free now than it was prior to 1994.”
154
 In response to 
Rudasingwa, I will briefly reflect on the ‘government’ that was installed after the 2003 
elections. Rwandans still carried extensive trauma; physically, psychologically, and 
materially, and therefore there were different expectations on the served objective of the 
national elections, which allowed for little contestation from Rwandans themselves. 
 
3.5.3 “Winner Takes All”: The Tutsification and RPF-ization of the 
Rwandan State 
 
The 2003 national elections were viewed as a “political milestone for the RPF,” having 
secured the leadership of Rwanda at the end of the transition, and by all technocratic 
accounts it had delivered the first ‘multi-party’ elections that were efficiently run.
155
 
Constitutionally speaking, the party that wins elections has “an obligation” to involve other 
parties in the ‘management of the country’.
156
This is understood through ‘power sharing’. Dr 
Habumureymi argues “the opposition in the manner of established democracies was not 
deemed appropriate in the post-genocide Rwanda and the selected option was a ‘consensual 
democracy’ through the forum of political parties with a rotating leadership for all political 
parties that compose it.”
157
This is a strategy that makes use of mediation (conciliation and 
dispute resolution), which addresses past practices of ethnic exclusion, as well as interethnic 
negotiation. Furthermore, the ruling party argues that the system proposes a proportional 
system to avoid a majoritarian democracy and “winner takes all” effect. In theory this 
“Rwandan democracy” would seek to secure the rights of all groups, and safeguard the rights 
of minority groups like the Tutsi. Paradoxically, Rwanda is also a Presidential Republic; 
meaning President Kagame is the ‘head of state’, ‘head of government’, and head of the 
‘multi-party system’.
158
 Bernard Makuza (ex-MDR) was appointed as Prime Minister. 
 
The parliament has a consociative arrangement, for the purpose of avoiding ethnic-violence, 
operates on a system of proportionality. This also guarantees seats to women (24 seats), the 
youth (2 seats) and disability (1) representatives, who are appointed by the senate.
159
 One of 
the widely lauded developments in the constitution is the inclusion of women in parliament, 
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as mentioned Rwanda has the highest representation of women in the world (64%).
160
 The 
presidency and bicameral are selected through a system of both direct and indirect elections, 
wherein 53 of 80 parliamentary seats, as well as the presidency is elected through a popular 
vote.
161
 Will Jones argues whereas this appears to abide by principles of pluralism, ‘ordinary 
Rwandans’ cannot effectively monitor the government. 
162
 As demonstrated in the elections, the 
ruling party has repressed competitive democratic practices. Rwandan political analyst, 
Kiwuwa, asserts, “The ability to manipulate the electoral college directly or indirectly, using 
political and social shrewdness coupled with government political ‘godfathering’, ensured that 
the right candidates obtained desired results.”
163
Furthermore, in order to be considered for 
parliament representation, a party has to get a minimum of 5% of the votes, which compromises 
small parties.
164
The EU electoral monitor and Umuseso news agent both reported that the small 
parties Parti Liberal (PL) and PSD (Social Democratic Party) did not win more than 5% of the 
votes but were both given positions in parliament, which garnered the critique that the RPF had 
manipulated the votes in the elections.
165
 
 
At a first glance, there seems to have been a higher representation of Hutus in parliament than 
the previous transitional government. Kagame appointed thirteen out of the eighteen 
positions to Hutu minister, and five of them came from the RPF, and two of the eleven state 
secretaries. 
166
On face value this seems that the government has been ethnically inclusive, 
however these positions are merely a symbolic administrative act, because they hold little to 
no influence directly on power. Sixteen of the twenty-nine member of government were from 
the RPF, which was a constitutional violation of Article 116.
167
Of the non-RPF Hutus and 
other representatives who were given positions in parliament, they came from parties who 
“either joined the RPF list or supported the RPF candidate during presidential elections” such 
as from the PL and PSD. 
168
Reyntjens notes “the Hutu recently incorporated in the RPF were 
from a new generation, whereas the old one, that was politically active in 1994, was evicted, 
in prison, killed or in exile.”
169
This was an attempt to broaden its base but also indicated to 
dissident Tutsis that they were no longer needed. The ‘modernization of the economy’ and 
pro-growth policies also attracted a new generation of Tutsis who were keen to show their 
loyalty and expertise to the RPF.
170
 Within Local Government, “80% of mayors were 
Tutsis”.
171
 Both the justice sector and the intelligence unit is “100% Tutsi.”
172
 Thus, it is 
apparent that the “regime claiming to fight ethnicity, is actually spearheading ethnic 
policies.”
173
Minister Chief Murigande states “there must be no Tutsi and Hutu call, but like 
in the past there is a constant danger that in the new Rwanda, as in the old “instruments of 
power and enrichment are concentrated in small networks based on a shared past.”
174
 
Reyntjens writes “when, in the past, Hutu were a majority in public institutions, this was 
called “ethnic discrimination”; however, now that Tutsi were a majority, this became 
“meritocracy”.
175
 
 
In order to address the historical North-South political divide, which has led to violence and 
undermined the capital Kigali, the constitution stipulates that the legislator is not allowed to 
represent a region, thus ridding Rwanda of geographical constituencies.
176
Whereas this 
contributes to dissolving ethnic-based politics/sectarianism, it also hinders smaller parties that 
rely on regional support from their constituency. Furthermore, because legislators do not  
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have specific constituencies, they are not accountable to electorates and representative of serving 
the interest of ‘ordinary Rwandan voters’.
177
 Rudasingwa argues that they are appointed by 
corrupt ways, and act as party functionaries for fear of being dismissed- ‘rubber stamping 
decisions made by cabinets’, and there is a real fear amongst parliamentarians to expose 
ineffective government practices or hold them accountable.
178
Moreover, the high of 
 
legislators renders institutions ineffective, because legislators are often recalled before 
the end of their terms.
179
 
 
These shrewd administrative practices have set a dangerous precedent in Rwanda, which has 
been reflective in each election since. Rudasingwa asserts every election “has been preceded 
with worrying patterns of intimidation, harassment and other abuses- ranging from killings 
to restrictive administrative measures-against opposition parties, journalist, members of civil 
society and other critics, with results confirming RPF’s monopoly of political power.”
180
 
 
I would like address an interesting debate that has taken place in the literature on post-
genocide governance, two opposing views, one held by Golooba-Mutebi et al, and the other 
position which seems to be held by the majority of Rwandan scholars. The latter argues that 
Rwanda has effectively seen a ‘Tutsification of the state’ and they have come to be critical of 
the façade of pluralism and power sharing. 
 
Golooba-Mutebi et al position their argument in response to critiques of the governing-party 
and repressive administrative practices that have closed the political space. They also attend 
to the development of elements in the post-genocide ‘political settlement’. ‘Political 
settlement’ is a term used by political economist and political scientist, who argue “a) 
institutions matter, and also b) that the way institutions work is shaped by non-institutional 
factors, especially the power distribution among major elements of a national elite, including 
its military, civil, economic and political wings.”
181
These institutions are compatible and 
mutually supportive. The authors assert that the current political settlement was arrived at 
through a. commitment to power sharing; b. the pursuit of development, not negotiation, as 
the principal path to national reconciliation; and c. a search for an alternative to clientalistic 
political competition.
182
 
 
I discussed the first element of the political settlement in the beginning of this section, which 
contextualised the RPFs view on ‘power-sharing’. To begin with, the authors argue that what is 
widely unappreciated, is the way in which the constitution (“the product of a national 
consultation process”) has posed limits on the power of the RPF, and “even caters to the needs of 
microscopic parties that are not members of the governing coalition.”
183
Larger parties who hold 
cabinet position are able to reject RPF proposals even on security issues. The RPF is also not 
constitutionally allowed to hold more than 50% of cabinet posts. Furthermore, from their 
interviews, Golooba-Mutebi et al note that “Both RPF and non-RPF ministers insisted to us that 
this is the outcome of a natural evolution that started in the 1980s, when the genocide had not yet 
happened but the cost of ethnic power monopolies were already clear enough.”
184
Moreover, the 
bicameral parliament strictly observes and ensures 
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that there won’t be a “winner takes all” effect. The authors also seem to place blame on 
‘smaller-parties’ as being “lazy” if they don't “develop new ideas to offer voters.”
185
 
 
The second element (development for national reconciliation) sees the inclusion of former 
Habyarimana’s regimes FAR, the RPA, and some forces from Congo, into the Rwandan Defence 
Froce as being indicative of both a commitment to power sharing and reconciliation. Secondly, 
Golooba-Mutebi et al argue that the current state is committed to including all parties in the 
bargaining, and “reconciliation has to come from the joint participation in a development and 
nation-building process, it cannot come from a political process in which ethnic supremacist are 
allowed once again to promote their point of view”- the later which is proven by history to put 
the country at great risk of conflict continuing.
186
The authors applaud the constitution and 
strategy that uses development for reconciliation, arguing that this importantly signals to the 
Hutu middle class, who previously had a historical ‘anti-Tutsi’ view and promoted anti-RPF 
propaganda (which the argue continues to circulate), that the ruling party is determined to and 
‘very deliberately’ pursue a “non-discriminatory approach” and a “non-political approach” for 
inclusion and development.
187
 
 
The third element, responds to the critique of a ‘prevailing Rwandan elite’ today, specifically 
a new RPF ‘akazu’. Golooba-Mutebi et al argue, “the current elite bargain was fully defined 
between 2000 and 2003 and not before”, an important distinction, which can reconcile 
current ‘misinterpretations on the Rwandan reality’.
188
The authors point out that around 
2000, the “majority view became that the nation-building project and wager on reconciling 
former enemies through a process of economic and social development would not be 
achieved if public affairs were allowed to revert back to type-that is, if the political system 
were to evolve back to the patron-client pattern, with the attendant tolerance for cronyism and 
corruption.”
189
 Thus, the authors assert critiques about “descent into tyranny”- Rwanda is a 
dictatorship, the constitutional checks and balances and tolerance of liberal freedoms have 
been eroded, are “naïve of politics in poor African countries.”
190
Furthermore, the view the 
dispute between the MDR and RPF, as owing to the MDR leaders being found to be 
“unreliable both on anti-sectarianism” and on the rising issue of “competitive clientelism” 
and individuals and parties were extracting personal gains from the public office.
191
 
Golooba-Mutebi et al argue there are various ways in which the RPF are using their own 
finances and institutions to fight competitive clientalism (RPF holding company Crystal 
Ventures Ltd.).
192
Also, they point to the ‘many’ significant Hutu elites (government, 
military, business community) who support anti-sectarianism and abide by the spirit of the 
constitution, which has centred the ban on ethnic politics.
193
 
 
In order to make their argument, Golooba-Mutebi et al have separate the political from political 
policies and institutions, arguing that the current institutions are enforced by formal and informal 
rules (checks and balances). Secondly, they place a great deal of faith in these institutions and the 
constitution, which as I have demonstrated in this chapter are riddled with monopolistic 
administrative practices, the constitution is used to repress ‘competitive politics’ (through laws 
such as “divisionism” and “sectarianism”) and also there have been outright violations of the 
constitution. I disagree with the authors argument that “political and 
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policy differences exist” and are facilitated by institutional rules, are indicative of a healthy 
political landscape. Moreover, Golooba-Mutebi et al assert that the notion of a ‘elite 
convergence’ owes to commitments by various parties in the political settlement to power-
sharing, development, and anti-sectarianism, a commitment that includes Hutus and Tutsi, 
because of its “robust inclusiveness” and ‘broad-based’ rules which appeal to many different 
people from different sectors. Finally, I find it problematic that the authors have been quick 
to dismiss internal and external critique of the Rwandan state (‘naïve’ about the nature of 
politics in poor African countries’) but in their own rationale, they oversimplify and grossly 
overlook critical political practices. Arguably, one cannot speak of ‘robust inclusiveness’ 
when it premised on various practices of exclusion and intolerance to alternative views and 
critical engagement, this only serves to further the governments stranglehold on the political 
space that prevents open and lively debates. The closure of the political space indicates a 
crisis in the political institutions that these authors seem to negate and justify given the 
history and specifically the genocide. Whereas as they give the ruling-party the benefit of the 
doubt (given the circumstances) they rob Rwanda of the opportunity to disinherit prevailing 
practices of the past, and contribute to the strict governing of what is considered ‘politically 
correct’. The following section of this chapter will continue exploring the political record, 
and engages with some of the flaws of Golooba-Mutebi et al’s argument. 
 
3.5.4 Closing the Political Space: Silencing Critical Voices 
 
Since 2003, the political climate in Rwanda has significantly deteriorated. Contrary to the 
perception that the RPF ‘enjoys relatively high’ legitimacy and Kagame’s 95% win 
demonstrates that he is the ‘elected peoples leader’, all other viable opposition parties have 
been ‘eliminated’ through false accusations sectarian politics. Hintjens states “The regime 
claims it stands for the very antithesis of racialised mentality of the past.”
194
However the 
use of the law to violently repress debate and competitive-politics is counter-productive for 
national reconciliation and achieving ‘Rwandicity’, a post-ethnic society that is politically 
reconciled into a single political community. There has been a sharp rise in ‘criminalising 
politics’ through house arrests, imprisonment, forced disappearances and of grave concern, 
a rise in assassinations. 
 
The 2003 Organic Law stipulates that political parties will be ‘allowed’ to practice, once they 
have registered, which means they must “…reflect the unity of the Rwandan people” also 
“all parties are prohibited from disseminating information (of) a denigrating and divisive 
nature about elected and appointed leaders” and are forbidden from using “words and acts 
that intend to denigrate and disparage a person in order to unlawfully remove him or her from 
leadership positions.”
195
These laws are interchangeable with “Negationism” or 
“Trivilisation” of the genocide. What is meant by ‘unity’ is demonstrated in the complete 
absence of political opposition, and the latter law, has safeguarded RPF positions in 
governance. Hintjens asserts “This hotchpotch of political correctness and political 
convenience highlight how law and politics merge, and are designed in combination to 
prevent open criticism of the current regime.”
196
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The 2003 elections presents a watershed in Rwandan politics, because since then every 
parliamentary elections (2003, 2008, 2013) and presidential election (2010) have seen the 
ruling-party use the law to exhaust the civil and political rights of Rwandans.
197
 Rwanda has 
yet to see a true multi-party election or a competitive political space. Formally, there are 
only the RPF’s coalition-partners, who bare little significance and only serve the RPF’s 
stranglehold on power. Despite the odds stacked against them, the opposition did resurface 
in time for the 2010 presidential elections. The leader of the PL asserts, “We are not here to 
oppose President Kagame but to build the nation. Rwanda does not need a European-type 
opposition.”
198
 The debate amongst the opposition challenged the monopoly of the RPF’s 
power, and “introduced inside the country, a debate that contested the ruling party’s 
discourse.”
199
However, reminiscent of how it addressed the MDR (in 2003), the regime 
used administrative practices, the law, and its security agencies to repress the discourse 
debate, and thus further excluding constituencies by criminalising their politics. 
 
Various leaders have been arrested, such as FDU-Inkingi (Victoire Ingabire Umohoza), PS-
Imberakuri (Bernard Ntaganda), and PDB- Imanzi (Deo Mushaidi), who have all sentenced 
with imprisonment.
200
 Deo Mushidi, who was a former (Tutsi) journalist and leader of PDB-
Imanzi, was arrested together with Kayumba Nyamwasa and Patrick Karegeye (2 former RPF 
officers living in exile in South Africa), and in addition to the ‘usual criminal laws’ they were 
charged with “terrorism”, “attempt against the security of the state” and for having ties to 
FDLR.
201
 The DGPR leader Andre Kagwa Rwisereka was “beheaded by state agents in 
2010”, and the new leader, formerly living in exile, returned to Rwanda and has since been 
unable to register the party.
202
 Similarly this has been the case for the AMAHORO People’s 
Congress and Rwandan National Congress (RNC).
203
 The AMAHORO People’s Congress, 
RNC, PS-Imberakuri, and FDU-Inkingi, have joined forces since 2013, extending its reach to 
Rwandans both in the diaspora and within Rwanda. It has also extended an invitation to civil 
society, calling upon them to unite in the demand to “speed up change” in Rwanda, and 
address the plight of political prisoners.
204
 They all seek to address what they describe as the 
central state’s neglect of the poor rural communities and the closing of the political space. 
Their meetings often take place in Brussels due to fear of imprisonment or violent attacks on 
members. 
 
The experience of political prisoner and leader of opposition party FDU-Inkingi, Victoire 
Ingabire Umohoza, is a troubling case in which the state chose to criminalise a political leader 
rather than engage in political mediation and face the opposition through political processes like 
elections. Her case marked intensified repression after 2010. Ingabire returned to Rwanda (2010) 
after spending 16 years in exile in the Netherlands, with the aim of running for president as the 
leader of the Rwandan Diaspora’s opposition. Marceline Nduwamungu (Rwandan exiled in 
Belgium) noted Ingabire’s courage- “many Rwandans in the diaspora speak and write about the 
regime” and some agreed to return with Ingabire, but out of fear they couldn’t, and she was left 
to return and take on Kagame alone.
205
 Compared in the media to Nelson Mandela, Patrice 
Lumumba, and Aung San Suu Kyii, Ingabire has inspired the opposition that live in exile to 
confront “the existing belief and power structures that has led to the death and disinheritance of 
millions in the Great Lakes Region, most of all in 
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Rwanda and Democratic Republic of Congo.”
206
 Upon her arrival, Ingabire spoke at a 
genocide memorial site (April 2010), where she stated, “We are here honouring at this 
memorial the Tutsi victims of the Genocide. There were also Hutu who were victims of 
crimes against humanity and war crimes, not remembered or honoured here. Hutu are also 
suffering. They are wondering when their time will come to remember their people. In order 
for us to give that desirable reconciliation, we must be fair and compassionate towards every 
Rwandan. It is imperative that for Tutsi survivors, Hutu who killed their relatives understand 
the crimes they committed and accept the legal consequences. It is also crucial that those 
who may have killed Hutu understand that they must be equally punished by the laws.”
207
 
 
Challenging the notion that only Tutsis were victims, and including Hutus in the narrative in 
thinking about reconciliation, was a provocative move by Ingabire. Ingabire also boldly 
suggested that both Hutus and Tutsis could be capable of extremism. Ingabire was arrested at 
the memorial site, and later released. However, two months later she was re-arrested and 
accused of ‘genocide ideology’, “suspicion of threatening national security and public 
order”, and “buying and distributing arms and ammunitions to the terrorist organisation” the 
FDLR.
208
 President Kagame used the opportunity to publicly state that Ingabire was guilty, 
saying that she confessed to him.
209
 This was before the trial began, which alerted 
international human rights organisations and the international media to the case, bringing the 
case under scrutiny for possible human rights violations and concern that she would not 
receive a fair trial and due-process. Ingabire’s defence had actually raised the issue “of the 
constitutionality of the 2008 genocide ideology law” however the Supreme Court refused to 
allow it, saying it was inadmissible in court.
210
In October 2012 Ingabire was sentenced to 8 
years in prison, which was later changed to 15 years house arrest. 
 
Ingabire’s criminal trial came to demonstrate the political crisis in post-genocide Rwanda. 
Local Government Minister, James Musoni, was instructed by Racepoint (U.K. PR firm for 
Rwanda) to address the banning of political opposition member- Ingabire. Musoni made a 
clear statement in his concluding remark for the article, stating that “The government is 
determined to ensure these elections go ahead peacefully and fairly – without interference 
from those inside and outside the country who stand to gain from stirring up instability.”
211
 
 
In response to the critique of a closed political space, President Kagame stated to a Belgian 
journalist, that his opponents were ‘ignorant’, ‘misguided’ or ‘disgruntled’… “Anyway, 
they were just a minority: The majority of people in Rwanda are engaged in these processes 
(of building the country) and are happy. The idea that those who do not adhere to the RPF 
view have no place in the political dispensation is quite old.”
212
 As the ICG notes, “When 
the regime’s viewpoint is not respected, accepted or understood, it is simply imposed. In 
this context political parties that exist today are only tolerated if they agree not to question 
the definition of political life drawn up by the RPF.”
213
 
 
In 2015, Freedom House interviewed David Himbara, who fled to South Africa in 2010, due to 
death-threats, and had to flee again in 2013 to Canada. In response to ‘Rwanda opening up and 
democratisation’ Himbara stated, “I do not see any hope of democratization in the near 
future.”
214
Himbara was responding in the context of the 2015 referendum for an amendment 
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to the constitution, which has since allowed Kagame to run for a third-term (Kagame’s term 
expires in 2017). Article 101 in the Constitution stipulates that a ‘president can only be 
elected for a term of seven years’ and “under no circumstances shall a person hold the office 
of President of Republic for more than two terms.”
215
 The ‘referendum vote’ was widely-
covered by state-owned newspaper, The New Times, who encouraged Rwandans that a three-
quarter majority was needed, and informed them repeatedly of Article 2 in the Constitution, 
which states the “power to govern the country is derived from its people”.
216
3.7 million 
Rwandans voted in favour of a third-term.
217
 The BBC has reported that the opposition was 
prevented from engaging with the referendum elections, and people were hired to vote in the 
petition. Moreover, the newspaper reported that voters were physically assaulted and 
coerced. Other than the state-owned media, the press was also prevented from reporting.
218
 
Rwandan news website, ‘Ighie’, stated that smaller parties close to the RPF were pushing 
towards “abolishing a cap on presidential term.”
219
 The opposition and even some members 
of the RPF rejected the new constitutional amendment. RPF member Connie Bwiza 
Sekamana was fired for her opposition to the amendment.
220
DGPR filed a Supreme Court 
lawsuit also opposing the change, with the leader, Frank Habineza, remarking that 
“Changing the constitution will not only undermine the democratic process but also the 
peaceful transfer of power.”
221
 Himbara argues “Kagame is playing a clever game, on the 
one hand, he publicly says that he doesn’t support a constitutional amendment, quickly 
adding however, that if Rwandans wish him to continue to serve, it is their right to do so, On 
the other hands, he has unleashed the Rwandan police state to intimidate the population into 
“demanding” that he stay in power…It is game over.”
222
 
 
Many critics of the regime note that the international community, particularly the donor 
countries, can play a bigger role in Rwanda. Himbara argues that the U.S has provided 
Kagame with unaccountable political leverage, which sends the message that the government 
can get away with anything.
223
An anonymous writer for Hiragana wrote a scathing critique 
of the support of ‘donor countries’ that have stood by the Rwandan government during these 
political events. The writer states, “The Rwandan president has to fool the donors that his 
government and institutions are somehow representatives of the will of the people. He needs 
badly such image because without it he cannot collect external aid from partner countries. 
The irony of the election masquerade is that these countries take it as a reflection of an 
acceptable democracy, then pledge their taxpayers’ money to the Kagame’s regime. If the 
citizens in these donor countries were well informed, they would surely make their 
governments change their minds about Rwanda and it’s system of leadership.”
224
 This was 
the demonstrated during the first elections, where the international community took 
Twagiramungu’s defeat as just that, and not indicative of administrative repression. Instead 
the international community has largely been distracted and bought into the image that Kigali 
projects. 
 
The government has hired a world-renowned British PR firm, Racepoint, that has worked to 
comprehensively re-construct and shift the image of Rwanda in the world, from genocide and 
Hutu/Tutsi conflict, to one that focuses on projects culture, the economy, natural assets such as 
the gorillas, attractive for foreign-investment, and boasts “zero-corruption”.
225
Rwandan 
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Foreign Minister, Louise Mushikiwabo worked closely with Kagame to selectively invite 
the international media and certain foreign stakeholders to ‘events’ that promote this idea of 
a “reinvented Rwandan”. In London, Mushikiwabo asserted “We are at a time in our post-
genocide history where we have to move on.”
226
 This was followed by Kagame’s remarks 
that “The people of Rwanda, their psychology and politics have completely changed," he 
said. "We have been investing in all this time we have been here and by building institutions 
and by making sure that Rwandans are more educated about not just their issues but global 
issues, they understand better what life means, their own life and what generally life means. 
They have also interest in being like others we see elsewhere in this world. In the past we 
were such a closed society that these things could easily happen.”
227
 
 
Rwanda’s excellent public relations machinery has also effectively masked the repression of 
the domestic press. The media, civil-society and ‘ordinary Rwandans’ are excluded from the 
‘new dispensation’. In a thriving democracy, ‘elections’ attract a flurry of debates and 
analysis, but not in Rwanda. Lars Waldorf asserts “In the aftermath of the genocide, in 
which… RTLM and Kangura played a notoriously galvanising role, Rwanda’s new 
government faced the task of ensuring that a resurrected press would not voice hate speech 
again.”
228
 Thus, it has used this experience to justify censorship and propaganda as a 
necessary safeguard against the recrudescence of genocide.
229
 ‘Reporters without borders’ 
produced an index (World Press Index-2014) which ranked Rwanda 167 out of 180 countries 
based on its assessments on freedom of the press and media.
230
 The RPF has imposed a 
‘legal regime’ that greatly restricts press freedom.
231
The 2002 criminal law punishes “public 
incitement to discrimination or divisionism.”
232
It stipulates that “Any person who makes 
public any speech, writing, pictures, or images, or any symbols over radio airwaves, 
television, in a meeting in public place, with the aim of discriminating against people or 
sowing sectarianism…” will be imprisoned or punished.
233
The maximum sentence (5 years) 
can be handed down to press and media personnel who are found to “publish false news, 
hold the president in contempt and defame or abuse public authorities.”
234
This has greatly 
removed the independence of journalist and with already very little resources it has forced 
most press operations to close due to losses incurred by suspensions, imprisonment and fines. 
 
Editor of Catholic Newspaper: Kinyamateka, Andre Sibomana states “a real censorship has 
gradually settled in. It started at the grassroots, within the editorial teams of public and 
private newspapers, and rose to the top: even the Minister of Information ended up fleeing 
the country…One event marked the turning point: the attack of Edouard Mutsinzi, the 
director of the independent weekly Le Messager. Towards the end of the day, in a café in the 
centre of Kigali, as group of Tutsi extremist beat him for a long time without anyone 
intervening…the message got through: from then on, anyone criticising the government knew 
what to expect.”
235
Since 1999 there has been little to no opposition or critique from the press 
and the state has fuelled suspicions and speculation because of it controls the dissemination 
of the ‘truth’. Sibomana asserts, “Rwandans realise perfectly well that there is significant 
discrepancy between what they see with their own eyes every day and what they hear 
through the official media or private newspapers, which support the government line.”
236
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Umuseso and Umuvigizi, which are Kinyarwanda newspapers and which hold the largest 
readerships, have been targeted relentlessly.
237
 These two newspapers are not shy to report 
on controversial issues and challenge the ‘favourable government propaganda.’ The 
government has set up the Media High Council (MHC) a “constitutional body that is 
nominally independent, but whose chief executives are appointed by the government and 
which is “supervised” by the Ministry of Information.” 
238
 In the last few years, the MHC 
has worked tirelessly to discredit the work of these two newspapers through suspensions and 
court action. The MHC describes their errors as “publishing false news”, “insulting, 
slandering, defaming innocent individuals”, “publishing biased information”, and “abusing 
and insulting the president of the Republic of Rwanda”, demanding that they correct their 
reporting and information and issue apologies.
239
After refusing to do so, and in the run up to 
the 2010 national elections, the MHC suspended Umuseso and Umuvugizi for six months. 
Umuvugizi now operates online, but since 2014 has been blocked by the Rwandan 
government. HRW reported that most independent journalists are silenced, especially around 
elections.
240
 After the release of BBC documentary, Rwanda: The Untold Story, BBC 
Kinyarwanda was cancelled, with the MHC accusing the BBC of “genocide denialism”.
241
 
 
In 2010, Umuseso editor Didas Gasana, oppositional journalist Deogratias Mushayidi, and 
Umuvigizi editor Jean-Bosco Gasasira, all fled Rwanda because they received death 
threats.
242
 Agnes Nkusi Uwimana, editor of newspaper Umurabyo, was arrested alongside 
other journalists for the newspaper. Journalist Charles Ingbire was a writer for Umuvugizi 
and editor in chief of Inyenyeri. Ingabire was very critical of the government in his writing, 
that lead him being assassinated (2011) in Kampala, Uganda, after several failed attempts.
243
 
The Ugandan government has publicly blamed the Rwandan government for the 
assassination.
244
 The same fate befell on journalist Jean-Leonard Rugambage, who was 
killed on the day the Umuvugizi published an article online in which Rugambage had 
uncovered evidence to support the allegation of the involvement by RPF members in an 
attempted assassination of former RPF General Kayumba Nyamwasa, who had dissented.
245
 
 
Civil society (CS) has also been completely eliminated as an “autonomous force.”
246
After the 
1990’s human rights advocates, advocates for rural development and NGO’s (both domestic and 
international) have been targeted and threatened with arrests. The role of the church in the 
genocide has meant that religious groups are also being targeted. CS has an important role to play 
because they highlight issues such as to do with women/gender inequality, labour relations, 
service delivery, rural-agricultural policy reforms…etc. and bridge the gap between citizens and 
state. The International Civil Society Index shows that the government has lacked transparency 
and has not followed due process with regards to its relationships with the private and social 
sector, and is responsible for breaking up rural-networks.
247
 The government has also issued a 
decree law, which gives them the authority to control finances, administration, and the projects 
that NGO’s pursue. Moreover, similar to its crushing assault on political opposition, a 
‘Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry on Genocide Ideology’ was released which recommended 
the banning of a number of CS associations and organisations, citing there is evidence that shows 
they are “preaching the ideology of genocide and ethnic hatred.”
248
 Ibuka, a Tutsi ‘survivors’ 
organisation, began to articulate criticism of the regime 
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“for failing to adequately address the needs of survivors.”
249
Its main leaders have all fled the 
country, and one leader was assassinated. The RPF has since replaced its leadership with 
RPF members, and the president is now Antoine Mugesera, a strong RPF-loyalist.
250
 The 
government is also very wary of criticism of their own human rights record and the crimes 
committed before and after the genocide. Liprodhor is an independent Rwandans human 
rights organisation that partners with international groups/organisations. It has been very 
critical of the government, and thus has been relentlessly targeted and accused of being a 
‘wing’ of MDR.
251
 After the banning by the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry on 
Genocidal Ideology, Amnesty International protested stating “the Rwandese National 
Assembly is inappropriately manipulating the concept of genocide to silence not only 
organisations and individuals critical of the government but organisations who have a close 
relationship with the Rwandese people and whose loyalty the government questions.”
252
 The 
organisation African Rights, who is usually sympathetic to the RPF also asserted “a flagrant 
misunderstanding of the exact meaning of the expression ‘genocide ideology’…The 
accusations seems to reside in the fact that these organisations are allegedly involved in anti-
government political activities…But this should not be the equivalent of muzzling every 
criticism of the government.”
253
In 2007, the government introduced the Civil Society 
Platform, which has been viewed as being exclusionary and hardly represents the variety of 
Rwandan CS. Christiane Adamcyzk observes a “widening gap between the grassroots level 
and a distant leadership with political aspirations.”
254
 
 
3.5.5 A ‘New Rwanda’ for who? The exiled opposition 
 
Golooba-Mutebi et al critiqued the assumption that the “RPF-led government and its armed 
forces are Tutsi-dominated, and more particularly a tool of Anglophone ‘Ugandan 
Tutsis’.”
255
Rather, the authors argue one needs to look ‘beneath the surface’, which shows 
that there is a new generation of men and women that are being promoted and preparing to 
take over top positions.
256
For Golooba-Mutebi et al this demonstrates that as the years have 
passed the ‘political settlement’ has become more ‘solid, consistent and inclusive.’ The 
authors also argue that yes disagreements tend to happen behind closed doors, but it is 
‘misleading’ to have the impression that this is indicative of “enforced consensus and RPF 
domination.”
257
 However, rather than ‘robust inclusiveness’ that Golooba-Mutebi et al 
speak of, most political decision are not taken in the cabinet or parliament, but within a 
small inner circle.
258
I will now address this argument, with evidence that indicates that in 
addition to the exclusion of oppositional parties, there is internal split in the RPF, that have 
become frustrated with the Tutsi-domination in governance and increasing militarisation of 
the state. Shyaka Kanuma, editor of a internet journal (Rwandan Focus) that is close to the 
RPF, stated there “is an over-reliance on a few, powerful “godfathers” to make major 
decisions…A few of these godfathers have been advancing their own interests above those of 
the collective Rwandan populace…the main godfather, the chief manipulator, the master of 
intrigue, the boss of machinations, is the one whom I will not name…He-who-must-not-be-
named has for years built a formidable network of political minions in important 
institutions.”
259
 “He-who-must-not –be –named” is powerful minister of Local 
Administration James Musoni, who is the closest ally to the ‘boss’- Kagame.
260
 
 
111 
 
 
 
 
 The RPF has had the difficult but common task that faces former rebel movements (e.g. 
ANC and SPLM) who become the ruling party, and that is to transform itself into a civil 
party fit to lead the state and maintain dialogue with all constituencies. It also has to integrate 
the stalwarts of the former armed struggle who may still hold onto the ideology of the 
struggle. As Phil Clark states it is the “pressure to absorb opposing factions into a cohesive 
whole.”
261
It is important to place the RPF in the context that drove them to Rwanda in 
October 1990, and contextualise the post-1994 vision based on the RPF’s formative 
experiences. Clark asserts “The fervour and discipline of the RPF in reconstructing the 
nation after the genocide stem from important elements of the party’s backstory: its 
formation in exile and the long refugee experiences of its founding members, many of whose 
parents fled waves of anti-Tutsi violence in the early 1960s; the direct experiences of many 
RPF leaders (including Kagame) of conflict… as part of Yoweri Museveni’s National 
Resistance Army (NRA) in Uganda; the RPF’s military campaign against the Hutu-
dominated government… which the RPF framed as the rightful return of Tutsi refugees to 
their homeland…”
262
I address this further in Chapter 5. These experiences have instilled “a 
deep sense of purpose and resolve, a collective identity forged through conflict, and an ethos 
of self-reliance that remains one of the RPF’s defining features.”
263
The devastating impact 
of the genocide also dominated the policies of the post-genocide governance, together with 
the ‘genocide credit’ afforded to them; external financial support and assistance placed the 
RPF in a position to pursue their vision for nation building. As I have demonstrated thus far, 
in order for the regime to achieve Rwandicity, a post-ethnic socially and politically cohesive 
state, it has operated on the logic that it must be vigilant of an environment that may lead 
Rwanda into another genocide. The outcome has been to remain suspicious of not only 
outsiders but of any internal critique, even within the RPF. 
 
The splits within the RPF began to show in the late-1990s. In the context of a ‘looted state’ 
and to establish itself as a political party, the RPF relied on financial assistance and 
intellectual resources/expertise from the diaspora. Within the RPF there are ‘hardliners’ and 
‘moderate’ voices that have developed, the latter consists of returnees from the Tutsi diaspora 
who possess “vital resources for the reconstruction of a nation.”
264
The ‘moderate’ voices are 
a diverse group, consisting of some who have had different experiences, such as having lived 
in ‘relative comfort’ exiled in Europe, North America and the Great Lakes region; English-
speaking; they may not have experienced the genocide and have different histories; and some 
of which are highly-educated and hold a different political view for the direction Rwanda 
should be going in.
265
They are bolstered by the support of the Anglophone international 
community. By the mid-2000s the RPF has integrated these highly educated Tutsis who have 
the type of international networks, skills and motivation to assist the RPF’s program 
(especially pro-growth modernisation policies). The socio-economic growth rates appeased 
Rwandans and were internally cohesive for the RPF. However, after the first military 
invasion into eastern-Congo, which led to an increased military budget, and which also led to 
the militarisation of Rwanda. This marked an increasingly growing discontentment with the 
closure of the political state, and criminalising any critique through new speech and thought 
crimes. Clark notes that factions began to appear, through the government debates on “justice  
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processes for genocide crimes…laws against ‘genocide ideology’ and ethnic ‘divisionism’, 
freedom of the press, the switch of the national language from French to English, and the 
presidential succession plan.”
266
 Golooba-Mutebi et al argue that the current political 
settlement has come about through an elite bargain between those who are committed to 
anti-sectarianism and reconciliation through development, that will eventually secure the 
state in order to have multi-party democracy and further power sharing. However, by the 
late-1990s, key players in the RPF were becoming considered enemies of Kagame and 
‘opponents’ because they were critical of the anti-democratic direction the state is going in 
and are more tolerant of inter-ethnic dialogue.
267
 
 
Seth Sendashonga (former Minister of Interior), Alexis Kanyarengwe (former Head of 
Intelligence) and Pasteur Bizimungu, were all former Hutus incorporated into the post-
genocide state and became disillusioned by Tutsi domination in the state-apparatus, and were 
critical of the “crimes committed against their ethnic kind.”
268
Sendashonga had joined the 
RPF in 1992, and together with Bizimungu became the most powerful Hutu leaders in the 
RPF-led government. After being fired from his position in 1995, Sendashonga at the time 
had agreed to testify at the ICTR in defence of two of the accused. He sought exile in Kenya 
in 1995, and started a small party of Hutu moderates that opposed the “increasing oppression 
of the ethnic majority by the RPF and mainly Tutsi army.”
269
In 1996 there was an attempt 
on his life, which the Kigali-government was blamed for, and which led to the expulsion of 
Rwandan diplomats in Nairobi.
270
 Once Sendashonga was seen as a dissident, there was a 
lifetime target on him, and in 1998 he was assassinated in Kenya. Prominent Tutsis too 
began to abandon ship soon after this. In 2001, Chief of Army Staff Faustin Kayumba 
Nyamwasa, left to the U.K after having a “violent verbal exchange” with Kagame 
concerning the military campaign in Congo.
271
 This sparked suspicions that Nyamwasa was 
planning a coup to overthrow Kagame. Nyamwasa who is currently living in exile in South 
Africa, shared with Susan Thomsan (Rwandan researcher) in a telephone interview that it 
was an “open secret known to everyone in the army at the time” that Kagame ordered for 
Habyarimana’s plane to be shot down.
272
Moreover, in those 100 days, the assumption was 
replaced with a “conspiracy theory laying the blame on Hutu extremists” which determined 
that the genocide got underway.
273
 
 
Nyamwasa, Patrick Karegeya, Gerhard Gahima (Prosecutor) and Theogene Rudasingwa, all 
had damning evidence on Kagame’s military campaign in Rwanda and in the region. They 
were all sacked by 2004 (including their close allies) but Nyamwasa was re-assigned to the 
intelligence agency the National Security Service (NSS), where after a brief stay was then 
placed in New Delhi as the Ambassador. Patrick Karegeya was arrested in 2006. Reyntjens 
writes “In 2006, he was condemned to eighteen months in jail for “insubordination” and 
“desertion”. However the real reason of his disgrace was that Kagame suspected him of 
being an opponent with excellent ties in Uganda and of aiming to overthrow him in cahoots 
with Kayumba Nyamwasa.”
274
 
 
Exiled journalist, Sweden Gasasira reported that the head of the NSS, General Karenzi Karake, 
has created a list called “The Exposer” which aims to discredit any opponents of the 
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regime, inside and outside the country.
275
This list has become a ‘hit-list’. In 2001, editorial 
Rwanda Newsline had reported on the “disappearance” of retired Major Alex Ruzinda who 
was later found dead, stating that it as “possible attempt to discourage new 
defections.”
276
The list of RPF members being fired, sent abroad by the state (on “study 
leave”), or seeking exile out of fear, has been growing steadily. Chief of Police, General 
Frank Rugambage left on “study leave”; Gahima, Karegeya and Rudasingwa sought exile. 
Ex-RPF defector, Lieutenant Abdul Ruzibiza sought exile in Norway, where he published a 
book, Rwanda: L’histoire Secrete (2005) in which he presents a body of evidence and 
testimony to support his claim that he witnessed the RPF shoot down Habyarimana’s plane; 
he points out a well-founded fear of Kagame’s that elections would mean “Hutu would most 
certainly come out the winning side”; and he exposes Kagame’s human rights record.
277
 
Patrick Karegeya was assassinated in South Africa in 2014; prompting a stern warning from 
the government that it will not tolerate South Africa becoming “a battleground to settle 
political scores by foreign nations” it also expelled Rwandan diplomats accusing them of 
“masterminding the attacks on dissidents.”
278
 Karegeya’s fall-out with Kagame and 
subsequent assassination have demonstrated a crisis with the ‘old-guard’, stalwarts such as 
Tharcisse Karuguarama and Protais Musoni ‘highlight critical divisions’ and as Clark asserts 
“Today, the greater challenge to the RPF comes from within the party, not from everyday 
Rwandans.”
279
 Himbaras has produced a critical assessment of Rwanda today, he sees 
Rwanda as a ‘totalitarian regime’ accompanied with propaganda, mass surveillance of its 
citizens, restriction on speech, intimidation of the electorate and oppositional parties, and 
terror that isn’t just limited by its borders but assassination campaigns and military 
interventions going on internationally.
280
 
 
With every election, since 2003, the opposition in exile continues to grow. In addition to 
trying to create an “inter-Rwandese dialogue” with Kigali (which it rejects as being ‘uncalled 
for’), the opposition is also engaging in a dialogue with representatives from political 
society, civil society and rural-organisations.
281
The aim is to inspire and develop better 
institutions that can properly secure a consensual democracy, and provide security to internal 
and external opposition members and challenge the RPF’s stranglehold on power. Kigali 
rejects dialogue with the exiled opposition because it associates them with the genocidaires 
in the Great Lakes region and the only way it addresses them is through the prism of security 
(military and intelligence) and suspicions. Carina Tertsakian states, “There isn’t really a 
democracy that one can speak of in Rwanda”, and the states repression has come at the cost 
of political freedom.
282
 Rudasingwa articulates “I do not agree that to be able to develop 
you’ve got to sacrifice people’s rights…In fact, all literature and human experience shows 
 
that for there to be prosperity for people, for a country to build, you’ve got to enrich people’s 
rights.”
283
 
 
Marina Rafti illustrates two ‘waves of defections’ that has taken place. The first wave began 
in 1995, consisting of mainly Hutu personalities in the diaspora that were trying to form a 
viable opposition.
284
 Among them were elements of genocidaires, which added claim to the 
government who saw them as an “invalid interlocutor” and scheming to overthrow the post-
genocide government and install a Hutu state.
285
However organisations such as the 
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Democratic Forces of Resistance consisted of Hutus and Tutsi that are internationally 
recognised for taking a stand against the genocide and seeking justice.
286
 Other examples of 
such organisations, is the ‘Republican Rally for Democracy’ (RDR). The RDR formerly 
included members of the old regime, ex-FAR, and Interhamwe, with the goal of invading 
Rwanda. However, after 1998 RDR “disassociated itself from the genocide” and “shifted its 
political trajectory”.
287
 Similarly, the ‘Forces of Resistance’ (FRD), made up of ‘moderate 
Hutus’ or the post-genocide political class, included Tutsis in their movement, as did the 
‘Alliance for Democracy and National Reconciliation’ (ADRN-Igihango), a Tutsi party that 
included former Hutu extremists.
288
 
 
The second wave of defections began in 2000 and consists of mainly Tutsi personalities, 
among them genocide survivors who had begun to flee Rwanda.
289
This wave of defections 
introduced ‘inter-ethnic cooperation’. Because it was organised by Tutsis it challenged the 
continuing accusation that all opposition are genocide-denialists or trying to sow divisions 
and sectarianism. Rafti argues that they are ‘re-defining the Rwandan problem as political 
and not ethnic’ and are pursuing an alternative path to militarisation.
290
This group has 
instead pursued pressure politics with the assistance of the international community. 
Genocide Tutsi-survivor and RPF veteran Jean-Pierre Mugabe wrote in Le Tribun du Peuple, 
“There are many Tutsi extremists. They are everywhere in the civil service and we have been 
decided to denounce them. They have arbitrarily arrested many Hutu, as if all Hutu were 
Interhamwe. For these extremists even the Tutsi survivors of the genocide are Interhamwe. 
Today many Tutsi are just as vulnerable as the Hutu.”
291
 Amongst this second wave of 
defections, are some who feel betrayed by the regime, there are increasing tensions between 
the Ugandan returnees and genocide survivors, the latter of who feel they have become 
“second-class citizens”, sacrificed by what they suspect to be main goal of the RPF- military 
victory and retaining power of Rwanda, rather than saving Tutsis.
292
 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
The political governance of the post-genocide regime poses critical questions for Rwanda’s 
future, it particularly begs the question ‘which unity is it striving towards?’ and ‘who is 
included in this national identity ‘Rwandicity’? The regime deserves credit for its rapid 
developmental strategy. However, the current regime places ‘Tutsi nationalism’ above 
democratisation. Today, the political opposition has been purged from formal politics, 
primarily operating in exile; the independence and political liberties of the media, press and 
civil society has been restricted; and most Rwandans fear the deteriorating political climate. 
Most Rwandan’s vote for the RPF out of fear, which empty’s the meaning of citizenship. The 
militarisation and surveillance of the regime to the local districts, have lent to the closing of 
the socio-political space. Moreover, the law has become a powerful political tool, which 
compromises the political liberties of Rwandans, and which inscribes political violence by 
criminalising any critique and open-dialogue on RPF and regime. Today, almost anyone can 
become an ‘enemy’ of the state. I have demonstrated this in the discussion on the political 
record, which saw the repression and Hutu dissent and then later Tutsi dissent- some of 
which are survivors of the genocide and political history of Rwanda. It is important to think 
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about the implications of the alternative inter-ethnic dialogues taking place, and to return to 
the internal (and external) debates that contest the monopoly of the RPF’s power. 
Unfortunately, we have to pay attention to the symbolism of a Tutsi-opposition, which shows 
that the political problem is not necessarily ethnic but political. I say ‘not necessarily’ 
because both anti-sectarian and sectarian politics should be addressed through a healthy 
debate in an open political space. The tendency in Rwanda’s politics is to delegitimise 
political demands and opposition as being sectarian and to see it vying to overthrow political 
power. These debates are introducing a different kind of discourse that challenges the ruling 
party’s discourse, which can productively redirect attention back to the political institutions, 
which arguably is where the political crisis lies. As in the past, the political institutions in 
post-genocide Rwanda today, continue to characterise and enforce the categories of a Hutu 
majority and Tutsi minority. Moreover, the genocide gives credence to logic that if we are to 
prevent the recurrence of genocide; rights and liberties might have to be temporarily 
sacrificed. This logic has been shaped by victor’s justice and victim’s justice and bolstered 
by the genocide credit afforded to the RPF, who were given the benefit of the doubt. 
Whereas, this may have been ‘forgivable’ in the aftermath of the genocide, and in the context 
of an insurmountable task (nation-building), it has set a dangerous precedent for Rwanda’s 
future. I argue that in order for the post-genocide regime to transcend the political crisis, it 
need to return to Rwanda’s historical and political context, which demonstrates the crisis in 
political institutions that has allowed for the ‘Tutsification of power’ today. 
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Chapter Four 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
"There is no ethnicity here. We are all Rwandan."
1
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter explores the impact of ‘victims justice’ on reconciliation in post-genocide 
Rwanda. The government has used law, politics and history as tools for their ambitious 
social-engineering project for reconciliation. Immediately after the genocide, the government 
legally eradicated ethnic identification, and conceived a singular national identity, understood 
by ‘Rwandicity’. The regime identifies justice, economic development and the re-education 
of Rwandans on their past, as the foundation for reconciliation and unity. It focused on using 
modernised ‘traditional’ mechanisms such as the gacaca court for restorative justice, and 
ingando camps for re-education. In the short-term the social-engineering projects seeks to 
refashion political identities, restore social and economic ties, intervene feelings of ethnic-
hatred and vengeance, and encourage healing and forgiveness. The end-goal is a post-ethnic 
society, where race and ethnicity no longer exist in the hearts and minds of Rwandans. 
Unfortunately, reconciliation in Rwanda has been frequently politicised, strictly disciplined 
and prohibits open debates on the imposed, state-sanctioned ‘official narrative of history’. 
The RPF has created a ‘victors truth and history’. Therefore, I explore the politicisation of 
reconciliation, the consequences of criminal justice for reconciliation, and the ‘official 
narrative’ on the past. Both Hutus and Tutsis express that the constructed truth of the past, 
does not demonstrate the experience of the entire Rwandan population. Thus, I argue that it is 
important to situate the various ways in which ‘ordinary Rwandans’ are personally 
addressing reconciliation, as they struggle to rebuild their lives. 
 
4.2 A Path to Reconciliation 
 
In its more general sense, reconciliation can be conceptually defined as “a condition of 
nonviolent mutually acceptable coexistence where former enemies come to re-envision one 
another as fellow citizens.”
2
 Reconciliation should seek to intervene where former or new 
political loyalties may try to mobilise and capture the collective space. It can also extend to 
reconcile political, social, and economic relations between states. This is an important suggestion 
for thinking about the Great Lakes regional crisis. Ernesto Verdeja shares, the reconciliation 
debate will look at the appropriateness of ‘trials, truth commissions, lustrations (purges), official 
apologies, memorials, reparations, amnestied, and other institutions and policies, which seek to 
address the past.’
3
 As I demonstrated in Chapter 1, reconciliation also implores us to think about 
the relationship between the predecessor and successor regimes, and prior morality and social-
political relations that characterises the identity of the former regime. It is at this intersection, 
that reconciliation becomes a political act. As Nuremberg became the template to define 
responsibility for mass violence, the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) 
was exemplified as a case in which justice combined with 
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truth telling and amnesty, were thought to serve reconciliation and responsibility. Charles 
Villa-Vicencio states that the TRC is a template against which transitional justice mechanism 
should “measure, adjust and improve”. 
4
 
 
I have addressed reconciliation in the ‘general sense’, but there are a broad-spectrum of what 
it could mean for each state, and what purpose it serves or how the end-goal is defined. 
Verdeja argues, “Minimalist accounts identify reconciliation with the cessation of overt 
political violence, respect for the formal rule of law, and a commitment to remain part of the 
same political community.”
5
 By the ‘same political community’, this perspective sees shared 
values and normative orientations as a basic condition, and disagreements in state and society 
are seen as productive and an important part of political and social life.
6
 Moreover, because 
achieving a ‘political community’ is the baseline for this perspective, other reconciliatory 
practices such as ‘truth-telling’ or ‘processes of mutual forgiveness’ are thought within the 
framework of how they serve the end-goal (same political community). Criticism of this 
perspective may focus on how this then serves ‘victims needs’ or marginalised groups, does it 
address their needs, and perhaps that this baseline is too low as a standard, failing to hold 
human rights violators accountable (justice) and to address power or the culture of impunity. 
On the other side of the spectrum, there is the perspective of what is commonly referred to as 
the “deliberative democratic”- who often pick up from where minimalists leave off.
7
 
 
The ‘deliberative democratic’ perspective will address more robust concerns such as 
‘institutional reform and deliberation over responsibility, collective identity, and justice and 
reparations’ as the basis for reconciliation. 
8
 Central to their concerns are victim needs and 
inclusion of victims and other marginalised group in consultations and public debates, as an 
important link in reconciliation. Moreover, reintegrating survivors and former perpetrators 
are argued to be acutely necessary in the public discussion on ‘historical memory’, the 
ideology that formulated the violence, forging the ‘collective identity’, and reaffirming basic 
rights which create “moral and political equals.”
9
 The ‘deliberative democratic’ perception 
may be have a pre-condition to achieve a liberal democracy, which can be problematic (as I 
discussed in Chapter 1), but it can also be a more suitable fit for the case-study because it is 
concerned with each step of the process of ‘re-integration’. Rather than trying to salvage 
whatever former ‘social harmony’ was in place, it seeks to dismantle and reconstruct a new 
reconciled state and society. Speaking shortly before his passing, Govan Mbeki stated, “For 
political renewal to endure, the economy needs to be restructured in such a way that the poor 
and socially excluded begin to share in the benefits of the nations wealth…People-all people, 
both black and white, Hutus and Tutsi, Shona and Ndebele- also need to feel they part of the 
new nation. If some do not feel welcome or at home in their respective countries they will not 
only be reluctant to work for the common good, they can also cause considerable trouble.”
10
 
 
In relations to Rwanda, Eugenia Zorbas defines ‘reconciliation’ as a “restoration of the ways 
of the past, giving citizens the ability to life as they did before colonialism.”
11
Phil Clark 
describes it as “an act of forgiveness and a willingness to live together peacefully for the 
sake of society.”
12
 In the case of Rwanda, because justice has been a foundation which has 
informed all major process in Rwanda’s transition, I am interested in how reconciliation  
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creates political and social equality, as well as how the meaning of ‘victims’ and ‘survivors’ 
has been centralised, and, as this chapter demonstrates, how it has shaped a particular kind 
of reconciliation in Rwanda. 
 
4.3 National Reconciliation and Unity in Rwanda 
 
In 1999, the Government of Rwanda created the National Unity and Reconciliation 
Commission (NURC) as an instrument whose goal is to achieve reconciliation and unity 
in Rwanda by combatting “discrimination and to erase the negative consequences of the 
genocide on the Rwandan people.”
13
 Although reconciliation has different meanings to 
individuals, the community, and the state, the government strives to meet this definition: 
 
“A consensus practice of citizens who have common nationality, who share the same culture 
and have equal rights; 
 
citizens characterized by trust, tolerance, mutual respect, equality, complementary 
roles/interdependence, truth, and healing or one another’s wounds inflicted by our 
history, with the objectives of laying a foundation for sustainable development”
14
 
 
NURC operates together with the National Human Right Commission, the Organic Law, and 
Rwandan Constitution. NURC argues that the great emphasis of the reconciliation process 
should be at a grass-root level, where the success is dependent on the agency and will of 
Rwandans to determine the outcomes through the facilitation of the state.
15
It excludes a 
truth-finding component because that was to be fulfilled by the legal mechanisms. This is an 
instrument designed to address the outlined causes of the genocide and ethnic tensions. Its 
projects are specifically aimed at the Rwandan population through educational programmes, 
discourse, community and national compulsory events, and socio-economic development as 
strategic policy for reconciliation. To assist the decree on eradication and “divisions among 
Rwandans”, Article 178 of the Rwandan Constitution works with NURC by illegalising 
‘sectarianism, division and repression’ in Rwandan society.
16
 Moreover, the aim of NURC is 
to re-educate and mobilise the population towards becoming socially cohesive and active 
participation in Rwanda’s conflict prevention and shaping a ‘common shared future’. In 
Rwandan there is mandatory community service (for all abled bodied persons over the age of 
18 and under 65) on the last Sunday of every month, called Umuganda. The day is called 
“umunis w’umugandu” which translates into “contribution made by the community.”
17
The 
community service is designed to “be a day of contribution and building the country by 
citizens.”
18
 Another historical practice is the Itorero ry’Igihugu, which was a “Rwandan 
school and the channel through which the nation could convey the message to the people 
regarding national culture in areas such as language, patriotism, social relations, sports, 
dancing and songs, defence of the nation…etc.”
19
 Itorero was also used to formatively train 
national leaders, and the participants saw it as educating the populations on cultural values 
that “could help them develop their judgement, psychology, work and mutual aid, life and 
collaboration.”
20
Other popular reconciliation mechanisms at the regional level include 
institutional practices such as Abunzi (dispute mediation community), Abakangurambaga 
(peace volunteers that mediate in conflict situations), and Ingando (built to develop co- 
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existence and reflection on national challenges).
21
 The government has also used the 
integration of former FAR members and the RPA into the RDF to demonstrate reconciliation 
in security apparatus. 
 
As part of the Vision 2020 development goals, as well as modernisation and implementation 
of pro-growth policies, the post-genocide regime centralises national development because 
through ‘non-discriminatory and inclusive public policies/civil services’ it hopes to combat 
“recurrence of violent ethnic extremism.”
22
 As a socio-economic policy, President Kagame 
has initiated Girinka (one cow per one family) which is a programme aimed at “ending 
malnutrition, poverty and strengthening social cohesion”.
23
 As part of a reintegration 
programme of returnees and the resettlement of displaced people, the Human Settlement 
policy ‘Imidugundu’ was implemented in 1997. This policy would resettle and centralise 
socio-economic development services, as well as “create an environment of social 
integration of different strata in Rwandan society”.
24
 
 
In Kagame’s official vision statement, he states “My vision of Rwanda is a united country 
that feels itself as an integrated into the sub region Family of nations, a country that is 
developed and has eradicated poverty, a country that is democratic, and above all, a stable 
country at peace with itself as well as with its neighbours.”
25
 Therefore, there is a 
regional mission within Rwanda’s official national reconciliation objective. 
 
NURC acknowledges that reconciliation is not a ‘fixed process’, therefore using the Rwandan 
Reconciliation Barometer, the government conduct qualitative and quantitative studies to 
monitor and assess how Rwandans perceive and understand the efforts of NURC, and where 
Rwanda is in the ‘reconciliation’ process.
26
 Moreover, NURC uses the Barometer to address 
“societal friction”, “social fault lines” and use it as a tool for early warning signs of 
conflict.
27
 If NURC’s principle objectives were to initiate programmes of peace-building and 
reconciliation, and to support community based projects nationwide as well as hold a annual 
National Summit, than the barometer is there to evaluate how these initiatives are being 
received, digested and what role are they taking on politically, socially and economically in 
local contexts, as Rwanda transforms. 
28
The Barometer is overseen by international 
observers and the surveys interview 12 000 Rwandan-participants (from 450 villages across 
30 districts).
29
 
 
The 2010 Barometer, candidly expressed challenges in eliciting “forthright responses from 
research participants, noting that that the presence of local leaders may have influenced the data 
collection process and research findings.”
30
 Moreover, it states “citizens were generally reluctant 
to participate in interviews related to very sensitive topics” and many participants re-iterated that 
“referring to Hutu, Tutsi and Twa, is currently forbidden by the government”, which led to a 
reluctance in answering certain questions. 
31
Despite this, the Barometer argues that 95.2% of the 
participants expressed that ‘reconciliation is going in the right direction, and 91.7% expressed 
that ‘democratic governance is going in the right direction.’
32
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The most recent Barometer -survey (2015) looks specifically at “how Rwandans understood the 
past and present and how they envision the future; their own status of citizenship and identity; 
their views on political culture, security; justice and social cohesion.”
33
It must be noted that the 
findings of the studies were published (2016) in the state-owned Newspaper: New Times. Up to 
“92.5% of Rwandans feel that unity and reconciliation had been achieved and citizens are living 
in harmony”; “95% of Rwandans feel proud of being Rwandan and the same percentage would 
do what it takes to protect and defend the sovereignty of the country”; the government 
emphasises that it has not coerced anyone into any kind of reconciliation and “97% believed in 
reconciliation as it fosters relationships”; “83,4% believe in reconciliation between genocide, 
perpetrators and survivors.”
34
 Regarding ‘causes of divisionism’ and ‘genocide ideology’, 
findings show that “There is an improvement with regard to the level of understanding on the 
major issues since the 2010 report rated the same variable at 87% as opposed to 92.2% in 
2015.”
35
 Interestingly, 22.5% of Rwandans strongly believe that “there are people who would 
still commit genocide if conditions favoured, a percentage that decreased from 40% in 
2010.”
36
Additionally, “27.9% of Rwandans view themselves through the lenses of ethnic groups, 
which 25% still see divisions and genocide ideology among their compatriots.”
37
In some districts 
(Burera, Kayonzi, Kamonyi, Musanze, Nyamagabe, Rubavu and Rutsiro) those participants 
believe that “genocide can never happen again”.
38
 Regarding ‘justice’- “95% believe that 
genocide perpetrators have been punished and 88.2% agreed to effected compensations for 
properties that were looted and destroyed during the Genocide.”
39
And Finally, regarding how 
political culture influences reconciliation, the findings showed that “the level of trust is higher 
with respect to the central government than that of local government mainly due to the 
interventions by Paul Kagame” and “92.1% believe they have a say in how they are governed, 
while 83% think they have a right to hold their leaders accountable, and 92.1 say they have the 
power to decide their own future.”
40
 
 
By invitation of NURC, the South African based institution, Institute of Justice and 
Reconciliation (IJR) evaluated NURC, which with the experience of South Africa, South 
Sudan, Northern Uganda and Burundi, could serve to describe Rwanda’s experience from an 
external apolitical institution. 
41
Interestingly, IJR chose to assess not only NURC and its 
activities carried out by government officials, community leaders and citizens, but also the 
prevalent donor community and international development partners. 
42
 IJR found that NURC 
was unique in its collaborative efforts and in its effort to place the responsibility of 
reconciliation in the hands of communities and individuals. 
43
Furthermore, with 71% of the 
population aware of NURC and its activities, 93% have a comprehensive understanding of 
reconciliation as a concept. 
44
 For the younger participants in the survey, reconciliation 
means “living together and moving forward”.
45
 For older participants who have experiences 
in pre-genocide and the genocide, there is a greater centring on truth telling and truth seeking, 
where memory and remembrance are imperative, along with forgiveness of perpetrators and 
prisoners.
46
 
 
At a first glance, the statistics presented in both the Barometer-surveys and IJR’s report are 
incredibly high and present a seemingly positive picture of Rwanda’s reconciliation. Hintjens 
argues that the problem with asking Rwandans about the past, and whether they find 
121 
 
 
 
 
it easier to be living side-by-side today, especially for the rural poor (majority of Rwandans) 
is “unlikely to produce reliable results.”
47
Closely tied in with the discussion in Chapter 3, is 
a fear to engage with ‘ethnicity/race’ (political identities), ‘the genocide narrative’ and 
especially a fear of attracting unwanted attention from the authorities, which may incur 
punishment. The introduction of the new ‘though and speech crimes’ have added a political 
and criminalised dimension to reconciliation. This chapter explores the processes, policies 
and experiences of ‘ordinary Rwandans’. 
 
4.4 Engineering Reconciliation: Law, Politics and History 
 
Rwanda’ post-genocide reconstruction has seen the merging of law and politics, which 
increasingly has closed the public and political space. For reconciliation, in addition to the 
law, political policies and governance, history has come to play a central role for the 
‘Rwandicity’ project. Whilst the state looks forward to a shared common future and post-
ethnic society, it also looks to the past, which has embedded particular meanings in 
citizenship, political identity- the national identity, and has imposed on reconciliation. At 
the intersection between the past and present, lies the genocide framework, which has 
provides the foundation that formulates the logic behind reconciliation. It is important to 
note, that politics, law and history are not mutually exclusive, it is their combined efforts 
have been most impressionable on post-genocide Rwanda. 
 
4.5 Reconciling political identities 
 
As the military and political victor, the RPF distinguishes itself by its political acumen and 
vision for Rwanda. The logic of the government is that it is unwilling to “sanction 
democracy until they are closer to their stated aim of creating a society with no Hutus or 
Tutsis, only Rwandans.”
48
The government looks at ethnic-divisions as both a Rwandan and 
regional problem, and it portrays themselves as being the “liberators”- the “good guys”.
49
 
Reyntjens’ argues, “by successfully demonizing the Habyarimana regime and pointing at its 
indisputable faults, it secured the support of influential but ill-informed political circles 
abroad and some NGOs, human rights organisations, and press outlets influenced by RPF 
supporters.”
50
Moreover, it uses the human rights discourse together with its diaspora 
network to include some Hutus, but projecting reconciliation project that collectively 
demonises the Hutu identity. Thus, there can be no democracy until the government has 
socially-engineered Rwandans into a ‘new way of thinking’ and a ‘new way of doing things’. 
Former Agriculture Minister, Habamenshi, shares that he was summoned by Kagame “to 
explain to him how the Hutus think.”
51
 
 
As part of its project to ‘de-ethnicise’ Rwanda and the region, the first priority was to legally 
eradicate ethnic categories of identity, thus the 2003 Organic Law illegalised references to Hutu, 
Tutsi and Twa in the public and private domain, as well as on identity cards. This would also 
dissolve the numerical value that supports majoritarian politics and secures minorities and 
marginalised groups in the new collective identity. As mentioned before, the government 
acknowledges that these identities were the central ingredient that caused the 
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genocide. In response, the government introduced into the law, a new set of ‘thought and 
speech crimes’, such as “divisionism”, “ethnic ideology”, “genocide denialism” and 
“genocide mentality.”
52
 Hintjens notes “all are seen as atavistic and backward looking…and 
Rwanda’s see themselves as steering the country towards an enlightened, progressive future 
free of colonial and racial mental maps.”
53
 The official policy of the government can be 
understood by the popular proclamation made by Paul Kagame in 2003 "There is no 
ethnicity here. We are all Rwandan."
54
As a Hutu student in the re-education class, Ernest 
Twahara states, “They're trying to change what we think… There have been many changes in 
this country. I need to change too. I need to be a new person.”
55
Central to the logic of 
governance in post-genocide Rwanda, is this idea of ‘educating the population’. 
 
There is an interesting paradox in Rwanda, on one hand, the government preaches that it 
practices strains of liberal democracy particularly in its understanding of ‘citizenship and national 
identity’. However, on the other hand, ‘victor’s justice is certainly at work, as the government 
enforces laws, such as “divisionism”, “genocide ideology” and “negationism” which prohibits 
Hutus from vocalising their suffering.
56
The logic of the state is that it must eradicate the ethnic 
differences that colonialism introduced. Thus, it asserts a repressive governance that aggressively 
pursues “eradication of ethnic, regional and other divisions” whilst promoting a unifying notion 
of national unity.
57
This hinders the opportunity to allow reconciliation from being openly 
debated and for honest engagement with the past and present. As, one Hutu woman expresses 
“Rwandans have become liars. We can’t say anything because they’ll imprison or kill us.”
58
 
Hintjens asserts, “Whilst public expression of political identities has been largely ‘de-racialised’, 
this has been done in a very top-down and authoritarian manner. Governance is distinctly 
paternalistic. The result has prevented the emergence from below a potentially more complex 
forms political identification, which could form the basis for more inclusive forms of Rwandan 
citizenship in the future.”
59
Thirdly, similar to its other practices of engineering a ‘new Rwanda’, 
the government has used the intelligence unit, military, and police to exercise tight control over 
public expression of political identities. Furthermore, the absence of ‘free and fair” elections 
threatens national reconciliation and unity. By excluding the opposition, independence of the 
press, civil-society organisations, the post-genocide power has removed the avenues of 
representation ‘ordinary Rwandans’ who are seeking to engage the state. As I have discussed in 
chapter 2, ‘obedience and top-down’ governance has a long-history in Rwandan state-society 
relations. 
 
Whilst the government has ‘eradicated’ and delegitimised ethnic-identities, there are new 
categories of identity that have emerged through law and politics (policy-making). Today, 
policies have legally introduced five categories of identity that have re-ordered society 
hierarchically rather than horizontally- singular political community. In addition to victims 
(living Tutsi-genocide survivors), perpetrators (Hutu), there are also the categories of 
‘returnees’ which are “mainly Tutsi”, and refugees, which are divided into “old caseload” 
(Tutsi pre-genocide refugees) and “new caseload” (wholly Hutu post genocide refugees).
60
 
 
The five new categories are reconstructed through the judicial mechanism, legal institutions, 
policy-making, rhetoric of the government, and through new inter-ethnic political groups. 
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These ‘facilitators’ have embedded new meanings for the ‘former’ racial categories of 
identity. Mamdani notes that the UN and NGO circles also use the terminology.
61
Moreover, 
in reports and research studies it is legally prohibited to speak of Hutu and Tutsi and the 
former has been replaced with “perpetrators, (former prisoners, French speakers, and new 
caseload”.
6263
The latter, can be referred to as “victims, survivors, English speakers, and old 
caseload.”
64
 Wielenge argues “those that returned from the diaspora in 1994 and those that 
returned in the late 1990’s may not subscribe exclusively to Hutu and Tutsi, but to identities 
formulated by their lived experiences in the diaspora, she refers to these as ‘lived 
identities’.
65
From her own research, Wielenge found that time and time again “Rwandans 
have reiterated that they feel most comfortable with those who come from a similar 
background.”
66
Thus, identities are far more complex than what is determined and imposed 
on people through state-policy definitions. The commemorations and memorials held 
annually reduce the complexity of lived identities to a “simple model of ethnic antagonism” 
because they remind Rwandans that there are Hutus and Tutsis.
67
 
 
Reyntjens argues, “paradoxically although officially denied, ethnic identity was thus 
indirectly reintroduced, and an ethnic hierarchy (victims are better than perpetrators) was 
established.”
68
 Theses identities have come to matter in Rwanda, as one observes in the 
‘Tutsification’ of the state and in businesses. Former bodyguards to Kagame, have since 
accused him of ‘running the country’ along ethnic lines. One stated, “All of the soldiers in his 
bodyguard were Tutsi. If you married a Hutu woman, you were kicked out.”
69
Persistent 
ethnic-discrimination also exists in organisations, such as in the genocide-compensation fund, 
FARG (Fonds d’Assistance aux Rescapes du Genocide) and ‘survivor’ organisation Ibuka. 
Human Rights Watch reported that Ibuka does not provide assistance to Tutsi women married 
to Hutu.
70
Moreover, as Rombouts asserts, “the government encouraged Tutsi victim 
completion and incomprehension on both sides by recognising Tutsi genocide victims and 
refusing to Hutu victims of RPF crimes while at the same time proclaiming a reconciled and 
united Rwanda where there is no room for different ethnic groups.”
71
 This isn’t just a 
sentiment felt amongst Hutu Rwandans, as I will demonstrate in Chapter 6, Rwandans from 
the diaspora are refusing to return home because the ‘ethnic question’ continues to polarise 
Rwanda, and the on-going repression on the basis of ethnicity continues to feed localised 
ethnic divisions and create further polarisation.
72
 A reporter for the New York Times, found 
that at the National University, “ethnicity remains an inescapable part of growing up for the 
young people” and that government “so far succeeded only in burying ethnic tensions just 
beneath the surface…So the students live in a surreal world of imposed silence, never talking 
about the only thing on their minds: each other.”
73
 
 
Finally, the government places a great deal of emphasis on socio-economic development as 
being a foundation of reconciliation. In a study conducted by Peter Uvin and Charles Mironko, 
they found that economic hardship is “one of the major social problems in Rwanda by 81.9% of 
the country.”
74
 Referring to the lack of attention by the government on the rural-poor, As 
Jeanne, a Tutsi widow expresses “there can be no peace in the heart if there is no peace in the 
stomach.”
75
Uvin et al argue, that the programme under the reconciliation project “offer no real 
way out of poverty” and only seem to further alienate the rural Rwandans from  
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reconciliation.
76
Debari argues that the government has focused too much on impressing 
the international community than listening to the ‘needs’ of its citizens, which only serves 
to further “amplify the failure of the current reconciliation programmes created by the 
government.”
77
 
 
4.6 There Can be No Reconciliation Without Justice 
 
Post genocide reconciliation has utilised two mechanisms in its project, these being the 
Modernised Gacaca Court and the ‘Ingando’ or ‘re-education programme (within the 
National Unity and Reconciliation Commission). The government operates on a notion of 
reconciliation that places ‘social needs’ and the ‘needs of the state’ above individual needs. It 
argues, “Individuals will prosper, if the society is functioning well.”
78
These ‘traditional’ 
‘home-grown’ mechanisms are seen to be ‘organic-social’ mechanisms that have an 
important function for society. Kagame asserted that gacaca “is the only remedy that can 
help us become human beings again.”
79
 
 
‘Reconciliation’ was only introduced into Rwanda in 1998, prior to that reconciliation was 
considered to be ‘taboo,’ as it was understood to mean ‘forgiving and forgetting’.
80
 Today 
‘justice’ and ‘reconciliation’ feature together on the official Government of Rwanda’s 
website.
81
The logic of the post genocide state is that only through accountability, eradicating 
the culture of impunity, and establishing adherence to the rule of law, can reconciliation and 
unity then be possible. As stated on the government website, “In order to expedite the 
delivery of justice, the Rwandan Government has returned to the traditional Gacaca Court 
system. The local Gacaca courts…combine traditional local justice with modern 
jurisprudence, with the aim of achieving truth, justice and reconciliation”.
82
 In much of the 
literature on Rwanda, reconciliation is often connected to justice, with an emphasis on 
addressing “injustices” or “righting wrongs”, thus justice is seen as introducing 
reconciliation processes. 
83
 As the government repeatedly affirms, “justice must be seen to 
be done” in order ‘to provide catharsis for those physically and psychologically scarred by 
violations of international humanitarian law.
84
Gacaca courts seek to provide ‘reunification, 
emotional reparations and restorative justice.’
85
The restorative component of the Gacaca 
court, seek to repair the “social fabric” of Rwanda, and remove feelings of revenge, 
resentment and any obstacles to reconciliation. 
86
As a means of achieving reconciliation, the 
government focuses on acknowledgment of the “other’s suffering, which will ignite 
‘collective trust’ amongst one another.
87
 
 
It is estimated, that around 2 million individuals were tried in the Gacaca Court.
88
Therefore, it 
is important to take a brief look at if this legal-reconciliation mechanism is working to provide 
reconciliation, and as Laura Sealy poses, has it built “accountability between government and 
citizens, and heal some of the sharp social divides created by the genocide?”
89
Debari notes 
“although restorative justice may not be the type of justice all Rwandans are happy with, it is 
supported by the majority, particularly because of the lack of alternatives and the dissociation 
with other approaches towards reconciliation such as the ICTR: which has left Rwandans 
“unaffected and unreconciled” by its failure to deliver 
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justice.
90
 Gacaca is seen to be an “African solution to African problems” and allows 
Rwandans to solve their own conflict. The Gacaca system would also allow the state to 
show that it can manage post-genocide society and maintain order whilst doing so. By 2001, 
the government and local populations, chose “respected leaders” of their communities, 
resulting in the employment and two-year training of 250 000 Gacaca officials, deployed in 
11 000 jurisdictions.
91
 Phil Clark states that the mechanism has involved most of Rwandan 
adults through testimony or as judges.
92
 Coming from the ‘community’ is important because 
it is understood that these leaders would understand local-community dynamics and the 
nature of the trauma from the genocide experience. The majority of these community leaders 
are Tutsi survivors themselves. This is deeply troubling with regards to ‘impartial justice’, if 
Gacaca court members are facilitating justice whilst dealing and healing their own trauma. 
However, Belgian specialist on Rwanda, Peter Urvin, seems to argue that “Politically 
[gacaca is] a brilliant piece of work. It offers something to all groups- prisoners, survivors, it 
offers them all and reason to participate.”
93
 
 
The Gacaca court seeks to establish the ‘truth’. Thus, the court places value on ‘confessions’ 
and ‘confronting complicity’ in the genocide, and questions why it happened and how it 
attracted such mass participation that turned one group against the other. This ‘social-legal’ 
instrument, proposed to establish ‘who committed crimes’, and push through the cloud of 
suspicion, in order to begin the process of integration. The court also went into prisons to 
encourage and educate the ‘accused’ and ‘perpetrators’ on the importance of ‘confession’. 
‘Confession’ in the public space, would give them the opportunity to take responsibility, 
repent, and be acknowledged by the ‘victims’ who are encouraged to forgive.
94
 The 
perpetrator would have the opportunity to meet the ‘victim’, who are centred through their 
account and expression of the violence inflicted upon them or that which they may have 
witnessed. The government encourages the ‘perpetrator’ to publicly apologise and 
acknowledge his or her crime, and in some cases their sentences were then 
reduced.
95
However, in most cases, the Gacaca court ‘rejects these confessions as being 
incomplete or blatantly untrue’ even after the accused has been dismissed, which stigmatises 
the perpetrator or accused. Part of confessing, also requires identifying other perpetrators. In 
some communities and prisons there is a ‘code of silence’, known in Kinyarwanda as 
“ceceke”, which is an agreement made to not testify against one another. 
96
Debari argues 
that in this way “underprivileged and oppressed survivors are denied reconciliation” and 
even if a perpetrator is charged and serves his/her sentence, they will be released and 
reintegrated into their communities, which can be traumatic for the survivors.
97
The suffering 
of Hutu victims of RPF crimes or Tutsi reprisal attacks are also not acknowledged or 
allowed to be spoken about, so they too are excluded from this ‘reconciliation’. 
 
There is also the issue of impunity afforded to the RPF’s crimes, which exempts them from 
reconciliation, and has impacted on state-society and Hutu-Tutsi relations. The RPF have stated 
repeatedly “…these courts may not hear accusations of such crimes by soldiers of the RDF 
[Rwandan Defence Force; the successor of the RPA], which must be taken to regular courts”; a 
position that continues to be critiqued by Rwandans and outside observers. 
98
As Ingabire 
demonstrated in her speech at the genocide memorial site, Hutu victims of crimes 
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against humanity, need to be acknowledged, have the opportunity to mourn, and have access 
to justice, in order for Rwandan break the stranglehold of Hutu-Tutsi and to reconcile. 
Hintjens asserts “Hierarchical leadership, passive acceptance of the status quo and a culture 
of silence, rumours and mistrust, none of which help to promote either a shared sense of 
citizenship or even trust, let alone reconciliation.”
99
 It becomes difficult for the RPF to not 
be viewed as an ethno-political elite who is securing its own interests, and may serve to 
incentivise ‘justice through indigeneity and revenge’, if the governing Tutsi-power is 
absolved from be held accountable to the very principles that they promote. 
 
One needs to take a critical view of the growing estimates of the ‘pool of perpetrators’, 
because it has political implications, as well as limitations for reconciliation. As I have 
discussed in Chapter 1 and 3, to be accused in Rwanda, or be suspicious of a crime, 
suspends your civil and political rights. It would take an estimated one hundred years for it 
the Gacaca court to complete all the trials.
100
 Therefore, arguably, “Rwandan traditional 
criminal justice systems are not designed to manage mass atrocities or genocide”.
101
 
Reconciliation has been difficult, when ‘justice for the accused in gacaca has been a 
haphazard affair.’
102
Hintjens argues “without any defence for the accused, serious 
miscarriages of justice can result; as with the formal court system, innocent people can be 
imprisoned, for instance, for having witnessed RPA war crimes, or for being involved in a 
land dispute.”
103
 Moreover, the Gacaca court encourages the arrests of Hutus based on their 
‘collective guilt’ and not a formal-investigation.
104
 Taken from her ethnographic research-
study in Rwanda, Wielenge shares that “Amongst those I interviewed, some felt they had 
been collectively labelled as being part of the group that perpetrated the genocide even 
though they were too young to have participated. Related to this, new identity labels that are 
emerging in Rwanda are ‘TIGiste’ and ‘relatives of perpetrator’.” 
105
’TIGiste’ (TIG: 
Trauvau d’Interet General) is used to describe those who participate in the genocide and are 
now serving part of their sentences doing community service. One interviewee shared that 
this has made some “feel ‘out of place’ in today’s Rwanda.”
106
Hintjens notes, “the 
contribution of gacaca to reconciliation and national unity is thus not self-evident; dangers of 
retribution and false accusations are real enough; witnesses and suspected genocidaires, as 
well as their relatives, have been attacked and even killed.”
107
Based on her research-study 
in Rwanda, Susan Thomson found, for many Rwandans “the gacaca court represents a form 
of state control in their lives, which promotes fear and insecurity as opposed to unity and 
reconciliation.”
108
Reyntjens argues that forced compliance with state-imposed rituals does 
not always correspond with reality. As one of Thomson respondents asserts “the gacaca 
courts are a site of everyday resistance to policies of the RPF-led government, not one of 
national unity and reconciliation.”
109
 
 
Finally, the politicisation of the Gacaca court has taken place by the explicit goal of the state to 
collectivise Hutu guilt and politicise Tutsi victimhood. A document was handed out to prison all 
inmates, which stated “3…the genocide is the responsibility of all Hutu, wherever they come 
from, whether they have killed or not…4. You must accept that, as the genocide targeted all 
Tutsis (because the aim was to exterminate them), it also concerns all Hutu. Here is why: all 
Tutsi are survivors, all Hutu are Interhamwe…”
110
This kind of logic, supports and 
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recognises Tutsi victims, which Rombouts argues that because of state-sanctioned victim-
competition, it has led to a Tutsi ‘victim-hierarchy’ and the outcome is that Hutu (victims) 
go unsupported and unrecognised by the state and society.
111
 A Hutu woman who was able 
to speak out, after Tutsi women left a ‘focus group’ stated that the gacaca is “profoundly 
dividing” the population along ethnic lines.
112
 Another individual articulated “Maybe there 
can only be reconciliation when gacaca finishes.”
113
 
 
4.7 Ingando: ‘planting the seeds for reconciliation’
114
 
 
The civil war and genocide triggered a mass migration of both outflows and influx’s into 
Rwanda. Prompted by the RPF defeat, an estimated 500 000 Tutsis returned in 1994-1995, 
and with the aggressive pursuit for justice and accountability, many Hutus fled Rwanda.
115
 
Rwanda’s geographical location and historical political context, has led to porous borders 
with neighbouring states. Migrations include unarmed civilians and armed groups, and there 
is a risk that the situation may become further exasperated, when returnees start to migrate, 
especially in such large volumes.
116
Furthermore, participants in the genocide, the 
Interhamwe, and ex-FAR members, had infiltrated into Zaire, between 1994-1996, and began 
armed incursions from eastern-Zaire.
117
 This brought the crises to the Great Lakes Region, 
and led the RPF to indiscriminately target Hutus, base on the presumption that they were 
guilty of the genocide, and now supported radical militias. Chapter Three demonstrated how 
this has led to a preoccupation in Rwanda with securitisation that has led to the post genocide 
state operating on a rationale of repression of social and political rights, as the state ‘rids 
Rwanda of genoicidaires and elements it ‘finds’ against ‘Rwandicity’. Accompanying its 
military and political strategy is the re-establishment of the Ingando mechanisms, aimed at 
ensuring security and peace. 
 
‘Ingando “stems from the verb kuganika”, which historically refers to an event in which the 
village elders remove themselves to an isolated place to discuss solutions to issues within the 
village (i.e. famine, poverty, land etc.).
118
 In the past, the Ingando mechanism has been 
deployed in cases such as military integration. Before, the military was characterised as being 
an “ethnically homogenous” entity, while today the government has used the ingando 
mechanism to create a ‘homogenous society and state’. Initially, the RPF chose to use the 
Ingando mechanism in response to a clause in the Arusha Peace Accord, which stipulated that 
the post-1994 military had to be made up of 60% of Habyarimana’s FAR and 40% of the 
RPA.
119
 Therefore, the post genocide RPF-state called upon the Ingando mechanism, as 
“traditional” and a legitimate cultural practice that could aid its political priorities and 
reconciliation. 
 
The Ingando program began in 1996, originally under the administration by the Ministry of 
Youth, Culture, and Sports.
120
It was also designed to address returning Tutsis, particularly 
the Banyrwanda from Congo, who were encouraged to re-integrate into communities and feel 
a “sense of nationalism” and safe in post genocide Rwanda.
121
 Program Officer of Advocacy 
(NURC)- Alex Rusagara, shared “ we thought that if we could remove these people from 
their daily lives and bring them together to share from a common dish-to eat and sleep  
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together- this would build confidence in the diverse population of repatriated Rwandans, 
confidence that we could in fact live together.”
122
 Very quickly, the RPF modified the 
mechanism to be used to educate all echelons of Rwanda- from civil, public and state and 
establish a synchronisation in the vision for national unity and nationalism. 
 
4.8 History: ‘Twigire ku mateka twubaka ejo hazaza’  
(English translation: which ‘Let us learn from our history to build a bright future’)
123
 
 
Prior to the implementation of programs such as the Ingando, the post genocide powers argue 
that it is of strategic importance for reconciliation, that the past is ‘dealt with’.
124
 Moreover, 
only through acknowledgment of the past, can ethnicity be enunciated from post genocide 
Rwanda. In 1994, one of Kagame’s first tasks was to order ‘emergency revision’ of the 
inherited narrative.
125
 In 1995, the conference, ‘La politiqueet la planification de l’education 
au Rwanda’ was held, placing history as a central component to reconciliation.
126
 Then, in 
1998 there was a conference held in Kigali, Valeurs partage´es pour la promotion d’une 
culture de paix au Rwanda, which “recommended that the teaching of civic education should 
return to traditional Rwandan values and “to create a formal forum for the restitution of the 
scientific truth of Rwanda’s history.”
127
 There was an international conference held in Kigali 
(2008) which stated aim was “to observe the failure of the human and social sciences to that 
have led to genocide”
128
Thus, the government were seeking a “new methodology, a new 
literature, a new history.”
129
This was seen as urgent, particularly for the history curricula 
taught in primary and secondary school. History was therefore suspended in schools until 
2005. 
 
The state hired a team of historians to work towards producing an “official history” of 
Rwanda, completed with data, facts and tabulations of protracted violence perpetrated 
against Tutsi victims. In 1998, the government together with the National University of 
Rwanda and Rwandan Ministry of Education, Science, Technology and Scientific Research, 
began discussing the politics of certain eras (e.g. 1959-1962). Although it attracted a heated 
debate, it remained an internal discussion. The approach to (re)writing Rwanda’s history was 
based on “scientific analysis of the past and the establishment of “the truth”. 
130
The issue of 
history was raised at the Dialogue, Consensus and Peace ‘consultation’ between Kigali based 
‘Institute of Research and Dialogue for Peace” and Rwandan politicians, civil society and 
intellectuals.
131
 One participant stated, “History…is a social field, but it is also scientific. 
We have been divided because we are not scientific. We therefore need archaeology and not 
only oral sources. Oral sources can be transformed.”
132
 In the same vein another participant 
stated that “history is a fact, and there are some things you cannot change. We need to talk 
the truth.”
133
Suzanne Buckley-Zistel argues that ‘despite such debates the government had 
already settled on its version of the past’.
134
The debate reflected the language of the colonial 
discourse (scientific’, ‘history’, ‘origins’). 
 
The National Curriculum Development Centre was devised to work with the Rwanda 
Education Board, to train the new batches of teachers who could teach the new history 
curriculum. Teachers who were not found to be competent, lost their jobs, and the state 
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elected more suitable candidates, the state claimed that surviving teachers were not capable 
of teaching the state-sanctioned history. 
135
Opposition and alternative views were sidelined 
in what was meant to be an inclusive participatory process, and it has been critiqued for 
deploying a politically charged curriculum that many feel should not be taught in schools. 
Case studies that accompanied the curriculum contain themes such as “politics”, “rumours”, 
“genocide denialism”, “negation” and “Tutsi victimhood”. 
136
 
 
According to the Government of Rwanda’s website, the ‘official history’ is: 
 
 “For centuries Rwanda existed as a centralised monarchy under the successions of Tutsi kings from 
one clan, who ruled through cattle, chiefs, land chiefs and military chiefs. The king was supreme 
but the rest of the population, Bahutu, Batutsi and Batwa, live in symbiotic harmony.”
137
 
 
Thus, there was social harmony, until the colonial intervention, which institutionalised a 
system of “indirect rule”.
138
 
 
 “From 1959, Batutsi were targeted, causing hundreds and thousands of deaths and sending almost two 
million of them into exile…”
139

 “…The First Republic, under Gregoire Kayibanda, and the second, under President Juvenal 
Habyarimana, institutionalised discrimination against the Batutsi and subjected them to period 
massacres”
140

 
A more comprehensive interrogation of Rwanda’s history will take place in Chapter 
5, working closely with Chapter 2. 
 
In order to eradicate or “unmake” the divisions of the past, the state asserts its interpretation 
of history, arguing was no ethnicity prior to colonialism. In the preamble of the 2003 
Constitution, is states that “…we enjoy the privilege of having one country, a common 
language, a common culture and a long shared history which ought to lead to a common 
vision of our destiny.”
141
It also describes the symbiotic harmony in social relations in pre-
colonial Rwanda, positing more or less a complete pre-colonial unity between Hutu, Tutsi 
and Twa.
142
 The only difference that existed was that of an “occupational 
difference”.
143
The state then argues, that it was the colonial intervention, that violently 
inscribed ethnic distinctions, for strategies of ‘divide and rule’, thus “the evils of the 
genocide can be traced back directly to these European colonials”
144
 As part of its aim to 
delegitimise the past, the ‘official narrative’ then describes the failures of the First and 
Second Republic, which imported these racialised identities for power and anti-Tutsi 
violence. Moreover, the ‘official narrative’ reads the genocide as the ‘main event’ in 
Rwanda’s history, both “privileging” the genocide but also “removing it from historical 
scrutiny.”
145
The consequence is that the state draws upon the genocide as the site upon 
which the “political correct categories of identification and guidelines” can be derived from, 
and to demonstrate as a lesson upon which the post genocide state must learn from.
146
Based 
on this narrative, the post-genocide’s logic is that history explains why “the RPF wants to 
remove ethnic and race markers from politics altogether.”
147
Furthermore, these markers are 
incompatible with ‘modernity and decolonisation.’
148
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The ‘official narrative’ is problematic for many reasons; I would like to briefly just touch on 
a few because I go into greater detail in Chapters 5 and 6. Firstly, it invokes the work of 
‘origins’, but selectively subscribes to history in order to make the claim that validates Tutsis 
as an indigenous group of Rwanda. Secondly, it fails to interrogate the colonial construction 
of political identities. Related to this point, and the state’s selectivity in ‘history-writing’, is a 
failure to include how identities came to be politicised through state-formation, and how law 
and politics have given shape and meaning to these institutionally-embedded political 
identities. Instead it chooses to pursue the argument that shames Hutus collectively for their 
version of history that had violent consequences for Tutsis, which have also excluded them 
from having political rights as citizens of Rwanda. Thirdly, similar to how ‘Hutu Power’ 
associated Tutsis to the ‘RPF political diaspora’, the RPF today associates Hutu Power with 
all Hutu politics and ‘ordinary’ Hutus in the Rwanda and Great Lakes region’. Finally, using 
Wielenge’s reading of “lived identities”, arguably, identities are more complex than being 
solely about ‘ethnic-identity’. ‘Ethnic-identity’ plays an important role, but if one looks from 
a regionalism perspective, there is a distinct north/ south divide between Hutus. There are 
also differences in the Great Lakes region, which I discuss in later chapters. 
 
A leading historian, Jan Vansina, finds that “a whole set of false propositions and assertions” 
exist in this narrative.
149
Vansina continues “The linguistic and cultural unity of Rwanda is 
not a ‘natural’ nation…Rwanda really became a nation in the twentieth century…There is a 
projection of nostalgic utopia into the past, a past that contrasts with a painful present.”
150
 
“The problem…is that the narrative is-from a scholarly perspective- inaccurate…the effect of 
these particularised versions are both to suppress discussion in the population and to perform 
a certain narrative for the internationals who involve themselves with Rwanda.”
151
 
 
The notion of a “common shared vision for the future” is understood in conflict resolution 
and transitional justice as a conflict transformation process that takes the “root causes of the 
violence” as a point of engagement with what they represent in the state and society.
152
 This 
is a deeply social and political process. However, the ‘history’ of Rwanda does not suit the 
regime, hence why it has re-constructed the truth of the history and takes all necessary 
measures to protect that ‘truth’. At a ‘scholarly debate in Kigali’ a historian remarked on the 
“value of different truths” and was met with a response by a high-ranking official, who 
asserted, “There is only one truth, we know it.”
153
 Kagame re-iterated a similar argument, 
stating, “Those who have divergent interpretations of how and why the genocide occurred are 
revisionist and/or proponents of the theory of double genocide. This, as we know, is another 
phase of genocide.”
154
 
 
In post genocide Rwanda, the ‘genocide laws’, prohibit engagement and participation with the 
work of “history and historiography.”
155
 The rural-poor are especially conditioned into 
swallowing this historical narrative and maintain strict obedience and loyalty to it. Post 
genocide Rwanda ‘constructs and utilises’ the “myths of difference” as the damaging impact of 
colonialism, and continues with the “myths of the oppressors”, the “myths of oppression” and 
the “myths of ethnicity”, to make a purchase in its reconciliation project, and resolve the ethnic 
question.
156
 It raises the “ethnic question” but also governs and represses a discussion 
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on it, thus avoiding it. The debate is further silenced by the re-enforcement that “There is no 
Hutu and Tutsi, there are only Rwandans”.
157
 Moreover, not “all issues” are taught and 
narrated in the Ingando programme. This is acknowledged by history lecturer at National 
University of Rwanda, Charles Kabwete Mulinda, who admits there is “much debate” about 
history, but the ‘official history’ does present the “major events” and in the context of the 
genocide, which as Mulinda shares, it is difficult to have “frank and open debates” 
about.
158
This “bares critically on the prospects of reconciliation.”
159
 Suzanne Buckley-
Zistel poses an important question: ‘does narrating the nation as founded on ethnic harmony 
lead to unity in Rwanda?’
160
Arguably it doesn’t, because of the repressive top-down 
approach, censorship of alternative historical accounts, as well as the reality that the 
genocide violently inscribed the divisions between Hutu and Tutsi, and has left deep scars 
and resentment. It also allows the RPF to govern “what is remembered and what is 
forgotten” and narrate a story that advances their own personal objectives.
161
 
 
The following section, will present experiences of the Ingando programme. It must be noted 
that by no means, do the anecdotal accounts represent a shared experience by all. The 
purpose of mentioning them is as discussed in Chapter 3, the shared and lived experiences of 
Rwandans are often side-lined by repressive laws and the hegemonic debates which 
legitimise certain truths and knowledge. Arguably by giving these individual accounts a 
platform, it incorporates them into the complex reconstruction project and supports the 
dismantling of the hierarchy that governs knowledge production and to read alternative 
narratives, parallel to the post-genocide dissemination of truth and narratives. 
 
4.9 Disciplining Reconciliation 
 
The goal of the Government of Rwanda, is to have all Rwandans go through the ‘Ingando’ 
programme.’ The Ingando practice has a curriculum, but adapts the lessons depending on 
what group is participating. This is based on the Government determinations of the 
individuals understanding of ‘Rwandicity’, and to what extent they can discern the wrong 
in history. 
 
The Ingando serves two types of participants, and arguably Rwandan society is well aware of the 
difference between the Ingando solidarity programmes and the Ingando re-education 
programmes. The former are for those who are identified as being aligned to the ‘new Rwandan 
identity’ and who are being trained for leadership positions that could be taken up as “politicians, 
civil society, and church leaders, Gacaca judges and incoming university students.”
162
 The latter 
is for ‘returning refugees, ex-combatants and soldiers, confessed genocidaires, perpetrators and 
prisoners.’ This group is almost entirely made up of Hutus, but also consists of ex-FAR, ex-RPF 
and any armed individuals who didn’t flee to Zaire but are accused of having ‘anti-sectarianism 
views’. There are many cases, since 1996 where people volunteer to go the Ingando because they 
do not want to further engage in the conflict. It is compulsory for these combatants to undergo 
“pre-demobilisation, pre-discharge” orientation programs.
163
This works is in line with the 
invitation for all Rwandans to return to Rwanda, and the state asserts that it does distinguish 
between non-genocidaires and genocidaires.
164
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However, anyone found not to be in line with the ‘official narrative’ or compliant to the 
Rwandan national identity, are ‘forced’ to enrol into these programmes, which vary from 
a few daily lessons or which could take place over months, depending on the government. 
 
The Ingando programme for ex-RPF, ex-Far and other armed groups, have seen an estimate 
of 48 000 participants since 2004.
165
 The programme is about two weeks long, and in 
addition to reconciliation and the ‘official history’, it addresses “psychological 
demilitarisation, reintegration, civilian life and HIV/Aids”. 
166
The ex-soldiers are given a 
‘basic needs kit’ worth $100 (provides transport, food stipend and basic household 
appliances) and then after 6 months they receive a ‘once off reintegration package’ worth 
$181.00.
167
 The RPF funds 53% of the costs.
168
 Chi Mgbako conducted an interview with 
the Kigali Veterans Association, where one representative maintains that the “ingando has 
been used . . . to change the ideologies of ex-FAR . . . who would be integrated into RDF . . . 
so ingando has not just been used for demobilization purposes.”
169
 In another interview with 
an ex-FAR soldier who returned from Congo, he shared, “I went to a previous ingando. . . . 
At Maryohe, they gave us a choice of whether to join RDF or demobilize. I chose to de-
mobilize at the time because I had a wife. If not, I would have wanted to join RDF. This was 
in 1998. There were only ex-FAR at Maryohe Ingando and some later became RDF.”
170
 
Mgbako also interviewed a prominent Rwandan journalist (anonymous) who claimed the 
military has both ‘encouraged’ and “in some cases forced ex-FAR who were participating in 
the ingando into the RDF” further emphasising that “this practice has kept the most talented 
soldiers of the former opposition in the current government’s military, thereby guaranteeing 
government control over the soldiers’ activities and neutralizing their potential 
opposition.”
171
 
 
In a study produced by IJR, they found that very little is known about the Ingando, it is 
greatly understudied because it difficult to gain access and the co-operation of the authorities. 
This is particularly worrying, when 64% of the Rwanda population under 25 years of age has 
to undergo the Ingando. Students who finish secondary school undergo a two-month re-
education through the Ingando. In addition to the official narrative, the curriculum contains 
lessons on “Achievements of the Government”, “The dignity of Banyarwanda” and the “the 
ethnicity question” (which is selective), and Western and Eastern philosophy, together with 
“economic and technological concerns facing the country”.
172
 The government outlines that 
they encourage students to develop critical analytical skills and to participate in developing 
solutions for the future of Rwanda, especially through attending Rwandan universities. 
However from her findings, Mgbako shares that the Ingando provides the government with 
the opportunity “to mould opinions of young students and orient them toward the RPF-led 
government, helping to create a generation of RPF loyalist.”
173
 One such participant in the 
Mutabo Ingando programme stated “Our teachers characterized the past government as 
solely wanting to hold onto power, and this was contrasted with the current 
government…characterised as primarily about reconciliation…this government held 
parliamentary, presidential, and local elections and that refugees were returning. We were 
given the right to criticize the government, but I found nothing to criticize…”
174
Mgbako 
further shares that when asked to propose or recommend government improvements, students 
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were “unable” to do so.
175
This is in line with the governments’ encouragement to engage, 
as long as individuals or groups do not possess ‘genocide ideologies’.
176
 
 
A former journalist and ex-Ingando participant, stated “Ingando . . . is about RPF political 
ideology and indoctrination.”
177
Susan Thomson was conducting ethnographic research in 
Rwanda, when in the midst of her research was ordered by the Local Government to 
participate in the Ingando, as well handed a manual outlining selected civil-society 
organisations, private sector and high-ranking government officials, to whom she should 
speak to, in order to find the ‘truth’ about Rwanda’s national reconciliation and unity project. 
178
 At the beginning of the 26 hours of history lessons she received over three days, the 
government official stated “You will not be able to return to your communities without 
understanding the real causes of the genocide. We will test you on history to make sure you 
understand. Remember also that you are former Hutu. We are all Rwandans now and this is 
the basis of our history lessons”. 
179
 Thomson, states that the re-education was conducted by 
‘well-learned historians and intellectuals’, which with six heavily armed military men, would 
detail the “root causes of genocide…the Hutu hatred for Tutsi… that ordinary Hutu men 
caused the genocide because they acted on their hatred for Tutsi”. 
180
 Therefore, the 
genocide is explained in a simplified manner, which trivialises the experiences of victims, 
perpetrators, bystanders and saviours. 
 
Some Hutus assert that they cannot share their experience. Their role is to acknowledge their 
guilt as an ethnic group, a group guilty of perpetrating violence against Tutsi’s. The extensive 
coercive practices in the genocide are formally not acknowledged and banned from speaking 
about. Through including lessons on “how to be a good citizen” which are about obeying 
officials and acknowledging Tutsi trauma, according to Thomson’s account of speaking with 
a Professor (participant), it also reminds Hutu’s of their relationship to citizenship, that their 
status as a ‘first class citizen’ is not a given if they do not abide and acknowledge Hutu 
guilt.
181
 One such participant, Gaston explains “Even if I am innocent, I am a former Hutu. 
In the new Rwanda, this means I must be guilty of killing.”
182
 
 
The modification of the Ingando mechanism to correct history and re-educate, meant that the 
mechanism would re-educate prisoners, returnees and allow “participants, soldiers or civilians, to 
go beyond the feelings of fear and mutual suspicion and ‘speak freely’ about the conflict which 
opposes them, to heal wounds, to accept responsibilities in case harm was done, to demystify the 
negative perceptions of one towards the other, to assume collectively the common tragedy and 
agree on the common future.”
183
 Thomson recalls her experience by stating, the Ingando “does 
little to re-educate confessed genocidaires on how to reconcile…it teaches these men, the 
majority of who are ethnic Hutu, to remain silent and not question the RPF’s vision for creating 
peace and security for all Rwandans”.
184
Lastly, Thomson expresses that the participants that she 
had interviewed, see the approach to history as a “re-imagined past” essential for the ‘re-
engineering of the future’, but without open discussion, is understood as “an exercise social 
control over adult Hutu men”.
185
 In an interview with a elderly Tutsi woman, Amiable, who is 
‘cynical’ about the process, she state “Whoever has power are the ones that shape our national 
history.”
186
Thus, it is apparent that the ‘naming 
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and shaming’ that accompanies the judicial practices, is prevalent in the re-education 
programme too. Filip Reyntjens writes “The evocation of an Eden-like past is also practical, as it 
allows the RPF to legitimize actions in the name of ‘tradition’, even if such tradition does not 
exist. Gacaca, ingando, imihigo, itorero, ubudehe, umuganda and other concepts with a positive 
“traditional” overtone were helpful in allowing the RPF to sell their story.”
187
 
 
It is understood, that ‘both men and women participated in the Genocide through agency, 
coercion, or necessity to survive. Family and friends turned on one another, and as Vijayan 
explains, within that dynamic, where does reconciliation and forgiveness begin whilst people 
are still mourning? Where the past is not quite the past- “What are the Rwandans to reconcile 
to?”
188
 Moreover, the post genocide state does not recognise moderate Hutus, Hutu loss 
(family and friends) nor does it acknowledge the many Hutus who protected Tutsis and did 
not participate during the violence. In ‘From Classrooms to Conflict in Rwanda’ Elizabeth 
King argues, that the implications of the re-education programme, is that it ‘stigmatises and 
devalues Hutu suffering’, as shared by a Hutu woman “I lost three-quarters of my family 
during the war…But we [Hutu] don’t have any right to say that we lost people.”
189
 Paul 
Rusesabagina, the well-known Kigali Hotel manager of ‘Hotel des Mille Collines’ who 
saved many lives, stated that “We have victims of the genocide who are commemorated, and 
we have crimes against humanity who are silenced.”
190
 As shared by another participant, it 
is there to “keep Hutus out of public life”- a mechanism of keeping Rwandan’s in check and 
governing information. 
191
These Hutus have a contemporary irrelevance in post genocide 
Rwanda, because to be Hutu “is to be presumed a perpetrator”.
192
 
 
Mamdani raises the concern about the growing pool of suspects and perpetrators. As 
mentioned, the state uses tabulations as facts to accompany its version of history and events. 
“Growing estimates” that ascribes Hutus as the “guilty majority” and Tutsis as the “fearful 
minority” or ‘victims’, has social, economical and moral implications, and of course political 
implications for post genocide Rwanda.
193
 How can Rwanda transition into a post-ethnic 
society and live in mutual-coexistence, when majority of the population has had their 
citizenship suspended, by waiting for the criminal justice to determine their faith? And this 
does not only affect Hutus, but Tutsis as well, because if one has to critically interrogate the 
outcomes of the judicial approach, it is apparent that justice is not a certainty. Lucie 
Niyigena- a survivor of the genocide shares in her experience “trauma and fear that 
permeated her home in the early years, are now mixed with flickers of hope, suspicion and 
resentment”.
194
 
 
Nina Illiza, founder of the NGO, ‘Heart of Thousand Hills’, and genocide-survivor, troubles 
the practice of trivializing the genocide. Illiza states that the commemoration that takes place 
in April, are merely a time when people “sympathise with what I go through all year.”
195
 
Illiza expresses that during the month of April, Hollywood movies like “Hotel Rwanda” and 
“Sometimes in April” will be viewed and spoken about, and Rwanda will be Googled more 
often, all serving to remind to “never forget” and to which she feels envy towards, because 
she never has forgotten.
196
 Illiza laments that the idea of reminding us to ‘never forget’ is 
“preposterous” because “remembering is so agonizing” that one could never forget.
197
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 The post-genocide government emphasises this notion of that Rwandans must ‘confront the past’ 
in order to move forward- asserting that it is the “only way to go about it.”
198
Confessing and 
exploring the truth, recollecting the past and processing ones understanding of it, is a difficult, 
intrusive, traumatic and a deeply-private process to go through, and in Rwanda, Rwandans are 
burdened by the idea that it is acutely necessary for political, social and economic reasons. 
Survivors mention a sense of shame in having survived when others didn’t survive, some blame 
themselves for not doing more to protect loved ones. As Josephine, a Rwandan Healing and 
Reconciliation worker states, “these are things most people don’t want to talk about. Why should 
you have to deal with it? After all, you’re the victim.”
199
 In other instances, sharing ones story in 
the Ingando, assisted others in opening up to their healing and reconciliation processes. Illiza has 
chosen to reclaim her process, sharing “… I have come to learn that acknowledging the truth is 
the first step to accepting it. Hiding my suffering for the past 20 years has gotten me nowhere. I 
cannot let the pain of my history be the pain of my future. I found it imperative to create a way to 
rewrite my history so that my present self can begin to heal. I decided to rewrite the loss of my 
mother as the discovery of hope for myself and my country.”
200
 For Vianney, a Tutsi survivor, 
she explains “The Hutu who killed, they know who they are but are they able to tell their truth? 
No, and I understand why not. If they say anything, they go straight to prison. I understand their 
problems; I blame this government for its lack of fairness. If we could all just get along in our 
own way and at our own time, I know we could find some way to co-exist. Reconciliation is 
never going to happen under this government...”
201
 This works together with the discussion in 
Chapter 2, on Ricouer’s notions of ‘Thwarted Memory, Manipulated Memory, and Enforced 
Memory, which addressed the states regulation and repression of critical memory. 
 
 
 
4.10 The Politicisation of Reconciliation 
 
‘Remembering’ and ‘memory’ must be thought of as two different practices. Jenny Edkins 
articulates ‘remembering’ is a negotiated activity that combines social and individual 
aspects.
202
 As demonstrated, ‘remembering’ can be a composed and traumatic practice, and 
is often formulated through the purpose and context and how one navigates 
complex/intertwined and fluidity of the emotions it triggers. 
 
The notion of ‘memory’ is used as a post-conflict strategy has attracted various disciplines from 
neuroscience to psychoanalysis, to history, social, cultural, literary studies, performing arts and 
political science. The University of Cambridge Post-Conflict and Post-Crisis research, defines 
memory as “a label for a diverse set of cognitive capacities with which human beings retain 
information about and reconstruct the past in (and for) the present. It is related but distinct to 
perception, imagination, or knowledge, as well as significantly connected to emotion, trauma, 
reasoning and morality.”
203
Memories are not necessarily ‘truths’ of the past, individuals may 
use them in order to re-imagine themselves as human-and as an individual, one may also be 
affected by ‘flashbacks of trauma’ or engage in borrowing memories from another persons 
past.
204
 In Rwanda, people accumulated personal photographs that they have held on since the 
genocide, photos of which aren’t even of their 
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loved ones. There are also the commemorations (billboard announcements, centres for 
remembrance, events throughout the year), as well as flowerbeds covering the mass graves, 
and every now and then new bones are discovered. These all add to formulating one’s 
memory, which can be different in the private and public realm. They also contribute to 
one’s identity and collective identities, “by sharing, constructing, and transmitting memories 
within a society or group.”
205
 In Allesandro Portelli’s work, Portelli argues that in the 
aftermath of mass-atrocity, “dominant memory practices play a crucial role in defining 
historical narrative(s)- and the positions which different groups occupy within that narrative-
allocating judgment and defining justice, reconstituting a national identity and legitimising or 
delegitimising the current regime and its policies”
206
 All of this dimensions bare 
consequences for reconciliation. 
 
Memory can perform as a prism of reconstructing the narrative of the past, which has a 
bearing on the construction of the identity, the individuals experience and place in society. 
Therefore, it “may” or may not relate to healing and reconciliation. Pierre Nora, describes 
the role of memory in France in the 1970’s and ‘80s, where memory became replaced by 
‘history’ and its narrative, that de-connected memory, as a process about the past, from the 
present.
207
 Maurice Halbwachs’ canonical work for ‘modern memory studies’ introduced 
the psychological and sociological practice of memory. Briefly, Halbachs argues “It is in 
society that people normally acquire their memories. It is also in society that they recall, 
recognize, and localize their memories.”
208
 Individuals and societies, “re-create narratives 
of the past” which demonstrates that it is a practice formulated through the social and 
political context or reality of the present. In Rwanda, ‘memory’ has become a primary 
consideration by ‘government, civil society and reconciling towards a notion of 
‘Rwandicity’. It has also meant that at times memory operates on the nexus between ‘politics 
and power’.
209
Katherine Conoway asserts “the consideration of a healthy memory 
environment is crucial in creating the space for individuals and society to heal”.
210
Conoway 
points that the word “may” should be used here, because it is not only “the element required 
for healing; however, it may set the stage for the possibility.”
211
Secondly, Conoway notes 
that where there is a variety of definitions and strategies within post-conflict societies that 
address ‘memory’, there isn't a ‘common understanding’ regarding memory or how it is used 
to make a ‘healthy environment’ where healing is possible for the individual and society.
212
. 
 
Rene Lemarchand writes about the ‘Hi-jacking of Hutu Memory”, and looks at a central aspect 
of ‘post-conflict strategies’ which raises the question “How are we going to handle the future” 
but more the more important question is “how are we going to handle the past?”
213
The approach 
of the Rwandan government is to combine an ‘emphasis on the memory of the past conflict, to 
conceal it, and to also engage in the work of memory.’
214
Lemarchand asserts there is a 
conscious effort to ‘obliterate the past by erasing ethnic identities’ (unconvincingly) whilst 
leaving no doubt that the roles of perpetrators and victims are assigned respectively to Hutu and 
Tutsi and are by no means interchangeable.
215
In addition, as I mentioned, the work of 
commemorations re-iterate that Hutus cannot be victims, and they have been kept in a 
continuous position of culpability. The second consequences of the state, has led Rwandans to 
make a ‘rational choice’ which is to  
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‘conceal one’s feelings about the past conflict’ in order to live in peace with each other.
216
 
Moreover, the ‘official memory’ and narrative of history relies on exclusion of Hutu memory 
in order for there to be a ‘unifying official memory that can bring Rwandans together. 
However, the question that Lemarchand asks ‘can this actually bring Rwandans any closer to 
national reconciliation, or at the very least, peaceful cohabitation?’
217
 
 
The work of Stephen Cohen, who introduced the term “social amnesia”, has been used in 
thinking about remembrance and truth as components for reconciliation in post-genocide 
Rwanda. Cohen defines ‘social amnesia’ as a “mode of forgetting by which a whole society 
separates itself from its discreditable past record. This might happen at an organisational, 
official or conscious level-the deliberate cover up, the rewriting of history-or through the 
type of cultural slippage that occurs when information disappears.”
218
 
 
Suzanne Buckley-Zistel, has written about memory in her article “Remembering to Forget: 
Chosen Amnesia as a strategy for Local Coexistence in Post-Genocide Rwanda. From her 
fieldwork conducted in Gikongoro and Nyatarama, she found that memory of the genocide 
and past, was more a case of “chosen amnesia” because of the essential need for cohesion, as 
part of day-to-day living.
219
 Re-iterating Lemarchand’s argument, Buckley-Zistel states that 
the ‘reluctance of her respondents to remember their tragic past can best be seen as a “chosen 
amnesia” which is the “cumulative pressures from the government coercion, fear of the other, 
pragmatism combine to make amnesia the preferred choice.”
220
She describes that most 
respondents found remembering as being important to education and eradicating ethnic 
ideology, and the role of forgetting as part of preventing another genocide. Moreover, she 
asserts that “memory of the genocide…is not a unifying factor, as disagreement prevails over 
the clear demarcation of victims and perpetrator.”
221
Buckley-Zistel also notes that none of 
the respondents deny the Genocide of the Tutsi, but “large parts of the Hutu population 
consider themselves to be victims of war, refugee camps or revenge killings post-
genocide.”
222
 The wife of a Hutu prisoner, explains that in the commemorations, only Tutsis 
are remembered, but that the RPF had also murdered- Hutus, and secondly that there is no 
way of telling whose bones lies in the mass graves (Tutsi or Hutus).
223
 Lastly, as important 
as the respondents found the need to not forget, one suggested that the memorial sites be 
removed, as she articulates that they “generate trauma and hate…Survivors remember what 
happened and it makes them angry”.
224
 Buckley-Zistel concludes “pretending peace…is 
common, and widely accepted practices in Rwanda.”
225
In response to Buckley-Zistel’s 
analysis, Lemarchand asserts that what is missing from her argument is a “critical discussion 
on whether amnesia in this case is ‘chosen’ or imposed, or, in Ricoeur’s terms, whether the 
behind this ‘chosen amnesia’ does not lie something more fundamental, i.e. thwarted 
memory: one is indeed impelled to wonder whether the phrase “chosen amnesia” is 
appropriate to describe a context in which the Hutu masses have no other choices if they want 
to survive but to keep their thoughts and frustrations to themselves. As Peter Novick reminds 
us ‘people often think of ‘choice’ as implying free choice, but the sort of choices we’re 
speaking of are shaped and constrained by circumstance.”
226
 
 
 
138 
 
 
 
 
It is important to think of how these practices (memory and history) can be similar to the 
past-violence, in that it produces a form of subjectivity or a ‘subject’ that says in order to 
exist in social or political order, one must formulate his/her process through the 
requirements or ‘elements’, the language and social order or structural order, even though 
we might not know what that space specifically is. Edkins argues that the “Survivors of 
events that we now label as traumatic have something to tell us. Specifically, they have 
something to tell us about how we organize ourselves with respect to power and political 
community in the contemporary western world.”
227
 
 
Although Edkins work is based on analysis of the western world, her articulations bare 
substance for the case of Rwanda. Edkins, argues that it is through violence, that the state 
comes into being, and in order for it to unite all individuals of the state, it has to keep that 
violence “hidden”, the very violence that “continues to underpin the state.”
228
 The 
implications for its survivors and their trauma, is that memory has to be kept under control, 
or what Edkins calls “disciplined”, which is governed by the victorious power.
229
 Moreover, 
the diagnosis and ‘medicalization’ of trauma and memory in Rwanda, renders survivors 
politically powerless, and legitimizes state-sanctioned ‘remedies’, which are argued to be 
depoliticized activities, but as observed in Rwanda is a very political practice. This conjures 
the work of Michael Foucault, particularly the dispersion of power, which is diffused and 
embodied in ‘truth regimes’(‘Power/Knowledge’). 
 
Foucault argues that ‘power’ has been shifted from its traditional readings of the monarchy to 
sovereignty, but it now exists “diffused” in the state, whereby it takes on a more ‘discursive, 
rather than purely coercive’ form, and ‘constitutes agents rather than being deployed by 
them’.
230
 Furthermore, the judicial ‘code/theory’ legitimized the democratization of the state, 
which assumingly collectivised sovereignty, but which masked the disciplining and exercise of 
power.
231
Foucault states, “from the nineteenth century until this present day, we have then in 
modern societies, on one hand, legislation, a discourse, and an organisation of public right 
articulated around the principle of the sovereignty of the social body and the delegation of the 
individual sovereignty to the State; and we also have tight grid of disciplinary coercions that 
actually guarantees the cohesion of the social body. That grid cannot in anyway be transcribed in 
right, even though the two necessarily go together. A right of sovereignty and a mechanism of 
discipline. It is, I think, between these two limits that power exists.”
232
 
 
Power produces its own discourse that Foucault argues as being separate from that of law 
and rights.
233
 Which lends to thinking about the use of law in post-genocide Rwanda that has 
come to support policies of repression through the Constitutional criminalizing 
(‘divisionism’, negation’, ‘genocide denialism’) of open debate and public expression. 
Furthermore, it challenges the traditional pursuit for overt authoritative practices that must be 
recovered through liberal democratic principles. In fact, Foucault’s work calls for the critical 
interrogation of the liberal democratic state. The discourse of power, furthermore normalizes 
its disciplining, through the “regimes of truth” that pervades society because of its 
heterogenic nature.
234
 Power is produced and produces social relations that did not exist 
prior.
235
The ‘regime of truth’ and knowledge are discursive practices of the discourse that 
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power produces. For Foucault, ‘truth’ is in a ‘circular relation’ with systems of power that 
“produce and sustain it”.
236
 
 
In Rwanda, ‘the truth’ is formulated through a scientific methodology, which is said to 
legitimise the narrative. This was demonstrated in the debates at the Kigali ‘Dialogue, 
Consensus and Peace’. Moreover, the ‘re-invention of traditions’ as Mgbako refers to also 
serves social and political control, particularly as the Rwandan government has ‘modernised 
these traditions’ (Gacaca and Ingando) and thus altering them to suit their post-genocide 
project. Foucault further argues that “there are manifold relations of power which permeate, 
characterize and constitute the social body, these relations of power cannot themselves be 
established, consolidated or implemented without the production, accumulation, circulation and 
functioning of a discourse'.”
237
 The ‘social body’ is thus subjected to the discourse of power, 
through scientific methods and productions of ‘truth’ and ‘knowledge’. 
 
To delegitimise the practices of ‘truth regimes’, according to Foucault’s logic, would mean 
to detach the political and social power relations, which as Edkins argues is where the work 
of ‘genealogy’ is so productive. Foucault, states that investigation and challenging power and 
truth/knowledge, as well as through local and specific interrogations that aren’t reliant on the 
‘hegemonic regime’, is where ‘truth’ (‘erudite knowledge’) can be found and most 
productive.
238
 The productions of knowledge on the fringe of power, is what Foucault would 
refer to as ‘subjugated knowledge’.
239
 In Rwanda, the category of ‘subjugated knowledge’ 
seems to be growing, both through the repression and exclusion of participation, and as 
individuals and groups begin to independently explore ‘memories of the past’. 
 
Foucault’s analysis also challenges political power in Rwanda that is shaping reconciliation 
through discipline and inscribing the victimisation of Tutsis as a means of accountability and 
legitimacy. There is a long-established tradition in Rwanda, where the struggle for power 
has relied on historical narratives of victimhood and political persecution of one group by 
the other, which also serves the claims for justice. Thus, the project of ‘memory’ and 
‘history’ are deeply political and have a political purchase for power, particularly as it gets 
taken up through ‘official narratives’, commemorations, national mourning and as the 
backbone of the ‘new society’. Mamdani argues that in post-genocide Rwanda today, there 
is a ‘Hutu version of history’ and a ‘Tutsi version of history, which will not reconcile until 
the post-genocide state transcends ‘victims justice’ and the reproduction of Hutu and Tutsi 
as political identities.
240
 
 
In ‘Silences in African History: Between the syndromes of discovery and abolition’, Jacques 
Depelchin calls upon a “relentless application of an ethical framework aimed at promoting a 
ethic of truth.”
241
 Depelchin makes this call, out of a critique he makes on the looking lens-
Africanisation (in the sense of being reduced to less than a human being) that has come to 
determine a reading of Africa, with an indifference to the “land of 
spectacles.”
242
Furthermore, he makes the indictment that “Given histories of colonisation, 
decolonisation/neocolonisation, and now so called democratisation…” are no less responsible 
than the perpetrators involved in the Rwandan genocide.
243
 Thus, Depelchin calls to suspend 
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the obsession of these stakeholders, and for a preoccupation to be placed in the “reality, and 
let the horror of the event guide us towards discovering the truth.”
244
 
 
The process that he proposes, has perhaps been pursued but never completed because it may 
‘implicate them’ in the horror- in the crimes. This has engendered a political and legal 
‘loophole’ that secures post genocide power. Depelchin puts forth the discretion that this 
work needs to take place beyond the traditional moral and legal frameworks, which the post 
genocide power has relied upon.
245
The resistance to mono-ethnic nation-states, presented in 
both chapters 2 and 3, demonstrate the existence of domestic ethics within Rwanda that 
operate and are pursuing a ‘different kind of Rwanda’. These kind of social and political 
engagements add to the type of ethics regarding truth and engagement that Depelchin offers, 
and is in line with Foucault. Depelchin draws upon Badiou’s formulation of ethic relating to 
‘event’. This is similar to the questions that Mamdani poses in his address on the ‘Politics of 
Naming: Genocide, Civil War and Insurgency’, which challenges the kind of 
knowledge/narrative productions by the international human rights regime, that accompanies 
the ‘event’. Mamdani argues the post genocide would have to dismantle the “genocide 
framework” as its lens, and critically interrogate ‘truth’. Mamdani goes on to further state, 
“This exercise requires putting the truth of the genocide, the truth of the mass killings, in a 
historical context…it is necessary to link political outcomes more to political institutions and 
less to political agency.”
246
 This would bring the 1990-1993 civil war into discussion, not to 
negate the genocide, but to read political violence as an outcome of political power struggles 
between Hutu and Tutsi and to see it as part of a cycle of violence.
247
Chapter 5 will expand 
on the ‘history’ of Rwanda that is excluded in the ‘official narrative’, and further continue the 
work of contextualising the many truths that the post genocide state neglects. Badiou’s notion 
of recognising the ‘event’ means that it would “force us to decide on a new way of 
being”.
248
This project is not just for Rwanda, but also to place the question and process of 
ethics on the African continent, and African history as a matter of acute importance. Badiou’s 
s formulation of ‘truth’ is that it is a by-product, produced in the grounding of the ‘event’, 
which requires what he terms as “faithfulness”, and in this process ‘truth’ then emerges.
249
 
Depelchin’s formulations, with the assistance of Badiou, cannot be ignored in the Rwandan 
case, and as he rightfully recognises, it takes courage to pursue an ethical history that will 
produce the ‘truth’. 
 
4.11 Conclusion 
 
It is difficult to separate reconciliation from being a political act, especially under the 
traumatic circumstances that genocide incurs. The post-genocide power inherited a 
population where one group- the majority, turned on the other- the minority. Moreover, it 
inherited a population that has been historically governed by radically different narratives of 
the past, and naturalised into thinking justice, rights, citizenship, and power is the prerogative 
of the native Rwandan. Thus, the logic of post-genocide Rwanda is that it is acutely 
necessary to eradicate ethnicity and race, and through disciplining the hearts and minds of 
Rwandans, Rwanda can transition into a post-ethnic society. The paradox is that whereas as it 
practices ethnic amnesia, the Rwandan post-genocide power has institutionalised ethnic 
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discrimination, through law, politics and history. Its top-down strict governing of 
reconciliation, erodes public debate, and robs both Hutus and Tutsis of the opportunity to 
come together and engage their common tragic past. Whereas it criminalises thought and 
speech deemed as “divisionism” and “genocide denialism”, it has trivialised the genocide 
experience, and inscribed ‘guilt’, ‘perpetrator’, ‘prisoner’, ‘immorality’ and ‘genocidaire’ 
into the Hutu identity. To some extent, the Tutsi victim can affirm their identity through the 
acceptable ‘official narrative’ of their historical victimhood. They can try to use it to 
influence and make gains for citizenship and material benefits, which arguably the state 
encourages through ‘victims justice’. The contemporary relevance of Hutus is assigned to the 
private space. It is deeply concerning to see evidence from research studies, which provide 
records of imprisonment, economic conditions applied to their obedience, and acceptance of 
their ‘guilt’, as well as social shaming at commemorations, gacaca processes, and the re-
education programmes. These processes do little to make Hutus feel part of the unity project, 
and compromises their rights as citizens. What the regime fails to recognise, is that the 
imposed reconciliation project is devoid of being personally meaningful for the daily 
struggles that Rwandans face in rebuilding their lives. As in many post-conflict 
circumstances, Rwandans have been forced to live side by side with one another, and to 
make matters worse, the regime has burdened them by attaching social, economic, and 
political conditions to reconciliation. Rwandans are finding ways to interrogate the ‘victors 
truth’ (on the genocide and history) that has been sanctioned, and are exploring ways or 
making attempts to reconcile and live peacefully together, questioning the historical 
naturalisation of violence and meanings of Hutu and Tutsi. The work of Foucault and 
Depelchin put forth productive contributions for how we think about individual and 
community based reconciliation practices, and the role of power that governs knowledge and 
history writing. Their work also contributes to the broader problem that this dissertation 
problematizes, and that is the limitations and implications of ‘victors justice’ and ‘victims 
justice’. Finally, I would like to conclude that limitations of Rwanda’s reconciliation 
experience demonstrate the dilemmas of addressing narratives of the past, history, truth, 
political identities, justice, and power where there is long-established history of theses 
dilemmas being politicised. Thus, it is an incredibly difficult task, which Rwanda needs to 
think critically about what would be the significance of addressing, because they will bare 
uncomfortable truths, and how can individuals, society and the state go about placing these 
dilemmas in their historical contexts, and still be able to co-exist in an open space where their 
civil and political liberties are protected. 
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Chapter Five 
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter explores the challenges facing land reform in post-genocide Rwanda. A critical 
challenge for the prospects of democratisation and resolving the politicisation of identities is 
an improvement in the situation of ‘ordinary poor Rwandans’. In Rwanda, the ‘Land 
Question’ has played a central role in the political landscape. How it is framed and resolved 
will have an influence on food security, socio-economic stability, and on reconciliation and 
unity. In Rwanda, land has come to symbolise citizenship, justice, and who shall have the 
right to govern. Therefore, Rwanda’s land reform policy needs to be placed in its historical 
and political context. I trace land relations from pre-colonial to the colonial and post-colonial 
periods. I am particularly addressing the historical relationship between land, race (political 
identity), and the mode of power that has resulted in cycles of political violence. Important to 
the discussion, is how the colonial intervention reconstructed pre-colonial relations to pursue 
territorial conquests and exploitation of colonies. In order to govern the inhabitants of the 
territory, the Belgian colonialist inscribed race to constitute the population into a hierarchical 
system that would serve their mode of power, and maintain rule and order. For the ‘race 
ideology’ to be naturalised in the colonies, the colonialist used pre-colonial relations as a 
foundation to reconstruct the political identities. Hutu and Twa were seen as the indigenous 
groups that were characterised as being primarily agriculturalist and lacking ‘civilised’ traits. 
As primarily pastoralists, Tutsis were seen as being far more evolved and civilised ‘African 
Caucasians’, having migrated from elsewhere into ‘modern-day Rwanda’ and possessing 
traits of rule and governance. The cornerstone of colonial rule was to crystallize and legally 
enforce race onto the bodies of its subjects. Thus, it introduced a dual system of rule, 
‘customary law’ for Hutus and ‘civic law’ for Tutsis. The introduction of race marked the 
degradation of Hutu as an identity, and the genesis of Tutsi privilege. In the post-
independence regimes, politics and ethnicity continued to be racialised and were expressed in 
law as well as violence. With each round of violence, a new group was exiled, and their land 
and property would be taken over by those left behind. This repossession was facilitated by 
the state’s failure to transcend Hutu and Tutsi as political identities, and to pursue a mode of 
power that secured justice, citizenship, and rights for one group over another. In the aftermath 
of the genocide, the post-genocide regimes pledged to address the ‘land question’ through a 
comprehensive land reform policy, by eradicating ethnic identities, and addressing the rights 
and needs of all surviving Rwandans through non-discriminatory and anti-sectarian policies. 
With each period of state formation in Rwanda, land, identity, and power has been shaped by 
the politics of indigeneity. As I demonstrate in this chapter, land reform in Rwanda today 
continues to be tied to power, rights and citizenship, and as elites continue to secure their 
gains the regime expresses an obligation to the ‘old-caseload refugees’ and ‘returnees’, and 
institutions and practices mark out ‘victims’ and ‘perpetrators’. 
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5.2 Contextualising the ‘Land Question’ 
 
Rwanda is situated on the Albertine Rift, which means it is part of one of the most richly 
diverse bio-diversity systems in Africa. Rwanda itself is a very small territory that consists of 
water in abundance, marshes, and steep hilly slopes, which has earned it the name- ‘Land of 
a Thousands Hills’.
1
 Although there is an abundance of water, only half of Rwandans have 
access to clean and safe drinking water.
2
 Rwanda does not have any raw natural materials 
and relies on cattle farming and agriculture, specifically tea and coffee production, which has 
been a staple contributor to the economy. The vast majority (80%) of Rwandans are 
subsistence farmers, therefore land and agricultural policies are the most crucial policy in this 
agrarian society.
3
 At the “World Bank Conference on Land and Poverty”, Musahara et al, of 
the University of Rwanda, stated, “Land is related to poverty in many societies that depend 
on agriculture.”
4
 Rwandans have also relied on their farmed goods to provide for securing 
education fees, health care, food and water and various basic needs. Thus, for the ‘landless’ it 
means deprivation of human security, particularly food security.
5
 Land scarcity is also a 
crucial problem that informs policies in Rwanda. The National Institute of Statistics of 
Rwanda estimates that of the 23.338 square km’s of land available, only 1.4 million hectares 
(52%) is arable, but due to population density, 1.6 million hectares is being used.
6
 National 
Authorities and ‘foreign observers’ have focused on environmental capacity for 
accommodating a 25% population growth by 2050. Rwanda has always been troubled by 
over-population, over-cultivation and land scarcity, which is why the ‘land question’ (access, 
rights and ownership) is critically important for Rwandans and those who hold state-power. 
In predominantly agrarian societies, “land constitutes the territory of political entities” and 
“control of land is seen by many governments as critical to the influence they exercise over 
their populations and control of their nation’s economic development and security.”
7
 
Therefore, in agrarian societies, land becomes a ‘political resource’ and determines who 
remains in poverty and who develops from it. 
8
 
 
In the recent literature on ‘post-conflict reconstruction as conflict prevention’ and in 
transitional justice, land has been thought about within the framework of sustainable 
reconciliation and social justice through economic equality.
9
 This is central to the approach 
of the current post-genocide regime, which has pursued a robust pro-growth development 
policy as a foundation for reconciliation. A visit to Kigali, or to the Virunga National Park, 
can leave one with the impression that Rwanda is an “orderly calm country that is doing quite 
well”, but as Helen Hintjens points out, “appearances can be deceptive in this respect.”
10
In 
1998, there was a dominant shift from reliance on coffee and tea agricultural production to an 
economy and public sector “increasingly reliant on cross-border ‘rent-seeking’ economic 
activities, especially in the DRC, and development aid.”
11
 Since the genocide, this has shifted 
the foundations of wealth, which may have an impact on “efforts to tackle chronic and 
worsening rural poverty” which have become less urgent for those in power, and as Hintjens 
argues, “who depend on a much more extraverted pattern of resources accumulation than 
their predecessors.”
12
I discuss this in greater detail in Chapter 6. A critical problem today has 
been the shift to modernisation and urbanisation strategies, and the relocation of rural 
Rwandans to urban areas, which offer little job opportunities and has instead contributed 
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significantly to a rising ‘landless’ population. The benefits of growth (8% poverty reduction 
between 1995-2000) have effectively ‘bypassed’ the rural poor’, where food and asset 
vulnerabilities remain a widespread crisis in rural areas.
13
 
 
Land is also an important part of the Rwandan identities, and is central to social and cultural 
traditions in Rwanda. In a predominantly agrarian society, land is greatly linked to notions of 
‘territory, people, ancestors’, and remains a material reminder about the contested memories 
and experiences of the past, where land disputes, dispossession, and political violence play 
into the politics of indigeneity: who belongs and does not belong: who is citizen and who can 
be heard by the state.
14
Addressing the ‘land question’ also offers a way of acknowledging 
the past, is a means for healing, but also rendering some form of justice t one part of the 
population and re-affirming their citizenship.
15
 As I will demonstrate; in Rwanda, land is 
inextricably linked to state-formation, the emergence of national consciousness; political 
identity; and the relations between the ethnic groups, state-citizen and urban-rural. Land 
gives meaning to citizenship. Today the government seeks to address the historical divisions 
of labour and land rights that are marked by gender, and have successfully worked to secure 
women’s land rights and change exclusionary patriarchal practices in land rights. 
 
The relationship between land and conflict has been hotly debated in the literature on Rwanda. 
Alison des Forges articulates “Rwandan authorities and foreign observers all agree that there 
has been and remains a strong correlation between issues of land use and conflict: the present 
precarious situation poses the risk of potentially widespread violence.”
16
 
 
In the literature on the Rwandan genocide, a predominant explanation for why ‘ordinary 
Rwandans’ were driven to participate in eliminating Tutsi is the economic explanation- the 
‘resource crunch’. 
17
 The ‘resource crunch’ is said to be an outcome of rapid population 
growth, detrimental agricultural policy-changes, crash of coffee prices in late 1980s, severely 
diminished food production and the imposed Structural Adjustment programme. The rise in 
land scarcity is then understood to have antagonised the old-ethnic rivalry, which had been 
building-up over a decade long economic crisis, until the situation exploded due to 
manipulation by Hutu Power. 
18
The economic situation was dire, and was quickly 
escalating, during the time that President Habyarimana was pushing for internal political 
reforms (promoting multi-partyism and negotiating the return of refugees since 1959). 
Within this context, the question that became pertinent was “Who rules Rwanda?” And 
although there was an economic crisis, the response to this question was formulated by the 
politics of indigeneity, which has come to determine the mode of power, institutional rule 
(policies) citizenship rights and belonging. Haydee Bangerezako asserts “land and people 
become central in genealogy of power relations.”
19
 
 
The following section addresses the formulation of the ‘land question’ in Rwanda and how 
‘land reform’ has been shaped by the historical and political context of Rwanda. Thus, I 
will begin with the logic of colonialism, territorial conquests and the ideology of race. 
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 5.3 Territory, Conquest and Colonialism: ‘The Ideology of Race’ 
 
In the Great Lakes region, the contemporary mode of power, governance and policies 
continue to reproduce the notion of ‘indigeneity’ as a basis for claims on rights. This 
demonstrates the profound living memory and prolific political crisis engendered by the 
colonial regime. Pre-colonial social, economic, and political relations were drastically 
changed by the territorial conquests and economic imperial projects of the colonialist. The 
colonials used the pre-colonial social and economic relations and activities, as a 
foundation upon which to re-construct identities into ‘crystalized legally-enforced political 
identities’ which would enable them to govern.
20
This became the cornerstone of colonial 
rule. It had violently disrupted existing social links and traditional structures of African 
societies.
21
 Moreover, European philosophical underpinnings concerning race were 
exported into the colonies, and institutionalised distinctions between the native 
(‘primitive’, ‘colonised’, ‘indigenous’) populations pitted them against the ‘civilised’ 
“settlers”, “colonizers” of “European descent”.
22
 
 
It is important to address the ethnographic work of the colonialist, because land use and land 
tenure are inextricably linked to political identities and state-formation. Two popular views of 
Rwanda’s pre-colonial ethnic orientations have dominated analysis. These are: a. the view 
that sees “the people of Rwanda have common ancestors” and b. the primordialist view that 
operates along the Hamitic Hypothesis 
23
 
 
The pre-colonial European explorers were fascinated by Rwanda, and wished to investigate 
the level of sophistication in the Rwandan kingdom and its three groups of inhabitants.
24
 
Colonial scholars wanted to document the “centralised, stratified, ethnicised and “feudal” 
systems, which may or may not have been practicing exclusion.
25
 Felix Mukwiza 
Ndahinda argues that the work on physiology and anthropology, and their associated 
stereotypes and ‘supremacy myths’, became the “guiding hypotheses upon which the 
history of the country was reconstructed.”
26
 In Rwanda, the central argument made by the 
European missionaries and explorers was shaped by the Hamitic Hypothesis. 
 
The Hamitic Hypothesis inscribed myths which lent to the racialization of Hutu and Tutsi, 
and the Twa as political identities. Premised on a “biblical myth” the Hamitic Hypothesis 
asserts “descendants of Ham were Negro Africans. Though part of humanity-as descended 
from Noah-they were considered an accursed part, having descended from a cursed son of 
Noah.”
27
Colonial rivalries, such as the British, German, and Belgians, convinced 
themselves that “wherever in Africa there was evidence of organised state life, there the 
ruling groups must have come from elsewhere. These mobile groups were known as the 
Hamite, and the notion that they were the hidden hand behind every bit of civilisation on the 
continent was known as the Hamitic Hypothesis.”
28
 
 
Charles Gabriel Seligman wrote the key text on the Hamitic Hypothesis, called the Races of 
Africa. Seligman argues, Hamites are “ “Europeans” for they belong to the great branch of 
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mankind as the whites.”
29
British explorer, John Hanning Speke wrote, “I profess to describe 
naked Africa- Africa in those places where it has not received the slightest impulse, whether 
for good or evil, from European civilisation.”
30
Mamdani notes, it is in Speke’s writings that 
the Hamite became known as an African Caucasian, and colonialists worked to reconstruct 
them through a cultural identity, language, and the idea that unlike the ‘Negroes’ who were 
seen as agriculturalist, Hamites were regarded as pastoralist.
31
 Ndahinda notes that it is 
interesting that the first German explorer (and Governor of East Africa) Count Gustav Adolf 
von Goetzen could gather physical descriptions and a history of Rwanda and Burundi after an 
expedition that lasted only a few weeks.
32
However, Ndahinda does argue that this isn’t 
particularly surprising given that his predecessors has shared similar view of the ‘inferior 
tribe’ and ‘superior tribes’, who although hadn’t visited Rwanda and Burundi, has made 
assumptions based on their expeditions in East and Central Africa.
33
 
 
The primordial view was therefore that “Hutu and Tutsi are different people that originate 
from different parts of Africa…”
34
 This introduced the work of migrations and origins. The 
Tutsi were seen as predominantly pastoralist (tended to keep cattle), who as late-comers to 
the country (Tutsis) had gradually taken control from the Hutu through military force as well 
as a system of loaning cattle in return for labour.”
35
 Hutu and Twa were seen as being 
already present- indigenous groups, and primarily agriculturalist.
36
The Hutu and Twa were 
understood as having remained ‘stateless’ until the arrival of the Tutsi. This belief was taken 
up by colonial authorities and a number of colonial-era scholars which also wrote about the 
“physical differences between the Hutu and Tutsi (especially in terms of height, as well as 
the size and shape of noses and lips).”
37
 
 
Prolific Rwandan writer, Alexis Kagame “is seen as the source of the popularisation of the 
separate origins of Rwandans.”
38
 Kagame subscribed to the “long-lasting Hamitic 
interpretation of Rwanda’s ancient history.”
39
He wrote extensively on the pre-colonial 
uburetwa land-contract system, and has greatly influenced the RPF’s notion of ‘pre-colonial 
social harmony and Rwanda being a socially progressive nation.’ Kagame’s argument 
features in the justification of the RPF’s post-genocide military invasion into eastern-Congo, 
because Kagame’s map of ‘Tutsis expansive territorial influence’ includes parts of the 
Congo. Ndahinda asserts “His reconstruction of the history of Rwanda and reflections of 
Hutu, Tutsi and Twa identities in historical perspective are and amalgam of appropriated 
theories on African migrations-en vogue at the time-an esoteric code of the dynasty to 
which he had access to since he was born into a family of royal court historians.”
40
His work 
on theology (translated Bible into Kinyarwanda), linguistics (French and Kinyarwanda), 
philosophy and history, garnered him a great deal of respect from the European colonials, 
who considered Kagame to be the ‘intellectual leader on Tutsi culture and rights under the 
colonial system. 
 
The second dominant view tracing ethnic orientations, argues that Rwandans have “common 
ancestors” and “speak the same language, have lived together in the same communities, and had 
the same customary religious beliefs. The differences in height and physiology, according to this 
view, may be explained primarily through differentiated access to foods, 
 
147 
 
 
 
 
which came about through the specialisation of labour.”
41
 The RPF subscribes to this view 
in the ‘official narrative’, that pre-colonial Rwanda was ‘socially harmonious’, but does 
make a ‘class-based’ differentiation between Hutu and Tutsi. Hutu is associated to ‘client’ or 
‘servant’, whereby Tutsi is ‘patron’ and ‘master’.
42
 This pre-colonial notion also describes 
the “exchange of cattle for labour-ubuhake” as both parts of the patronage system, but which 
also allowed “people to cross class boundaries.”
43
 Colonial intervention thus becomes the 
tragic instigator of violence. 
 
The problem with this second view is that it understands state-formation as being a colonial 
construct. Secondly, it fails to respond to how prior to colonisation, Tutsis became associated 
with privilege, and for example in Kinyanga, ‘lineages that were wealthy in cattle and had 
connections with chiefs became known to be Tutsi.’
44
 Thus, there were socio-economic and 
‘partial ethnic’ constructions in identities, which were exploited during the colonial-
intervention and which re-constructed them into political identities. 
 
Musahara et al argue that both views tend to be overly simplistic, and problematically 
maintain the ‘search for origins’.
45
Both views fail to account for the complex picture of 
migrations. Briefly; a. “migrations may not be a single massive movement of people and may 
not be associated with conquest- it may be a protracted affair”; b. “any presumed migration 
of people may not necessarily be the only or the primary source of pastoralist livelihood 
strategies and not the only model of ‘statehood’ (Livestock keeping, perhaps on a small scale, 
may have been part of a basket of options employed by primarily agricultural people in the 
region for centuries); c. ‘an exchange of ideas and practices between communities is possible 
without migration or conquest’; and d. “many contemporary Rwandans man be the 
descendants of marriages between Hutu and Tutsi, although the idea of Hutu or Tutsi identity 
was maintained through patriarchal transmission of cultural identity.”
46
 
 
The following section of this chapter will investigate the historical process of state-
formation in Rwanda, and how race became institutionally embedded, which cast a political 
crisis for rights and citizenship in post-colonial Rwanda. The “land question’ demonstrates 
the profound effect of the ‘native (indigenous)/non-native’ dynamic. 
 
5.4 Tracing the Logic of Colonialism back to Europe 
 
To understand the insidious logic of the colonial imperial project, one needs to return to the 
political and historical context of politics in Europe, which shaped the policies in the 
colonies. I will turn briefly towards the work of Hannah Arendt. Arendt’s work is merited 
for reflecting on the ‘internal history of Europe’ and its wider history of global conquest and 
expansion.
47
 Importantly, Arendt demonstrates how “scientific racism” conceived ‘racist 
ideologies’ that constructed racial political identities and which underpinned institutions at 
home and in the colonies. Although Arendt focuses on German bureaucracy and the nation-
state, her contribution is useful for thinking about European expansion and the devastating 
political crisis it has had for the colonies and their ‘state-formation’. Furthermore, Arendt 
provides a descriptive analysis on the ‘decline of the European nation-states’ that led to 
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political crises which bore devastating impacts on its ‘citizens’, and which led to the 
final political outcome- the Nazi Holocaust. 
 
Hannah Arendt’s work in ‘Origins and Totalitarianism’ has re-examined the limitation, and 
what Arendt describes as the decline of the nation-state. Arendt argues that politics shifted 
from “the terms of established national territory” and the nation-state which was “based upon 
a homogenous population’s active consent to its government” towards patriotism that was 
founded on “money-making” and expansionist goals.
48
 ‘Conquest’ became the new political 
tool.
49
Arendt uses the rise in ‘Anti-Semitism’ in Europe and ‘Imperialism’ or colonial 
conquests through the South African case study of the Boers, to re-examine tyranny and 
totalitarianism, which bore the crisis that resulted in the German Holocaust. Through 
imperial conquests, the ‘bourgeoisie’ brought the economic structure and desired material 
accumulation, back to the nation-state in Europe for economic growth. However the ‘nation-
state as a political structure could not effectively “be expanded indefinitely, because it is 
based on the productivity of man, which is indeed unlimited. Of all forms of government and 
organisation of people, the nation-state is less suited for unlimited growth because the 
genuine consent at its base cannot be stretched indefinitely, and is only rarely, and with 
difficulty, won from conquered peoples.”
50
 
 
In the second part of ‘Origins of Totalitarianism’, Arendt discusses the effect WW1 had on 
the nation-state, particularly once the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman and Russian Empires 
were collapsing, rendering their heterogeneous populations into categories of “minorities” or 
the “stateless”. Arendt refers to these two groups as ‘victim groups’. The ‘minorities were 
addressed through the League of Nations Peace Treaties under the Minorities Treaties that 
worked with the pre-war definition of ‘nation-states’ and criteria for being a national. This 
treaty conferred that only post-war “nationals could be citizens, only people of the same 
national origin could enjoy the full protection of legal institutions, that persons of different 
nationality needed some law of exception until or unless they were completely assimilated 
and divorced from their origin.”
51
 Arendt thus argues that this shifted “the transformation of 
the state from an instrument of the law into an instrument of the nation.”
52
 
 
In the second part, ‘The decline of the Nation-state and End of the Rights of Man’, Arendt 
discusses the failure of Human Rights and Peace Treaties to protect the minorities and 
stateless, and a realisation of the nation-states inability to integrate or accept these stateless 
populations into the nation-state. This contributed to the formulation of the “Jewish 
Question” and what to do with the populations of refugees in Europe- “to get rid of the 
refugees”.
53
 Initially there were solutions through repatriations and naturalisation. Both 
conjured a ‘fear of the minorities and stateless’, for both the state, and the modernising 
economies, and the legislation that demarcates the nation-state prevented naturalisation. 
Moreover, states began to produce impressive administrative systems to regulate 
naturalisation, thus effectively even denaturalising some. This has been observed in the 
cases of Rwanda, Uganda and Congo. Arendt is interested in that which precedes the final 
act, in this case genocide, therefore, the “abolition of civil and political rights, the exclusion 
from public life, confiscation of property…”
54
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 It is important for this chapter to address Arendt’s second part, on Imperialism. Arendt 
argues that, “Two new devices for the political organisation and rule over foreign peoples 
were discovered during the first decades of imperialism. One was race as a principle of the 
body politics, and the other bureaucracy as a principle of foreign domination.”
55
 Arendt 
argues that without race the “scramble of Africa…might well have remained purposeless” 
and without “bureaucracy as a substitute for government, the British possession of India 
might well have been left to the recklessness of the ‘breakers of law’”.
56
 Thus, Arendt reads 
racism as a consequence of imperialism. 
 
Arendt reviews the imperial approaches of the French and British. The French attempted to 
“develop the body politic into an imperial political structure, “the French nation (was) 
marching…to spread the benefits of French civilisation”, they wanted to incorporate overseas 
possessions into the national body, by treating the conquered people as “both…brothers and 
subjects- brothers in the fraternity of a common French civilisation, and subjects in that they are 
the disciple of French light and followers of French leading.”
57
 The British opted not to 
incorporate the colonies into the British nation- “refraining from spreading British culture and 
law”, and instead, “…strengthened tremendously the new imperialist consciousness of a 
fundamental, and not just temporary, superiority of man over man, of the “higher” over the 
“lower breeds.”
58
 Arendt further writes that “despite their genuine respect for the natives as 
people, and in some cases even their love for them…almost to a man, do not believe that they are 
or ever will be capable of governing themselves without supervision…the natives could not but 
conclude that they were being excluded and separated from the rest of mankind.”
59
 Genocide, 
such as the case of the Herero population in the German colony of South West Africa, has been 
overlooked as the grounds of “colonial warfare”, which served as an experimental ground for 
‘race’ and power.
60
 Arendt’s use of “savages” to describe the South African Boer encounter, has 
rightfully earned her widespread critique. 
 
Arendt writes, before there is ‘racism’ there is ‘race-branding’. The colonial project shifted ‘race’ 
from a “marginalised” preoccupation to “widespread expression in nineteenth-century European 
thought, from natural sciences and philosophy to anthropology and politics.”
61
 Therefore, race is 
utilised in organising power and asserting it on the defined subject and enemy. Race branding 
was “nurtured in the colonies”
62
 through ‘bureaucratic administration’, which introduced second-
class citizens and the ‘enemy’, and for Arendt, the constitution of the Jewish people, amongst 
other minorities, as a race that were set apart from the ‘Europeans’.
63
 Mamdani argues “To 
identify the link between biology and culture, between the language of race and civilisation, is to 
fill the shaded transition from Republicanism as home to a full-bodied imperialism abroad. Born 
of internal class crisis, the race idea took full form in the context of an external imperial crisis. 
Race spread from marginal to a mainstream doctrine…Race became the marker dividing 
humanity into a few subhuman and the rest less human, the former civilised, the latter putty for a 
civilizational project.
64
Moreover, Mamdani argues that the centuries-long trans-Atlantic slave 
trade further racialised the African continent, fuelling the Hamitic Hypothesis. The trans-Atlantic 
slave trade divided Africa as ‘above the Sahara’ from ‘the below’, and as Georg Wilhelm 
Friedrich Hegel asserts the  
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‘North Africa’ was understood as “Africa Proper” (“European Africa”) which attached the ‘land 
of the Nile’ to Eurasia.
65
 Arendt demonstrates that “Although the race idea found free reign in 
the colonies, Europe was the land of its conception, its prehistory, as it was of its culmination.”
66
 
By locating the ‘racialising policies’ of the European colonials in their historical political context, 
Arendt’s contribution supports Mamdani’s argument that the ‘Rwandan genocide must be 
thought through within the logic of colonialism’; and the politics of indigeneity that has had a 
violent impact on Rwanda since the colonial intervention. 
 
5.5 State- Formation in Rwanda: Land, Race and Power. 
 
Catherine Newbury asserts “Studies of Rwanda often assume that before the arrival of 
Europeans, Rwandan state power extended uniformly to most (or all) regions of the 
kingdom.”
67
However, upon closer investigation, it is apparent that there were diverse 
socio-economic and political relationships that require exploration of how centralisation 
came about, as well as the rise of Tutsi power. 
 
The ‘social order’ that describes Rwanda and Burundi from the 15
th
 Century, is called 
Ubukhake, and it often compared to European feudalism. A chief historical distinction is 
made, which notes Hutus have been primarily agriculturalists and Tutsis have been cattle 
farmers/pastoralist. There was a “quasi-feudal contract”, which produced a “pastoral 
servitude”, whereby the local patron was usually a Tutsi who would make the usage of cattle 
and land available to a client, usually a Hutu.
68
The Tutsi monarchy used the Uburetwa 
system for land distribution, but it was the igikingi system (central, southern and eastern part 
of ‘modern-day Rwanda’) that came to centralise control of land.
69
 Land could be granted 
through ‘cattle-owning lineage’ or by a “political authority”.
70
 Hutus in the northwest of 
Rwanda refused to submit to the igikingi system. Chris Huggins notes, in the northwest, 
“heads of customary ‘landowning’ lineages” dominated rural rights and “enjoyed 
considerable power over farmland rights of those local people who were not members of 
their lineages.”
71
 The other important system is the ubukonde, which referred to land that 
had been kept in family lineages (passed on from father to son) and was the status of 
abakonde and abagererwa. This land was not given by a political authority.
72
 
 
Prior to colonialism, there was both a political connection to the land and an important 
network of personal relationships in respect to land management. People of one kin shared 
the land, but held in high respect the one who cleared the land (abakonde), and those who 
could authorise members who do not belong to the kin (abagererwa) to make use of the land. 
73
 Land served as binding in kinship, and provided an opportunity to move between lineages 
through marriage and patronage systems. 
74
 The patron-client relationships regarding land 
have become a prototype through which “political authorities” have assumed their roles in the 
evolution of the modern Rwanda state. 
 
Hutu and Tutsi, as identities, arose from “state formation and changes in control over land 
and livestock.”
75
 The system of patronage introduced pre-colonial classism and privileges, 
which has led to the Tutsi identity being more advanced conceptually, than Hutu. A ‘Tutsi  
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identity’ began to emerge by the fifteenth century, as “microstates” governed by Hutu and 
Tutsi chiefs began to be incorporated into a larger Tutsi kingdom.
76
 Towards the seventeenth 
century, traditional practices began to change, as rulers of land (umwami) started to assert 
the “use of force, persuasion and an apparent control over spiritual power to establish his 
right to rule over increasingly large areas.”
77
 Umwamis developed a system of power-
relations, which considered inclusion based on adherence to the umwami. As the role of the 
umwami grew in Rwandan society through the nineteenth century, both Hutus and Tutsis 
“contested” the control of land by the umwami, as well as his claim to land and coercive 
governance. 
78
The umwami was always a Tutsi, and through cattle ownership, so were many 
of his ‘subordinates’, but both Hutus and Tutsis served in his armies.
79
 The umwami’s 
‘subordinates’ could be required to also serve in his ‘courts’, guard his cattle or cultivate his 
crops.
80
In Rwanda today, there are two versions of history that narrate this period. The Tutsi 
version narrates that “Tutsi privilege was exclusively a colonial creation” and that they too 
were victims of the Umwami’s despotic system. The Hutu narrative argues “Tutsi privilege 
is as old as the presence of Tutsi on Rwandan soil.” 
81
 
 
King Rwabugiri was a Tutsi King who institutionalised a feudal system in the nineteenth 
century, in which Tutsis were semi-autonomous and Hutus had to “exchange labour for land 
owned mainly by Tutsis”.
82
 This refers to the uburetwa system. If one did not perform their 
‘uburetwa’ they could risk losing land. Only Hutus had to provide unpaid labour. 
83
This set 
the foundation for Hutus to be regarded as second-class citizens that produced a mass 
peasantry population, and which became a system of the ‘powerful and powerless’. In 
describing the effect of Rwabugiri’s reforms, Mamdani argues that at the turn of the century, 
this marked “the starting point of a process with two related outcomes, the degradation of 
the Hutu and genesis of Tutsi privilege.”
84
 
 
When King Rwabugiri died, many of his supporters had broken away from the monarchy, 
and against the wishes of the royal court, had formed their own constituencies. This led to a 
tenuous relationship between society and the role of the ‘kingdom’, through which colonial 
intervention could take advantage of. Yuhi V. Musinga acceded King Rwabugiri. The 
legitimacy of Musinga’s monarchy and kinship was called into question upon the arrival of 
the German colonial conquest, which lasted 18 years. The Germans relied on the pre-
colonial system of governance in Rwanda, and did very little for modernisation of the state 
or centralisation of the regime. It did have profound effect, in that it provided ‘military 
assistance’ to Musinga who was fighting a northern-uprising.
85
 Des Forges states, “The 
northerners were resisting demands that they provide labour service to the umwami’s 
representatives in return for the right to cultivate land that they regarded as their own.”
86
It is 
important to note that it was in this period, that Europeans became ‘obsessed’ with race, 
which encouraged Germans to assert that Tutsi were a “superior ruling class” that owes to 
their Hamitic origins. 
 
Belgian Colonials were entrusted with the state in 1945. With the introduction of the Belgian 
colonial rule came the expansion of Tutsi authority over predominantly Hutu areas. Des Forges 
asserts, “the colonial administration, were hoping to make what they regarded as an 
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admirable political system more responsive to their direction” and “eliminated competing 
political authorities, leaving ordinary Rwandans increasingly obliged to heed the orders of the 
officials imposed by the umwami with colonial approval.”
87
 
 
Whilst the Belgian colonials continued to make use of umwami’s they also encouraged 
Tutsi chiefs to take over areas that were self-governed, thus challenging local Hutu Chiefs 
who attempted to remain independent, particularly in the northwest.
88
 The “colonial regime 
consciously attempted to integrate the political authorities and ‘customary’ practices into the 
colonial economy” which changed the pre-colonial meaning of the uburetwa and ubuhake 
system.
89
 For example, prior to colonialism there were instances where Tutsi were clients in 
the ubuhake system, but with colonial intervention the colonisers turned the institution into 
one of complete Tutsi domination of Hutu.
90
 Using Tutsi chiefs, the colonial administration 
exploited the system of forced labour to meet their quota, which fulfilled their gains through 
economic production of agriculture (i.e. coffee).
91
 Legally, only Hutus were made to 
provide labour. Secondly, the colonial administration ‘codified certain practices having to 
do with land and cattle, transferring customary practices- or what they took to be customary 
practices- into written law’.
92
 Colonials governed the dual land system and together with 
foreigners had the greatest opportunity to access and own land. There was opportunity for 
some “politically-powerful Tutsi” to take advantage of Belgian laws and acquire large tracts 
of land that previously belonged to Hutus.
93
 
 
It is through these practices that the colonial administration corrupted the former political 
and socio-economic relations to the territory, where personal relationships played a role in 
the politics of land. Moreover, we begin to see the Hamitic Hypothesis used to both racialise 
and naturalise a hierarchy of identities. 
 
Pamphile Sebahara argues it was the coloniser who first introduced the term “ethnie” to refer 
to Hutus, Tutsi and Twa.
94
 Etymologically speaking, the term ‘ethnic’ derives from the 
Greek term- ‘ethnos’, which means people or nation.
95
Once it entered the French language in 
1896, its popular definition postulates “a language, an area, customs, values, a name, a shared 
lineage and an awareness on the part of its members that it belongs to the same group.”
96
The 
Belgian administration used the differing uses of land and social relations to inform their 
understanding of these ethnic groups, and to shape their policies in order to assert their power 
and exploitation of resources. They legally were formalised as racial categories through the 
introduction of reforms between 1926-1936. In Kinyarwanda Rubanda Nyamwinshu became 
the translation of the Hamitic Hypothesis; it means ‘the majority of the population- the 
ordinary folk’ (Hutus). 
97
 This term provides the basis upon which the Belgian colonials 
turned the “Hamitic racial supremacy from an ideology into an institutional fact by making it 
the basis of changes in political, social, and cultural relations.”
98
The administrative reforms 
of institutions were comprehensive, and made use of ‘taxation, education and the Church’ to 
breath life into these constructed political identities. Sebahara argues that the colonials made 
use of writings and reports from missionaries and explorers, who described the Tutsi with 
characteristics of superiority.
99
 Jean-Pierre Chretien asserts ‘the “social manipulation” 
enacted by colonisers, who were informed by missionaries, was “based on the axes:  
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feudalism, racial policy and cultural segregation.”
100
Tutsis were defined within the 
‘civilising mission of the colonial state’, thus the Belgians saw the Tutsis as a racial category, 
and not ethnic. 
101
 
 
European racial prejudices observed and managed to convince themselves that “Tutsi ruled 
Rwanda because of some genetic superiority associated with race.”
102
 Thus, Tutsis became 
the settler race, which carried a connotation of being “civilised”, and was therefore 
“written into civil law, enforced by the central state”.
103
 Through this perception of being 
‘civilised’ by the colonial state, Tutsis gained a ‘civic identity’ and became citizens 
(members of the central state). The colonial administration set up the ‘Native Authorities’, 
which would govern the ‘natives’ (the indigenous populations- Hutu and Twa) through 
‘customary law’. The difference, to other colonial experiences, is that Hutus ‘were not 
ruled by their own chiefs but by Tutsi chiefs’, thus producing “bipolar racial identities, and 
not plural ethnic identities.”
104
 This also produced a ‘Tutsi administration’ and “governing 
class”.
105
Bangerezako argues that Belgian governance “led to a thorough elimination of 
Bahutu leaders during that period. Tutsi rule was naturalised.”
106
 
 
At the moment of independence, all ‘chefs de chefferies’ of land were Tutsis, and of the 559 
sub-chiefs, 544 were Tutsis.
107
 These chiefs were also only derived from two Tutsi clans. 
Moreover, despite segregation, Hutus and Tutsi were not territorially segregated, but they 
continued to live within the same space under racially segregated 
institutions.
108
Bangerezako notes, “Instead of a decentralised despotism (or indirect rule), 
with tribalised identities of Hutu and Tutsi having different ethnic homelands with their own 
native authorities and customary laws, it was rather a racialised, centralised despotism 
within a single political and legal space.”
109
 
 
Tutsi became local adjuncts or instruments of indirect colonial rule. Umwamis, unknowingly or 
not, were the messengers for colonial power, as they had the ‘power’ to violently distribute and 
“dispossess” land from the ‘disobedient’- which included Tutsis, but predominantly Hutus. 
110
 
This set a precedent in later land reforms, were dispossession was legalised. Over time, small 
farmers began to be taxed and Hutus became the labourers for both the colonialist and 
Tutsi.
111
Thus the monetization of the economy, taxation and labour becomes the first colonial 
reform. The second reform was to make use of the Catholic Church, which was complicit in 
racialising the identities. Clark notes that the mission schools run by the Catholic authorities 
“recruited almost exclusively the sons of Tutsi notables for education, which was the main 
vehicle for maintaining social superiority.”
112
 The colonial administration would invest into 
skills development and education of Tutsis, which developed Tutsi leaders for the administration 
and lent to a rising Tutsi consciousness. Moreover, history books that were written at the time 
“scientifically” confirmed the differences between races, and were foundational to the subject 
matter of textbooks (migration and origins, physiological differences…) used in schools, which 
also contributed to “ethnic consciousness”.
113
 The final administrative act (third reform) to 
‘crystalize’ these political identities, was to introduce racial identification cards in 1933. In 
addition to genealogy and physiognomy, the identity 
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cards introduced a ‘wealth differentiation’, because it classified ‘anyone with 10 cows 
or more’ as a Tutsi.
114
This administrative census classified the entire population. 
 
John F. Clark refers to Rwanda as the ‘land of two nationalisms’, that of Rwandan Hutu 
nationalism and Rwandan Tutsi nationalism.
115
Clark argues that the colonial project, 
created a political crisis, whereby Hutu and Tutsi became two dual-nations within Rwanda 
“communities of people organised around the idea of self-determination”, by nationalism, 
Clark defines it as “the pursuit-through argument of other activity-of a set of rights and 
privileges for the self-defined members of the nation, including minimum, territorial 
autonomy or independence.
116
The fundamentals of the Tutsi identity “have included the 
groups distinctive ethnic origins, economic role, and political institutions, including the 
mwamiship and the chieftaincy.”
117
Clark asserts, as important as these socio-political 
distinctions are, it is the myths and stereotypes that have given them depth- further 
meaning.
118
Although a ‘Tutsi consciousness’ only emerged around Independence, there 
was an established Tutsi association to power and the monarchy. In response to the 
physiological difference, Clark asserts that by the time the European fanaticism around race 
arrived in Rwanda (20
th
 Century) it had largely been obliterated through “intermarriages, 
“caste changing” and other forms of ethnic mixing.”
119
Similarly, cultural practices and 
beliefs have been blended over time. Therefore, it is the political function of the Tutsi in 
Rwanda, which formulates the emergence of a Tutsi identity.
120
The ubuhake was an 
important socio-economic institution that introduced “pastoral servitude” and a Tutsi 
patron-Hutu client relationship. Socio-economic functions and institutions shaped political 
control and ethnic differences. As already discussed, it is also in this moment that Hutus 
were constructed as a “subject identity alongside Tutsi as an identity of power.”
121
 
Mamdani argues “The colonial reforms of 1926-1936 racialised the Tutsi identity and 
“hardened Tutsi privilege into a crust, giving it an apartheid-like quality.”
122
 It would 
symbolise the degradation of Hutu identity, and the genesis of Tutsi privilege, and later 
serve to formulate justice for Hutus as being a native prerogative. Tutsi was underlined by 
its privileged relationship to power and its preferential treatments “whether as part of power, 
in proximity to power, or simply to be identified with power.”
123
 These colonial reforms 
would prove to have a profound impact on the post-colonial state. 
 
Since the introduction of the colonial-economy, Hutus have seen themselves as the “original 
inhabitants of the Rwandan territory, as opposed to immigrants from a different past; in 
economic terms; their lives have been more associated to clientage and agricultural work, rather 
than patronage and cattle herding.”
124
Clark argues that because of their overall subordination in 
society, Hutus have had little opportunity to develop any sense of collective Hutu consciousness, 
even as victims, until late in Rwanda’s colonial history.
125
 However there is an important 
exception, which is that in the peripheral regions of Rwanda, there are cases where Hutu chiefs 
maintained their independence well into the colonial period.
126
It is also important to note that 
there was a large sect of the Tutsi population that was excluded from the superior-Tutsi 
socialisation but were seen as the “oppressors of the majority”, which would later serve anti-
Tutsi violence because of this association.
127
The disenfranchisement 
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and exploitation of the Hutu majority, led to Hutus seeing themselves as victims of 
‘dual colonialism’ by the Belgian Colonials and the Tutsi foreigners. 
 
The ‘dual nationalist identities’ converged in the anti-colonial debate that preceded the 1959 
Social Revolution. Between 1953-1962, Tutsi continued to dominate in the higher levels of 
chiefdoms and a small group of Tutsi elites became advisors to the colonial administration. 
Clark argues that during this time “as in every other case in colonial Africa, a small taste of 
power only whetted the appetites of those selected for more significant roles in their state 
governments…By the end of the decade, the Tutsi elites had developed in classical 
anticolonial fashion, a sense of entitlement to power, and pressures for immediate 
independence began.”
128
In Chapter Two I discussed in length the shift in colonial support of 
Tutsi power to come after Independence, towards Hutu sympathy (based on Hutu being the 
indigenous majority), which allowed the Hutu national consciousness to advance. 
Furthermore, whereas the Second World War was impressionable in constituting racist 
ideologies and the notion of the ‘superior/master race’, its devastating impact (German-
Holocaust) served as a hard-lesson that demonstrated the disastrous effects of such a 
political doctrine. 
129
 
 
Hutu consciousness could only emerge, once it raised “consciousness of Hutu oppression 
among the literate class of new Hutu elites,” which began by taking over the leading 
Kinyarwanda language paper, the Kimanyateka.
130
 Secondly, a consciousness emerged 
through the philosophical mapping of the Bahutu Manifesto. The Bahutu Manifesto 
highlighted the “Social aspects of the Racial Problem”, and demanded “reforms in favour of 
the Mahutu population subjected to the ‘Hamite monopoly on other races which had 
inhabited the country earlier and in greater numbers.”
131
The manifesto was a direct assault 
on the “feudal” economic system, and served to formulate the idea that justice would mean 
establishing the state as a Hutu republic, and securing rights for the majoritarian as a means 
of correcting the subjugation of Hutus and widespread inequality.
132
 This signalled that the 
Hutu elite had bought into the fiction of race, which was naturalised through colonial law. 
 
5.6 The Inherited Colonial Legacy: Who Shall Govern the Land? 
 
The ‘1959 Social Revolution’, or ‘Muyaga’ as it is known in Kinyarwanda, was about 
overthrowing the colonial administration and the Tutsi Monarchy, and seeking justice from 
the Tutsis as a ‘alien race’.
133
It would demonstrate the affect that colonialism had by 
racialising political identities; legalising them; and naturalising them. Secondly, as 
Mamdani asserts, “This had a crucial social effect: neither kwihutura (the social rise of an 
individual Hutu to the status of a Tutsi) nor gucupira (the social fall from a Tutsi to a Hutu 
status) was any longer possible.”
134
Thirdly, it would mark the rise of a nationalist Hutu 
debate that rejected the status of Hutu subjectivity and the association of Tutsi identity with 
power, and assert the indigeneity of Hutus as a means to address past injustices and 
victimisation under colonial and Tutsi rule. 
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The ‘Revolution’ lasted less than two years. Hutu nationalism was enunciated by the 
ideology of ‘democratic-majoritarianism’. President Gregoire Kayibanda made little attempt 
to develop a unified civic identity- a ‘Banyarwanda national identity’, and instead he 
focused on defending the interests of the Hutu nation (or as he referred to as “nation-
protecting”), as well as protecting the “sovereignty” of the territory by quashing any internal 
or external threat to the Hutu-territory.
135
The conceptualisation of Kayibanda’s nationalism 
was demonstrated in 1972, when a genocidal massacre of Hutus in Burundi, led Kayibanda 
to extend a welcome to Hutu refugees, and he openly proposed his ambition to support 
Burundian Hutus in seizing control and power of Burundi.
136
 
 
The top priority of Kayibanda’s regime was to abolish the Tutsi monarchy and replace it with 
a Hutu Republic (the Hutu Nation). This drastically altered the “ethnic composition of the 
ruling group…as Hutu leaders, members of the majority (but formerly subordinate) group, 
replaced earlier Tutsi rulers.”
137
Interestingly, Kayibanda maintained the land distinction 
held “under customary laws and that held under written laws.”
138
The first Rwandan 
Constitution (1962) also demonstrated that Kayibanda maintained the centralisation of land 
regulation. The Constitution stated; “codified land regulations, declaring that occupied lands 
would remain in the occupants’ possession; that possession of all presently unoccupied land 
would vest in the state; that the state claimed ownership of all land, occupied and 
unoccupied…”
139
Most noticeable in the constitution was the sentiment behind dismantling 
the system of ‘igikingi’, which had governed land that was reserved for Tutsi chiefs and the 
monarchy for cattle pastures.
140
 The regime also eradicated forced labour of Hutus. Gerard 
Prunier notes that by the 1960s “…the new burgomaster were quickly picking up the old 
habits of ‘feudal’ rule and were creating their own Hutu clienteles on the Tutsi model.”
141
 
 
An attempt at land reform that would benefit the Hutu peasantry was thwarted by a rapidly 
developing Hutu elite, which introduced new forms of patronage. Patronage corrupted systems of 
local administration and maintained land in a centralised system, which was misused for socio-
economic and political gains.
142
 Jamie Crook argues, “The 1962 Constitution laid the foundation 
for Rwanda’s present parallel system of formal and local-customary land regulation. Unlike a 
common law system, in which judges look to prior case law to fill gaps in existing statutory and 
constitutional law, under Rwanda’s parallel legal system, adjudicators are not bound by prior 
judicial interpretations of local customary law.” 
143
Majority of land was governed through ‘local 
customary law rather than formal law.’
144
 The ‘flexibility’ of the parallel-legal system, allowed 
for the arbitrary application of local customary land law, especially during the pogroms of anti-
Tutsi violence between 1959-1994.
145
 It also effected some Hutus, as Clark notes, the Hutu 
chiefs in the north who were previously independent, now found themselves ‘disempowered’ by 
the “modern” nationalism of Kayibanda and other educated Hutu elites in Rwanda’s central 
regions.
146
 Hutus in the north were more connected to peasant populations, and it is in the north 
were as Lemarchand argues “the earliest and strongest reaction” against Tutsi supremacy 
emerged.
147
 
 
When Habyarimana overthrew Kayibanda in 1973, there was a marked shift in the political 
terrain, because the Second Republic had to address both Tutsi nationalism and competing 
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Hutu political clans vying for power. Habyarimana had relative control of the political 
situation until the mid-198-s. Jamie Crooke describes Habyarimana’s reign as the “abuse of 
discretionary power in land allocation…and actively promoted inter-ethnic hostility and the 
withholding of land and other vital resources from Tutsis.”
148
Moreover, Habyarimana also 
consolidated power, at the expense of southern Hutus and Hutus from other clans, which 
further disrupted land use patterns and social cohesion.
149
 To expand on Crookes 
observation, Habyarimana also continued to retain the identity cards, which together with the 
quota system encouraged Hutus to believe that the republic still favoured them at the expense 
of the Tutsi. 
 
Since Independence, both Republics have emphasised that Rwanda was a territory belonging 
to the Hutu nation. State-sponsored violence against Tutsis, has taken place since 1959, 
which has led to hundreds and thousands of Tutsis fleeing Rwanda. The government took 
possession of that land property and distributed it amongst Hutu local residents, encouraging 
them to use it towards building a political base for Hutu politics.
150
 This land and property 
is commonly referred to in Kinyarwanda as “amasambu ya demokrasi” – “plots of 
democracy”, and has remained a stain on the memory of those Tutsi victims who lost their 
land. 
151
Des Forges states, “Those who benefited from this distribution of property counted 
their new holdings as part of ‘the gains of the revolution’ (les acquis de la revolution).”
152
 
 
Mr Claude Rubeka is the son of Francois Rubeka, the chairman of the outlawed political 
party, Union Nationale Rwandaise (UNAR).
153
 When Francoise Rubeka passed away in 
exile, Claude Rubeka, who lives in exile in Canada, took over the interim management of 
the party, which was negotiating a return for refugees and political participation in Rwanda. 
In response to the quota system of the Second Republic (discussed in Chapter two), Claude 
Rubeka states: 
 
“Today, the country is governed according to the laws of ethnic percentages…. it is high time 
old ethnic rivalries were set aside and everyone worked together for national reconciliation. 
Mr Habyarimana’s regime is a real apartheid system…the government has imposed a 5% 
quota on Tutsis serving in the civil service. Aside from a single officer, the Army has no 
Tutsis. Moreover, every Rwandan citizen has to carry an identity card on which the ethnicity 
of the bearer must be mentioned. We strongly object to this idea of identity cards, as they are 
used for repression.”
154
 Rubeka continues to share the experience of Tutsi citizens, by 
stating, “[a] Tutsi citizen has no political right, no freedom of expression. He does not even 
have the right to read the newspapers published by his compatriots in exile. Nor does he have 
the right to receive visits from family members coming from abroad. The government has 
repeatedly said that there is no place in Rwanda for the two million Rwandans in exile.”
155
 
 
The Rwandan Ambassador to Canada, Mr Joseph Nsengiyumva, responded to Rubeka’s 
statement, by stating, “The demographic pressure makes it difficult to find any solutions to 
the refugee problem….” He continues, by pointing out the grim statistics of Rwanda’s 
poverty levels, lack of growth in agriculture and land scarcity. Ambassador Nsengiyumva 
also stated that UNAR is viewed with ‘suspicion’, it is “an offspring of the Rwandan feudal 
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system, which is remembered with fear…although the minority won and established a 
political system based on the monarchy, the exclusive preserve of important Tutsi families, 
the majority of Hutu harvesters were completely politically and economically 
enslaved…”.
156
 This conversation took place in 1989, as Habyarimana was proposing 
internal reforms (multi-party democracy and against the critique of Tutsis being 
reconstructed as an ethnic group) and was negotiating the return of refugees and 
naturalisation, with the government of Uganda. 
 
Between 1973 to the late-1980s Habyarimana did introduce progressive economic policies 
and maintain relevant political stability, with few incidences of anti-Tutsi violence. During 
the first decade of rule Habyariman made significant improvements “in the development of 
infrastructure (roads in particular), in the expansion of schools and health centres, in 
reforestation programs, and in an attempt to promote increased agricultural production.”
157
 
This led to increased economic growth in the 1960’s/1970s, which was acutely necessary 
given that the population grew from 1 million in the colonial era to 8 million in the 1970’s. 
Habyarimana also introduced ‘compulsory labour every Sunday’ which entailed tilling the 
land to eradicate soil degradation, but also to initiate reconciliation between Hutu and 
Tutsi. This was called “umuganda”.
158
A second policy was “paysannat”, which was a 
forced villagisation programme that resettled Rwandans.
159
 By 1978, more than 800 000 
people were resettled in ‘arable areas’, thus providing land for peasants and the landless.
160
 
On the contrary, Habyarimana’s policies also contributed to the plight of the rural 
population and compromised land ownership rights. 
 
In 1976 the state introduced a decree-law, which recognised “state power over land in its first 
articles: it stipulated that all land not appropriated according to written law belonged to the state, 
whether occupied or not and whether encumbered or not by customary rights.”
161
This 
centralisation of control over land led to many Rwandans (both Hutu and Tutsi) having to sell 
land off in order for money for basic expenses such as health care or education.
162
 By the 1980s 
it became clear that the process of land concentration had accelerated through unregistered sales, 
and most of the land was owned by the government, commerce, or aid industry, and was not 
being used for full-time agriculture.
163
 The rise in aid and development from the international 
community bore little benefits for the rural poor, whose private land was dispossessed, with the 
promise that it would be used for development.
164
The 1979 law on expropriation continued the 
distinction between land held under written law and that held under customary rules.
165
Elites 
who originated from the northwest, who were connected to Habyarimana, were illegally 
acquiring land and distributing it to locals to reduce poverty, which resulted in social exclusion 
and animosity, particularly from southern-Hutus who viewed the regime and northern-Hutu elites 
with suspicion.
166
 
 
Rwanda’s history of land occupation and dwindling land entitlements has been greatly 
affected by population pressure and continuous migration, before, during and after 
colonialism. Johan Pottier argues, “Throughout the twentieth century, family farms in 
Rwanda decreased, a process accompanied by deepening poverty.”
167
Whereas, after 
Independence an estimated 110-120 inhabitants lived per km ², and by 1970 that same hill  
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was supporting 280-290 inhabitants, which had a profound impact on food production.
168
By the 
1990s there was virtually no arable land left to claim. 1988 marked the rapid deterioration  
of the economy. In addition there was an influx of refugees from Burundi, and an ‘official 
ban placed on food imports’.
169
By the 1990s the economy was in a dire state due to the 
 
imposed structural adjustment program (compromised Rwanda’s sovereignty), increased 
taxes, devaluation of the currency, and most importantly, the 1990 October invasion led to an 
estimated 40% of the national budget being diverted to military resources to fight the 
RPF.
170
 In the context of this chronic crisis, the question of “who rules Rwanda?” became 
pertinent, and gave way to the rise of ‘Hutu Power’, who would redefine Tutsis back to being 
an ‘ethnic category- the settler race and ‘enemy’ in Rwanda. 
 
Central to the claims of ‘Hutu Power’ was that Rwanda was Hutu-territory, and they 
threatened Tutsis to return to ‘their homeland’ in Ethiopia.
171
 Once ‘re-ethnicised’ the threat 
to kill was demonstrated in Bugesera, where “landless Hutu from the north-west had 
resettled.”
172
Hutu Power encouraged the landless Hutus to massacre 300 Tutsis, and any 
members of opposition. In November 1992, following Bugesera and leading up to further 
Tutsi massacres in Gisenyi prefecture, Vice-President Leon Mugesera incited the Hutu 
majority to “eliminate all Tutsi and everyone opposed to Habyarimana…Your country is 
Ethiopia…and we shall soon send you back via the Nyaborongo river on an express 
journey.”
173
 During the civil war, there was a widely held view that the RPF’s invasion 
facilitated the return of the Tutsi diaspora (since 1959) ready to overthrow the state, and that 
they were “overstaying their stay.”
174
 Politics returned to a preoccupation with justice for the 
Hutu indigenous majority, but as it has since the Revolution, it evolved into seeking revenge 
for past injustices and victimisation of Hutus by foreigners. 
 
5.7 The Politics of Indigeneity and the ‘Right of Return’ to Rwanda 
 
The emergence of ‘Hutu Power’ and Habyarimana’s reversal in policies to maintain power 
reached a feverish intensity, and it must be thought within the crisis that was taking place 
within Rwanda and Uganda. Secondly, the October 1990 RPF invasion “needs to be 
understood as a confluence of a dual crisis of postcolonial citizenship, in both Rwanda and 
Uganda.”
175
 
 
Indigeneity has become a central issue in Uganda, as it has in Rwanda since 1959. Both 
regimes shared the colonial experience, where the non-indigenous was privileged over the 
indigenous, and similarly both post-colonial regimes, pursued to turn this logic on its head, 
by privileging the indigenous over the non-indigenous
176
 
 
Since 1959, Tutsi Rwandans have fled Rwanda, seeking refuge in Burundi, Uganda, Zaire, and 
Tanzania due to the anti-Tutsi pogroms and exclusion of political rights. By the 1980s the Great 
Lakes Region had a bulging refugee crisis, of which the Banyarwanda were caught up as a non-
indigenous minority. The Great Lakes region shared the political inheritance of the colonial 
state, but each state differs in how it takes up the post-colonial task of deracialising civil law and 
de-ethnicising customary rights and law. Whereas the post- 
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colonial states in the region recognised the settler and eradicated it by deracialising civic 
citizenship, the failure has been to transcend the ‘native’ identity by seeing it as a colonial 
construct. Thus the ‘native’ category continues to be reproduced in post-colonial states.
177
 
 
The term ‘Banyarwanda’ in the Great Lakes Region applies to a cultural identity, because the 
group speaks Kinyarwanda. Within Uganda, the Banyarwanda are sub-divided into nationals 
(those who came prior to 1910 western borders); migrants (cultural diaspora, mainly 
Rwandan labour); and refugees (fled post-colonial Rwanda due to the “political crisis”).
178
 
Hutus and Tutsis are socially differentiated because refugees are predominantly Tutsi and 
migrants are predominantly Hutus. The Banyarwanda refugees in Uganda mainly consist of 
those that left in ‘1959-1961, 1963-1964, and 1973’. Since Uganda gained its Independence 
(1962), the Banyarwanda have felt ‘the wrath’ of former President Milton Obote’s regime. In 
the context of their experiences, a “political intelligentsia” derived from the cultural 
diaspora, had organised the first political group around the return of exiles and refugees to 
Rwanda. The political organisation was called the Rwandese Alliance for National Unity 
(RANU). RANU would later become the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) in 1986. 
 
The Banyarwanda had different experiences in Zaire and Tanzania. In Tanzania they 
assimilated both socially and culturally and could apply as citizens, whereas in Zaire 
citizenship was at times offered and then withdrawn.
179
 In Uganda, Tutsis experienced great 
“anti-refugee prejudice” that was promoted by the Ugandan state, but which also served in 
the shaping of the refugee experience and yearning for a Tutsi belonging to return home-
Rwanda.
180
 Mamdani articulates the experience of the Banyarwanda in Uganda, stating 
“once a refugee always a refugee”.
181
 
 
The era of Idi Amin’s leadership introduced a sharp focus on indigeneity within politics. A 
noticeable outcome of the political crisis was the violent expulsions of Asians in 1972.
182
 
But Amin’s approach to the Banyarwanda was different. For the Banyarwanda refugees there 
was a popular belief that Amin was supportive of the re-establishment of the “deposed Tutsi 
King, Mwami Kigeri”, as he had “promised to help re-establish the monarchy in 
Rwanda...and ensure the return of refugees.”
183
 Amin had in actual fact invited King Mwami 
Kigeri to live in Uganda and provided him with property.
184
 Some of the Banyarwanda 
politically supported Amin, whereas others supported the oppositional guerrilla movement, 
the National Resistance Army (NRA). This fuelled suspicion in Rwanda, and a fear that 
Amin would support the return of the Tutsi monarchy. 
 
In 1986 the NRA, led by Yoweri Museveni, overthrew Amin in Uganda. A quarter of his 
army was constituted of Banyarwanda soldiers. Among them were Paul Kagame and his 
closest friend Fred Rugyema, founding father and later head of the RPA during the 1990 
October invasion into Rwanda. Initially the NRA was motivated by an alternative politics to 
that which was based on indigeneity, however once in power, the post-colonial political 
crisis proved to have had a stranglehold on Museveni’s mode of power. 
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Whilst in Museveni’s army (NRA), the Banyarwanda were perceived by both Amin and the 
Obote II regime as providing the “backbone of Museveni’s guerrillas”.
185
Thus, the state 
resettled the Banyarwanda into old refugee camps, and also violently attacked them, leading 
many to return to Rwanda or flee into Tanzania. When Museveni overthrew Amin, he 
initially granted Ugandan citizenship to the Banyarwanda from 1959 out of sympathy for 
their support to the National Resistance Movement (NRM). At this point the Banyarwanda 
had already began to infiltrate the military, leadership and civic life in Uganda, which led to 
Ugandans being suspicions of the Banyarwanda. Thus, under immense pressure, Museveni 
redefined citizenship in Uganda. Lodged in a Pan-African view, Museveni made the 
distinction between Ugandans and European foreigners, but also African foreigners from 
neighbouring states.
186
 This dissolved the citizenship and branded Banyarwanda as “non-
Ugandan” and African foreigners.
187
 Mamdani argues that this “confirmed the colonial 
inheritance” and reformed citizenship back to being based on indigeneity.
188
 Furthermore, 
the implication was that only Ugandans could access and own land, and citizenship rights 
and benefits. 
 
The politics in the region suggested to the RPF that the broad-based approach of the NRA 
was ineffective for achieving its own political goals, and specifically for the Tutsi diaspora. 
Furthermore, once in power, Museveni had to broaden its base in order to gain political 
support. This meant excluding the once confident political and military Tutsi elite from the 
generation of the 1959 expelled Rwandan Tutsis. Tutsi refugees now centred their political 
and military ambitions on the notion of the ‘right of return’ to Rwanda. The RPA organised 
itself along two focal points in its struggle; 1. “The leader of the refugee struggle would 
come from Banyarwanda” and 2. “The return home could only be an armed struggle.”
189
 
Although the RPF claimed to be a ‘broad-based front’, representative of the ‘right of return’ 
for all refugees, the RPF was comprised mainly of Banyarwanda Tutsis.
190
 
 
Remigius Kintu, presented a paper to the U.N Tribunal on Rwanda (Arusha,Tanzania 2005) 
in which he deliberated on why things had gone so wrong for Tutsis in Uganda.
191
 Kintu 
presents a sharp critique of the intentions of the RPA invasion in 1990. In reference to pre-
colonial and colonial social and political relations, Kintu states that in addition to ‘land 
belonging to Tutsis and Hutus merely being labour,’ Hutus were ‘dehumanised’ by the 
treatment and perception by Tutsis.
192
 Similarly, Hutus were excluded from education and 
political organisation, thus creating a “mass of ignorant and uneducated population” that were 
left vulnerable to the “brutal injustices” because Tutsis did not equate themselves with the 
“moral/spiritual value” of Hutus.
193
 Kintu argues that as soon as Tutsis had fled Rwanda, 
they “made no secret of their intentions to return to Rwanda as rulers.”
194
 From the 
beginning, there were five attempts to overthrow Kayibanda, as they declared, “We cannot 
accept to be ruled by Hutus who are supposed to be our slaves.”
195
 Kintu further continues to 
state that Uganda “has always been a country founded on an unwritten policy of inclusion, 
not exclusion”, which he states that the Tutsi political class has used as opportunities ‘to 
expand Tutsi power within the Great Lakes Region’.
196
 His evidence is based on military 
campaigns/invasions into Rwanda, and evidence given to the tribunal, of violent killings in 
attempt to numerically get rid of a Hutu presence in the region.
197
 Kintu further supports his 
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argument by noting the wealthy, well-adjusted Banyarwanda in the region were not affected 
by the Ugandan Land Law, and had in fact continued to refer to themselves as Rwandans and 
not Ugandans, regardless of having lived there for most of their lives.
198
 The same, he 
argues, can be said for generations of Banyarwanda. Many intellectuals from the Tutsi 
diaspora had assisted the RPF with financial, logistical, and political resources, towards the 
return of Tutsis. Kintu states that after many unsuccessful plans to take over Rwanda, a small 
political elite devised a committee to discuss the end-goal; to invade and overthrow the Hutu 
political powers in Rwanda.
199
 
 
The challenge to Kintu’s argument that collectivises the Banyarwanda sights on Rwanda, as 
‘their ethnic home’, is demonstrated by the ‘guerrilla war in the Luwero Triangle of Uganda 
between 1981-1986.’ The generations born from Banyarwanda exiles in the seventies and 
later, were in fact trying to make Uganda their home.
200
 This was despite being read as 
‘ethnic strangers’ and then an ‘ethnic group’ prior to the political reversal of the NRM. The 
irony was that the Banyarwanda were participating in the guerrilla war convincingly showed 
“the limits to which ethnic strangers could make themselves at home in a state defined 
‘home’ as an ancestral-indigenous-abode for “native”, keeping at bay all those considered 
non-indigenous, no matter their commitment or predicament, as “settlers.”
201
 The confluence 
of Rwanda and Uganda’s citizenship crisis, was impressionable on the RPA political vision 
because they felt that the Banyarwanda did not have an ‘ethnic home’ through which rights 
could be claimed.
202
 This may have changed at different periods in the post-colonial state, 
but they were always excluded from having political rights and thus a claim to the territory 
(land). 
 
The plan was that once the NRM/NRA overthrew Amin in Uganda, they would assist the 
RPF in overthrowing Habyarimana. As discussed, the assistance never materialised, but in a 
meeting between Museveni and General Habyarimana, Museveni suggested that Fred 
Rwiygema, Paul Kagame, and Mugisha Muntu be allowed to join the Rwandan Army.
203
 
After declining this suggestion and another to allow low-ranking soldiers to join, 
Habyarimana finally agreed to slowly start allowing the Banyarwanda to return to 
Rwanda.
204
 At the same time, Uganda’s citizenship reform, reflected in the 1990 Land Law, 
“denied non-citizens the right to own land” therefore, rendering an estimated 450 000 
Banyarwanda landless and “ethnic strangers”.
205
 
 
The October 1990 RPF invasion took place whilst Rwanda was undergoing internal-political 
reforms, and not during a period of repression.
206
 Furthermore, “Uganda-Rwanda 
negotiations on the right of refugees to claim Rwandan nationality reached an advanced stage 
by then.”
207
 In fact only days prior to the 1990 invasion into Rwanda, General Habyarimana 
declared at the U.N General Assembly that he would grant naturalisation and travel 
documents to those wishing to return.
208
 This reflects a context that differs from the account 
given by the RPF. 
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5.8 Post-Genocide ‘Land Reform’ 
 
Central to the challenges that post-genocide political, social and economic development 
faces, is the issue of land. In the decade leading up to the genocide, poverty levels were on a 
steady incline as people were forced off their land and due to state corruption. Millions of 
Rwandans (80% of the population) depend directly on access to land for subsistence needs. 
The ‘fabric of Rwandan society has been torn’ and society is under extreme stress.
209
Both 
Republics have produced laws in favour of power and violence, and with a complete 
disregard for equity and equality. How the current regime responds to land and agrarian 
reform is under scrutiny, especially in a context where previous reform has benefitted some 
and disadvantaged others in a racially fragmented society. Furthermore, land hasn’t just 
weakened bonds, but it has also been used to violently dispossess one group by another 
premised on justice and indigeneity. 
 
Today, competing property and land claims, are wrapped in an inherited complex legal 
system. As Saskia Hoyweghen asserts, the land question will have to be approached with 
two considerations: 1. by situating its socio-economic dimension in a deeper political and 
historical context; and 2. by considering its specific contemporary socio-political 
problem.
210
Moreover, as the previous and following chapter demonstrates, both the national 
and regional political climate continues to challenge the Rwandan government’s political 
strength to overcome its critical issues particularly the inherited colonial institutions of rule. 
 
Pottier states that the discourse on land reform “acts as a instrument which, through its 
representation of the past, helps legitimate the present.”
211
Thus, I would like to return to the 
propositions that were made at the Arusha Accords, which as previous chapters have 
shown, has been impressionable on the reconstruction of post-genocide Rwanda. 
 
The RPF arrived at the Accords, emphasising in their agenda, both the ‘right of return’; securing 
naturalisations (citizenship) and political rights for the Tutsi diaspora. It also demanded land 
access for the returning Tutsis.
212
 John W. Bruce argues “The Tutsi-led RPF recognised that 
displacing those Hutu occupants on any large scale would only lead to further conflict, and 
agreed that returnees who had been out of the country for more than ten years would have to be 
accommodated on state-owned lands.”
213
 However, after the genocide the situation was 
drastically different from what the negotiators at Arusha had envisioned. 
 
During the genocide, government officials and the propaganda-filled ‘Hate Radio’ incited 
fear in the Hutu peasantry, by arguing that Tutsis would dispossess them of their land if they 
did not kill the ‘enemy’ first.
214
Furthermore, killers were often rewarded with their Tutsi 
victims’ ‘livestock, crops, houses, land and personal belongings.’
215
However, as discussed 
in chapter two, Scott Strauss pointed out that few were motivated by greed, the looting 
mostly took place after the genocide had dissipated.
216
 
 
In this context, the post-genocide regime has embarked on a formidable project of ‘political, 
economic, social and cultural engineering’.
217
 Within the agricultural sector, the government 
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has combined a “green-revolution” policy and sophisticated technology. Reyntjens notes that 
the ambitious project is aimed at the domestic scene, but it also applied to the region and the 
world.
218
 Similar to the transitional justice mechanisms, the land and agricultural reform has 
involved bold experimentation, which is framed within the logic of ‘victims justice’ and 
‘Rwandicity’. Land reform in post-genocide Rwanda is rationalised to correct past injustices 
and boost production through modernisation.
219
 The Tutsi-led government also had to 
reconcile with the fact that Tutsis made up 14% of the population, and it therefore had to 
strictly abide by the ‘ten-year rule’ in order to gain political legitimacy and maintain ‘peace’. 
 
Since the genocide, Rwanda has ‘experienced the most dramatic refugee returns of any 
country in Africa’.
220
 Waldorf states “massive population displacement has led to further 
property conflicts.”
221
Inequity in land access has increased with each successive migration 
wave returning from different historical and present periods thus leading to overlapping land 
claims. As discussed, most land was occupied by Hutus, who “claimed to own the land 
because, they said the had occupied Rwanda before the arrival of Tutsis.”
222
 During the Civil 
War between 1990-1993, the RPF invasion encouraged and influx of Tutsi refugees. 
‘Returnees’ are mainly considered to be Tutsis who returned with the RPF. These refugees 
together with refugee migrations into Rwanda several years after the genocide, returned with 
the hope of reclaiming land and houses that were abandoned in the 1950’s, 1960’s and 
1970’s during the different periods of anti-Tutsi violence.
223
Refugees and exiles are divided 
into ‘old-caseload refugees’ (which are pre-genocide Tutsi refugees) and ‘new-caseload 
refugees’ (which are post-genocide Hutu refugees). After the post-genocide regime invaded 
Zaire (Congo) in 1996, many Hutu refugees who had left Rwanda during and after the 
genocide, returned. They returned to land that was now being occupied by Tutsi repatriates 
who for the past two years, had “worked the land, enriched the soil and importantly had built 
alliances with the new authorities…themselves repatriates.”
224
 Prior to the Gacaca Court and 
Land Laws, Waldorf argues “competing property claims were sometimes resolved on an ad 
hoc basis by local officials or through revived customary mechanisms.”
225
 Almost all of the 
new Local Authorities in the decentralised system are repatriates themselves and are Tutsi, 
thus dispute channels are viewed to be ethnically bias towards Tutsis. 
 
Due to the post-genocide transitional ‘policy of mass accountability’, a budget that relies on 
external international donors, as well as its large numbers of victims, the government was 
unable to provide individual compensation to its victims. Between 1997-2008, there were 
various compensation bills drafted, but none have been enacted.
226
Waldorf notes, the closest 
to a compensation fund is the introduction of Fonds d’Assistance aux Rescapes du Genocide 
(FARG), which provides medical aid and education scholarships to ‘survivors of the 
genocide’, stating that ‘survivors’ are those who survived the genocide regardless of 
ethnicity.
227
However, leaders of FARG are all Tutsis and closely connected to the RPF; and 
it has a reputation for discriminating against Hutu-survivors and favouring Tutsi-
Survivors.
228
 Face with being unable to provide financial compensation, the Government has 
instead embarked on a complete restructuring or Rwanda as a means to address victim needs, 
accommodate the returning populations and part of its modernisation drive (new agrarian 
policies and commercialisation). 
229
A central problem for the current administration is that it 
 
165 
 
 
 
 
rests on fragile legitimacy and is characterised by its “increasingly narrow ethnic 
composition.”
230
As Des Forges argues in addition to security concerns “In trying to 
resolve the current crisis over land, the government must be constantly aware that 
decisions will have-or in any case will be seen to have-ethnic connotations.”
231
 
 
5.9 Modernising Rwanda and Rwandans 
 
The Arusha Accords ‘affirmed the inviolability of property’ thus it proposed a ten-year 
limitation to reclaim land/property lost, and a thirty-year period to make that claim.
232
 In the 
meantime, the Rwandan government initiated the National Habitat Policy, which would 
resolve the housing crisis, land scarcity problem by encouraging redistribution, and 
implement the ‘villagisation project’. The post-genocide regime has adopted two policies, in 
response to its political priorities, which have greatly changed the traditional landscape of 
Rwanda (agricultural and social networks). They are; a. 1996 villagisation policy or 
‘Imidugundu’; and b. to modernise the economy by completely reforming the agricultural 
sector. These institutions work closely with the pro-growth ‘Vision2020 development goals.’ 
By 1998 there was a severe food-shortage, which led to the creation of the state-led NGO-
l’Association Rwandaise de Recherche et d’Appui en Amenagement du Territoire 
(ARAMET). ARAMET works in conjunction with National Habitat Commission and 
proposed the development of cities as a source of diversifying the economy and providing 
employment, by drawing people towards urban cities and off rural land away from 
subsistence agricultural activities.
233
 Furthermore, the villagisation policy makes the 
following proposals, that it would: a. “bring the population closer to roads, facilitate 
provisions of water and other services, improve access to schools and health clinics; b. 
“villagisation permits more rational use of land since housing can be constructed on less 
fertile land, and the broad enclosures typical of rural Rwanda households can be reduced in 
size”; c. “villagisation can encourage income-earning activities for residents”; and d. 
“villagisation will provide better security for people and property.”
234
By 1999 the Ministry 
of Land (MINITERE) announced: “the ultimate objective of the government is to enable the 
entire rural population to live in group settlements.”
235
However, what began as a 
development project has today over-extended itself as a (failed) housing project, which has 
been greatly supported by the international development community.
236
 The villagisation 
project has been intrusive and disruptive for the majority of Rwandans, especially the rural 
population. 
 
‘Villagisation programmes’ have a long political history in Africa, implemented in various 
states such as Tanzania and Mozambique.
237
Newbury argues that in the African experience 
and beyond, the policy has had disastrous consequences.
238
The imidugundu policy was 
conceived by the state and its agents, without any true consultations with the population. 
Newbury asserts, in a highly charged political terrain “Rwanda’s leaders might have been 
expected to take a gradualist, consultative approach to changing land policy…giving real voice 
to the concerns of diverse constituencies, including rural producers” and especially because it 
completely replaced the traditional residence patterns (previously dispersed 
homesteads).
239
This is particularly pernicious in a state with a long-established tradition of 
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top-down, state-centred governance, and which historically laws are seen to be anti-rural 
that approaches the rural poor with a standardised approach. It has also contributed 
significantly to the Tutsi-Hutu, urban-rural, and the state-society divide. 
 
In order to understand the policy attitude that generated these policies, it is important to look at 
the post-1994 Government, majority of which have been recruited from the diaspora and former 
guerrilla movement.
240
 Hoyweghen asserts that the “brains behind the orchestrated 
 
return have not only brought with them different experiences but most all a vision of what their 
home country ought to be like and strong will to re-shape it to fit the mould.”
241
The RPF  
leadership is made up of soldiers and intellectuals.
242
 The soldiers mainly value ‘cattle-
raising’ due to a long historical association with the military and cattle, and few had close 
links to cultivating crops.
243
Moreover, following the RPF’s military victory, generations of 
Tutsi elite from Uganda and Congo returned, and settled in Kigali or in the cities, because 
they no longer had ties with the “hill of origin”- and had little incentive to return to the rural 
areas.
244
As they took up positions in upper echelons of state institutions, it became clear that 
many of them were detached from rural-life. A European donor representative articulated 
that “Many of the government officials have never known the Rwandan countryside. They 
came from refugee camps, and when they took over power, they often left their parents 
behind in Umutura [a province in the north-east with many large cattle farms]. Moreover, in 
the past, there was still a lot of insecurity in the countryside, so people preferred to live in the 
city of Kigali. That is where they concentrated now and have limited knowledge and 
understanding of how peasants live.”
245
Des Forges notes “a small number of intellectuals 
returning from the diaspora had been educated in rural and land specialities, but most were 
urban-based members of the elite more experienced in commerce, education or law than in 
cultivating crops.”
246
It is also important to note the Anglo-influence on development and 
economic policies. During the consultation phase of designing the 2005 Land Law, 
influential RPF members described the inherited land tenure system as “archaic”, 
“backwards”, “anarchic” and “lacking in specialisation”.
247
 There is also a language barrier, 
as one representative from civil-society asserts “The government really adopts a policy to 
exit ‘Francophony’ and to enter ‘Anglophony’…Those who speak French and have the right 
competences are not taken into consideration…It is nonetheless mostly the French-speaking 
who master the rural setting.”
248
 There was also a prevalent animosity felt towards Hutu 
returnees, because of the association with the genocide-propaganda, which would ‘glorify’ 
“Hutus –as-cultivators” and Hutus being the indigenous people of the soil.
249
 The new 
political elite’s socio-economic discourse stands in stark contrast to Habyarimana’s 
administration, which “relentlessly championed the culture of an agrarian society.”
250
 Often 
Habyarimana’s speeches “glorified the peasantry and he pictured himself as a peasant.”
251
 
Musahara et al argue that the “current vision and ambition of the Rwandan elite go much 
farther than previous attempts at reform, and are all the more problematic, given that they see 
no role for small scale peasants.”
252
Instead the government is pushing for consolidation of 
small-plots to produce 50ha plots of land for cattle farming and cash crops, and to improve 
agriculture using “modern professional farmers.”
253
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The RPF prejudices towards farming led to the government to neglect the many ways in 
which rural Rwandans and micro-plots are successful in crop-cultivation. It also refuses to 
consult and ignores data and recent studies being conducted. The Rwandan Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper shows that cash-crop farmers have been the most productive 
agricultural contributors to the economy in post-genocide Rwanda.
254
 Despite 
overwhelming evidence from other African case studies that resettlement schemes rarely 
work, the government pushed on with the imidugundu policy, and handled it in a very 
bureaucratic manner, using coercive practices. 
 
By 1996, the government began relocating rural dwellers into villages. Rwandans were informed 
through national-radio broadcasts, but the details of its implementation were left up to the 
interpretations of local administration.
255
 Due to the de-centralised system of administration, this 
meant that local administration were less answerable to local Rwandans than they were to 
National Authorities. Des Forges argues that those who refused to relocate to the new sites were 
met with “coercion and outright force, even making people destroy their own homes.”
256
There is 
a widespread perception that the National Authorities, who often defend the abuse of local 
authorities approve of the harsh measures, which has led to some international donors pulling out 
funding for villagisation project. 
257
The other cause for concern, is that the government promised 
those that it relocated to villages, that they would be compensated; or if they exchanged land they 
would be given new land- but few received land and if they did, it was often land of poor quality 
and far from their actual homes.
258
 One cultivator in Ruhengeri shared that he was forced to give 
up his land for the imidugundu, and relocated, but now two Tutsi families reside on his land and 
are not putting it to agricultural use.
259
 In the case of villages created in eastern Rwanda, due to 
land shortages, lack of food and resources (to pay educational and medical expenses), some have 
had to seek day-labour work on their formerly owned land, which has since been taken over by 
the military.
260
In such cases, Rwandans are earning a third of what they use to earn before 
relocating to the villages, and recent research conducted at the National University of Butare 
confirms the perception that today Rwandans are poorer than before.
261
 Hintjens argues that 
“Rwanda is more class divided and polarised than ever before”, pointing to the gini-coefficient as 
an indicator, and to the industrial infrastructural development is only taking place in the cities, 
which have offered few job opportunities.
262
Similar to the previous regimes, is the critique that 
expropriated land has been given to wealthy businessman, military and political officials living in 
Kigali, and is not being used for agricultural purposes. 
 
 
 
Newbury argues that because the government defined the ‘villagisation policy’ as a security 
issue, it made it very difficult to debate the ‘merits and advantages’ of such a policy.
263
 
‘Security’ touches on “psychological perceptions as well as empirical realities- and was the 
monopoly of the states. Rwandans hesitated to question the villagisation openly, for such 
opposition could be-and often was- interpreted as unwillingness to recognise the loss, trauma 
and fears of genocide survivors.”
264
 Chris Huggins argues “different areas are effected by 
different kinds of challenges, depending on the dates of people’s flights and return to/from 
the area, and the circumstances under which they left.”
265
I will briefly give two examples of 
different local-variations:  
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 The Kibungo prefecture lost two-thirds of its population during the genocide, which had led to 
thousands of mostly Hutus fleeing to neighbouring states. After the genocide, mainly Tutsi (old-
caseload refugees returned) and moved into the abandoned homes, but after 1996, ‘new-caseload 
refugees’ began to return seeking their formerly abandoned plots/properties.
266
Newbury argues 
“rather than requiring refugees to cede houses to their former owners, the local authorities 
required everyone to move into villages”.
267
Furthermore, the Rwandan authorities forced local 
residents to share their land with returnees, without guiding legislation or with payment/ 
compensation. The Centre for Conflict Management (National University of Rwanda) found that 
over half the conflicts in Kibungo prefecture are related to land sharing.
268
Human Rights Watch 
reported that ‘a significant number of Rwandans applying for refugee status in neighbouring 
countries, expressed “continuing anger at having to sacrifice some of their land at official order 
some seven eight years before.”
269
 
 
In the northwestern parts of the former prefectures of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri, 
villagisation has been a violent affair. During 1997/1998 this area was “a war zone, where 
Hutu abacengezi (insurgents or rebels) made sporadic attacks on army installations, killed 
local officials, and attacked Tutsi refugees who had fled from ethnic violence in the 
Congo.”
270
Newbury notes, whereas the abacengezi claimed to be fighting to liberate the 
Hutus form Tutsi oppression, it was in fact Hutus who fell victim to the RPF’s mercilessly 
retaliated attacks against the Hutu civilian population, “who were suspected of providing 
succour and support to the guerrillas.”
271
This not only severely affected their crops, but 
forced 40 000 Hutus into ‘temporary shelters’, which subjected inhabitants to horrific and 
inhumane conditions.
272
 
 
Depending on the dispute, whether they are due to customary or statutory legal aspects, will 
determine dispute mechanism to pursue. Huggins, argues typically the first option is to 
approach the widely respected “gacaca” family council (which is different to the Gacaca 
Court system).
273
 The ‘gacaca family council’ involves all relative family members and 
“wise” community leaders, as well as witnesses. Therefore, the gacaca family council does 
not use statutory law, and often relies on the “relationship between the participants” for 
enforcement of the gacaca’s decisions.
274
 If one of the parties does not feel satisfied, they 
can then approach the local authorities for legal redress, from local level (Nyumbakumi) to 
the mayor at commune level.
275
 Huggins notes that decisions are based on “their ability to 
command respect at the local level as well as their knowledge of the communities 
involved”.
276
Furthermore, there is certainly ethnic-favouritism, ad-hoc and various local-
arrangements being made, and bribes taking place. There is very little information 
(government or independent research studies) addressing the dispute-resolution mechanisms. 
 
5.10 Land Ownership: Legalising Dispossession in Rwanda 
 
I will now address the contentious of land ownership and access to land tenure. Post-genocide 
Rwanda has inherited a ‘complex land matrix’ whose layered contours have been formed 
over many decades.
277
It attends to the crisis through the new 2005 Land Law. The Ministries 
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of Lands, Environment, Forestry, Water, and Mines’ assert that its aim is to “establish a land 
tenure system that guarantees tenure security for all Rwandans.”
278
 
 
Whereas recent land reform in African countries have incorporated or taken into account, 
customary land tenure system, by contrast, the post-genocide 2005 Land Law has casts the 
customary tenure system in a negative light and sees rights as being “individual by 
nature”.
279
 The policy document states that “the definition of land…carries the mark of the 
socio-political history of the country.”
280
 Musahara et al argue that “the new policy is 
somewhat contradictory regarding the influence of customary tenure…it characterises current 
written law as “very restrictive and confining” and the customary system as “widely 
practised, but with a tendency to cause insecurity, instability and precariousness of land 
tenure, in general.”
281
The ubukonde system was officially abolished. The policy avoids 
making references to the political nature of land tenure, and the fact that different systems 
served different ethnic groups, but how it narrates the past is deeply political. For example 
the governments states “one should try avoid being trapped by cultural considerations…”, 
but then it in its historical narrative on pre-colonial tenure it states “Facilitated economic 
production, stability and harmony in production…The profits were thus based on the liberty 
to occupy any territory as well as the complementary links among types of production…”
282
 
Thus, it completely ignores the experiences of forced labour, taxation and brutality 
experienced by the Tutsi monarchy. 
 
The question of ‘who owns the land’ is complicated in Rwanda by the ambiguities and 
contradictions in the 2005 Land Law policy document. For example, the policy stipulates 
that “Rwandan farmers, like city dwellers, believe that they own their land” it also recognises 
“Rwandans believe that once land has been recognised as theirs it cannot be taken away from 
them”, moreover it stipulates that “the Rwandan state regards itself as the owner of the 
land.”
283
Rwandan small-farmers are very concerned about the overlapping in meanings 
between land-ownership and land-leases. Furthermore, the 2005 Land Law stipulated that 
“land holders enjoy full rights of ownership if their land is used for commercial, industrial or 
a series of other enumerated uses, but the list does not mention agriculture…”
284
Thus, 
suggesting that full land-rights were not granted to smaller farmers. The government argues 
that in order to guarantee land rights, one needs to have a land title/ title-deed but the 
registration document continues to refer to land as being leased on behalf of the state to the 
leaseholder. Moreover, in order to register, one must own 1ha of land (majority of Rwandans 
own less than 1ha), and the registration requires a business plan (demonstrating how one 
intends to use the land and how it fits within the national economic reform project).
285
This 
requires formal skill-education and financial resources, which the government has not taken 
into consideration, and has proven to be both an obstacle for owning land and is a source of 
insecurity for small farmers/ land owners. 
 
Hintjens argues “the law starts from the false premise that in the Rwandan context, larger-scale 
farms would be more efficient than the small family-farmed plots.”
286
However, the distress 
sales of land and the increasing land scarcity within larger families, has meant that the rural 
poor now need food supply aid simply in order to survive.
287
 The state ignores this 
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reality, and has instead pushed for ‘consolidation’ of land-holdings, and relocation to the 
imidugundu, rather than engaging in the expertise and knowledge that most rural-Rwandans 
have about agriculture. Moreover, as Hintjens argues “the problem of small-scale producers 
in Rwanda is not a Malthusian one” but is an outcome of the growing elite land-grabbing that 
is taking place.
288
The modifications of land reform has been small but “significant in 
showing both movement towards increasing support for the elite and wealthy landholders as 
opposed to the poorer Rwandans and increasingly clear commitment to providing land for the 
returnees who fled Rwanda in the 1960’s.”
289
 Particularly, RPF-linked people were provided 
plots of up to 100 hectares and more (e.g. General Kayumba Nyamwasa- 207ha; Patrick 
Ngoga 384h).
290
The question Reyntjens asks ‘how did people who arrived in Rwanda in 
1994 were able to amass such land holdings in a country experiencing acute land 
shortage?
291
In response Huggins indicates that these practices have “cast serious doubt on 
Rwanda’s commitment to following the laws and procedures for registering land claims and 
thus improving security of land tenure.”
292
 Authoritarian practices, elite-resource capture 
and high aid dependency have resulted in structural and social violence, but also direct 
physical violence due to the coercive practices but the local administration to get Rwandans 
to obey their orders. 
 
5.11 ‘Victims justice’ and the growing ‘landless population’ 
 
In the aftermath of the genocide, the government had greatly publicised the ‘agricultural 
disaster’ at the end of the war, which added to their claim that socio-economic pro-growth 
policies and modernisation were acutely necessary as a solution. The government has also 
used ‘development’ as tool for reconciliation by demonstrating to Hutus and Tutsis that it is 
pursuing non-discriminatory and non-ethnic policies. However, as Ann Ansoms notes “so-
called pro poor policies can introduce or reinforce institutional barriers for many, while 
facilitating access and enhancing the opportunities for few.”
293
 A critical failure of the state, 
has been that it downplays the crisis of land rights (wrapped up in a complex land-tenure 
legal system) and the prevalence of illegal repossession by returning populations. This has 
led to an expansion of the ‘landless population.’ USAID released a report assessment, stating 
“[The new land policy] could increase inequality and exacerbate class divisions, which if 
politicised, could lead to conflict…[i]f the dispossessed subsistence farmers are mostly Hutu 
and the commercial farmers are mostly the Ugandan Tutsi elite, there is a risk of recreating 
ethnically-based, patron-client relations that characterised the Tutsi monarchy and colonial 
period.”
294
The land-market is also viewed as being ethnically biased, because majority of 
buyers are Tutsi and majority of sellers are Hutu. It also prevents ‘genocidaires’ or even the 
accused from purchasing land. 
295
Moreover as Peter Uvin notes the regime’s engineering 
“has led to a dramatic rise in income inequality, mainly between the city and countryside, 
which de facto means between Tutus and Hutu. This may be politically very dangerous and it 
may well be one of the reasons the RPF intends to maintain tight control over all the reigns of 
power.”
296
 
 
The 2005 Land Law Policy contains a historical section that describes reasons for being landless 
pre-1994. These are, “people who have become landless through the distress sales of 
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the land, or sheer land scarcity within a family…people depending on renting or 
sharecropping…women, particularly widowed, divorced or single women.”
297
 In today’s 
context, the 2005 Land Law also narrowly defines the ‘landless’ as being specifically “‘old 
case’ refugees who have returned: Rwandans who fled the country in 1959 or later and 
stayed outside the country for more than ten years.”
298
 Musahara et al note that it is true that 
the old-caseload category has been the major victims of land problems in Rwanda, but “No 
other type of landless person is mentioned.”
299
 
 
The Rwandan government has repeatedly emphasised their “obligation to provide for those 
who have lost land and property when they fled the country after the 1959 revolution.”
300
The 
Minister of Local Government Protais Musoni (close ally to Kagame) had reiterated this 
commitment in his speech addressing the return of 60, 000 Rwandans. Musoni states “Every 
Rwandan who happens to return home has a right to own a plot of land in any part of the 
country. It is your (mayors’) role to secure such land, even if it means redistributing it among 
natives.”
301
He then went on to speak of “amasambu ya demokrasi” – “plots of democracy”, 
and addressed the returnees who are “feeling cheated.”
302
Musoni indicated “land may be 
taken from other Rwandans if needed to provide for the returnees.” 
303
Des Forges argues that 
the only resolution for the returnee populations land claims, rests on the Arusha Accords 
recommendation (ten-year limit) but that in many cases the old-caseload refugees and 
returnees have been able obtain land without much difficulty.
304
In some cases this has been 
to go to court, but in most cases they have used other channels of influence to have their land 
restored to them. Moreover, as des Forges points out, no where in the Land Law does it 
prohibit anyone from just taking land by other means, and in fact stipulates “Land taken by 
force may be exempt from the usual thirty year limit of legal action.”
305
This allows the old-
caseload refugees and returnees to make the claim that their land was unjustly taken by force 
between 1959-1994, and should thus be rightfully returned to them. 
 
Land provisions by the state have also been viewed by the Hutu population as being ethnically 
biased. To begin with, mainly Hutus have been made to give up their land, enter into land 
sharing, or have been relocated to the imidugundu settlements without compensation. Innocent 
Gahigana states that since 1996, ‘The Akagera National Park’, has been set aside to provide land 
for the 1959 returnees, which has become an area of great tensions and land dispute because it is 
a national reserve.
306
 Other public land, such as the Gishwati Mountain Forest and Mutara 
Game Reserve, has also been allocated to the 1959 returnees. Furthermore, they have been 
settled on “fertile land, pastures and areas near shallow sections of marshlands”, which has been 
viewed as showing favouritism towards the ‘old caseload refugees’ and returnees by granting 
them the most ‘agriculturally-productive’ land.
307
 Recent survey research shows that ‘herders’ 
have been receiving “large swathes of land” for cattle grazing, and are more organised through 
‘Herders associations’.
308
 
 
The domestic politics in Rwanda has also influenced the return of refugees. A research study, 
A Dangerous Impasse: Rwandan Refugees in Rwanda, conducted interviews with Rwandan 
refugees in Nakivale settlement in Uganda, asking why the refugees are reluctant to repatriate 
back to Rwanda. The study seeks to gain a deeper understanding of the linkages between 
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conflicts over citizenship and belonging in the Great Lakes region, and how identity 
contributes to displacement. The overwhelming responses related to “the fact that they 
believe that if they return to Rwanda, they will not be safe, let alone have equal access to 
their rights as citizens of the country.”
309
The findings from the respondents have also 
expressed the deeper problems due to the political and legal system currently in place. 
Inextricably linked to refugee returns, is the view that the “gacaca process is unjust” which 
has led to the “stigmatisation of Hutus and collective attribution of guilt” that directly 
impacts their ability to ‘re-access land and other related property.’
310
Moreover, the 
respondents shared that “old caseload refugees are able to exercise claims on land for which 
they did not have a case.”
311
The refugees also expressed that mostly Hutus are made to live 
in the ‘imidugundu’.
312
They also pointed out that there is gap in the Land Law that protects 
provisions for land previously owned by refugees, and by “virtue of their status are unable to 
contest any claims…” 
313
Finally, the refugees expressed fear to return because of state-
repression, and how ethnicity continues to function as an instrument for control and polarises 
communities. The respondents stated that the control of the state impacts “almost all aspects 
of its citizens lives.”
314
 One respondent described “being forced to grow red peppers and 
flowers despite the fact that they are not profitable”, and another stated “you are told what to 
grow and are imprisoned if you refuse.”
315
 
 
5.12 Conclusion: 
 
The current land reform policy was responding to the immediate crisis of the genocide, and 
has taken on an incredibly complex task of addressing historical land practices. The state 
acknowledges that it does not have the financial and resource capacity to compensate 
‘victims of the genocide’, and thus has pursued pro-growth development policies, the 
‘villagisation programme’ and reconciliation as a dimension to development, as an 
alternative solution to meet the problems Rwanda’s reconstruction faces. Unfortunately, as a 
consequence of being the military and political victor that has inherited Rwanda’s post-
genocide reconstruction project, means that land reform today is distinctly shaped by the 
RPF’s vision. This vision is formulated by their experiences in exile; by ‘victims justice’; and 
a particular narrative of the past, from pre-colonial to the colonial and post-colonial regimes. 
Thus, their policy-vision asserts an obligation to Tutsi within Rwanda and in the diaspora. 
This is demonstrated in its commitment to compensate and provide for ‘old-caseload 
refugees’ and returnees who are viewed as historical victims of political violence, exclusion 
of rights and citizenship, and dispossession of land and property. As in the past, Rwanda’s 
land law relies on the power of the state to have established control over land and to govern 
the debates on the ‘land question’. This has impacted land access; land ownership; and land 
disputes, and has allowed for the ruling political elite to abuse their power through elite-
capture of resources, bribes and corruption and ethnic favouritism. The current political elite 
has also discriminated against Hutus because of their association as an identity to agricultural 
farming; but they also contribute to marginalisation of the rural poor because of their 
modernisation-policies. Historically, in Rwanda it has been the rural poor (both Hutus and 
Tutsis) who have reaped few material benefits because of the elites influences on policies and 
patron-client relationships. Thus, it is important to critically investigate the historical role that 
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the political elite has played in the relationship between land, identity and political violence. The 
international community also has a role to play, in that they provide donor assistance to policies 
that are contributing to the growing inequality between the rural poor and urban middle class, 
and the expanding ‘landless population’. The international community has also supported the 
‘forced’ repatriation of refugees, who as the study in Uganda demonstrated, there are many who 
are reluctant because they fear the current situation in Rwanda, and don't feel that they will be 
treated equally and gain meaningful citizenship rights and benefits. Owning land is crucially 
important for their survival (livelihoods, food security, cultural identity). Therefore, the current 
regime needs to think carefully about their approach to land reform, specifically if it serves as a 
foundation to transcend historical relations between land, political identities and political 
violence. Or is it merely the latest stage in historical practices of land dispossession, land 
alienation, and reproducing a mode of power and notion of citizenship that determines one 
groups belonging and another group’s exclusion? 
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Chapter Six 
 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
“Everything is yours, everything is not yours”
1
 
 
(Quote by Clemantine Wamariya, Rwandan seeker residing in the U.S) 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter explores the consequences of ‘victims justice’ in the Great Lakes region. The 
close geopolitical proximity and porous borders between the states in the region have meant 
that each state’s political and social dynamics tend to spill over, and take on a regional 
dynamic. The Rwandan genocide has had a devastating and widespread impact on the region, 
which has contributed to one of the most destructive wars in modern history, the two DR 
Congolese wars. This is in turn has led to a complex Great Lakes refugee crisis. In the 
immediate aftermath of the genocide, the RPF’s central concern was the securitising the 
Rwandan territory from possible retaliation and invasions by Hutu militias, and protecting 
surviving Tutsis within Rwanda and in the diaspora. With the support of major western 
superpower, President Kagame has always maintained that the genocidaires and former 
members of General Habyarimana’s forces, have infiltrated the Kivu-regions in Democratic 
Republic of Congo, and pose a real security threat. This is the ‘pretext’ for Rwanda’s 
military campaigns in DR Congo since 1996. Much of the fighting has taken place in the 
mineral-rich areas of DR Congo, which has garnered the critique that Rwanda’s ‘moral 
argument’ is a mask for its economic interests. This chapter departs by addressing this 
explanation. I argue that although it does have a basis in reality, it does not sufficiently 
address the crisis in the region. Thus, I redirect focus to the fact, that what began as ‘morally 
simple’ motive to seek justice and security for Tutsis, has quickly evolved into revenge 
attacks ordered by Kagame. These attacks specifically targeted Hutus in the diaspora, 
however both Hutu and Tutsi are victims caught up in the political violence. Hutus and 
Tutsis have a long history of migration into DR Congo, over different periods of time. They 
are referred to as ‘Kinyarwanda-speakers’ or the Banyarwanda. After the genocide, the 
regional dynamic was such that it shaped Hutu and Tutsi into two separate politicised 
diaspora communities, marked by violent overtones. This chapter will address the 
politicisation of these two diasporic communities. I do so by tracing DR Congo’s inherited 
colonial legacy, which has produced a post-colonial citizenship crisis, that merged with 
Rwanda’s own crisis, which had explosive repercussion after the genocide. This has born the 
Great Lakes refugee crisis where citizenship and belonging have become the most critically 
important question for the millions of people displaced in the regions. Attending to the crises 
in the region, requires returning to the political crisis in Rwanda, because Rwanda lies at the 
epicentre. Thus, I conclude this chapter with a discussion on Rwanda’s inherited colonial 
legacy, specifically the institutions of rule which continue to retain political identities and 
determines the modes of power, citizenship, and justice. 
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6.2 African Great Lakes Region: A ‘Hotbed’ for instability 
 
The Great Lakes region consists of countries in East and Central Africa, a complex network 
of states that are inextricably linked politically and economically, which is why implications 
for peace, security and governance require a regional response.
2
 Patrick Kanyangara argues 
“it is also a region with interlinked conflicts and common fundamental problems that emanate 
from post-colonial challenges to state-building and nation-building.”
3
The Rwandan genocide 
and post-genocide Congolese-Wars challenged the classic theorisation of ‘interstate’ and 
‘intrastate’ conflicts.
4
 There is a tendency to overlook the specificities of each country, and 
lean towards macro-explanations for understanding the on-going regional conflict because 
they are seen to share common dimensions such as; ‘multi-ethnic identity divisions, poor 
governance, structural violence and the role of natural resources.’
5
 In addition, since the 
Cold-War, we have seen an imposition of liberal-democratic notions (‘rule-of-law’, elections 
and inclusive politics), and neo-liberal philosophy, which has unfairly surrendered state 
sovereignty through structural adjustment programmes and conditions applied to aid/donor-
funding.
6
 Although many of these conditions were later abandoned, they had a long-lasting 
impact on the “position of incumbent regimes and engendered instability.”
7
 Critiques on 
‘national sovereignty, austerity and privatisation’ led to many African-states returning to the 
‘national question’. This was seen in the late-1990s in Rwanda, and held true for Congo as 
well. Rene Lemarchand notes in DR Congo “as the delivery of political rewards (…) became 
increasingly problematic, the control of state shrank correspondingly…just as Mobuto owed 
his rise of power to penetration of East-West rivalries on the continent, in the last analysis the 
collapse of the Zairian state must be seen as a casualty of the cold war’s end…”
8
 It became 
apparent that some states were more sovereign than others, and the moral and legal 
justification were masking a global imperial project. As a broader critique of the ‘neo-
colonial conditions’ of the ‘West’ was made, it was Africans who were made to bear the 
consequences. 
 
There is a popular interpretation and trend in thought that attributes the instability and inability of 
failed African states to fulfil the most basic roles of government towards citizens as owing to the 
“arbitrary establishment of borders by colonial powers.”
9
The geopolitical crises in the Great 
Lakes region were taking place in the midst of a debate (1996-1997) that was responding to other 
significant African conflicts, such as the Second Sudanese Civil-War (1983-2005) and the 
Angolan Civil-War. These wars are intrinsically linked, in that the geographical proximity has 
produced “hotbeds of instability and the play of objective alliances (where all actors reason in 
terms of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend”) have imbricated these conflicts.”
10
 The Angolan 
civil-wars demonstrate that politics is only settled with violence, whilst the cyclical civil-wars in 
Sudan and the 2011 secession of South Sudan, marked a crisis of the ‘nation-state’. South-
Sudan’s secession is troubling for many reasons, one of which is that it became an example for 
other secession movements, and re-surfaced the debate on ‘territorial borders’ and the criterion 
for citizenship, as well as whether states should be dismantled and broken up into smaller nation-
states. To make matters worst, international actors have also aligned themselves with domestic 
political actors, which in 
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some instances have re-enforced polarised perspectives in political consciousness 
and influenced the frameworks of transitions and resolutions. 
 
DR Congo ‘constituted the juncture of two war zones’ but it also has its own unique 
crisis.
11
By 1997, the porous borders of DR Congo, together with the lack of an effective 
national army or administration, ‘very poor communication between the peripherals and 
centre’, and an informal economy, led to the perception that the state had “virtually 
disappeared.”
12
Secondly, the then-President Mobutu was implicated in supporting the 
Khartoum government against the South Sudanese rebellion, who were in turn supported by 
the U.S, Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea.
13
Thirdly, and as I will discuss later, the implication 
of Mobuto support, provided a base for an armed attack on Congo in 1997, by Uganda, 
Rwanda and Burundi. Mobuto in turn was supported by the Angolan rebel movement- 
UNITA.
14
 These factors eventually contributed to the downfall of Mobuto. 
 
Uganda and Rwanda, to a lesser extent Burundi, intervened into Congo, for reasons relating 
to their security.
15
 Rwanda believed that there is a threat to their security, because after the 
genocide, the former government’s armed forces- FAR and the Interhamwe, along with 
thousands of Hutus fled to Congo to seek refuge. Since 1995, Kigali has organised armed 
assaults on ‘Hutu refugee camps’ in Congo, with two particular invasions that contributed to 
the two Congolese-wars. In the first invasion, its stated objective was security. However, in 
the second invasion, the RPF “funnelled Congo’s remarkable mineral-wealth to Kigali.”
16
I 
would like to acknowledge and briefly address a popular argument made, regarding the 
recent wars in the region. Particularly, that Rwanda’s central objective in Congo is an 
economic one, vying for the Congolese mineral-rich resources and territorial expansion. 
 
6.3 D.R Congo and the ‘Predation’ Argument 
 
In 2009 US Scholar Jeffrey Herbst and South African scholar Greg Mills posed a crude 
resolution to the crisis in DR Congo. They wrote “the international community needs to 
recognise a simple, albeit brutal fact: The Democratic Republic of the Congo does not exist. 
All of the peacekeeping mission, special envoys, interagency processes, and diplomatic 
initiatives are predicated on the Congo myth- that one sovereign power is present in this vast 
country-are doomed to fail.”
17
 Herbst et al continue their analysis by arguing that “Congo 
has none of the things that make a nation-state: interconnectedness, a government that it able 
to exert authority consistently in a territory beyond the capital, a shared culture that 
promotes national unity, or a common language. Instead Congo has become a collection of 
peoples, groups, interests, and pillage who coexist at best.”
18
 Whereas the authors have 
noted that “Congo is a product of its history” particularly the ‘predation’ of colonialism and 
foreign powers, the authors chose to merely “write Congo off” and propose that this country 
of 67 million people be ‘split amongst its surrounding countries’- to ‘dissolve’ the borders.
19
 
 
Disturbed by their analysis, Jacques Depelchin has written a poignant response to Herbst et 
al. Depelchin, points out that the authors, as well as former US State Secretary for African 
Affairs Herman J. Cohen (who is an outspoken diplomat on Congo-affairs) have a “central 
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idea to promote the interest of Rwanda, which has been anointed as the best 
manager/protector of global corporate mining/predatory ventures in Central 
Africa.”
20
Rwanda is a land-locked country, that has little to offer economically, and is 
surrounded by resource-rich neighbour-states, especially Congo. Much has been written in 
the literature about the shift in Rwanda’s interest in Congo after 1994 and more recently 
its post-genocide economic and territorial expansionist goals. Congo is an incredibly 
mineral-rich country that unfortunately has never been able to have complete control over 
its resources.
21
 
 
In the late nineties, Kigali and Kampala became primary delivery points for Congo to sell 
their minerals on the world-market.
22
 Rwanda’s economy/national budget and the lifestyles 
of its military and political elite, all are greatly dependent on Congo’s export minerals. The 
more Congo disintegrates, the more its minerals are re-orientated towards Kigali and 
Kampala. Between 1996-1997 and then from 1998-2002, the Congolese-Wars developed a 
state of ‘permanent impunity’; ‘a culture of devastating and increased violence’; and an 
extensive “informal economy run through parallel networks making use of state’s weaknesses 
developed in a totally militarised economy run by warlords.”
23
 
 
In 2000, it estimated that the Rwandan army generated between $50-$100 million through 
the exploitation of coltan, in the same year its military defence budget was $86 million.
24
 
Kris Bewouts asserts “The official Rwandan budget not only provided the invisible part of 
Rwanda’s defence budget, they also bought the loyalty of the political, military and 
economic elite in favour of a regime that was never as monolithic or coherent as it wanted to 
be.”
25
 Filip Reyntjens writes that Rwanda’s motives in Congo have changed over time from 
“a combination…of genuine security concerns, economic interests, ethnic solidarity and even 
(selective) humanitarian concerns, the need to ‘buy’ internal elite solidarity, (military) 
institution building and a feeling of entitlement coupled with a sense of invincibility against 
the background of the comfort offered by the collapse of its rich neighbour.”
26
 In 2013 the 
Enough Project produced a report on Rwanda-Congo’s relations (“Rwanda’s Stake in Congo: 
Understanding Interest to Achieve Peace”), which stated, “The key to unlocking peace is to 
expand the economic pie for Congo, Rwanda and the region by bringing in a much more 
robust private sector that practices responsible investment in conflict-free minerals…If the 
U.N. and U.S envoys build the right incentives for cooperation in the peace process, this 
investment will benefit all parties…Rwanda, Congo and the region will then be financially 
invested in peace instead of war.”
27
 In review of Gerard Prunier, Rene Lemarchand and 
Thomas Turner’s seminal work examining the region’s dynamics, Howard W. French writes 
“In all three, the Kagame regime, and its allies in Central Africa, are portrayed not as heroes 
but rather as opportunist who use moral arguments to advance economic interests. And their 
supporters in the United States and Western Europe emerge as alternately complicit, gullible, 
or simply confused. For their part in bringing intractable conflict to a region that had known 
very little armed violence for nearly thirty years, all the parties-so these books argue deserve 
blame, including the United States.”
28
 Bewouts argues that while it is true that DR Congo is 
increasingly important to Rwanda’s economy, it would be a “terrible simplification to reduce 
the problem in eastern Congo to its Rwandan dimension.”
29
 Defending Rwanda’s economic 
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interest is only one layer of the conflicts dimension. Depelchin offers a different approach for 
thinking about the Congolese-wars and the role of Rwanda. 
 
Firstly, Depelchin redirects attention to functions of regional and global economic 
stakeholders in the DR Congolese territory. The international alliances with post-genocide 
Rwanda have perpetuated the image that Rwanda stands for ‘order and development’ (anti-
corruption and development goals: Vision 2020), which has seen it garner 
support/cooperation from its allies during the intervention in DR Congo, premised on the 
argument it will increase security, as well as ‘order and development’.
30
 Depelchin argues 
that the author’s ‘mind-set’ is a typical product “which draws inspiration from European-US 
based perception that their interventionism in African and world affairs has always been for 
the good of everybody. At least that is the pretension.”
31
As they look through the lens of 
‘order and development’ they get rid of segments of humanity, which they view as the 
source of ‘dysfunction’, and who no longer serve the ‘order and development project’.
32
As 
the “so-called financial crisis” unfolds, there is an authority or entitlement amongst the major 
powers that are tempted to push for solutions that will remove or discount whoever they feel 
are dispensable.
33
In DR Congo this has led to a narrow account of the political violence, and 
together with the international community’s ‘genocide-guilt’ that has allowed Rwanda to 
acquire “regional superpower status” and be entrusted to intervene in DR Congo with 
promises of peace, security, order and development.
34
 Depelchin argues that the logic of the 
authors is so fixated on the negation of the Congolese people and their history; they seem 
unaware of the consequences of getting rid of the Congolese entity.
35
 
 
The ‘mind-set’ can be traced historically to the process of conquest since the Berlin 
Conference and subsequent colonial projects, in which there is a tendency to “determine the 
conditions under which Africa and Africans must exists or not exist” operating on a ‘tabula 
rasa’.
36
 This has led to ‘Congo’s history having not meant anything’ and negates the history 
and experiences of Congolese people, which allows for one to in ‘one bold stroke erase them 
off the map’-to pretend that ‘Congolese’ have never existed.
37
 
 
Depelchin also troubles over the treatment of the DR Congo within the framework of the 
‘nation-state’. By their account, Herbst et al, have completely dismissed the Congolese state. In 
response Depelchin argues that the “entity is much more that its name-the nation-state.”
38
 There 
are historical limitations of the ‘nation-state’ because of the historical and political context of 
DR Congo. This is part of a broader crisis in writing about the post-colonial state, where there is 
a tendency to ‘ignore and recount only parts of the story’, and as Depelchin argues, in DR 
Congo the history of ‘predation’ (“through Leopoldian, colonial and neo-colonial regimes”) 
have largely been written out in the current narrative on the conflict.
39
 
 
Cheikh Anta Diop has written about the “elimination of colonial borders”, but from the 
perspective of “uniting against the predators, not for the purpose of carrying out their wishes.”
40
 
Rather than proposing a solution in the form of ‘dissolving borders’, democracy itself has not 
been critically interrogated, perhaps as some argue that is has become obsolete. Moreover, 
Depelchin calls for an investigation into the ‘motives’ or the ‘unstated logic’  
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which he refers to as the ‘rationalisation for increased predation on those who have endured 
it most’ and to think of DR Congo within a history of predation that has taken place since the 
“Belgian Congo has been treated by its owners and managers as a vast 
plantation.”
41
Departing from Depelchin’s framework, I will continue the discussion by 
exploring the colonial legacy that has produced a citizenship crisis in DR Congo, and which 
merged with the political crisis in Rwanda, after the genocide. I argue that the ‘predation 
argument’, framed as a economic conquest is a significant problem, but it does not 
sufficiently explain the Great Lakes regional conflict (and the refugee crisis). At the heart of 
the problem is the crisis of political power and the institutions of rule, which is determined 
by the politics of indigeneity, and which has a profound impact on the meaning of citizenship 
and belonging. 
 
6.4 Migrating Violence, Citizenship and Political Identities in the Region 
 
In the late 1980s it became apparent that there was a profound geopolitical crisis at the heart 
of the Great Lakes Region. Reyntjens articulates “the seeds of instability were sown in the 
beginning of the 1960s: the massive exile of the Rwandan Tutsi who fled neighbouring 
countries during and after the revolution of 1959-1961, and the virtual exclusion of Tutsi 
from public life in Rwanda, the radicalisation of the Burundian Tutsi who monopolised 
power and wealth and the insecure status of the Kinyarwanda-speakers in the Kivu 
province.”
42
 The convergence of the post-colonial citizenship crisis in Uganda and Rwanda 
resulted in an armed repatriation (the RPF), which triggered the 1990 October invasion. After 
the military victory of the RPF in the Rwandan genocide, an estimated 2 million Rwandans 
fled to Tanzania but predominantly into DR Congo. Reyntjens states, “a unique combination 
of circumstance explains unravelling of the successive wars. The main circumstances can be 
found in the recent history of Rwanda. Although it is the smallest country in the region, the 
epicentre of the crisis lies in Rwanda.”
43
 Mamdani argues, as the RPF had crossed into 
Rwanda in 1990, it made another crossing into DR Congo in 1997.
44
Furthermore, the 
refugee migration from Rwanda’s genocide, and the subsequent invasion by Kigali, has 
exported a “double tension” in the Kivu regions (Congo), one being an external tension 
between Kivu and the power in Rwanda, and a tension within society in the two Kivu-
regions.
45
This tension grew as the refugee population grew, which blurred the distinctions 
within the Kinyarwanda-speaking community, and exposed a long-established post-colonial 
citizenship crisis, producing a volatile crisis. 
 
6.4.2 The Banyarwanda in DR Congo: The ethnic and civic dimensions 
of post-colonial citizenship 
 
The Hutu and Tutsi population in Rwanda is different to that of in DR Congo, where they are 
called the Banyarwanda, or Kinyarwanda-speakers. The differences emerge from different 
colonial experiences and inherited legacies. In Rwanda, Hutu and Tutsi are the “salient 
political identities” but in Uganda and DR Congo they were a “single political identity”, 
which are known as the Banyarwanda.
46
 Secondly, in Rwanda, Tutsi (Hamitic origins) and 
Hutu (Bantu) were constituted in the colonial era as racial categories. Tutsi were ruled 
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through civic law and Hutus through customary law. However, in the cases of Uganda and 
DR Congo, they had experienced indirect colonial rule that “distinguished between the 
indigenous (natives) and nonindigenous (non-natives).
47
 Thus, identities are both racialised 
and ethnicised. With Independence, civil law was deracialised, but the customary law that 
ruled ethnic groups remained.
48
The majority in DR Congo were divided further into ethnic 
groups, each with its own “customary home”, “customary law”, and a “customary” authority 
to enforce it.
49
 
 
The migration of Hutus and Tutsis into DR Congo, reaches back to pre-colonial times, and 
has staggered over centuries.
50
Mamdani proposes three categories of the Banyarwanda in 
DR Congo, which assist in illustrating the citizenship crisis. These are; ‘nationals’ (those 
who entered the Congolese territory prior to the colonial era), ‘migrants’ (those who crossed 
borders at different times during colonial era), and ‘refugees’ (post-independence).
51
 
‘Refugees’ were part of a political diaspora, whereas migrants and nationals were considered 
a cultural diaspora.
52
 The Belgian colonials in DR Congo referred to the Banyarwanda 
nationals as ethnically indigenous (natives), but those that came after the arrival of the 
colonials were seen as non-indigenous (non-native).
53
 After Independence, this ‘ethnic 
distinction’ produced an acute dilemma for citizenship. 
 
Similar to Uganda, DR Congo’s decolonisation saw the de-racialising of the civic identity, 
but not the de-ethnicising of the ‘native/indigenous’ identity.
54
 The rationale was to get rid 
of the stigma that racial categories produced by colonial rule, but the ‘native’ was 
naturalised. Mamdani states, “civic citizenship is the consequences of the membership to the 
central state. Both qualifications for citizenship and the rights are its entitlement and are 
specified by the constitution. Under de-racialised civic law, these rights are mainly 
individual and are located in the political and civil domain.”
55
 
 
The idea that the ‘native’ is a natural identity meant that it continued to be reproduced in the 
post-colonial state. The implication for the Banyarwanda is that they became considered 
“ethnic strangers.”
56
 Over time, the Banyarwanda may have had access to civic law and 
citizenship, but they were never allowed to have their own “ethnic home”- governed by an 
ethnic administration (Native Authority).
57
 The purchase to be made in post-colonial DR 
Congo is that to be considered ethnic and have a ‘Native Authority’ would allow one to then 
have access to important rights such as land ownership, which is the greatest socio-
economic material inheritance.
58
An ethnic identity is also considered to be more of a social 
identity, accompanied with a sense of belonging, because it has more meaningful socio-
economic rights and a customary claim to land. 
 
There are important distinctions to be made about the Banyarwanda that explain the political 
dynamism that has evolved. To begin with, although the Hutu and Tutsi in DR Congo were 
lumped together (as Kinyarwanda-speakers) between 1963-1994, they have historically been 
very different communities in North-Kivu and South-Kivu.
59
 In Northern-Kivu, one finds 
that the Banyarwanda are mainly Hutus, and in South-Kivu they are mainly Tutsis. Reyntjens 
writes that the Hutu Banyarwanda “often aligned themselves with ‘autochthonous’ ethnic 
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groups”.
60
The perception amongst ‘autochthonous’ leaders was that the Tutsi Banyarwanda 
privileged their ethnic ties to the Rwandan state, over national ties, which cast doubt over 
their loyalties to DR Congo.
61
 This perception was re-enforced after the 1990’s when the 
RPF aligned and self-identified themselves with the Banyarwanda in South-Kivu, and made 
and appeal for them to return to Rwanda. The RPF were operating on a homogenous 
understanding of the Tutsi diaspora. They presented themselves as being both ‘revolutionary’ 
and a political power that could represent Tutsis and break the association made that sees 
Rwanda as a Hutu nation. The importance of historicising political identities is demonstrated 
in the irony of this ‘self-identification’ because there are two influxes of Tutsis in South-Kivu 
that were prompted by Tutsis-related historical events. 
62
Firstly, as an outcome of the 
centralising of power by King Rwabugiri, many aristocratic Tutsi families left Rwanda in the 
late-nineteenth century.
63
 Secondly, there was a “bitter factional struggle in the Tutsi elite 
after the death of Rwabugiri.”
64
 Therefore, there are Tutsis who voluntarily left Rwanda and 
who don’t have a‘romantic view of Rwanda as their home’. Rene Lemarchand notes “many 
Kinyarwanda-speakers, Hutu and Tutsi, trace their family origin to pre-colonial times and 
have every right to claim the status of Congolese citizens.”
65
This is true of the 
Banyamulenge and the Hutu of Bwisha, many of whom have lived in the area long before the 
colonial era.
66
 Furthermore, the post-colonial volatile conflicts over power encouraged many 
of the Banyarwanda, to distance themselves from the “explosive world of Hutu and Tutsi in 
Rwanda and Burundi, instead seeking to define their place in the ethnic kaleidoscope called 
Congo.”
67
 
 
The colonial predicament had a profound impact on the imaginaries of political and social 
order and related modes of subjectivity.
68
 By failing to disinherit the Native Authorities, 
customary law was able to reproduce subjectivity and mark the continuation of the colonial 
history of rule. Judith Verweijen and Koen Vlassenroot argue, “the effects of processes of 
ethnic and territorial reification were very powerful, as ethnic communities came to be 
represented as existing since times immemorial and as having ‘natural right’ to their 
‘homeland’ that was justified by their ‘having arrived their first’. Thus, a dichotomy was 
created between communities identifying themselves as ‘born from the soil itself’.”
69
 
These ‘autochthones’ further demonstrated to the ‘ethnic strangers’- the Banyarwanda, that 
they lacked having a ‘tribal home’ and increasingly they became viewed as ‘recent 
arrivals’, as ‘immigrants’ or ‘foreigners’ which influenced the debates on rights and 
citizenship, and further shaped political identities.
70
The salient outcome is demonstrated 
through the Banyamulenge group. 
 
Lemarchand articulates; “the Banyamulenge are a perfect example of how geography, history 
and politics combine to create a new set of identities within the larger Banyarwanda cultural 
frame.”
71
Verweijen et al argue “The growing political emancipation of the Banyarwanda was 
also manifested in their effort to change their name to ‘Banyamulenge’, or ‘those from Mulenge’, 
referring to the hill in the Moyens Plateaux where a part of their ancestors had temporarily 
lived.”
72
 Most historians state that the group is predominantly made up of Tutsi pastoralist, who 
had migrated to the area prior to colonialism.
73
Lemarchand notes that they are “culturally and 
socially distinct from the long-established Tutsi in North Kivu and the 
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Tutsi refugees from the 1959-1962 Rwanda revolution. Many do not speak Kinyarwanda, 
and those who do, speak it differently.”
74
The group experienced a political awakening 
between 1964-1965, when some of the Banyamulenge had joined the DR Congo-rebellion, 
and supported the insurgency only to later switch sides when they saw that their cattle were 
being slaughtered.
75
Lemarchand notes that their efforts did not go unnoticed by Kinshasa, 
and many were rewarded with ‘lucrative positions’, their children were well educated and 
they became self-aware that they could be an influential political force.
76
In a context where 
the politics of indigeneity is rife, and preoccupied with ‘origins’ and migration, the political 
emancipation of the Banyamulenge became a highly contentious issue after the 1970s.
77
 
‘Hardliners’ from other communities refused the name-change linked to a place South Kivu, 
they saw it a “…a ploy from the Banyarwanda to ‘mask their real origins’, and therefore 
unjustly claim citizenship.”
78
The ‘name-change’ would politically and socially mean that 
they could then be considered to be an ‘original Congolese tribe’. In 1972, an influx of 
Burundian Hutus destabilized the region, and as the “indigenous majority” began to feel 
insecure, it created a sense of vulnerability for the Kinyarwanda-speaking minority.
79
 All 
groups sought protection from the central state in this brewing citizenship crisis. In response, 
President Mobuto Sese Seko issued a decree law that granted citizenship to Banyarwanda 
refugees who entered Zaire between 1959-1963. 
80
 Fofana argues “by granting citizenship to 
all those present on Congolese territory at the time of independence, the decree erased 
distinction between the groups considered to be indigenous, later settlers, and refugees from 
1959.”
81
 
 
The 1972 Citizenship Law threatened the livelihoods of the ‘indigenous majority’, who now 
felt that Mobuto was creating a ‘free for all’ environment for refugees from Burundi and 
Rwanda. There was also the perception that Mobuto was greatly influenced by Bisengimana, 
who was a 1959 Tutsi refugee from Rwanda.
82
 The consequence was similar to the case of 
Uganda, where citizenship reform meant a return to indigeneity for political leverage and the 
preservation of rights. In 1973, Mobuto also passed a “General Property Law” which like Idi 
Amin’s regime meant that all land was nationalized “including both the land under control of 
“traditional” authorities in the rural areas and land controlled by white settlers.”
83
 Mamdani 
argues that the law was “unable to implement the provision with regard to rural land under 
“customary control” but it did transfer land to a new Congolese capitalist class.
84
 The 1972 
law, benefited some of the Kinyarwanda-speaking population, who could now access land 
and property rights through gaining civic citizenship.
85
 By 1991, in Masisi, 502 of the 512 
families living in the area were Tutsi Banyarwanda who owned land.
86
Thus, the 1972 
Citizenship Law opened up civic rights to those both from Rwanda and Burundi, which 
threatened the politics of power and rights, and re-surfaced nationalist politics that was 
aimed to oust the Banyarwanda influence. Fofana notes that the outcome of civic citizenship 
being granted to the Banyarwanda, led to it being vulnerable to political manipulation, and 
controversy that triggered a “nativist sentiment.”
87
The ‘indigenous Conogolese groups’ 
feared that it allowed the Banyarwanda to use their influence over Mobuto for means of 
gaining power.
88
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In response to the political turmoil that was heightened by the1972 Law, there was a reform 
of the law that introduced the 1981 Citizenship Law. The new law repealed the former 
citizenship criterion, “persons originating from Rwanda-Urundi who were residents of the 
Kivu before January 1, 1950”
89
 and stipulated that citizenship conferred to those who could 
“demonstrate an ancestral connection to the population residing in 1885 in the territory then 
demarcated as Congo would qualify to be citizens of Congo.”
90
Much of the pressure for this 
repeal came from North-Kivu. The 1981 Citizenship Law placed emphasis on the 
‘Nationality Question’, and as Lemarchand asserts, it marked “A turning point in relations 
between immigrant and indigenous communities.”
91
 The law was indiscriminate and de-
historicized the different narratives and different migration periods of the Banyarwanda. 
Furthermore, to negate their numerical value at the ballot box during the elections, the 
Banyarwanda were allowed to vote in the 1985 provincial elections, but Kinyarwanda-
speaking people were not allowed to run for office.
92
 Thus, compounding “all Kinyarwanda 
speakers…into a single group, regardless of how long different sections had been together on 
Congolese soil.”
93
This had a political impact that excluded both North and South Kivu. 
Stephen Jackson documents that after 1973, “some local authorities sought to deny national 
identity cards to Banyarwanda despite the law granting them citizenship.”
94
 Which meant 
that although the Banyarwanda became citizens, there was a prolific difference between 
“civic and lived citizenship” which “fostered a Banyarwanda identity based on the sentiment 
of exclusion from Congolese society.”
95
 
 
The Banyamulenge were especially resentful of such exclusionary measures.
96
The situation 
would prove to worsen as events unfolded in Rwanda from 1990, and then after 1994. After 
the RPF’s military victory, the parliamentary ‘Vangu-commission’ took place, which was 
charged with “investigating the identity of the refugee populations”.
97
 The commission 
declared the Banyamulenge “foreign migrants” (“immigres estrangers”).
98
It also advised 
the then ‘transitional parliament’ in April 1995 to swiftly adopt a resolution that demanded 
the repatriation of the Banyamulenge to their countries of origin, it stated “all Rwanda and 
Burundi refugees and immigrants without condition and without delay.”
99
By 1996, the 
Banyamulenge in DR Congo, were referred to socially and politically as ‘ethnic Tutsi 
Rwandans’. 
 
6.4.3 Two Diasporic Communities: ‘Victims Justice’ exported into the Region’ 
 
The domestic social and political upheavals within each country in the region, became 
interconnected by the nature of the close geographical proximity. Between Burundi, Rwanda and 
the Kivu provinces, there is a combined population of 20 million that were migrating across the 
porous borders, which brought major security risks, and also demographic pressure that placed 
considerable pressure on land.
100
Secondly, Hutu and Tutsi had by the 1990s taken on an ‘extra-
territorial’ regional dynamic that was exploited by the alliances between Mobuto-Habyarimana 
and Kagame-Museveni, which coalesced at the local level.
101
 This was demonstrated in the 
violent ‘cross-border tit-for-tat’ due to the ethnic crisis between Burundi and Rwanda in 1972.
102
 
The Social Revolution in Rwanda had “generated a powerful backlash in Burundi, steadily 
raising the ethnic temperature until some 200,000 Hutu were  
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killed by Tutsi in 1972, in what can legitimately be called partial genocide.”
103
 This had a 
catalyst effect in Rwanda and DR Congo, as it led to anti-Tutsi pogroms and paved the way 
for Habyarimana’s rise to power, but it also triggered a brutal retaliation in DR Congo 
against the Banyamulenge civilians.
104
However, none of the above, had carried 
consequences as ‘devastating and wide-ranging as the 1994 Genocide.’
105
 
 
There are two pivotal moments that are significant to note, which contributed to 
the polarisation of Hutu and Tutsi as two diaspora communities in the region. 
 
Both were an outcome of Rwanda’s internal political struggle over power, which 
resonated with the political crisis within DR Congo. 
 
To begin with, the citizenship crisis in Uganda and the negotiations of the ‘right of return’ for 
the Tutsi diaspora, exerted internal and external pressure on Habyarimana’s regime. 
Habyarimana had exported the logic of ‘nativism’ in his approach to the Kivu-region, he saw 
the Banyamulenge as ‘settlers’ in the region. Mamdani notes, in the early 1980’s 
Habyarimana “backed the creation of an organisation called Maghrivi in Goma, Ruchuru and 
Musisi in Kivu Province… he made two demands in return for his material and political 
support: one, that all Tutsi be defined as non-indigenous, no matter where they lived; and 
two, that all questions of citizenship be settled democratically, by majority vote.”
106
Thus, 
attending to the question of Tutsis in Rwanda, expanded to include a debate of Tutsis in the 
diaspora. By the 1990s, Hutu nationalism spoke of ‘Hutu victimisation’ in the political, social 
and economic realm, and recalled the memory of Tutsi privilege, since the pre-colonial and 
colonial era.
107
This kind of rhetoric was a response to the RPF invasion, but it also coincided 
with tensions in North- Kivu. 
 
In 1993, a ‘land-conflict’ erupted in North-Kivu. Encouraged by the Rwandan regime, and 
the Hutu-led organisation, Maghrivi, the Hutu Banyarwanda in North-Kivu formed a 
coalition between the rich and poor. Central to their demand to the indigenous authorities, 
was the Hutu Banyarwanda wanted their own chief derive from their group, a privilege 
reserved only to indigenous groups.
108
 The local indigenous authorities refused, which led to 
a conflict that “evolved into a confrontation between the Banyarwanda and the recognised 
indigenous groups.”
109
 The growing scarcity of land triggered anti- Banyarwanda violence, 
carried out by the youth of the armed groups, from Nande, Hunde and Nyanga.
110
 This 
demonstrated to Habyarimana that he was the ‘protector of Hutus’, he considered himself the 
“the President of all [Hutus], globally”, and justified his claim to “intervene on behalf of the 
Congolese Hutu.”
111
 Habyarimana’s administration had also been financing and advising 
Hutu organisations in North-Kivu, such as Maghrivi.
112
 Moreover, Mobuto was considered 
a close-ally of Habyarimana, and whenever the Mobuto-army would intervene, Mobuto 
extended his protection over Hutus, and the army often would terrorise and kill Tutsis.
113
 
The collusion between the central Congolese state with the Hutu in North-Kivu, heightened 
fears among the indigenous groups that the state was assisting Hutus in taking over their land 
and possessions. This was coupled by the fact that wholesale expropriation of the land by the 
state, had not only dispossessed many of the ‘indigenous Congolese’ but also repeatedly 
violated customary land rights, broke up patron-client relations and eroded the power of the  
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chief authority.
114
 Fofana argues “this provoked a rebellion that would soon find support 
in South Kivu and Rwanda.”
115
 
 
The ‘citizenship crisis’ has effected the Banyarwanda in North-Kivu since the 1970s, as they 
became more and more disenfranchised. Mamdani asserts, “North-Kivu had been home to a 
long-simmering citizenship crisis, stemming from the fact that the Banyarwanda of Masisi, 
previously recognised as indigenous, had been systematically disenfranchised over three 
decades beginning on the eve of Independence.”
116
 As tensions grow within society and with 
the central state, the more it tends to blur the distinction between ‘immigrants’ and ‘non-
immigrants’ amongst the Banyarwanda, who had come at different periods. It also pitted the 
‘indigenous- majority’ against the ‘Kinyarwanda-speaking minority’, and as tensions amongst 
the Hutu and Tutsi increased in Rwanda, it did so particularly in North-Kivu, where the Hutus 
were trying desperately to be seen as ‘indigenous’ and disassociated themselves with the Tutsi 
Banyarwanda.
117
In South-Kivu, the citizenship crisis only arrived in the early nineties, which 
surfaced because of the expectations of elections in early 1990s and later as a consequence of 
the Rwandan-genocide.
118
Meanwhile, there was also a “growing number of Congolese Tutsi 
who were returning to Rwanda, to join the ranks of the RPF’s army.”
119
 
 
The second pivotal moment for the Hutu/Tutsi diaspora divide, came during and after the 
genocide, where the numbers of the Kinyarwanda-speakers had exploded, particularly in North-
Kivu.
120
The 1981 Citizenship law led to a growing discrimination and victimisation of the 
Banyamulenge, which worsened considerably after the presidential plane was shot down in 
Rwanda, and then in 1995 when the Banyamulenge were ordered to repatriate back to Rwanda 
and Burundi. The anti-Tutsi violence had increased considerably, as Banyamulenge were 
dragged out on to the streets and stoned to death, or forced to leave their land and possessions 
behind and flee. Fofana notes; “the sense of victimisation that developed among Congolese Tutsi 
was pivotal to their rapprochement with Rwandan Tutsis.”
121
 
 
Rwanda’s intervention into DR Congo began in 1996, but since the RPF’s invasion in 
October 1990, there have been flows of people seeking refuge in the UN-run camps in DR 
Congo.Between 1993-1994, an estimated 500, 000 unarmed Hutus fled Rwanda into 
primarily South-Kivu.
122
 Lemarchand notes that during the genocide “the litany of 
cataclysm is all too familiar: over 1 million Hutu refugees pouring across the border into 
Rwanda, creating chaos and penury in many parts of North and South Kivu; repeated cross-
border raids into Rwanda by remnants of the…FAR and interhamwe, accompanied by 
wholesale massacre of ethnic Tutsi, causing many to seek refuge in Rwanda; growing 
evidence of humanitarian aid diverted to extremist hands and of Mobuto’s military assistance 
to the Hutu refugee leaders.”
123
When the RPF claimed military victory, an estimated 2 
million Hutus fled Rwanda into DR Congo, and were settled in refugee camps that were 
ruled by ex-FAR and the Interhamwe (estimated 20 000 in Bukavu and 30-40 000 in Goma), 
thus the general population was being mixed in with the armed militia.
124
 Strauss et al argue 
“In 1994 the rump genocidal regime had relocated to the DRC with more than a million Hutu 
refugees and from there prepared to reinvade Rwanda…”
125
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Mobuto did not have an effective army to control the situation, thus leaving intervention up 
to the U.N and France.
126
Responsibility of the refugees was left in the hands of the UNHCR, 
which would later prove to be a political disaster for Mobuto. As mentioned, the RPF projects 
a strong distrust and hatred towards the French government. Mamdani argues, “the setting up 
of armed camps of Hutu refugees made life hell for the Tutsi in North and South 
Kivu…already the threat of being declared non-citizens by the Mission d’Identification de 
Zaios au Kivu had increased cross-border movement of young Tutsi returning to join the 
RPF for military training.”
127
This gave credence to the spread of “indigenous” organisations 
such as Maghrivi to argue that Tutsis were indeed Rwandan and not Congolese and had 
political allegiance to the RPF. In the beginning Tutsis tried to remain in DR Congo, in spite 
of the bloody ethnic conflict in Masisi in North Kivu, because Congolese Tutsis had 
“everything to lose and little to gain if they moved”.
128
 However, after 1994 they “felt 
physically endangered by the influx of over a million Hutu in armed camps; on the other, 
they felt a vacuum in Rwanda to which they could retreat in safety.”
129
 Some had left with 
the hope of returning to their old land and property but mostly because they were no longer 
welcomed.
130
Congolese weekly newspaper Munanira, published in Uvira, responded 
enthusiastically to the outflow of Banyamulenge refugees, by stating “Finally, the foul has 
been unmasked, The Rwandan of Tutsis ethnicity who has migrated to Zaire since a certain 
time and presents himself as ‘Zai-Rwa’ after intelligently inventing an ethnicity (tribe or 
clan) unknown in the history of Zaire, the Munyamulenge, has been identified and exposed, 
this trickster Zairwa of yesterday is but a Rwandan of a morphology and ideology similar to 
Paul Kagame…”
131
 
 
After the genocide in 1995, the former youth combatants that supported the RPF returned to the 
‘Mulenge’ region in South-Kivu, which triggered two major anti-Tutsi protest marches in Uvira 
and Bukavu.
132
The protestors chanted “Mututsi na imbwa wote ni sawa” (Tutsis and dogs are all 
the same”.
133
Verweijen et al argues that this accelerated the “cycle of tit-for-tat massacres that 
had been generated by the infiltration of Banyamulenge recruits, which drew local militias and 
the Zairian army.”
134
Reyntjens notes “By early 1996, the Tutsi in North-Kivu were victims of 
pogroms, and some degree ethnic cleansing. By mid-1996 a similar campaign started in South-
Kivu, in particular against the Banyamulenge…”
135
 
 
The victimisation of Tutsis by Hutus, ‘indigenous’ Congolese and the central government, 
instilled a conviction in the Rwandan post-genocide power, and confirmed to them that they 
had to extend their protection over Rwandan Tutsis into the Great Lakes region. 
136
This is a 
consequence of the logic of justice in post-genocide Rwanda, specifically ‘victor’s justice and 
victims justice’. Similar to Habyarimana, the RPF indeed saw themselves as the “liberator of 
Tutsi people across the Great Lakes region.”
137
 They claimed that this would be a liberating 
mission into the DR Congo, having seized power in Rwanda, they had to “eliminate the Hutu 
soldiers because they were preparing to launch an assault in Rwanda.”
138
 
 
During 1995-1996, armed groups from the refugee camps in DR Congo, attacked the 
Rwandan provinces in Geisenyi, Ruhengeri, Kibuye and Cyangugu.
139
Kigali had also 
claimed that they had gathered significant intelligence that proved more ‘wide-scale  
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operations’ were being planned, and “possibly an all-out invasion were being 
prepared.”
140
At the 2010 Oppenheimer Lecture: The Challenges of Nation-Building in 
Africa, Paul Kagame re-iterated the first priority and precondition for nation-building, is 
stabilisation and security.
141
 Kagame, along with the support of some Congolese groups and 
the international community, pointed out that the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of 
Rwanda (FDLR)-which included Hutu militia, remnants of the former Rwandan army and 
genocidaires, continued to pose a threat to Rwanda, particularly Tutsis.
142
 Operating on this 
logic, Kagame justifies the incursions in DR Congo as eliminating the threat.
143
 Moreover, it 
is important to note that there is a significant amount of Congolese Tutsi in the ranks of the 
RPF, who as Fofana argues “certainly has the intention of pursuing their liberating mission 
into the Congo, having seized power in Rwanda.”
144
 The outcome was an extension of the 
RPF’s policy from being a territorial conception of the state to a “privileged a notion of a 
political community that extended to the entire Tutsi diaspora.”
145
 
 
Very soon after consolidating power in Rwanda, Kagame started shipping arms and ammunition 
to the Banyamulenge in South-Kivu, who had already began training to fight Hutu militias in 
both of the Kivu-regions.
146
 ‘Behind the ADFL coalition’ (Rwandan, Ugandan, Burundian and 
some Congolese) Kigali engineered a ‘Banyamulenge-led rebellion’  
that successfully overthrew President Mobuto Sese Seko in 1997, which brought 
Laurent Kabila in to power.
147
 
 
Johan Pottier writes about the role of the media and press, who ‘morally legitimised’ 
Kagame’s motives stating “journalist were also actively involved, albeit most unwittingly and 
on for a short period of time, in helping legitimate the ADFL campaign.”
148
Pottier continues 
“they did through arguing, or implying strongly, that the Alliance was homogenous and 
representative of all in eastern Zaire, and by ignoring or underestimating Rwanda’s role in 
the Banyamulenge uprising. Like that new generation of instant academics who viewed 
Rwanda’s pre-colonial past as harmoniously balanced…manipulated journalist ignored 
evidence about society and history that could cast doubt on the self-image the alliance 
projected. The ethnic turmoil in North Kivu just before the Rwandan Hutu refugees arrived, 
which could have been used better to pinpoint potential rifts within the ADFL, was especially 
ignored, as were the relationships that had developed in the 1960s between Kabila, 
Banyamulenge Tutsi, Rwandan Tutsi refugees and autochthonous groups. ”
149
 The ‘moral 
simplification’ that had become perfected in the rhetoric in post-genocide Rwanda, was 
projected in the stated logic of the ADFL, which pieced together its ‘liberating’ claim 
premised on selected events in history. The ADFL relied on “highlighting the persecution of 
Zaire’s Tutsi population (1981, 1994-1996)” but was silent on events such as “1964-1965, 
1992-1993” or the 1993 land conflict that pitted the Hutu and Tutsi Banyarwanda against the 
indigenous groups.
150
Instead, the ADFL spoke of 1964-1965, as a departure point in 
Kabila’s long struggle for justice. Journalist also fed into Kagame’s argument, which 
narrowly focused on ‘the role that refugees had played in racialising anti-Banyamulenge 
sentiment’ which not only obscured an inquiry into the real motive behind the ADFL, but 
also failed to see the Alliance as a political movement.
151
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Lemarchand asserts that a critical turning point for the ADFL, came in 1996, after the 
destruction of refugee camps in October 1996, followed by the “killings of tens and 
thousands of civilian refugees” by units of the RPF- the Rwandan Defence Force 
(RDF).
152
This was the first stage of the “grand politico military strategy aimed at the 
overthrow of the Mobutist dictatorship and its replacement by a Tutsi-led 
protectorate.”
153
The Banyamulenge formed the bulk of the ADFL, and after overthrowing 
Mobuto, they ‘filled most of the administrative positions that were vacated by the 
Congolese, particularly those who were ardent Mobutist supporters.’
154
However, the 
Banyamulenge also suffered the greatest losses, with Lemarchand arguing that “Bukavu 
claimed a larger number of Banyamulenge widows than any other town in the region.”
155
 
 
Kabila had proven that he was unable to attend to two central problems that plagued DR 
Congo and which were the origins of the 1996-1997 war. These were a. “the security of the 
Eastern neighbours” and b. “the status of the Congolese Tutsi.”
156
 Local militias within DR 
Congo, such as the mai-mai and Bembe, launched attacks on Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi, 
and even supported rebel groups within these countries.
157
Reyntjens notes that by late-
1998, this became the major concern for these neighbouring states, and they encouraged 
Kabila to pour more military resources into Eastern Zaire or to “allow the neighbouring 
forces ‘to do their job’.”
158
The former U.S Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, 
Herman Cohen, stated that it was very clear that “Rwanda is saying eastern Kivu must be in 
friendly hands and the only friendly hands are Tutsi…the others wont stand for Tutsi 
hegemony in their area, so they will therefore give safe haven to… those who will help their 
case, including defeated Rwandan Hutus and Zairean soldiers.”
159
A Rwandan commander 
of the Congolese Army made a similar point, re-iterating that “The Tutsi are just a scared 
group, from 1959, 1973, 1994. They will feel no assurance until they are protected by Tutsi 
themselves. That is natural.”
160
 
 
Reyntjens notes that a contributing factor to the increasing anti-Tutsi sentiment, owes to the 
attitude of a number of Rwandan and Congolese Tutsi, civilians and military alike- “who 
behaved as if they were operating in occupied territory.”
161
This led to local populations 
being harassed, insulted and humiliated by the “liberators” who were looting, killing and 
demoting traditional chiefs, whilst also taking up positions in the new administration.
162
 
Thousands of civilians were also killed by the Alliance and Banywarwanda, which lent to the 
rise of new organisations who were organising themselves with a stated objective to “fight 
against Tutsi hegemonism” and which used “violent anti-Tutsi language.”
163
One such 
organisation was the Conseil de la Resistance et de la Liberation du Kivu (CLRK) announced 
that they would “totally refuse cohabitation with the Tutsi refugees and any negotiation 
whatsoever with the enemy, the Tutsi, and to chase the Hima from the territory of Eastern-
Zaire.”
164
The politics of indigeneity and pre-occupation with ‘origins’ was even taken up by 
other leaders, such as Zimbabwe’s President- Robert Mugabe. President Mugabe justified 
Zimbabwe’s involvement in DR Congo arguing that “the rebirth of a 19
th
 century Tutsi-Hima 
Empire’ should by combatted.”
165
 Some Angolan leaders had also bought into this idea, as 
they sought to re-discover their own “Bantuness” and expressed concern over the “Nilotic 
hegmonism.”
166
Increasingly the Banymulenge became viewed as the “fifth-columnist for 
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expansionist tendencies of Rwanda, suspected of wanting to annex the Kivu to an enlarge 
‘Hima-Tutsi empire’ in Central Africa and in this manner ‘balkanise’ the Congo…This 
balkanisation plot became an important lens through which the Banyamulenge’s territorial 
claims were viewed, intensifying the efforts to resist their aspirations.”
167
 
 
Many of the Banyamulenge sought protection under the AFDL, which proved to both a curse 
and a blessing.
168
 There was a growing resentment amongst the Banyamluenge who blamed 
Kigali for their plight, and many families resisted the RPF’s call for them to return to Rwanda. 
This testifies to Kigali’s limited knowledge of the dynamics within the Banyamulenge 
community. Furthermore, the more Kagame spoke of his protection of the Tutsi population, the 
more it confirmed to their opposition that the Banyamulenge are ‘immigrants’ who had no right 
to seek Congolese citizenship or have an ‘ethnic-home’.
169
By 1998, a political movement had 
formed- the FRF, fuelled by their distrust and frustrations towards Kigali, which they saw as 
contributing to their current their current predicament. 
 
The FRF were seeking political and military independence from Rwanda, as well as the 
“most visible route for Banyamulenge emancipation, believing their precarious position in 
the Congo could only be resolved by creating an autonomous state on the Plateaux as part of 
the Congo.”
170
Although there was widespread support, the outbreak of the Second-
Congolese War in 1998 prevented the FRF from mobilising itself as major political force, 
and thus forcing them underground, which reluctantly drove the Banyamulenge towards 
seeking protection from Rwanda.
171
The FRF represents a radical confrontation to the RPF’s 
logic but also demonstrates that their own logic failed to transcend the politics of indigeneity. 
Fofana notes, many of the indigenous Congolese regarded the Rwandan army as “an 
occupation force promoting the interest of Tutsis” which led to; a. Tutsis endangered by 
retaliation attacks from ‘indigenous’ Congolese; and b. Kabila firing his Rwandan chief of 
staff and ordered all Rwandan officials to return home, which severely complicated Rwanda-
Congo relations. 
172
By the late 1990s, supporters of Kabila had also turned their back on the 
Banyamulenge, and went on a murderous campaign targeting them. 
 
Once in Power, Kabila refused to be dictated by the Rwandan and Ugandan foreign powers, 
which led to the Second-Congolese War, beginning in 1998. The presence of both Uganda and 
Rwanda had significantly undermined Kabila’s domestic legitimacy, and Kagame was bold in 
stating that he played a significant role in the war, which proved to be a ‘major embarrassment 
for Kabila’.
173
 French argues “Kabila’s hold on power was saved at this point by Angola and 
Zimbabwe, which rushed troops into Congo to repel the Rwandan invaders.”
174
The regime in 
Kinshasa wanted to ‘liberate’ itself from what was widely viewed as a “Rwandan overrule.”
175
 
Moreover, during the First-Congolese War, former RPF army leaders were found to have 
participated in the “widespread looting of the eastern DRC’s mineral riches and organised 
murders of powerful Hutus”.
176
Lemarchand notes “Ironically, Rwanda was the first to feel 
threatened by the presence of armed Hutu refugees in eastern Congo; its security concerns made 
it mandatory to “neutralise” the camps from which it originated the raids against national 
territory. Expansion quickly followed pre-emption and with the power vacuum created by fall of 
the Mobutist state, the needs to fill it with more  
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trustworthy allies backed by the effective military force became all the more urgent. This is 
where the radical shift occurred in Rwanda’s policy goals…Security meant, in essence, 
continuing access to mineral resources, not only to reward local allies but to strengthen its 
military establishment.”
177
UN investigators reported that the RPF was “directly operating 
mining businesses in Congo” and “more recently, Rwanda has attempted to maintain 
control of regions of eastern Congo through various proxy armies.”
178
 
 
A terrifying example is that of “Congo’s most notorious warlord” Laurent Nkunda, who is a 
Congolese Tutsi that fought in the Rwandan civil-war and subsequent war against Mobuto’s 
regime.
179
In 2002, Nkunda was dispatched by the Rwandan government to Kisangani (inland 
city in eastern DR Congo) which is nearby gold-rich mines that have been fought over by 
Rwandan and Ugandan forces.
180
In 2004, Nkunda declined a ‘military appointment in the 
Congolese transitional government’ and instead chose to back a Tutsi-led insurgency in North-
Kivu, claiming that his objective were aimed at “preventing the impending genocide of  
Tutsi in Congo.”
181
Many observers have noted that these claims are groundless.
182
Thus, 
the RPF has gone from war to war and from one military victory to the next.
183
 Reyntjens  
paraphrases the late 19
th
 Century case of Prussia, and asserts comparatively “Rwanda 
became and army with a state, rather than a state with an army, and it emerged as a major 
factor for regional instability.”
184
 
 
It is during the Second-Congolese War, that the Alliance and specifically Kagame’s 
motives, were called into question. There was growing critique, that what started out as a 
policy to seek justice for the genocide victims and a policy to protect Rwanda’s borders but 
particularly the surviving Tutsi population, had now turned into full-blown revenge attacks 
on the Hutu population in DR Congo. Reyntjens writes “The pretext, or the fig-leaf so to 
speak, for an operation that was so obviously prohibited under international law was another 
outstanding problem in the Zairean-Kivu region…”
185
 
 
In 1998, a UN report was submitted to the UNSC that documented the RPF crimes committed in 
DR Congo, stating, “the systematic massacres of those [Hutu refugees] remaining in Zaire was 
an abhorrent crime against humanity, but the underlying rationale for the decision is material to 
whether the killings constituted genocide, that, is a decision to eliminate, in part, the whole Hutu 
ethnic group.”
186
 The findings are supported by the UNHCR, earlier UN panels, national and 
international NGOs, and investigative journalist. The report concluded “[s]everal incidents 
listed in this report, if investigated and judicially proven, point to circumstances and facts from 
which a court could infer the intention to destroy the Hutu ethnic group in the DRC in part, it 
these were established beyond all reasonable doubt.”
187
 In a 1997 UN report, UN special 
rapporteur Roberto Garreton found that RPA “Commander Jackson” admitted that it was “his 
job to kill Hutu refugees”, adding that “all the male refugees were members of the interhamwe 
militia responsible for the 1994 genocide of the Tutsi.”
188
 Reyntjens states that the ADFL had a 
habit of separating men from women and children for the purposes of committing massacres.
189
 
However, MSF reported in 1997, that gender distinctions were no longer made and “women and 
children were exterminated too.”
190
The ADFL forces and Rwandan allies had also made it 
impossible for  
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humanitarian assistance to gain access to the “starving, exhausted, and sick refugees” by 
either setting up military blockades (such as from Kisangani to Biaro, Kasese and Ubundu), 
or by relocating them out of reach of humanitarian assistance and security.
191
In a press 
conference in November 1996, UN Secretary-General, General Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated 
“two years ago, the international community was confronted with the genocide of the Tutsi 
by weapons. Today we are faced with the genocide of the Hutu by starvation.”
192
Six months 
later, Secretary General Boutros-Ghali’s successor, Kofi Anan, argued that the rebels had 
organised a “slow extermination” of refugees.
193
 
 
The DR Congo filed a case against Rwanda before the ICC, but by Rwanda refusing its 
jurisdiction, the ICC could not take the case further.
194
 Reyntjens argues that although this 
served as a serious “moral warning” Rwanda escaped formal judicial condemnation and 
gained immunity through the ICTR.
195
Between 1997-1998, the massacres continued on a 
large scale, and the Rwandan’s government’s response has always been to minimise the 
death toll by debating the numbers, and deny the victimhood of innocent lives by conflating 
the victims as being “genocide perpetrators, criminal elements and sympathisers with their 
targets”.
196
After 1998, the US, a major supporter of the RPF, publicly critiqued the RPF’s 
human rights record. Although the international community has becoming increasingly 
critical of the post-genocide regime, the legacy of their genocide-guilt has allowed the RPF 
to act with impunity and they have shied away from demanding and imposing 
accountability.
197
This sentiment is best captured by a former British Diplomat (remains 
anonymous) - “we had invested so much in rebuilding Rwanda – did we want to give it all up 
on the basis of rumours?”
198
This statement was made despite Rwanda’s application to join 
the Commonwealth being denied, on the basis of not meeting the Commonwealth’s values. 
The Commonwealth responded with “There are considerable doubts about the commitment  
of the current regime to human rights and democracy. It has not hesitated to use violence 
at home or abroad when it has suited it.”
199
 
 
In December 2002, a peace accord formally announced the end of the Congolese-Wars, and 
a transitional period was to follow from 2003-2006. The transitional arrangement stipulated 
that there had to be power sharing and reconciliation between the political, military and “ex-
belligerents”.
200
Fofana argues, the UN has focused more on negotiations and compromises 
with ‘ex-belligerents’ rather than within communities.
201
 Similar to Rwanda’s transition and 
the Arusha Peace negotiations, constituencies have been excluded from participating in 
negotiating the new political order. They are also viewed narrowly as instigators and as 
having few legitimate political demands, because they are seen to be simply vying for power. 
This has only served to further confirm power for President Joseph Kabila.
202
The 
international community has displayed a certain fear of upsetting the fragile balance in 
eastern DR Congo, and instead has spoken only about ‘power-sharing’ and ‘consensus’ 
building, without addressing the Kivu regions.
203
 
 
Regarding, citizenship, there was a crucial step made, where the new 2006 Constitution 
stipulated that ‘all members of ethnic groups within Congo, at the time of independence, will be 
granted citizenship.
204
However, the law does little to address problems concerning “ethnic 
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citizenship” and “lived citizenship.”
205
Finally, because Rwanda continues to see Tutsis in 
DR Congo as an extension of the Rwandan political community, they continue to abuse the 
weak central authority, and the fact that the new president hasn’t addressed a. security for 
eastern neighbours, or b. security/protection of Tutsi Congolese, Rwanda continues to play 
an undermining role in Congo till today. 
 
Berwouts argues that this was the start of a second phase in Rwanda’s policy, one which, “did 
not have a open and visible presence in Congo, but where it gave military support to the rebel 
movement to protect its interest and to maintain its impact on Congolese politics.”
206
In 2008, 
Nkunda (apparently encouraged by Kagame) led a new offensive of Tutsi rebels, seeking to 
capture the city Goma, which displaced 200, 000 civilians.
207
A UN report detailed “Rwanda’s 
close ties to the warlord, and concluding that he was being used to advance Rwanda’s economic 
interest in Congo’s eastern hinterlands.”
208
Following this report, and increased pressure from 
the international community, Kagame made a surprising decision to move to arrest Nkunda. 
209
After Nkunda’s arrest, President Joseph Kabila agreed to allow a joint-military operation in 
eastern Congo against Hutu rebels, which has allowed for both Hutu and Tutsi militias to remain 
active, making long-lasting peace an elusive goal.
210
 
 
6.5 The Crisis of Citizenship and Belonging 
 
The following part of this chapter will briefly explore the implications of the political 
crisis, namely the post-colonial citizenship crisis. I will introduce two research-studies that 
have collected valuable information on the experiences refugees are faced with. It 
highlights the continuation of the unresolved political crisis. 
 
The Second-Congolese War had claimed an estimated 2 million lives, which is more than that 
of the Rwandan Genocide and Darfur combined.
211
In 2015 ‘World Without Genocide’ 
estimated that after the war, a further 6 million people have since died, with 45 000 dying a 
month.
212
 Moreover, 3.4 million people are said to be displaced within DR Congo and 2 
million refugees are living within Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda. 
213
Resolving the 
refugee crisis involves attending to the major security issue for each country in the region, 
developing an inclusive participatory economy that contributes to local economies, 
humanitarian and social welfare (health-care) support, addressing the environmental impact it 
will have, the ‘land question’, and crucially important is citizenship.
214
Kitenge Fabrice 
Tunda, asserts that ‘voluntary repatriation’, ‘community integration’, and ‘permanent 
residency’ are resolutions that can support the return.
215
The 2006 International Conference 
of the Great Lakes Region Pact (ICGLR) addressed the issues on ‘Security, Stability and 
Development.’ The Conference centralised discussions on democracy, peace building, and 
security.
216
 Arguably, it is important to dissect the universalism of these notions. Therefore, I 
will discuss citizenship the theoretical and practical implications of the citizenship law in 
Rwanda, and briefly address DR Congo. 
 
Citizenship in Rwanda is determined by the Organic Law (no. 30/2008 of 25/07/2007) 
relating to Rwandan Nationality. Briefly, the Rwandan citizenship law states that it 
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recognises dual citizenship (Article 3), and grants nationality to returnees who have been 
deprived of their nationality between 1 November 1959-December 1994.
217
 Therefore, this 
‘protects’ Rwandan ‘nationals’ living in the diaspora, and hints towards a prioritisation of old 
caseload refugees and returnees. The citizenship laws also stipulates that nationality can be 
deprived if the person has the “intention of betraying the country” (Article 19/2).
218
 In 
Article 24, the section regarding ‘Prohibition to recover nationality’ stipulates that if the 
person is a “security threat whom it had been decided to expel from the country” serves as 
grounds for denying citizenship.
219
This has been problematic because of the post-genocide 
regime’s obsession with security, and the ‘genocide laws’ have been used to exclude some 
from gaining citizenship. 
 
The Citizenship Rights in Africa Initiative states that Rwanda’s citizenship law has been 
generous in allowing dual-citizenship, and naturalisation of Rwandans by origin or children 
with Rwandan parents.
220
 In 2010, the governments of Rwanda, DR Congo and Uganda, 
under the facilitation of the UNHCR, signed a tripartite agreement that would end those 
seeking exile and the status of refugees. As a follow up, in 2013 the UNHCR recommended 
that Rwanda should invoke the Cessation Clauses, which “are built into the 1951 Refugee 
Convention and the 1969 Organization of African Unity Refugee Convention”. 
221
 This 
clause recommends that Rwandan refugees between 1998-2011 would no longer qualify for 
refugee status in their host countries, premised on the assessment that Rwanda is safe to 
return to regarding human rights protection.
222
 By July 2013, 100,000 Rwandan refugees 
had lost their refugee status and were faced with becoming stateless.
223
 
 
A Ugandan research-study report: ‘A Dangerous Impasse: Rwandan Refugees in Uganda,’ 
has produced insightful information about why Rwandan refugees in Uganda, are reluctant 
to return. The Rwandan newspaper, The New Times, which is state-owned, responded to the 
report by refuting its findings and wrote a scathing review stating “Whereas researchers were 
interested in gathering information from refugees, the inclusion of falsehoods and blatant lies 
defies the idea of their impartiality… it instead became a channel for the old propaganda 
propagated by the same groups that held captive Rwandans in the former Zaire in the 
1990s.”
224
 
 
The refugee respondent that were interviewed for this research-study are from Nakivale 
refugee camp, Uganda. The research notes that these refugees have come under increasing 
pressure to return to Rwanda, and “they are an on-going reminder of ethnic tensions that are 
supposed to have been addressed, but the Government of Rwanda has strongly pursued the 
return of all citizens accordingly.”
225
 The Rwandan government cites stability and 
economic growth as the reason for those in exile to return, yet many continue to resist 
return. The respondents listed a number of reasons, which broadly relate to “if they return 
they will not be safe in Rwanda, let alone have access to their rights as citizens of the 
country.”
226
Succinctly, the research found that “the refugees overwhelmingly view the 
regime as repressive. There was frequent referencing to the fact that dissent in many aspects 
of public life and economic life is not tolerated, and those who question the regime are 
subjected to human rights violations ranging from discrimination in employment to 
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imprisonment and forced disappearances.”
227
They stated that “Specifically, ethnicity is being 
used as a basis for repression.”
228
 Moreover, the research findings suggest that “…the genocide 
– and the legacy of guilt, heart-searching and recriminations that have surrounded it  
– is being used by the Government of Rwanda as a smokescreen for political 
repression, particularly through the association of Hutu identity with the genocide. 
Images of Hutu brutality during the genocide are evoked to mute criticism.”
229
 
 
The respondents demonstrate that “the accusation of participation has become one of the 
most feared instruments of repression…and most refugees who had previously tried to return 
home form Rwanda…recounted having had a negative experience of the gacaca process and 
bodies linked to it.” 
230
They shared stories of torture, imprisonment and having family 
members killed. Finally, the refugees have revealed since the announcement of a repatriation 
‘deadline’ that many have had their land confiscated and given to the new Congolese 
refugees, their rations reduced, and they have been cut off from some social services as a 
means to force them to return.
231
The study notes that Rwanda is not only preventing 
refugees from returning, but its domestic and foreign policies are in fact generating new 
refugees. A quarter of those interviewed were refugees that have been in Uganda since 2001, 
some of which had fled into exile for the second or third time.
232
 This is a very different 
reality than what the Rwandan government projected to the international community. Macro-
level recommendations from the report entail improvement of the political climate in 
Rwanda. The report argues that it is critical that “Rwanda engage with the genuine concerns 
expressed by its refugees, open up its political space, and allow for full and equal civic and 
political participation of all its citizens.”
233
 A second recommendation is that the 
“promulgation and reinforcement of singular versions of history…create ethnically aligned 
divisions between victims and perpetrators.”
234
 Durable solutions for refugees require 
looking at them as individuals and not groups. Lastly, the report urges both Rwanda and 
Uganda to ensure refugee rights upon return, and must not enforce return.
235
 
 
Rwandan-born journalist Yoletta Nyange, states that the new invoked cessation clause leaves 
refugees with three options; “voluntarily repatriate to Rwanda, appeal to challenge the cessation 
clause to stay in their host country, or apply for asylum again in a third country.”
236
 Nyange 
points to the Institute for Economics and Peace’s 2013 Global Peace Index, to indicate that 
Rwanda is the least ‘peaceful’ nation in the world (ranking 135 out of 162 states) and is not 
conducive for return.
237
Furthermore, the majority of the population ‘living inside and outside of 
Rwanda are overwhelmingly Hutu’, thus engendering a problem if the state regards those who do 
not wish to return as harbouring a “dark, ugly past to hide and are running away form 
prosecution.”
238
 At ‘Rwanda Day’ in the Netherlands, Kagame addressed the Rwandan diaspora, 
stating “Our coming here is a way of inviting you to repatriate. Even if you would have 
something that makes you detest your country, we can forgive you because you are one of 
us...”
239
 Kagame further ‘assured’ them by continuing, “no worries as of the size of Rwanda, 
where old regimes denied some people a home because Rwanda was too small to accommodate 
its returnees, We are not like the previous regimes.”
240
In response, Manzi Mutuyimana, a 
Rwandan refugee in Uganda, expressed that “[Since May 2009], no Rwandan refugee of any 
profile, either urban or rural, has expressed [a] willingness to return  
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back home…”
241
Another refugee interviewed by IRIN news agency, shared that, “If things 
change in Rwanda, there will [be] no need of declarations of... cessation clause... We shall be 
willing to go to our country without their help”.
242
 
 
An additional issue that Rwanda faces, concerns the situation of the Kinyarwanda-Speakers 
who live “outside” of Rwanda, and are considered “Rwandans” due to their language and 
ancestry.
243
 Citizenship Rights in Africa Initiative, notes that this has often been to the 
“detriment of their rights” and there is perception that this would lead these people to seek 
‘naturalisation’ in Rwanda.
244
However, the research-study ‘Shadows of Return: The 
Dilemma of Congolese Refugees in Rwanda’, reported that refugees in Rwanda “felt that in 
practice this option was not open to them and that they felt excluded in Rwanda”.
245
The 
respondents noted that they haven’t been able to integrate locally in Rwanda, and that they 
“see returning to Congo as offering the best opportunity to shed their refugee status and re-
establish livelihoods.”
246
However, following the 2010 UNHCR Tripartite agreement, local 
communities within DR Congo have expressed that they strongly oppose the repatriation of 
the Banyarwanda refugees. 
 
Lucy Hovil, who is one of the researchers in the study (Shadow of Return…’ states) asserts 
“Rumour and speculation are rife in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC) North 
Kivu province regarding the anticipated return of Congolese (Tutsi) refugees in 
Rwanda…feelings of hostility towards the idea of their “return” are widespread.”
247
 Central 
to the study are questions addressing citizenship, belonging, and land access. The reasons 
for “suspicions” regarding the return of these refugees, is because they are perceived to “not 
really be Congolese”, and some have argued that their “repatriation is, in fact, part of a 
broader scheme by Rwanda to appropriate land in North Kivu.”
248
Some also accuse the UN 
agencies operating in North-Kivu, as having a ‘hidden agenda’ and promoting Rwandan 
encroachment on Congolese territory by facilitating the return of ‘Rwandan’ refugees.
249
 
 
Hovil argues, that in part, ‘suspicions’ have been shaped by “the way in which individuals and 
groups are seen to be included and excluded in the messy geopolitical context of eastern Congo, 
where violence, sustained by an insidious war economy, has become the main currency of power, 
and where the pursuit of land is heavily laden with economic and symbolic importance…ethnic 
categories remain a potent mechanism for mobilising people, including the creation of ethnic-
aligned militias.”
250
 The study shows that there are three reasons that have created this ‘impasse’ 
for repatriation. These are: 1. “the fact that these refugees speak Kinyarwanda identifies them 
with Rwanda and leads some, intolerant of cross border identities, to label them as Rwandan and 
not true Congolese”, 2. “the fact that the majority of this group is Tutsi identifies them with the 
current regime in Rwanda”, and 3. “the fact that this group fled to Rwanda is seen as 
confirmation of their sympathies.”
251
These arguments lead to an overall assumption that is being 
made, which is “if they were never really Congolese, then they are not really refugees.”
252
These 
factors have conspired to work against the refugee’s legitimacy as Congolese citizens, and as the 
study notes the “very basis on which they are looking forward to repatriation is seen as 
fraudulent.”
253
Many of these refugees stated that even though they are recognized legally as 
‘Congolese refugees’ their  
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return has extremely fraught with problems, and they never imagined that 14 years later they 
would still be living as refugees in camps, without the possibility of returning safely to 
Congo. The respondents stated “Most importantly, repatriation offers the prospects of 
(re)instating their Congolese identity and proving their legitimacy to belong.”
254
 
 
The study argues that “The government needs to be unequivocal in stating that these 
refugees are not only legitimately entitled to return home, but are welcome as a genuine 
component of the rebuilding of a country that has been thoroughly torn apart by divisions 
and polarisation.”
255
The respondents expressed that they “need to return as recognised 
Congolese citizens and not as Tutsi or Kinyarwanda speakers.”
256
Secondly, they recognise 
that “their acceptance as citizens by the national government, though critical, will have 
limited salience if they are not accepted in the local areas from which they fled, and where 
they would try to reclaim land and property.”
257
The study proposes that a durable solution 
would require repatriations and citizenship to be reconceptualised as essentially being a 
‘political process’ rather than simply a humanitarian one.
258
Repatriation needs to be thought 
about as ‘restoring the political contract between the state and citizen that was broken by 
their exile.’ 
259
Moreover, repatriation needs to be “constantly linked to the broader process 
of post-conflict (or post-authoritarian) reconstruction: the ability for individuals and groups 
to secure citizenship, therefore, becomes not only an indicator that exile has ended, but that 
broader issues of instability have been, or are being, addressed—that there is a functioning 
state to which people can attach themselves.”
260
Finally, the study recognizes that “the local 
context in which repatriation takes place is of huge importance…The predicament of this 
group of Congolese refugees provides a prism through which to view the multiple dynamics 
and tensions that remain fundamentally unresolved in North Kivu—tensions that are both 
highly localized and yet interact with the broader national and regional context. These 
tensions revolve around polarized constructions of identity, mobilized and manipulated by 
those seeking to gain power.”
261
 
 
6.6 Rethinking ‘Citizenship’ 
 
This final section in the chapter troubles ‘citizenship in theory’, as a means to think through 
the post-colonial citizenship crisis that has been inherited through the colonial legacy. As the 
above section demonstrates, questions of citizenship beyond the legal realm, continue to 
hinder the return or repatriation of refugees. 
 
This dissertation has chosen to shift away from the kind of ‘identity-based’ arguments that have 
come to present metanarratives and over-simplified explanations concerning post-colonial 
African states, which also subjects the continent to criterion of modernity, particularly liberal 
democracy. Samuel Huntington’s seminal piece, Clash of Civilisations, which considers 
people’s cultural and religious identities as sources of the new conflict, and Francis Fukuyama’s 
argument that the “post-cold war would signal the end of history”, have been noticeable.
262
 
Whereas Huntington’s work has gained significance because of the ‘identity-driven nature of 
his analysis’, it cannot account for how “group identities have assumed not only primary means 
of social expression, but also of rights and privileges in the 
 
197 
 
 
 
 
polity.”
263
 Moreover, tenuous relationships between the governed and those who govern 
have revealed the juxtapositions between civil law and customary law, or the continuation of 
a bifurcated state. Thus, universalised notions such as ‘democracy’, ‘nation-states’ and 
‘citizenship criterion’ need to be problematized for who it considers citizens, and by its very 
composition, can it allow all residents to be encompassed under a singular political 
community, as active members of the central state? 
 
The relationship between citizenship and the state has evolved since the beginning of western 
political theory. Traditional conceptualisations emerged from Aristotle, who argue, “a state is 
nothing but a compound made up of citizens, and this compels us to consider who should 
properly be called a citizen and what a citizen really is.”
264
 ‘Social Contract’ theorist such as 
Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, recognised citizenship as “those in the political community” 
which thus meant problematizing the notion of ‘nation-state.
265
 For both Aristotle and 
Rousseau, their work on citizenship was limited to “small city-states” and saw citizens as 
necessary active political agents in order to maintain the notion of a state.
266
 With the 
problematizing of the nation-state, particularly as the idea of ‘the state’ began to evolve, the 
meaning of citizenship was further shaped by the introduction of territory, conquest and 
sovereignty. Thus through exclusion and exploitation it produced the subject. These 
formulations also produced identity and notions of legitimacy that are exploited by their 
relationship to power. 
 
T.H. Marshall thought about the relationship of the state and the individual, through civil, 
political, and social rights.
267
These include “the right to free speech, association, due process 
and equality before the law, franchise and social welfare.”
268
 This further added duties and 
privileges to the meaning of the state and the rights of the individual. From a different 
prescriptive, Charles Tilly argues that citizenship includes the categories of “role”, “tie” and 
“identity”.
269
Moreover, as a category, citizenship designates a set of actors-citizens-
distinguished by their shared privileged position vis-à-vis a particular state.”
270
 As a “tie” 
citizenship identifies “a continuing series of transactions between person’s and agents of a 
given state in which each has enforceable rights and obligations uniquely by virtue of (1) The 
person’s membership in an exclusive category, the native born plus naturalised and (2) the 
agent’s relationship to the rather than any other national authority the agent may enjoy.”
271
 
There is a sense of reciprocity in the relationship/contract between citizen and state. Who has 
access to citizenship has varied depending on the state, and may be dependent on ‘birth 
right’, descent/ancestral, or naturalisation. Although the concept of citizenship and state has 
changed, their relationship to one another remains closely connected.
272
 
 
It isn’t difficult to see how ‘western theorising and the criterion for state and citizens’, poses 
critical challenges for questions on citizenship for the post-colonial African state. Moreover, if 
(broadly) the modern-state is a territory and collective of citizens, than the nation-state 
“identifies a particular set of persons as its citizens and defines others as non-citizens, as 
aliens.”
273
 Thus, the nation-state is defined by its ‘sovereignty; authority; legitimacy; and 
identity’. Basil Davidson describes the emergence of the nation-state in Europe in the 
nineteenth century, “it appeared obvious that the continents manifest of supremacy of power 
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derived from the God-directed work of forming nations from cultures, and nation-states from 
nations.”
274
 Nationalism drew from a consciousness, or as historian and philosopher Hans 
Kohn articulates, “Nationalism is first and foremost a state of mind…an act of 
consciousness” which became further refined through ridding the nation of ‘impurities’, and 
thus the symbiotic relationship is produced, where the “nation-state strengthens 
nationalism.”
275
 Therefore, the “idea of the state or nation-state cannot be meaningful 
without citizenship.”
276
 The institution of citizenship is what reinvents the state and gives 
meaning to. Basil Davidson might be wrong in thinking that the ‘nation-state’ was inherited 
from colonialism. Instead, the colonial state ruled through territorial associations and 
federations and did not impose ‘nation-states’. Secondly, one needs to think critically about 
whether the demand for nation-states, was actually a demand for anti-colonial nationalism. 
Thirdly, we need to trouble the notion of ‘democracy’ and the demands made by liberal 
human rights solutions that overlook the troubling practices or criterion for citizenship in 
post-colonial states.
277
 
 
In Rwanda, the logic of the state is that in order to ‘build and modernise the nation-state’; it 
must pursue a particular kind of identity, namely citizenship, which must be prioritised above 
all other identities.
278
 This is understood as ‘Rwandicity’. Cori Wielenge argues that the 
citizenship discourse in Rwanda echoes the discourse of liberal-democracies.
279
 However, in 
reality, as I have demonstrated in previous chapters, abiding by liberal democratic principles 
has been a haphazard affair in post-genocide Rwanda, and the government hasn’t exactly 
practiced what it preaches. Moreover, as Wielenge notes, the paternalistic attitude of the state 
tends to look at ‘ordinary Rwandans’ as being this “primordial public”, which informs the 
way it interacts with Rwandans, specifically in a disciplining manner and top-down 
approach.
280
Said Adejumobi notes that many African states still follow patterns of state-
governance established during colonialism, in which “rights, privileges and entitlements were 
institutionally divided along ethnic lines, creating a sense of inequality.”
281
Furthermore, 
Adejumobi asserts that the issue at stake is “not whether multiple groups exist, but whether 
the state through citizenship, can create a sense of equality.”
282
Adejumobi thus argues, “The 
way forward with regards to resolving ethnic conflict for African states is to take ‘liberal 
democracy’ very seriously.” However, the problem with this, is that it takes the 
conceptualisation of citizenship by liberal-democracy as the ‘cornerstone’, and 
problematically implies that identities can be reconstructed (“to result in a particular kind of 
citizenship and citizen participation”) in the post-colonial context, whilst ignoring identity 
conceptions that have “existed beyond the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial divides 
and that are currently emerging.”
283
Also, Adejumobi doesn’t address how liberal democracy 
has been an accomplice in political violence born from political identities and the institutions 
of rule. 
 
The evidence and discussion in this chapter, demonstrate that to democratise the post-colonial 
state and re-think citizenship in post-colonial African states, would mean to attend to the 
crisis embedded in institutions of rule that were inherited from colonialism. Mamdani argues 
that when the post-colonial state is confronted with a crisis, the first impulse is to “turn the 
colonial world upside down again” and to return to the question of who is the native and who 
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is the settler- the ‘politics of indigeneity’.
284
 Instead Mamdani offers an alternative 
solution, which would seek to “reform the very structure which has institutionally 
underwritten the distinction between indigenous and the non-indigenous, the Settler and the 
Native, into the division between the civic and the customary.”
285
 
 
The insidious nature of colonialism, was that it constituted identities into political identities, 
in Rwanda ‘race’ underscores the salient political identities, and in DR Congo and Uganda, it 
was a combination of both race and ethnicity that came to politicise identities. Thus, if the 
settler identity was racialised, then the native identity was ethnicised.
286
 Secondly, the post-
colonial regimes mistakenly retained and have long preserved this idea, that ‘customary law’ 
and the ‘customary home’ are symbols of “African tradition”, and particularly a tradition 
indigenous to Africa.
287
 In the aftermath of the 1994 genocide, the RPF had declared 
Rwanda “liberated”.
288
 By ‘liberated’, the RPF meant, “liberation from the colonial mind 
set, true de-colonisation.”
289
 Emerging from a Marxist ideology (mass organisation and 
popular mobilisation) the RPF’s ostensible ideological underpinnings was in line with the 
“Second Liberation” guerrilla movements of the 1980s/90s, such as that of Yoweri Museveni 
and the National Resistant Movement (NRM).
290
Museveni maintains that “anticolonial 
struggles of the 1960s had failed their people and had sustained (mainly ethnic) 
division.”
291
Marina Rafti argues the ‘Second-Liberation armed struggles “waged wars 
against the regimes in their countries with the aim of “liberating” Africans from western 
domination and of preparing their populations through “indigenous” institution for a distinct 
type of “African democracy”.”
292
 Within this logic, the post-genocide regime constructed 
the notion of ‘Rwandicity’ that would serve as the basis of citizenship and reconciliation and 
defines state-society relationship.
293
 
 
However, whereas as the ‘independent governments’ vowed to end the ‘perversion of 
colonialism’ by restoring the rights and political prerogative of the indigenous over the 
‘foreigners’/ the strangers, which merely reproduced the bifurcated state of two type of 
citizens.
294
There are two types of citizenship; ethnic citizenship and civic citizenship. For 
the poor, ethnic citizenship is far more important than civic citizenship, because it is the only 
means of gaining land, one can claim land customarily.
295
 It would also provide one with a 
sense of belonging to the territory. The post-colonial Congolese state, has socialised the 
Banyamulenge to understand that the idea that having a customary territory is a precondition 
for being recognised as an ‘authentic Congolese group’, and is the only form of redress 
exclusion and being deprived of access to a local authority and land of their own.
296
The 
problem with this is whenever there is a crisis such as land scarcity, economic downfall, 
political competition or conflict, ethnic distinctions are sharpened. It also gives more power 
to the agents of ‘customary law’ who reproduce and reshape subjectivity in the post-colonial 
state. Interestingly, it is movements such as the Tutsi Banyarwanda in Congo, who have 
challenged the notion of rights and ethnic strangers. 
 
Attending to the ‘institutions of rule’ is an incredibly difficult task. In societies which are 
divided by political majorities and political minorities, democracy is often equated with 
“unqualified majoritarian rule”, a political set-up where the winner take all and has the power 
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and “unchecked possession of the majority.”
297
It would also challenge the modes of 
power, citizenship and justice that have come to preserve benefits for some groups over 
others. However, it is arguably an acutely necessary for political reform to take place, and 
to intervene into the cycle of violence, which can also respond to the refugee crisis. 
 
There are important lessons that the region can draw from Rwanda’s colonial experience and 
post-colonial political crisis. To begin with, historically, the post-colonial leadership ignores 
that both Hutu and Tutsi are victims of colonial institutions of rule, and both were colonised 
subjects. Tutsis were defined as a race, but didn't gain civic rights, and were victims in the 
civic sphere.
298
 Hutus were defined as an indigenous ‘ethnic’ group, but were ruled by Tutsi 
chiefs under the Native Authority, thus they became victims in the ethnic sphere.
299
Both 
developed a “victim consciousness” that is observed in the 1959 Social Revolution and 
October 1990 Invasion. Both relied on history- to never forget the past, in order to secure 
‘power, citizenship, and justice’ for their group, who they perceive as being the ‘eternal 
victims of politics.’ The dilemma of post-genocide Rwanda today is that the genocide 
“retrenched Hutu and Tutsi as salient identities” and in post-genocide Rwanda what 
continues to thrive is a “chasm that divides Hutu as a political majority from Tutsi as a 
political minority. While the minority demands justice, the majority calls for democracy.”
300
 
Within this predicament, the Tutsi minority will always fear democracy as it sees it as a mask 
for the unfinished genocide, and the Hutu majority will always fear justice, as it sees it as a 
ploy to achieve power. 
 
Helen Hintjens argues, the approach of the post-genocide government “resembles the 
projection of Jewish victimhood into the past by the official history commemorated by the 
Israeli authorities.”
301
In a sub-section of the ‘official History’ on the Government of 
Rwanda’s website, it refers to the “killings of Tutsi in 1959” as the beginning of ‘a habit’ of 
anti-Tutsi killing under the two previous Hutu-dominated regimes, and the “precursor of the 
genocide.”
302
Hintjens, argues that the implications is that the post-genocide regime sees the 
past two regimes as “implicitly genocidal through and through”, which is a highly 
contentious and divisive position.
303
This allows for the assumption to be made that “a social 
grouping with some identifiable common origins has been victimised continuously over a 
long period of times” and “members of this group have been forced into a diaspora, into 
exile, and have a right to return-in this case to Rwanda- to reclaim their promised land denied 
to them by a history of persecution.”
304
Robin Cohen best describes the post-genocide 
leadership as operating on ‘victim diasporic nationalism’.
305
 For the RPF, they have a 
personal experience of exile that adds claim to this argument. Similar to the 1959 Social 
Revolution, the RPF also sees themselves as being ‘revolutionary’ for Rwanda’s politics, and 
the ‘liberators’. However, as it has been in the past, the RPF’s logic of victimhood continues 
to entrap them in the history they argue to be trying to transcend. Post-genocide nationalism 
is based on the myth of a diasporic Tutsi victimhood, which compounds the lived realities of 
the diaspora, and which it uses to morally justify its incursions in DR Congo. Hintjens argues 
this “cannot form the basis for unifying Rwandan nationalism”, and also “simplifies the 
whole experience into goodies versus baddies”, which cannot open up a more democratic 
future or more inclusive ways of constructing citizenship for the future.
306
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 The Congolese-wars had pitted the “indigenous” majority against the divided “nonindigenous 
minority”, and has forced the Congolese Tutsis to ally with the post-genocide Rwandan state, 
whilst the Congolese Hutu become strongly opposed to it.
307
Thus, the war has “crystallised 
two volatile regional diaspora- one Hutu, the other Tutsi-each determined to set the region on 
fire if the demands it considered legitimate were not met.”
308
The ‘moral responsibility’ that 
the RPF feels for the survival of Tutsis has taken on a ‘diasporic’ character, which requires 
returning to the critique of ‘victors justice and victims justice’, which has informed the mode 
of power and citizenship in Rwanda. As I have demonstrated in this chapter, what began as a 
‘policy of justice and security for Tutsis’ has now turned into revenge. To understand Hutus 
and Tutsis as both being victims, would enable breaking out of the cycle of violence, where 
the victims of yesterday become the perpetrators today. This is crucially important also for 
the regional refugee crisis and on-going conflict. Mamdani asserts that the “internal pressure 
in Rwanda is now joined to a regional dynamic as two diasporas- one Hutu, the other Tutsi-
confront each other in a life-and-death encounter. Both diasporas are animated, not simply by 
the cycle of revenge in Rwanda but also by the common regional inheritance that has been 
translated into a mode of citizenship that denies full citizenship to residents it brands ethnic 
strangers.”
309
 
 
Mamdani proposes that “Political justice for the Tutsi cannot mean simply identifying and 
holding perpetrators of massacres accountable.”
310
It would mean for the institutions of rule, 
as well as the judicial system, to think out of the trap that reproduces two kinds of citizens: 
one indigenous, the other not.
311
Thus, indigeneity as the test for rights and citizenship, has to 
be deconstructed and left behind, as a prerequisite for re-thinking citizenship in post-genocide 
Rwanda. In response to the post-colonial citizenship crisis in the Great Lakes region, which 
has produced Tutsi as the ‘proto-type settler’ and Hutu as the ‘proto-type native’, Mamdani 
argues it “would require making a clear distinction between the cultural and political 
identities, and thereby to depoliticise historical facts of migration…”
312
To get rid of the 
politics of indigeneity, is to remove race and ethnicity, as well as ‘native’ and ‘settler’, as 
political identities in the post-colonial state. Hutu and Tutsi can no longer be understood as 
‘natural identities’, it is the historical state formation that through politicisation has 
‘naturalised’, thus producing them to be political identities. Furthermore, to reform the state 
and its institutions, that define citizenship, would mean power would have to recognise equal 
citizenship rights for all based on “a single criterion: residence.”
313
Finally, to differentiate 
between political and cultural identities, is to “accent the commitment to live under a 
common roof over the recognition of a common history-no matter what the overlap between 
them-as the basis for a shared future.”
314
 
 
6.7 Conclusion: 
 
The crisis of citizenship and belonging in the region are a result of the confluence of Rwanda’s 
post-genocide political crisis and the post-colonial citizenship crisis in the region. Shaped by 
‘victors justice’ and a ‘victims justice’ rationale, the post-genocide power has asserted a Tutsi 
nationalism that has taken on a diasporic character. The preoccupation with 
 
202 
 
 
 
 
justice and security provided the post-genocide power the pretext for military intervention 
into DR Congo. Central to the regime’s concern was safeguarding the survival of Tutsis, and 
through the ‘genocide credit’ afforded Tutsis, the RPF asserts a moral obligation to protect 
all surviving Tutsis against Hutu militias in the region. This isn’t to deny the real security 
threat that the Hutu militia posed, but arguably the logic of the post-genocide power has 
created new security threats, for Rwanda and Hutus and Tutsis in the diaspora, that needs to 
critically interrogated. Furthermore, this chapter demonstrated that Hutu and Tutsi were able 
to evolve into diasporic communities, because of the failure of DR Congo to disinherit its 
own colonial legacy. As the genocide crisis spilled over into DR Congo, the historical 
limitations of the post-colonial state were exposed through the way in which local politics 
and the central government chose to address the crisis, which is by returning to the politics of 
indigeneity. Every time it does so, it redefines and shapes new subjectivity that become 
victims of the political crisis. The location of the Congolese political crisis lies in the 
‘customary home’, which has characterised the Banyamulenge as ‘non-indigenous’ and 
descendants of Rwanda, rather than seeing their lived identities as resident in Congo. Until 
the institutions of rule are de-ethnicised and reformed, the mode of citizenship will continue 
to determine rights, material benefits (such as land), and belonging based on indigeneity. 
Today, the Tutsi diaspora has come to be seen globally as settlers; reluctantly forced to seek 
protection from the post-genocide power. The consequence is that the ‘indigenous/native’ 
groups of Congo are afraid that ‘Tutsi nationalism’ is seeking territorial expansion and power 
for DR Congo, thus they violently oppose rights and citizenship to be granted to the 
Banyamulenge. This has fuelled the cycles of war, and power and justice are politicised into 
being a ‘native’s prerogative’. The politics of the post-genocide power (and its ‘victims 
justice’ rationale) has contributed directly to the plight of Hutus in the diaspora, which some 
have referred to in the literature as being a ‘genocide of the Hutus targeted through violence 
and as an outcome of the humanitarian crisis’. Thus, both communities are victims of the 
violent political crisis. The case of two different influxes of Tutsis into DR Congo due to 
Tutsi-related political problems, is significant for (re)thinking out of the politicisation of 
Hutu and Tutsi and redirecting a critical interrogation of the institutions of rule. It also means 
that in thinking about justice, we have to examine identities at different points of state-
formation, thus to historicise them. I returned to Rwanda’s political crisis because it lies at 
the epicentre of the regional crisis. The extensive human loss and complex web of the Great 
Lakes refugee crisis requires a commitment from each regime to attend to their inherited 
colonial legacy, and it requires a regional perspective in thinking towards a resolution to the 
citizenship crises. This chapter argues that lies in deconstructing the political identities that 
have become ‘naturalised’ through state-formation, because the colonial institutions of rule 
have been retained. This presents two types of citizens: one ethnic and one civic. This 
chapter proposed Mamdani’s contribution, which is to re-think citizenship based on a 
singular criterion: residence. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
The legacy of Nuremburg has shaped the understanding of justice to be criminal justice and 
defines responsibility for mass violence as criminal responsibility. The logic of Nuremburg 
can be traced to a well-established tradition in which the victors of inter-state war have the 
power to decide on justice for the losers. ‘Criminal justice’ became a universalised principle 
through the rise of the human rights regime, which has come to determine ‘human wrongs’ 
that gain legal recognition through international law. Particularly in cases of mass violence, 
criminal justice is understood as being the most morally acceptable and politically viable 
option to ignite a new political and social order. A central argument made by these regimes 
and practices, is that they are apolitical, and can effectively prohibit justice from being 
politicised. Complicit to this logic and the legacy of Nuremburg is the ‘Holocaust effect’. 
The Holocaust has become the standard-reference for human suffering experienced in 
genocide, and Nuremburg became the template as the response. Comparisons are often drawn 
between the German-Holocaust and Rwanda, particularly relating to the purposeful manner 
of the annihilation of the Tutsis and Jews. This dissertation has shifted away from this 
comparative analogy, because both cases have experienced their own catastrophic atrocities, 
born from distinctly different political and historical contexts. What these cases do share is 
that the ‘victor’ decided on the human suffering experienced in their genocides, and 
determined the justice meted out for the victims. 
 
The Rwandan-genocide violently re-inscribed the political distinction between Hutu and 
Tutsi, and tore the social fabric of Rwandan society, as distrust, fear, horrific sexual and 
psychological violence took place. As in the case of the German-Holocaust, international law 
and the human rights regime provided the initial framework for making sense of the 
genocide violence, particularly the popular agency of participation by ‘ordinary Rwandans’. 
The obsession and with the nature of the violence, quickly led to sensationalised simple 
generalisations, and explanations that lacked historical background. This is also a 
consequence of criminal justice, where the trials provide a judicial record that becomes the 
historical record, and obscures interpretations of the genocide and the historical inquiry. 
Those ‘100-days of massacres’ have been shaped into the event of Rwanda’s history, which 
is looked at through a ‘genocide lens’. It has also produced a ‘genocide framework’ that has 
led to a pre-occupation with preventing another genocide, and the resumption of war. 
 
My objective has been to critically interrogate ‘victims justice’, as a means to redirect 
attention to the historical and political context, which made the genocide possible. It is a call 
for an alternative historical inquiry and interpretation of the genocide, to that which was 
produced through the judicial record. This has since become the ‘official narrative’. I also 
wanted to demonstrate that Rwanda’s historical political record reveals some hard ‘truths’, 
and exposes the limitations of both kinds of justice, for political reform and the intervention 
into the cycle of violence in post-genocide Rwanda. Moreover, I departed from a critique of 
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‘victors justice’ and ‘victims justice’ rationale because the response to the genocide has been 
exclusively judicial, and has became the foundation for re-engineering a ‘new Rwanda’. 
Rwanda’s transition justice experiment has been one of the boldest in the world, and since the 
genocide has consumed state, society, and the lived realities of all Rwandans. 
 
As the ‘military victor’ of the genocide the RPF did not have to negotiate a compromise. It 
had the power to pursue its ‘policy of mass accountability’ and was placed in a position 
where it could impose its views on how to deal with the past and future. The crimes were 
grave, and the scale of ‘victims’ and ‘perpetrators’ was vast. By implication of both kinds of 
justice, the Rwandan population was legally and morally divided by the underlying 
presumption made by criminal justice, which is that one is either wholly innocent or wholly 
guilty. The outcome today is that Tutsi victims are the only ‘living survivors of the genocide’, 
defined by their eternal victimhood, and Hutus are collectively understood to be perpetrators. 
This has become the contemporary relevance of Hutus today, where the presumption of guilt 
continues to define their identity. This is despite the fact that Hutus were killed during the 
genocide for refusing to participate in the genocide, and have been targeted by the RPF since 
the genocide for supposedly having collaborated with ‘Hutu Power’. 
 
In the aftermath of the genocide, the RPF wanted to hold public executions for the ‘accused’ 
in the national stadiums, inviting the victims to witness the redemptive act as a symbolic 
gesture towards justice. Fortunately, the state was prevented from doing so because of the 
conditions applied by the international community who argued it was against human rights 
and values. However, after the genocide, ‘suspicions’ and distrust facilitated undocumented 
murders of Hutus by the military and local RPF cadres (abakada). Thousands have also 
been detained, languishing in jail without a case file or access to legal-counsel. Whereas the 
human rights NGO community has expressed their concern for prison conditions and mass 
incarceration without due process, the government has responded with a moral authority, re-
iterating their ownership of the judicial process to silence their critics. The estimates of 
suspected Hutus perpetrators continue to grow, with one minister asserting that “80 percent 
of those Hutu alive had participate in the killing.”
1
In the first genocide commemoration, all 
Rwandans who had lost their lives were mourned. However, by mid-1995, the government 
began to re-define who are the ‘true victims’, and prescribed to an ‘official narrative’ of the 
genocide that completely ignores Hutu victims. The political implication is that today, Hutus 
are treated with suspicion and excluded from public life, forced to mourn and face their 
experiences in private. It has also deprived Hutus of their political and civil rights, as well as 
socio-economic benefits. 
 
The judicial process in Rwanda has been a haphazard affair that has not delivered the kind of 
justice that it proclaimed it would. Furthermore, the presumptions made by the ‘criminal trial’ 
in cases of mass violence have led to the politicisation of justice in Rwanda. Criminal justice 
sees the violence as criminal violence, and responsibility as individual. Thus, the genocide 
has been criminalised rather than being seen as political violence, which would allow for a 
more thorough investigation into the issues the drove the genocide. Criminal justice seeks 
individual responsibility so that it may uphold due process, pursue top military and political 
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leaders, and avoid collectivising a group or constituency. In Rwanda, naming the genocide as 
the ‘crime of all crimes’ has allowed the post-genocide government’s aggressive judicial 
pursuit of the Hutu population. This has collectively assigned guilt to all Hutus without a free 
and fair trial or due process. Secondly, it has provided judicial immunity to the Tutsi 
population, particularly to the RPF, who have even presented themselves as victims because 
they are Tutsi. Paralysed by the opposition from the government, the ICTR reached an 
impasse fairly soon after it was established. It could not effectively prosecute the RPF for 
‘crimes against humanity’. The significant ‘stand-off’ between Prosecutor Carla del Ponte 
and President Kagame demonstrated that the Tribunal had no bearing on Rwanda’s justice 
without the goodwill and cooperation of the government, and that justice in Rwanda is 
deeply politicised. The RPF has tested the tolerance of both Rwandans and the international 
community, and the initial ‘genocide credit’ afforded to them has depleted over the years. 
The mounting critique of their human rights record and judicial immunity has challenged the 
former perception of their ‘good guys’ image as the ‘liberators’ of Rwanda. 
 
What would it then mean to think of the genocide as political violence and not criminal 
violence? Arguably, it would mean seeing the genocide as having a history- a historical and 
political context. This in turn would require the current regime in Rwanda to confront its 
political record and address the political crisis that continues to have hold on Rwanda today. 
 
The post-genocide power relies on Tutsi victimhood and a singular historical perspective to 
maintain control of the state and society. I do not deny the extensive persecution of Tutsis 
and the distinct objective to annihilate them during the genocide. I am concerned, however, 
with how Tutsi victimhood has been politicised in order to make a purchase on political 
power, which has led to the emergence of ‘Tutsi Power’. Furthermore, the problem with the 
singular historical perspective is that it continues the practice of history writing and history 
making in Rwanda, a powerful tool used to secure power, citizenship rights, and justice for 
one group over another. 
 
This was demonstrated in the political logic of the 1959 Social Revolution, and the First and 
Second Republic, which spoke of Hutus as the eternal victims of Rwanda’s politics under 
the pre-colonial Tutsi monarchy, and the experience of ‘double colonialism’ by both Tutsis 
and the Belgian colonialists. The Social Revolution and subsequent regimes show that they 
bought into the fiction of race, as demands were made based on a ‘native prerogative’. When 
they spoke of justice, it was specifically justice for the Hutu indigenous majority. Thus 
political identity shaped the meaning of justice. Chapter 2 demonstrated that Rwanda’s 
Independence was a political victory for the Hutu elite and secured their power. However, it 
reaped few benefits for ‘ordinary Rwandans’, especially the poor, and victimised the Tutsi 
minority on the basis that they were foreign/non-indigenous group within Rwanda. 
 
The mode of power that came into being relied on a rhetoric that the battle is essentially 
between Hutu and Tutsi, and history had demonstrated that Tutsis could not be trusted in 
a power-sharing arrangement. It excluded other critiques of colonialism or suggestions for 
inter-ethnic dialogue that were taking place in the peripheries. It also showed that political 
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identities had become naturalised through their links to organised forms of power. The 
inherited colonial legacy set a profound precedent for both Republics and the post-genocide 
regime, because the political crisis is embedded in the institutions of rule, and is given life 
through political power and meaning of citizenship. Tutsi were primarily kept out of politics 
and public life, and were made to pay for past injustices based on their ethnic identity. 
Identity cards were retained, which reminded each Rwandan that there is a hierarchy of 
political identities. This is seen in the way the identity cards were used to mark out 
privileges, such as access to land and education, and to identify the Tutsi minority who were 
excluded. The colonial experience also shaped a distinct type of justice that closely resembles 
the logic of ‘victor’s justice’ and a ‘victims justice’ rationale today. 
 
The historical limitations of the post-colonial political crisis became acute after the October 
1990 invasion. Chapter 5 explored how the exiled experience of the Tutsi diaspora in 
Uganda, which has its own colonial legacy (post-colonial citizenship crisis), shaped a 
yearning amongst the Tutsi diaspora to return to Rwanda, their ancestral home and basis for 
citizenship and rights. The RPA launched an external critique of the Habyarimana regime, 
and organised itself along the lines of returning to Rwanda as a right, and to represent the 
political demands that Tutsis were making to be recognised as equal citizens of Rwanda. I 
importantly noted that this was despite Habyarimana proposing internal political reform in 
the midst of a negotiation with Ugandan President Museveni regarding the ‘right of return’ 
for those in the diaspora. Thus, the Invasion was seen by the government as an attempt by the 
RPA to overthrow the Rwandan government, which polarised and antagonised racial groups 
within Rwanda. As the RPA gained military ground, Hutus either fled Rwanda along with 
Tutsis, or they became part of the expanding internally displaced population. Moreover, the 
internal opposition that was calling to liberalise Rwanda were discredited, and in some cases 
killed, because they were seen as co-conspirators by ‘Hutu Power’. This was supported by 
the role of the radio, television and print media which would spew propaganda, fuelling 
tensions with the claim that Tutsis were not an ethnic group, but a foreign race in Rwanda 
seeking to re-install the Tutsi monarchy and subjugate the indigenous Hutu population. The 
civil war returned Rwanda’s politics back to the battleground between Hutu and Tutsi over 
state power, and the political tendency to see power as the only security for rights and 
protection of one’s group. It also allowed radical Hutu politics to emerge from the 
peripheries and take centre stage. 
 
Rwanda’s historical political tendency was re-affirmed during the Arusha Peace negotiations, 
which excluded major constituencies, and framed their political demands as being disruptive 
and merely about political power. Both radical and moderate Hutu political opposition saw 
this as a ‘victor’s deal’ for the RPF, and feared that it would mean a return to Tutsi privilege 
and power. Thus, ‘Hutu Power’ recalled the logic of colonialism, the ideology of race that 
distinguished Hutus as native and the political majoritarian, and devised a policy for 
genocide premised on justice for Hutus. ‘Hutu Power’ was very much thinking along the 
lines of the 1959 Social Revolution, seeking to redeem what it saw as the ‘failed revolution’- 
the unfulfilled promise of a Hutu nation. 
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The Arusha Accords critically failed to de-racialise Rwanda’s institutions of rule, and the 
mode of power and citizenship. Instead it focused on universal liberal-democratic principles, 
such as the ‘rule of law’, ‘power-sharing’, multi-party elections…etc., and neglected the 
political context. When the RPF broke the ceasefire agreement, and it was evident that 
President Habyarimana had no interest in fulfilling it either, it demonstrated that the 
transitional compromise was a dead deal. Arguably, it contributed to the genocide, as the 
deal reified the racialised political identities. 
 
The Arusha Agreement should have been comprehensively addressed after the genocide, but 
instead the interim government chose to modify its stipulations, which placed the RPF in 
important positions, allowing them to have direct influence on power and policy-making. The 
RPF’s ‘military victory’ particularly allowed Paul Kagame full reign, to set the terms and 
conditions of the post-genocide political dispensation. 
 
‘Justice’ and ‘Tutsi victimhood’ have become powerful tools for the RPF’s control of the 
political space in Rwanda. The political rhetoric of the former regimes that projected 
‘victim consciousness’ echoes loudly in the logic of the RPF. Between 1994-2003, the RPF 
were seen to have desirable character traits (discipline and vision) that were seen to be 
necessary for preventing the resumption of war, establishing order and restoring the 
functions of the state, whilst attending to its traumatised population by seeking justice and 
socio-economic development. 
 
For this reason, I divided my analysis on the post-genocide political record into two periods: 
the interim transitional government, and from 2000-today. The investigation demonstrated 
that the political crisis prevails, political reform has not taken place, and that there is a well-
established historical tradition that has formulated the RPF’s current political tendencies. The 
RPF does not see the party having much of a choice other than monopolising power in order 
to secure justice for the victims. Moreover, it has to contend with a widely held perception 
that sees the RPF as being representative of the Tutsi political minority, and an even smaller 
constituency- the Tutsi political diaspora. This has meant that the RPF does not trust opening 
up the political space and allowing for a competitive democracy, as it would simply mean 
that they would lose power and endanger the security of the Tutsi population. This has also 
seen the party alienate Hutu democrats and later Tutsi survivors, a growing opposition which 
has been forced to operate primarily in exile. The silencing of the political opposition, and the 
limited to non-existence political menu at the national elections (2003) had garnered the 
critique that Rwanda has seen both the ‘Tutsification’ of the state, and ‘RPFization of power’. 
Initially, the international community and even Rwandans were reluctant to critique the 
‘liberators’. I would argue that this was because the trauma of the genocide was still very 
much fresh in the minds of everyone and the reconstruction project was an almost impossible 
task. Furthermore, bold re-engineering project, which seeks to ‘remake Rwanda’, and re-
define its political, economic and social landscape, was a great distraction. 
 
The post-genocide regime places significant emphasis on socio-economic development as 
the basis for reconciliation and unity, and to restore the dignity of Rwandans. However, 
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agricultural and land tenure system reforms; the forced ‘villagisation programme’; the 
Gacaca court; and the ‘re-education’ of the Rwandan population, have contributed 
dramatically to inequality, poverty, and insecurity of Rwandans, especially the rural poor. 
These policies have also done little to assist social peace and reconciliation. Whereas, the 
2003 Constitution has legally eradicated ethnic identification, the new ‘speech and thought 
crimes’, also known as the ‘genocide-laws’, and the new categories of identification (victims, 
perpetrators, returnees, old-caseload refugees and new-caseload refugees) have added new 
meaning to Hutu and Tutsi. Practices such as prioritising land security for Tutsi victims, 
returnees, and old-caseload refugees, or forcing predominantly Hutus off their land and into 
the villagisation programme, or into land sharing arrangements, only serve to further 
antagonise the population. As I discussed in Chapter 5, land is inextricably linked to the 
organisation of forms of power, social, and economic relations. Of crucial importance, 
colonials used land relationships and management to politicise identities premised on the 
ideology of race. Thus, whilst the government pushes for reconciliation, its policies 
constantly draw attention to the past and the un-reconciled political identities. 
 
A central conviction of the current regime is ‘Never Again’, which has meant that the past 
cannot be forgotten. There are constant painful reminders of the genocide, from the annual 
commemorations and memorials held for Tutsi victims, to the monopoly of the ‘official 
history’ and narrative of the genocide that has been forced onto Rwandans. This is very 
difficult for Rwandans, where radically different narratives of the past exist but Rwandans 
cannot publicly engage in a discussion on them, because alternative views are silenced by 
the genocide laws. This does little to allow Rwandans to recognise each other’s experiences 
and to see that they all share Rwanda’s common tragic past. My discussion on the ‘re-
education’ programme presented an alarming transcript of how the regime seeks to condition 
and discipline the minds of Rwandans. It also is used to continue the demonising of the Hutu 
identity, and cast them as second-class citizens in Rwanda. The official policy on 
reconciliation and unity relies on the exclusion of Hutu victims and Hutu memory. The 
government has a peculiar approach to identities. On the one hand it practices ‘ethnic 
amnesia’ and speaks of ‘Rwandicity and a post-ethnic society. On the other hand, the post-
genocide power has become trapped by its ‘victims consciousness’, which has led to each 
policy serving justice for Tutsis. The result is that it constantly attacks the Hutu identity, 
which has led to an uncomfortable co-existence for Rwandans when the regime consistently 
reminds them of the ‘guilty majority’ and ‘fearful minority’. 
 
Rwanda will not be able to conceive a single political community whilst it remains trapped 
by the logic of ‘victims justice’. As I demonstrated in Chapter 6, this logic has further 
complicated the dilemma of reconciling Hutus and Tutsis, because it has now taken on 
diasporic character. Born from the Tutsi diaspora, the RPF has, since the genocide, pursued 
genocidaires in the Great Lakes region on the pretext that it has a moral obligation to protect 
the survival of Tutsis within Rwanda and in the diaspora. Similar to how the genocide 
hardened Hutu and Tutsi as political identities, the post-genocide political and military 
campaigns in Congo have violently reconstructed two diasporic communities, one Hutu and 
one Tutsi. Moreover, what began as a policy pursuing justice and security for Rwanda and 
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Tutsis, quickly evolved into revenge attacks against the Hutus in the diaspora. This has had a 
devastating impact on the Great Lakes, which triggered two Congolese wars, which has 
claimed more lives than the genocide and has displaced millions of people in the region. 
Rwanda’s political crisis has become a regional dynamic, because Congo, as with other 
states in the region, has inherited its own colonial legacy, shaping a complex post-colonial 
citizenship crisis which the Banyarwanda have become victims of. The post-colonial 
citizenship crisis has produced two types of citizens: one ethnic and one civic, and with each 
crisis the Congolese state re-defines who belongs and who should govern based on politics of 
indigeneity. The Banyarwanda have become victims of this predicament. 
 
This dissertation has drawn on arguments made by Mahmood Mamdani, particularly 
concerning citizenship and justice. My suggestion is that we need to think of Mamdani’s 
concept of ‘survivor’s justice’, rather than ‘victims justice or victor’s justice’, which assist 
in confronting the needs of political reform that address colonial legacies. 
 
I would like to introduce one of Mamdani’s key contributions in ‘When Victims Become 
Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda.’ It is the notion of ‘survivors 
justice’. Karenkezi argues that it is one of the most original and important contributions 
because the Banyarwanda have come to be considered globally as ‘settlers’, and if we take 
Mamdani’s argument that the Genocide in Rwanda was a ‘Native’s genocide against the 
Tutsi settler’, than this has troubling consequences. 
2
The ‘lived experience’ of the 
Banyarwanda is one that seeks continuous affirmation because they fall between the cracks of 
‘citizen-rights’ and ‘customary-rights’. Thus, it supports the argument that the issue of 
citizenship requires commitment by each state, through disinheriting their colonial legacies 
that have shaped post-colonial political institutions; and it requires a strong regional approach 
and commitment in order to achieve a sustainable solution. I will thus explore the notion of 
‘survivors justice’ and its prospects for post-genocide Rwanda, since Rwanda lies at the 
epicentre of the Great Lakes regional crisis. 
 
Mamdani asserts that while the RPF won the war, there has been no divorce between Hutu and 
Tutsi in Rwanda.
3
Furthermore, consequential to a military victory and a political victor, is that 
justice for the victims is only determined by the victor. This is referred to as ‘victors justice’ and 
‘victims justice’. This renders the question, if the form of justice flows from the form of power, 
and “victor’s justice requires victor’s power, than is not victor’s justice simply revenge 
masquerading as justice?
4
 Within Rwanda, and as demonstrated in Chapter 6, what began as 
military intervention into Congo, premised on the argument that it is necessary for protecting 
Tutsis in the diaspora, has turned into revenge attacks and a cyclical war which keeps producing 
new ‘sets of victims and perpetrators’. Mamdani calls for a re-thinking around the formulation of 
‘justice’, which produces the mode of power. It also redirects inquiry back to the question of 
‘justice’ itself, and one needs to ask: “Is a form of justice possible that is not at the same victor’s 
justice?” And “Is a form of reconciliation possible that is not at the same time an absence of 
justice, and thus an embrace of evil?”
5
These questions relate back to the central historical 
question of what type of ‘justice’ to pursue-punishment or impunity? ‘Successor justice’ 
emerged as the most suitable form of justice, 
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and has come to define how we think about justice. Moreover, these two questions are 
thought about within the contemporary debates on the ‘rule of law dilemma’ and the ‘peace 
versus justice dilemma’ (discussed in Chapter 1). Mamdani argues, “these question provide 
a clue to finding a way out of the dialectic of civil war”- that way has to be anchored in an 
alternative, which Mamdani has called ‘survivors justice’.
6
 
 
Mamdani asserts, “The prerequisite for survivor’s justice, as for victor’s justice, may also be 
military victory”.
7
 But, it is different to ‘successor justice’ (‘victor’s justice’) which has 
historically decided on the fate of the vanquished, and whether the ‘vanquished’ should be 
included or excluded from the political settlement and new political order. ‘Survivors justice’ 
transcends these categories, by seeing all those “who continue to be blessed with life in the 
aftermath of civil war” as survivors or as a ‘community of survivors.’
8
In Rwanda, this would 
transcend the idea that only ‘Tutsis are victims’ and the reproduction of Hutu and Tutsi through 
the categories of perpetrator, victim, returnee, and old and new caseload refugee. 
 
‘Survivors justice’ was formulated from the logic of two types of post-war paradigms of 
justice: 1 ‘de-Nazification’ and 2. ‘de-Sovietization’. ‘De-Nazification’ came about at the 
onset of the Cold-War, where justice is premised on the logic of blaming the agent. This 
requires identifying ‘victims’ and ‘perpetrators’, and to go further by ‘demonising the 
perpetrator’.
9
For the latter- ‘de-Sovietization’ marked the end of the Cold War. The logic 
was to blame the system, and is anchored in the identity of the survivors.
10
Post-genocide 
Rwanda has followed the logic of ‘de-Nazification’, and has pursued the leadership through 
the Arusha Tribunal and judicial courts.
11
 Mamdani argues, “to pursue the logic of de-
Sovietization would be to put emphasis, first and foremost, on the institutions of rule in 
Rwanda. Where survivors, victims and perpetrators, from an earlier round of struggle must 
learn to live together, ways must be found to reconcile the logic of reconciliation with that of 
justice.”
12
 
 
‘Survivors justice’ is also different to revolutionary justice, and only makes sense where 
there have been few beneficiaries from the preceding civil war. This is the case in Rwanda. 
The key to reconciliation in Rwanda is political reconciliation. Mamdani argues, “The prime 
requirement for political reconciliation is neither criminal justice nor social justice, but 
political justice.”
13
Political justice goes beyond holding perpetrators accountable, and 
replaces the question of ‘who should govern’ to ‘how they should govern’- through what 
kinds of institutions.
14
 This is important because historically in Rwanda, political identities 
and power are linked to formation of the state, and institutions of rule. Political justice 
requires shifting the primary focus on individuals and redirecting it to the institutions. 
Furthermore, it requires recognising that the key to institutional reform is the reform of 
institutions of rule.
15
The objective is to depoliticise Hutu and Tutsi, and reorganise the mode 
of power in order to make reconciliation possible, and introduce a single criterion for 
citizenship: residence. This is not easy but is acutely necessary for political reconciliation and 
justice for all survivors. It renders an important question that needs to be taken up, which is 
“what would it mean to reform institutions of rule so as to give the survivors of the genocide 
another chance?”
16
 
 
211 
 
 
 
 
 Notes on Introduction: 
 
1
Author Unknown, A day in the marshes, Rwandan Stories, available from  http://www.rwandanstories.org/genocide/marshes.html 
 
1
Author Unknown, A day in the marshes, Rwandan Stories, available from http://www.rwandanstories.org/genocide/marshes.html 
(accessed on 11 November 2015) 
2
 Ibid.
 
3
 Ibid.
  
4
 Human Rights Watch, “Shattered Lives: Sexual Violence during the Rwandan Genocide,” Human Rights Watch, 1996. Available 
from https://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/Rwanda.htm, (accessed on 11 November 2015)
 
5
 Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda, (New Jersey: Princeton 
Press, 2001): 6.
 
6
 Ibid., .5
 
 
Notes on Chapter One 
 
1
 Mahmood Mamdani, “Beyond Nuremburg: The Historical Significance of the Post-Apartheid Transition in South Africa,” (Annual Lecture 
held by Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection, Johannesburg, South Africa, 18 March, 2013): 1
 
2
 Ibid.
  
3
 Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000): 31
 
4
 Ibid., 3.
 
5
 Richard H. Minear and Takeyama Michio, ““The Trial of Mr. Hyde” and Victors’ Justice,” The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus,
 
Volume 4., Issue 8, (August, 2008): 1 
6
 Ibid.
 
7
 Chandra Lekha Sriram and Suren Pillay, eds. Peace versus Justice? The Dilemma of Transitional Justice in Africa (Kwa-Zulu Natal:
 
University of Kaw-Zulu Natal Press, 2009): 347 
8
 Ibid.
 
9
 Ibid.
  
10
 Ibid., 348.
 
11
 Lieutenant Colonel Wilfred L. Ebel, “The Amnesty Issue: A historical perspective,” available from 
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a531961.pdf (accessed 4 May, 2016): 69
 
12
 Ibid.
 
13
 Kingsley Chiedu Moghalu, Global Justice: The Politics of War Crime Trials, (Westport: Praeger Security International, 2006): 5
 
14
 Ibid.
  
15
 Ibid.
 
16
 Ibid.
 
17
 ibid.
 
 
18
Gary Jonathon Bass, “Victor’s Justice Versus War Crimes Tribunals,” Centre on Law and Globalisation, 2000, available from . 
https://clg.portalxm.com/library/keytext.cfm?keytext_id=51 (accessed May 9, 2016) 
19
 William A. Schabas, An Introduction to the Criminal Court, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004): 1
  
20
 Ibid.
 
21 Teitel, Transitional Justice, 29. 
22
Ibid., 28. 
23
Ibid., 29. 
24
 Ibid., 28.
 
25
 Ibid., 27.
  
26
 Sriram et al. Peace versus Justice: The Dilemma of Transitional Justice in Africa, 349.
 
27
 Mahmood Mamdani, “In Conversation with Mahmood Mamdani,”Interview by Bhakti Shringapure. Warscapes Magazine, July 15, 2013. 
Available from http://www.warscapes.com/conversations/conversation-mahmood-mamdani (accessed 7 February, 2015)
 
28
 Teitel, Transitional Justice, 29.
  
29
 Simon Chesterman, Just War or Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001):
 
11  
30
 Ibid.
 
31
 Ibid., 11-12
 
32
 Alexander Mosley, “Just War Theory, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosphy: A Peer-Reviewed Academic Resource”, available from 
http://www.iep.utm.edu/justwar/ (accessed on 8 May, 2016)
 
33
 Ibid.
 
34
 Ibid.
 
35
 Ibid.
  
36
 Ibid.
 
37 Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, 2. 
38
 Ibid., .3
  
39
 Marcus Tullius Cicero, “De Officiis”, Translated By Walter Miller, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1913. Available from 
http://www.constitution.org/rom/de_officiis.htm (accessed on 3 May 2016)
 
40
 Ibid.
  
41
 Chris Brown and Kirsten Ainley, Understanding International Relations, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan): 105
 
42
 Ibid.
 
43
 Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 212.
  
44
 Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, 3.
 
45
 Teitel, Transitional Justice, 31.
 
 
 
212 
 
 
 
 
 
46
 Elliot Adams, “War Crimes: Were the Nuremburg Tribunals only Victor’s Justice?,” Global Research: Centre for Research on 
Globalisation, available from http://www.globalresearch.ca/were-the-nuremberg-tribunals-only-victors-justice/5405078 (accessed on 8 
May, 2016)
  
47
 Guenael Mettraux, “Trial at Nuremburg,” in Routledge Handboook of Intrernational Criminal Law, eds. William A. Schabas and Nadia 
Bernaz, (Oxin and New York: Routledge, 2011): 6
 
48
 Ibid., 5.
  
49
 Teitel, Transitional Justice, 31.
 
50
 Mettraux, Trial at Nuremburg, 5.
 
51
 Mamdani, “The Logic of Nuremburg,” London Review of Books, Vol. 25, No.21 (November, 2013): 33
  
52
 Leila Nadya Sadat, The International Criminal Court and the Transformation of International Law: Justice for the New Millennium (New 
York: Transnational Publishers, 2002): 30
 
53
 Mamdani, “The Logic of Nuremburg,” 33.
  
54
 Teitel, Transitional Justice, 72.
 
55
 Moghalu, Global Justice: The Politics of War Crime Trials, 7.
 
56
 Mamdani, Mahmood,“Beyond Nuremburg: The Historical Significance of the Post-Apartheid Transition in South Africa,” Politics and
 
Society, Vol. 43(1), (New York: Sage Publications, 2015): 64 
57
 Moghalu, Global Justice: The Politics of War Crime Trials, 7.
 
58
 Ibid.
  
59
 Mamdani, “Beyond Nuremburg: The Historical Significance of the Post-Apartheid Transition in South Africa,” (Annual Lecture): 2
 
60
 Ban Ki-Moon, “Secretary-General’s Statement to the Inaugral Meeting of Judges of the International Criminal Court,” Speech at The 
Hague, Netherlands, 11 March, 2003, available from http://www.un.org/sg/STATEMENTS/index.asp?nid=280 (accessed on 11 June,
 
2016) 
61
 Gary Jonathon Bass, “Victor’s Justice Versus War Crimes Tribunals”
 
62
 Ibid.
  
63
 Ibid.
 
64
 Ibid.
 
65
 Yuki Tanaka, Tim L.H. McCormack and Gerry Simpson,eds., Beyond Victor’s Justice? The Tokyo War Crimes Trial Revisited (Leiden:
 
Brill-Nijhoff, 2011) 
66
 Moghalu, Global Justice: The Politics of War Crime Trials, 7.
 
67
 Mamdani, “The Logic of Nuremburg,” 33
  
68
 Moghalu, Global Justice: The Politics of War Crime Trials, 34.
 
69
 Ibid., 35.
 
70
 Mamdani, “Beyond Nuremburg: The Historical Significance of the Post-Apartheid Transition in South Africa,” (Annual Lecture): 5
  
71
 Mamdani, “The Logic of Nuremburg,” 33.
 
72
 Mamdani, “Beyond Nuremburg: The Historical Significance of the Post-Apartheid Transition in South Africa,” 65-66.
 
73
 Ibid., 66.
  
74
 Ibid.
 
75 Mamdani, “Beyond Nuremburg: The Historical Significance of the Post-Apartheid Transition in South Africa,” (Annual Lecture): 5 
76
 Ibid., 1.
 
77
 Ibid.
 
78
 Ibid., 5.
 
79
 Mamdani, “In Conversation with Mahmood Mamdani,”Interview by Bhakti Shringapure.
 
80
 Mamdani, “Beyond Nuremburg: The Historical Significance of the Post-Apartheid Transition in South Africa,” (Annual Lecture): 5
  
81
 Teitel, Transitional Justice, 73.
 
82
 Lars Waldorf, “Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity: Transitional Justice and Illiberal Peace-Building in Rwanda,” (PhD thesis, 
National University of Ireland, 2013): 23
 
83
Mamdani, “In Conversation with Mahmood Mamdani,”Interview by Bhakti Shringapure 
84
 Mamdani, “Beyond Nuremburg: The Historical Significance of the Post-Apartheid Transition in South Africa,” (Annual Lecture): 1
 
85
 Ibid., 3.
 
86
 Ibid., 5.
 
87
 Waldorf, “Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity: Transitional Justice and Illiberal Peace-Building in Rwanda,” 23
 
88
 Ibid.
  
89
 Yayan GH Mulyana, “The 1955 Bandung Conference and Present Significance,” The Jakarta Post, 29 April 2011. Available form 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/04/29/the-1955-bandung-conference-and-its-present-significance.html (accessed on 4 July 2016)
 
90
 Ibid.
  
91
 Ibid.
 
92
 Stephen Winter, “Towards a Unified Theory for Transitional Justice,” The International Journal of Transitional Justice, Vol. 7, (2013):
 
227  
93
 Sriram et al. Peace versus Justice: The Dilemma of Transitional Justice in Africa, 349.
 
94
 Ruti G. Teitel, “Transitional Justice in a New Era,” Fordham International Law Journal, Vol. 26, Issue 4, Article 2, (2002): 893-894
 
95
 Ibid., 893.
  
96
 Sriram et al. Peace versus Justice: The Dilemma of Transitional Justice in Africa, 350
 
97
 Ayel M. Gross, “The Constiution, Reconcilliation and Transition: Lessons from South Africa to Israel,” Stanford Journal of Internal Law,
 
40 (47), (2004): 49. 
98
 Ibid.
 
99 Kingsley Chiedu Moghalu, “Prosecute of Pardon? Between Truth Commissions and War Crimes Trials,” in Peace versus Justice? The 
Dilemma of Transitional Justice in Africa, eds. Chandra Lekha Sriram and Suren Pillay (Kwa-Zaulu Natal: University of Kwa-Zulu Natal
 
Press, 2009): 69 
100 Aeyal M. Gross, “The Constitution, Reconciliation and Transitional Justice: Lessons form South Africa and Israel,” 48. 
101 Ibid., 49.  
102
 Yasmin Louise Sooka, “The Politics of Transitional Justice” in Peace versus Justice? The Dilemma of Transitional Justice in Africa, 
eds. Chandra Lekha Sriram and Suren Pillay (Kwa-Zaulu Natal: University of Kwa-Zulu Natal Press, 2009): 24
 
103 Ibid. 
 
213 
 
 
 
 
 
104
 Padraig McAuliffe, Transitional Justice and the Rule of Law Reconstruction: A Contensious Relationship, (Oxfordshire and New 
York: Routledge, 2013): 42
 
105 Mirelle Affa’a Mindzie, “Transitional Justice, Democratisation and the Rule of Law,” in Peace versus Justice? The Dilemma of  
Transitional Justice in Africa, eds. Chandra Lekha Sriram and Suren Pillay (Kwa-Zaulu Natal: University of Kwa-Zulu Natal 
Press, 2009):119 
106 Teitel, Transitional Justice, 19. 
107 Ibid. 
108 Martin Krygier, “The Hart-Fuller debate in Transitional Societies,” available from 
https://law.anu.edu.au/sites/all/files/krygier_on_teitel.pdf (accessed on 7 June 2016): 1
  
109 Teitel, Transitional Justice, 13. 
110 McAuliffe, Transitional Justice and the Rule of Law Reconstruction: A Contensious Relationship, 93-94. 
111 Teitel, Transitional Justice, 14. 
112 Ibid., 13. 
113 Ibid., 14. 
114 Ibid  
115 McAuliffe, Transitional Justice and the Rule of Law Reconstruction: A Contensious Relationship, 94. 
116 Ibid., .93 
117
Teitel, Transitional Justice, 13.
 
118 Ibid. 
119 Teitel, “Transitional Justice in a New Era,” 895. 
120 Ibid., .896  
121
 Laury L. Ocen, “Justice and Peace after War: Conceptual Difficulties in the Discourses of Transitional and Reform in 
Postwar Societies,” MISR Review, Issue 1, August (2016): 44
 
122 Chandra Lekha Sriram, “Introduction: Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding,” in Peace versus Justice? The Dilemma of Transitional 
Justice in Africa, eds. Chandra Lekha Sriram and Suren Pillay (Kwa-Zaulu Natal: University of Kwa-Zulu Natal Press, 2009):1 
123 Ibid 
124 Ibid.  
125 Sooka, “The Politics of Transitional Justice”, 21. 
126 Ocen, “Justice and Peace after War: Conceptual Difficulties in the Discourses of Transitional and Reform in Postwar Societies,” 45. 
127 Ibid.  
128 Sooka, “The Politics of Transitional Justice”, 21. 
129 Teitel, Transitional Justice, 51. 
130 Sriram, “Introduction: Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding” 1.  
131 Teitel, Transitional Justice, 21. 
132 Ibid. 
133 Ibid.  
134 Waldorf, “Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity: Transitional Justice and Illiberal Peace-Building in Rwanda,” 31. 
135 Bronwyn Leebaw, Judging State-Sponsored Violence, Imagining Political Change, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011): 
178.  
136 Ibid.  
137 Waldorf, “Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity: Transitional Justice and Illiberal Peace-Building in Rwanda,” 33. 
138 Ibid. 
139 Mahmood Mamdani, “The Question of Justice in Response to Political Violence: Criminal or Political?,” ( Annual Lecture held by  
University of Sussex: Centre for Conflict and Security Research, Sussex, England, 11 May, 2016), available from 
http://www.sussex.ac.uk/broadcast/read/30277 (accessed on 8 July 2016) 
140 Waldorf, “Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity: Transitional Justice and Illiberal Peace-Building in Rwanda,” 32 
141 Ibid. 
142 Teitel, Transitional Justice, 28. 
143 Mindzie, “Transitional Justice, Democratisation and the Rule of Law,” 121.  
144 Sriram, “Introduction: Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding,” 2. 
145 Teitel, Transitional Justice, 27. 
146 Mindzie, “Transitional Justice, Democratisation and the Rule of Law,” 120  
147
 Neil Kritz, “The Dilemmas of Transitonal Justice,” in Transitional Justice. (Washington D.C: United States Institute of Peace Press, 
1995) available from http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace/example/krit3285.htm (accessed on 7 June 2016).
 
148 Charles Villa-Vicencio, “Inclusive Justice: The Limitations of Trial Justice and Truth Commissions,” in Peace versus Justice? The  
Dilemma of Transitional Justice in Africa, eds. Chandra Lekha Sriram and Suren Pillay (Kwa-Zaulu Natal: University of Kwa-Zulu 
Natal Press, 2009):44 
149
Kritz, “The Dilemmas of Transitional Justice”. 
150 Ibid. 
151
 Debra Delaet, “Review of After Evil: A politics of Human Rights by Robert Meister,” International Dialogue: A 
Mulitdisciplinare Journal of World Affairs (2011): 1.
 
152 Ibid., .2 
153 Ibid. 
154 Nir Eiskovitz, “Transitional Justice,” The Stanford Enclopedia of Philosophy (Winter Edition, 2014) available from 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/justice-transitional , accessed on 7 June 2016. 
155 Waldorf, “Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity: Transitional Justice and Illiberal Peace-Building in Rwanda,” 14. 
156 Mark A. Drumbl, “Punishment, Postgenocide: From Guilt to Shame to Civis In Rwanda,” New York University Law Review, Vol. 75 
(November, 2000): 1225 
157 Waldorf, “Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity: Transitional Justice and Illiberal Peace-Building in Rwanda,” 14. 
158 Drumbl, “Punishment, Postgenocide: From Guilt to Shame to Civis In Rwanda,” 1225.  
159
 Alison des Forges and Timothy Longman, “Legal Responses to Genocide in Rwanda,” availabe 
from http://faculty.vassar.edu/tilongma/justice.html (accessed on 19 February 2015).
 
160 Ibid. 
161 Ibid.  
214 
 
 
 
 
 
162 Ibid. 
163 Ibid. 
164 Philip Gourevitch, We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our families: Stories from Rwanda, (Great Britain: 
Picador, 1999): 150. 
165 Ibid. 
166 Ibid.  
167 des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, 635. 
168 Waldorf, “Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity: Transitional Justice and Illiberal Peace-Building in Rwanda,” 71. 
169 Gourevitch, We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our families: Stories from Rwanda, 154. 
170 Ibid. 
171 Ibid. 
172 Ibid., .155  
173 Waldorf, “Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity: Transitional Justice and Illiberal Peace-Building in Rwanda,” 71. 
174 Ibid. 
175 Ibid. 
176 Ibid. 
177 Gourevitch, We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our families: Stories from Rwanda, 156. 
178 Ibid., .161  
179 Sophie Haspeslagh, “Safe Havens in Rwanda: Operation Turquoise,” available from 
http://www.beyondintractability.org/cic_documents/Safe-Havens-Rwanda.pdf , (accessed on 7 June 2016): 1.
  
180 Omar Shahabudin Mcdoom, “Rwanda’s Exit Pathway from Violence: A Strategic Assessment,” World Development Report: Background 
Case Study, 62054 (2011): 3 
181 Ibid., .5 
182 Waldorf, “Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity: Transitional Justice and Illiberal Peace-Building in Rwanda,” 73.  
183 Teitel, Transitional Justice, 28. 
184
 William A. Schabas, “Justice, Democracy and Impunity in Rwanda: Searching for Solutions to Impossible Problems,” Criminal 
Law Forum, Vol. 7, No 3 (1996): 523.
 
185 Filip Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013):  213 
186 Schabas, “Justice, Democracy and Impunity in Rwanda: Searching for Solutions to Impossible Problems,” 527. 
187 Virginia Morris and Michael Scharf, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, (Leiden: Bril-Nijhoff, 1997): 66 
188 Ibid. 
189 Waldorf, “Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity: Transitional Justice and Illiberal Peace-Building in Rwanda,” 14. 
190 Schabas, “Justice, Democracy and Impunity in Rwanda: Searching for Solutions to Impossible Problems,” 529.  
191 Schabas, “Justice, Democracy and Impunity in Rwanda: Searching for Solutions to Impossible Problems,” 528. 
192 Schabas, “Justice, Democracy and Impunity in Rwanda: Searching for Solutions to Impossible Problems,” 529. 
193 Nicholas A. Jones, The Courts of Genocide: Politics and the Rule of Law in Rwanda, (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2010): 80 
194 Ibid. 
195 Ibid.,  .81 
196 Ibid. 
197 Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 214.  
198 Jones, The Courts of Genocide: Politics and the Rule of Law in Rwanda, 81. 
199 Ibid. 
200 Ibid. 
201 Ibid. 
202 Ibid. 
203 Ibid.  
204
 Peter Uvin, “Difficult Choices in the New Post-Conflict Agenda: The International Community in Rwanda after the Genocide,” 
Third World Quarterly , 22:2 (2001): 182
 
205 Ibid.  
206 Jones, The Courts of Genocide: Politics and the Rule of Law in Rwanda, 83 
207 Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 182. 
208 Jones, The Courts of Genocide: Politics and the Rule of Law in Rwanda, 85. 
209 Ibid., .86 
210 Ibid., .89 
211 des Forges et al, “Legal Responses to Genocide in Rwanda,” 
212
Ibid.
 
213 Jones, The Courts of Genocide: Politics and the Rule of Law in Rwanda, 89 
214 Ibid., .100  
215 des Forges et al, “Legal Responses to Genocide in Rwanda,” 
216 Morris et al,  The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 64. 
217 Ibid. 
218 Ibid., .65 
219 Ibid., 66. 
220 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Approved and Proposed for Signature and Ratficiation or  
Accession by General Assembly resolution 260 A (III) of 9 December 1948. (Entered into force 12 January 1951, in accordance with Article 
XIII). Available from http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CrimeOfGenocide.aspx (accessed on 7 June 2016). 
221 Jones, The Courts of Genocide: Politics and the Rule of Law in Rwanda, 133.  
222 Morris et al,  The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, xv. 
223 Jones, The Courts of Genocide: Politics and the Rule of Law in Rwanda, 108. 
224 Ibid.  
225
 Wambui Mwangi, “The International Criminal Court for Rwanda: Reconciling the Acquitted,” in Peace versus Justice? The Dillemma of 
Transitional Justice in Africa, eds. Chandra Lekha Sriram and Suren Pillay (Kwa-Zaulu Natal: University of Kwa-Zulu Natal Press, 
2009):266
 
226 Ibid.  
215 
 
 
 
 
 
227 Morris et al,  The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 72 
228 Ibid. 
229 Ibid. 
230 Ibid. 
231 Ibid. 
232 United Nations Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunal, “The ICTR in Brief”, available from http://unictr.unmict.org/en/tribunal 
(accessed on 7 June 2016). 
233 Waldorf, “Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity: Transitional Justice and Illiberal Peace-Building in Rwanda,”11. 
234 Helen Scanlon and Nompumelelo Motlafi, “Indigenous Justice of Political Instrument? The Modern Gacaca Courts of Rwanda,” in Peace  
versus Justice? The Dillemma of Transitional Justice in Africa, eds. Chandra Lekha Sriram and Suren Pillay (Kwa-Zaulu Natal: 
University of Kwa-Zulu Natal Press, 2009): 301. 
235 Ibid. 
236 Ibid. 
237 Waldorf, “Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity: Transitional Justice and Illiberal Peace-Building in Rwanda,” 7. 
238 Ibid., .11  
239 Scanlon et al, “Indigenous Justice of Political Instrument? The Modern Gacaca Courts of Rwanda,” 301. 
240 Ibid., 12. 
241 Ibid., 7. 
242 Ibid. 
243 Ibid. 
244 Ibid., .12 
245 Ibid. 
246 Ibid., .15 
247 Ibid., .148 
248 Ibid., .7 
249 Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 213. 
250 Ibid., 214. 
251 Ibid. 
252 Jones, The Courts of Genocide: Politics and the Rule of Law in Rwanda, 100. 
253 Moghalu, Global Justice: The Politics of War Crime Trials, 202.  
254
 Victor Peskin, “Victor’s Justice Revisited: Rwandan Patriotic Front Crimes and the Prosecutorial Endgame at the ICTR,” in Remaking 
Rwanda: State-building and Human Rights after Mass Violence, eds Scott Strauss and Lars Waldorf, (Wisconsin: The University of 
Wisconsin Press, 2011): 174.
 
255 Ibid. 
256 Ibid. 
257 Waldorf, “A Mere Pretense of Justice: Complimentarity, Sham Trials, and Victor’s Justice at the Rwanda Tribunal,” Fordham 
International Law Journal, Vol 33, Issue 4 (3), (2011): 1231 
258 Moghalu, Global Justice: The Politics of War Crime Trials, 139 
259 Ibid 
260 Ibid. 
261 Ibid. 
262 British Broadcasting Corporation, “Rwanda: The Untold Story,” Film Documentary, Released on October 2014. 
263 Waldorf, “A Mere Pretense of Justice: Complimentarity, Sham Trials, and Victor’s Justice at the Rwanda Tribunal,”1231  
264 Peter Erlinder, “The Rwanda Crimes Cover Up: UN Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte confirms the cover up,” Global Research: Centre for Research 
on Globalisation (7 April, 2014) available from http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-rwanda-war-crimes-coverup/15037 (accessed on
  
7 June 2016) 
265 Peskin, “Victor’s Justice Revisited: Rwandan Patriotic Front Crimes and the Prosecutorial Endgame at the ICTR,” 174. 
266 Ibid. 
267 Ibid 
268 Ibid 
269 Ibid. 
270 Ibid.  
271 Moghalu, Global Justice: The Politics of War Crime Trials, 149 
272 Ibid., .150 
273 Ibid.  
274
 Chief Charles Akheleke Taku, “ICTR: Eternalising the Judicial Genocide Hutu,” (Publication Unknown, 2009) available from 
http://www.heritagetpirdefense.org/papers/Charles_Taku_ICTR_eternalising_the_judicial_genocide_of_the_hutu.pdf (accessed on 11 
June 2014): 8
 
275 Ibid. 
276 Ibid. 
277 Ibid. 
278 Ibid. 
279 Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 183. 
280 Moghalu, Global Justice: The Politics of War Crime Trials, 198  
281 Waldorf, “Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity: Transitional Justice and Illiberal Peace-Building in Rwanda,” 111. 
282 Ibid. 
283 Peskin, “Victor’s Justice Revisited: Rwandan Patriotic Front Crimes and the Prosecutorial Endgame at the ICTR,” 175.  
284 Waldorf, “A Mere Pretense of Justice: Complimentarity, Sham Trials, and Victor’s Justice at the Rwanda Tribunal,” 1225. 
285 British Broadcasting Corporation, “Rwanda: The Untold Story,” Film Documentary, Released on October 2014. 
286 Ibid. 
287 Ibid. 
288 Waldorf, “A Mere Pretense of Justice: Complimentarity, Sham Trials, and Victor’s Justice at the Rwanda Tribunal,” 1229. 
289 des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story. 734.  
290 Peskin, “Victor’s Justice Revisited: Rwandan Patriotic Front Crimes and the Prosecutorial Endgame at the ICTR,” 179.  
216 
 
 
 
 
 
291 Waldorf, “Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity: Transitional Justice and Illiberal Peace-Building in Rwanda,” 151. 
292 Ibid. 
293 Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 183.  
294 Waldorf, “Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity: Transitional Justice and Illiberal Peace-Building in Rwanda,” 151. 
295 Ibid. 
296 Ibid., .111 
297 Ibid. 
298 Ibid., .151 
299 Ibid.  
300 Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 27 
301 Ibid., .28 
302 Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda, (New Jersey: Princeton Press, 
2001): 270. 
303 Ibid., .267 
304 Ibid. 
305 Ibid. 
306 Ibid. 
 
Notes on Chapter Two 
 
1
 Regina E. Rauxloh, “Negotiated History: The Historical Record in International Criminal Law and Plea Bargaining,” International 
Criminal Law Review, Vol. 10, Issue 5 (2010): 740
  
2
 Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000): 69
 
3
 Mahmood Mamdani, “Lessons of Nuremburg and Codesa: Where Do We Go From Here?” (Memorial Day lecture at University of Free
 
State, Bloemfontein, South Africa, 14 July, 2010): 4 
4
 Rauxloh, “Negotiated History: The Historical Record in International Criminal Law and Pleaa Bargaining,” 3.
 
5
 Ibid., .4
  
6
 Ibid., .1
 
7
 Mamdani. “Lessons from Nuremburg, and CODESA: Where do we go from here?”  4-5.
 
8
 Ibid.
  
9
 Rene Lemarchand, The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009): 99
 
10
 Fanie du Toit, “Reconciliation and Transitional Justice: The Case of Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts,” Institute for Justice and Reconciliation 
(2011): 9.
 
11
 Ibid.
 
12 Ibid. 
13
Lemarchand, The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa, 108. 
14
 Teitel, Transitional Justice, 70.
 
15
 Lemarchand, The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa, 100
 
16
 Ibid.
  
17
 Ibid.
 
18
 Ibid., .103
 
19
 Nigel Eltringham, Accounting for Horror: Post-genocide Debates in Rwanda,(London: Pluto Press, 2004): 97.
 
20
 Ibid. 97-98
 
21
Ibid. 
22
 Lemarchand, The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa, 108.
  
23
 Ibid., .104
 
24
 Ibid.
 
25
 Ibid.
  
26
 Ibid.
 
27
 Du Toit, “Reconciliation and Transitional Justice: The Case of Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts,”9.
 
28
 Lemarchand, The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa, 108.
  
29
 Teitel, Transitional Justice, 70.
 
30
 Mamdani, “Lessons of Nuremburg and Codesa: Where Do We Go From Here?” 4-5.
 
31
 Helen Hintjens, “Explaining the 1994 genocide in Rwanda,” The Journal of Modern African Studies, 37, 2 (1999): 243
  
32
 Ibid., 243.
 
33
 Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda, (New Jersey: Princeton Press, 
2001): xi.
 
34
 Ibid., .267-268
 
35
 Ibid., .7
 
36
 Ibid.
  
37
 Ibid.
 
38
 Scott Strauss, The Order of Genocide: Race, Power and war in Rwanda, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006): xi
 
39
 Mamdani, When Victims become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda, 6.
  
40
 Saskia Van Hoyweghen, “Book Review: Mahmood Mamdani, 2001, When Victims become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and 
the Genocide in Rwanda,” Review of African Political Economy, (ROAPE Publications, 2001): 481
 
41
 Ibid., .482
  
42
 Mamdani, When Victims become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda, xii.
 
43
 Paul Magnarella, “Explaining Rwanda’s 1994 Genocide, Review of When Victims become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the 
Genocide in Rwanda,” Human Rights and Human Welfare, Vol. 2:1 (Winter, 2002): 28.
 
44
 Mamdani, When Victims become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda, 7-8.
 
45
 Magnarella, “Explaining Rwanda’s 1994 Genocide, Review of When Victims become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide 
in Rwanda,” 28.
 
 
217 
 
 
 
 
 
46
 Urusaro Alice Karekezi, “Review of Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide 
in Rwanda,” African Review of Books/ Revue Africaine Des Livres, Vol. 1, No. 1,(October, 2004): 9.
 
47
 Mamdani, When Victims become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda, 15.
  
48
 Ibid.
 
49
 Government of the Republic of Rwanda, “History: A Brief History of Rwanda,” available from http://gov.rw/home/history/ (last updated: 
2014), (accessed on 16 July 2016)
 
50 Arlette Vandeneycken, “Reconciliation and Justice in Africa, a Review of Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims become Killers: Colonialism, 
Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda,” Published on H-Africa (May, 2004) available from https://networks.h-
net.org/node/28765/reviews/32839/vandeneycken-mamdani-when-victims-become-killers-colonialism-nativism (accessed on 11 November
 
2015) 
51
 Mamdani, When Victims become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda, 19.
 
52
 Ibid.
  
53
 Ibid., .20
 
54
 Ibid., .19
 
55
 Van Hoyweghen, “Book Review: Mahmood Mamdani, 2001, When Victims become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in
 
Rwanda,”481. 
56
 Mamdani, When Victims become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda, 15.
 
57
 Ibid.
  
58
 Karekezi, “Review of Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda,” 9.
 
59
 Mamdani, When Victims become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda, 34.
 
60
 Ibid., .14
  
61
 Ibid.
 
62
 Karekezi, “Review of Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda,” 9
 
63
 Mamdani, When Victims become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda, 14.
  
64
 Ibid.
 
65
 Ibid.
 
66
 Ibid., .18
 
67
 Ibid., .5
 
68
 Pal Aluwhalia, “Specificities: Citizens and Subjects Citizenship, Subjectivity and the Crisis of Modernity,” Social Identities, Vol 5 No. 3, 
(Taylor and Francis:1999):314
 
69
 Karekezi, “Review of Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda,” 10.
 
70
 Ibid.
 
71
 Ibid.
  
72
 Ibid.
 
73
 Francis B. Nyamnjoh, “Expectations of Modernity in Africa or Future in the Rear-view Mirror?” Review Article, Journal of 
Southern African Studies, Vol. 27, No. 2 (2001): 367
 
74
 ibid.
 
75 ibid. 
76
 ibid
 
77
 Aluwhalia, “Specificities: Citizens and Subjects Citizenship, Subjectivity and the Crisis of Modernity,”319
  
78
 Rene Lemarchand, “Review of Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in 
Rwanda,” The Journal of African History, Vol. 43, No. 22 (University of Cambridge Press: 2002): 308.
 
79
 Ibid.
  
80
 Ibid.
 
81
 Karekezi, “Review of Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda,” 9.
 
82
 Ibid.
  
83
 Ibid.
 
84
 Hintjens, “Explaining the 1994 genocide in Rwanda,”  257.
 
85
 Van Hoyweghen, “Book Review: Mahmood Mamdani, 2001, When Victims become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in
 
Rwanda,”482. 
86
 Karekezi, “Review of Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda,” 9.
 
87
 Ibid.
  
88
 Ibid.
 
89
 Ibid.
 
90
 Lemarchand, “Review of Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda,” 308.
  
91
 Ibid.
 
92
 Ibid.
 
93
 Ibid.
  
94
 Magnarella, “Explaining Rwanda’s 1994 Genocide, Review of When Victims become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide 
in Rwanda,” 28-29.
 
95
 Lemarchand, “Review of Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda,” 308-
 
309.  
96
Omar Mcdoom, “Rwanda’s Ordinary Killers: Interpreting Popular Participation in the Rwandan Genocide,” Crisis States 
Research Programme: DESTIN’s Development Research Centre, Working Paper Series no. 1, Working Paper no.77 (2005): 3 
97
 Ibid.
 
98 Woodrow Wilson’s International Centre for Scholars, “Book Release: Webs of Violence in Rwanda, In Conversation with Lee Ann 
Fujii,”(23 September, 2009), Audio-Video available from https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/book-release-webs-violence-rwanda-
 
conversation-lee-ann-fujii (accessed on 3 August 2016).  
99
 Lee Ann Fujii, “A New Model for Studying Mass Murder: The Order of Genocide by Scott Strauss,” Genocide Studies and Prevention: An 
International Journal, Vol. 2, Issue 3, Article 7. (2007): 265
  
100 Jennie E. Burnett, “Review of Scott Strauss, The Order of Genocide: Race, Power and Violence in Rwanda,”Africa Today, Vol. 54, 
No. 4(Summer, 2008): 117 
101
 Peter Uvin, “Review of Killing Neighbours: Webs of Violence in Rwanda by Lee Ann Fujii,” Book Reviews: Comparative 
Politics, Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 7, No. 4 (2009): 983  
218 
 
 
 
 
 
102 Mcdoom, “Rwanda’s Ordinary Killers: Interpreting Popular Participation in the Rwandan Genocide,” 2. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Ibid., .2-3 
106 Ibid. 
107 Ibid., .4 
108 Ibid., .23 
109 Ibid. 
110 Ibid. 
111 Ibid., .2 
112 Ibid. 
113 Ibid., .23 
114 Ibid., .15 
115 Ibid. 
116 Ibid.  
117
 Lee Ann Fujii, “The Power of Local Ties: Popular Participation in the Rwandan Genocide,” Security Studies, 17, (Routledge: Taylor 
and Francis, 2008): 569
 
118 Ibid., .570.  
119 Ibid., .571 
120 Ibid., .570-571 
121 Uvin, “Review of Killing Neighbours: Webs of Violence in Rwanda by Lee Ann Fujii,” 983  
122 Fujii, “The Power of Local Ties: Popular Participation in the Rwandan Genocide,” 569. 
123 Uvin, “Review of Killing Neighbours: Webs of Violence in Rwanda by Lee Ann Fujii,” 983. 
124 Ibid.  
125
 Lee Ann Fujii, “Transforming the moral landscape: the diffusion of a genocidal norm in Rwanda,” Journal of Genocide Research, 6(1). 
(Carfax Publishing: Taylor and Francis Group, 2004): 102.
 
126 Ibid. 
127 Ibid. 
128 Ibid., .103 
129 Ibid.  
130 Uvin, “Review of Killing Neighbours: Webs of Violence in Rwanda by Lee Ann Fujii,” 983. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Fujii, “The Power of Local Ties: Popular Participation in the Rwandan Genocide,” 571 
133 Ibid. 
134 Ibid. 
135 Ibid., .568  
136 Uvin, “Review of Killing Neighbours: Webs of Violence in Rwanda by Lee Ann Fujii,” 983. 
137 Strauss, Order of Genocide: Race, Power and War in Rwanda,  8. 
138 Ibid., .224 
139 Fujii, “A New Model for Studying Mass Murder: The Order of Genocide by Scott Strauss”, 265  
140 Strauss, Order of Genocide: Race, Power and War in Rwanda,  8. 
141 Ibid., .12 
142 Ibid., .224 
143 Ibid. 
144 Ibid., .12 
145 Ibid., .11-12  
146
 Omar McDoom, “Review of Scott Strauss, Order of Genocide: Race, Power and War in Rwanda,” Book Reviews: The Authors 
Journal Compilation (Asen/Blackwell Publishing: 2007): 760
 
147 Ibid.  
148 Strauss,Order of Genocide: Race, Power and War in Rwanda, 225. 
149 Ibid., .13 
150 Ibid., .226  
151 McDoom, “Review of Scott Strauss, Order of Genocide: Race, Power and War in Rwanda,” 760. 
152 Ibid., .761 
153 Ibid.  
154 Strauss,“Order of Genocide: Race, Power and War in Rwanda,”  225. 
155 Ibid., .16 
156 Ibid., .160-161 
157 Ibid., .15 
158 Ibid., .225 
159 Ibid.  
160 McDoom, “Review of Scott Strauss, Order of Genocide: Race, Power and War in Rwanda,” 761. 
161 Strauss, Order of Genocide: Race, Power and War in Rwanda, 226. 
162 Ibid. 
163 Ibid., .18 
164 McDoom, “Review of Scott Strauss, Order of Genocide: Race, Power and War in Rwanda,” 762. 
165 Karekezi, “Review of Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda,” 10.  
166 Lemarchand, “Review of Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda,” 308. 
167 Mamdani, When Victims become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda, 34. 
168 Ibid. 
169 Ibid., .34-35 
170 Ibid., .35 
171 Catherine Newbury, The Cohesion of Oppression: Clientship and Ethnicity in Rwanda, 1860-1960, (New York: Columbia University  
Press, 1988): 180.  
219 
 
 
 
 
 
172
Linda Melvern, Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide, (New York and London: Verso, 2004): 12 
173 Ibid. 
174 Ibid. 
175 Ibid., .13-14 
176 Mamdani, When Victims become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda, 116. 
177 Rene Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, (London: Pall Mall Press, 1970): 146  
178 Eltringham, Accounting for Horror: Post-genocide Debates in Rwanda, 34. 
179
Ibid.
 
180 Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, 149.  
181 Linda Melvern, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide, (London: Zed Books, 2000): 12 
182 Ibid. 
183 Ibid. 
184 Ibid. 
185 Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, 149 
186 Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide 1959-1994, (London: Hurst & Company, 1995): 45-46 
187 Ibid, p46 
188
Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, 149 
189 Ibid.  
190 Mamdani, When Victims become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda, 116 
191 Ibid., .117 
192 Ibid. 
193 Ibid. 
194 Ibid. 
195 Organization of African Unity Report, “Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide: Report of the Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate 
the Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events,” (29
th
 of May, 2000):18 
196 Melvern, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide, 14 
197 Mamdani, When Victims become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda, 119.  
198
 Organization of African Unity Report, “Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide: Report of the Panel of Eminent Personalities to 
Investigate the Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events,” 16.
 
199 Mamdani, When Victims become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda, 119. 
200 Ibid. 
201 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide 1959-1994, 48. 
202 Melvern, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide, 14. 
203 Ibid. 
204 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide 1959-1994, 49. 
205 Mamdani, When Victims become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda, 130.  
206 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide 1959-1994, 50. 
207 Ibid. 
208 Ibid. 
209 Ibid. 
210 Ibid., .52 
211
 Organization of African Unity Report, “Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide: Report of the Panel of Eminent Personalities to 
Investigate the Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events,” 18.
 
212 Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, 146. 
213 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide 1959-1994, 52. 
214 Mamdani, When Victims become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda, 36. 
215 Ibid. 
216 Ibid. 
217 Organization of African Unity Report, “Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide: Report of the Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate 
the Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events,” 18 
218 Ibid. 
219 Mamdani, When Victims become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda, 116.  
220 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide 1959-1994, 57. 
221 Mamdani, When Victims become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda, 127. 
222 Ibid., .118 
223 Ibid. 
224 Ibid., 135 
225 Ibid., .87  
226 Ibid., .136 
227 Ibid., .137 
228 Ibid.  
229 Melvern, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide, 22. 
230 Ibid. 
231 Mamdani, When Victims become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda, 137 
232 Ibid. 
233 Ibid., .138 
234 Ibid. 
235 Ibid. 
236 Ibid. 
237 Ibid. 
238 Ibid. 
239 Ibid. 
240 Ibid., .153  
241 Hintjens, “Explaining the 1994 genocide in Rwanda,” 259.  
220 
 
 
 
 
 
242 Ibid., .262 
243 Mamdani, When Victims become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda, 153. 
 
244
 Phillip Verwimp, Peasants in Power: The Political Economy of Development and Genocide in Rwanda, (Netherlands: Springer 
Press, 2013): 263
 
245 Mamdani, When Victims become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda, 140 
246 Ibid. 
247 Ibid. 
248 Deborah Mayersen, On the Path to Genocide: Armenia and Rwanda Revisited, (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2014): 156  
249 Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, 151 
250 Mayersen, On the Path to Genocide: Armenia and Rwanda Revisited, 157 
251 Johan Pottier, Re-Imagining Rwanda: Conflict, Survival and Disinformation in the Late Twentieth Century, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002): 35 
252 Hintjens, “Explaining the 1994 genocide in Rwanda,” 259. 
253 Ibid. 
254 Ibid. 
255 Eltringham, Accounting for Horror: Post-genocide Debates in Rwanda, 41. 
256 Hintjens, “Explaining the 1994 genocide in Rwanda,” 261.  
257 Mamdani, When Victims become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda, 206. 
258 Ibid. 
259 Lindsey Scorgie, “Rwanda’s Arusha Accords: A Missed Opportunity,” Undercurrent, Vol. I,No. 1, (2004): 69. , 
260 Ibid.. 
261 Ibid. 
262 Wambui Mwangi, “The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Reconciling the Acquitted,”  264.  
263 Scorgie, “Rwanda’s Arusha Accords: A Missed Opportunity,” 69. 
264 Melvern, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide, 60. 
265 Ibid. 
266 Ibid., .70 
267 Ibid. 
268 Mamdani, When Victims become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda, 210  
269 Alison des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999): 116 
270 Mamdani, When Victims become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda, 127 
271 Hintjens, “Explaining the 1994 genocide in Rwanda,” 258.  
272 Mamdani, When Victims become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda, 210 
273 Scorgie, “Rwanda’s Arusha Accords: A Missed Opportunity,” 69. 
 
274 des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, 117. 
275 Ibid. 
276 Hintjens, “Explaining the 1994 genocide in Rwanda,”  261. 
277 des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, 117. 
278 Ibid. 
279 Mamdani, When Victims become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda, 213 
280 Hintjens, “Explaining the 1994 genocide in Rwanda,”  258.  
281 des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, 72. 
282 Ibid., .73 
283 Ibid. 
284 Ibid. 
285 ibid. 
286 Ibid., .74 
287 Ibid. 
288 Hintjens, “Explaining the 1994 genocide in Rwanda,”  258. 
289 Ibid., .265  
290
 Human Rights Watch, “The Rwandan Genocide: How It was Prepared,” A Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, No.1 (April, 2006) 
available from https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/africa/rwanda0406/4.htm (accessed on 14 October, 2014)
 
291 des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, 75.  
292 Mamdani, When Victims become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda, 127. 
293 Ibid. 
294 Ibid., .189  
295 Ibid., .191 
296 Ibid., .190 
297 Ibid., .191 
 
Notes on Chapter Three 
 
1
 Filip Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda, (Cambridge University Press, 2013): 1.
 
2
 Lars Waldorf, “ “Thinking Big”: Rwanda’s Post-Genocide Politics,” E-International Relations, 30 April, 2014, available from
 
http://www.e-ir.info/2014/04/30/thinking-big-rwandas-post-genocide-politics/APR 30 2014 accessed on (5 July 2016)  
3
 Phil Clark, “After Genocide: Democracy in Rwanda, 20 Years On,” Juncture: The Institute for Public Policy Research: Vol. 20, Issue 4, 
(Spring, 2014): 308
  
4
 Ibid.
 
5
 Waldorf, “ “Thinking Big”: Rwanda’s Post-Genocide Politics”
 
 
221 
 
 
 
 
 
6
 Richard Grant,“Paul Kagame: Rwanda’s redeemer or ruthless dictator?,” The Telegraph, July 22, 2010. Available from 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/rwanda/7900680/Paul-Kagame-Rwandas-redeemer-or-
ruthless-dictator.html (accessed on 11 March 2014)
  
7
 Waldorf, “ “Thinking Big”: Rwanda’s Post-Genocide Politics”
 
8
 Ibid.
 
9
 Ibid.
  
10
 Clark, “After Genocide: Democracy in Rwanda,” 309.
 
11
 Omar Shahabudin Mcdoom, “Rwanda’s Exit Pathway from Violence: A Strategic Assessment,” World Development Report: 
Background Case Study, 62054, (Washington D.C.: Worldbank, 2011): 2
 
12
 Ibid.
 
13
 Ibid.
 
14
 Waldorf, “ “Thinking Big”: Rwanda’s Post-Genocide Politics”
  
15
 Ibid.
 
16
 Ibid.
 
17
 Ibid.
  
18
 Ibid.
 
19
 Human Rights Watch, “Rwanda: Human Rights Development,” Human Rights Watch: World Development Report, 1999, available from 
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k/Africa-08.htm (accessed on 11 March 2014)
 
20
 Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda, xiii.
 
21
 Clark, “After Genocide: Democracy in Rwanda, 20 Years On,”  310.
 
22
 Ibid.
  
23
 Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, “Against the Odds: Rwanda, 20 years after- Rwanda has made rapid strides in development since 
1994,”Aljazeera: Opinion Politics, 12 April, 2014, available from http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/04/against-odds-
rwanda-20-years-af-201441292413620474.html (accessed on 14 August 2016)
  
24
 Adam Green, “Exclusive interview: Paul Kagame,” This is Africa: A global perspective, 18 November 2013, available 
from http://www.thisisafricaonline.com/News/Exclusive-interview-Paul-Kagame (accessed on August 19, 2015)
 
25
Grant, “  Paul Kagame: Rwanda’s redeemer or ruthless dictator?”.
 
26
 Golooba-Mutebi, “Against the Odds: Rwanda, 20 years after- Rwanda has made rapid strides in development since 1994.”
 
27
 Grant, “Paul Kagame: Rwanda’s redeemer or ruthless dictator?”
 
28
 Ibid.
  
29
 Author Unknown, “Africa’s Singapore?: A country with a bloody history seeks prosperity by becoming business-friendly,” 
The Economist, 25 February, 2012, available from,
 
http://www.economist.com/node/21548263, (accessed on 3 November 2015)
 
30
 Ibid.
 
31
 Grant, “Paul Kagame: Rwanda’s redeemer or ruthless dictator?”
 
32
 Christian Caryl, “Africa’s Singapore Dream: Why Rwanda’s President styles himself as the heir to Lee Kuan Yew,” Foreign Policy: The
 
 
Magazine, 2 April, 2015, available from http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/02/africas-singapore-dream-rwanda-kagame-lee-
kuan-yew/ (accessed on 3 November 2015) 
33
 Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda, xvi.
 
34
 Grant, “Paul Kagame: Rwanda’s redeemer or ruthless dictator?”
  
35
 Caryl, “Africa’s Singapore Dream: Why Rwanda’s President styles himself as the heir to Lee Kuan Yew”
 
36
 Grant,  “Paul Kagame: Rwanda’s redeemer or ruthless dictator?”
 
37
 James Munyaneza, “Rwanda: Women take 64 seats in Parliament,” New Times, 19 September 2013, available from
 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201309190110.html, (accessed on August 16, 2015) 
38
 Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda, xiii.
 
39
 Ibid.
  
40
 Johan Pottier, Re-Imagining Rwanda: Conflict, Survival and Disinformation in the Twentieth Century, (Cambridge: Cambrigde 
University Press, 2002): 53
 
41
 Rachel Hayman, “Rwanda: Milking the cow? Creating Policy Space in Spite of Aid Dependence,” in The Politics of Aids: African
 
Strategies for Dealing with Donors, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009): 3  
42
 Rachel Hayman, “Funding Fraud? Donors and Democracy in Rwanda,” in Remaking Rwanda: Statebuilding and Human Rights 
after Mass Violence, eds. Scott Strauss and Lars Waldorf, (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 2011): 120. 
Ibid. 
43
 Ibid., .121
 
44
 David E. Kiwuwa, Ethnic Politics and Democratic Transitions in Rwanda, (New York: Routledge, 2012):105.
  
45
 Ibid.
 
46
 Hayman, “Funding Fraud? Donors and Democracy in Rwanda,” 120.
 
47
 Author Unknown, Rwanda: Nation’ Will Survive Without Aid, East African Business Week, 2012 available on
 
https://kigalinews.wordpress.com/tag/rwandan-patriotic-front-rpf/  (accessed on July 27, 2015) 
48
 Ibid.
 
49
 Hayman, “Rwanda: Milking the cow? Creating Policy Space in Spite of Aid Dependence,” 3.
  
50 Government of Rwanda, “The 10th National Dialogue to Focus on Achieving Self Reliance, 13 November, 2014, available from 
http://www.gov.rw/newsdetails2/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=470&cHash=8f09ccda3e55f1b6a6508e1f9c42c4f6 (accessed on 16 September, 2015)
  
51
 Ibid.
  
52
 Ibid.
 
53
 Grant, “Paul Kagame: Rwanda’s redeemer or ruthless dictator?”
 
54
 Ibid.
  
55
 Ibid.
 
56
 Tom Murphy, “Kagame doesn't like NGO’s, but loves foreign aid,”Humanosphere, 11 September, 2015, available 
http://www.humanosphere.org/world-politics/2015/09/kagame-doesnt-like-ngos-loves-foreign-aid/ (accessed on 10 August 2016)
 
57
 Helen Hintjens, “Post-Genocide Identitiy Politics in Rwanda,”Ethnicities, Vol.8, No. 1, (Los Angeles, New Delhi and Singapore: 
Sage Publications, 2008): 11.
 
58
 Ibid.
  
59
 Ibid.
 
 
222 
 
 
 
 
 
60
 Author Unknown, “Rwanda: France Opens Rwanda Genocide Archives,” Radio France Internationale, 8 April, 2015. available on 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201504081275.html (accessed on 1 August , 2015)  
61
S.A.P., “Language in Rwanda: Speak English? Invest here. French need not apply,” The Economist, 10April, 2012, available 
from available from www.economist.com/blogs/johnson/2012/10/language-rwanda (accessed on 9 August 2015)  
62
 Author Unknown, “Rwanda opposition sues over exclusion of French language,” 9 December 2014, available from 
http://www.expatica.com/fr/news/country-news/Rwanda-opposition-sues-over-exclusion-of-French-language_442155.html (accessed 
on August 2, 2015) 
63
 Ibid.
 
64
 Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda, xiii
  
65
 Hintjens, “Post-Genocide Identity Politics in Rwanda,”  9.
 
66
 Clark, “After Genocide: Democracy in Rwanda, 20 Years On,”  310.
 
67
 Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda, xiv
  
68
 Dr. Pierre Damien Habumuremyi, “Pluralism of Consensus and Political Inclusion in the Post 1994 Tutsi GenocideRwanda- Part 3,” The 
New Times Newspaper, March 17, 2013, available from http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/article/2013-03-17/63927/ (accessed on August 
12, 2015)
  
69
 Mcdoom, “Rwanda’s Exit Pathway from Violence: A Strategic Assessment,” 3.
 
70
 Dr. Pierre Damien Habumuremyi, Pluralism of Consensus and Political Inclusion in the Post 1994 Tutsi Genocide Rwanda- Part 3,  
The New Times, March 17, 2013 accessed on August 12, 2015, available from http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/article/2013-03-
17/63927/ 
71
 Habumuremyi, “Pluralism of Consensus and Political Inclusion in the Post 1994 Tutsi GenocideRwanda- Part 3,”
 
72
 Mcdoom, “Rwanda’s Exit Pathway from Violence: A Strategic Assessment,” 3
  
73
 Ibid.
 
74
 Ibid.
 
75
 Ibid.
  
76
 Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda, of the 4
th
 Amendment, (2010): 3
 
available from  http://www.parliament.gov.rw/fileadmin/Images2013/Rwandan_Constitution.pdf, (accessed on August 1, 2015) 
77
 Hintjens, “Post-Genocide Identity Politics in Rwanda,”  9.
 
78
 Ibid., .9-10
 
79
 Ibid., .10
 
80
 Simran Kaur Chahal, “Appropriating the Past: A Comparative Study of Official Memory Practices in Rwanda and Burundi,” (Canada:
 
Simon Frasier University, 2012): 34 
81
 Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda, of the 4
th
 Amendment,  10.
 
82
 Rene Lemarchand, “Genocide, Memory and Ethnic Reconciliation in Rwanda,” L’AfriqueDes Grand Lacs Annuaire, ( 2006-2007): 25
 
Rene 
83
 Ibid.
 
84
 Ibid.
  
85
 Ibid.
 
86
 Ibid.
 
87
 Ibid.
 
88
 Frederick Golooba-Mutebi and David Booth, “Bilateral Co-Operation and Local Power Dynamics: The Case of Rwanda,” Overseas
 
Development Initiative, September, (2013): 11. 
89
 Ibid.
 
90
 Ibid.
  
91
 Ibid., .11-12
 
92
 Ibid.
 
93
 Ibid., .12
  
94
 Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda, xix.
 
95
 Ibid.
 
96
 Ibid.
  
97
 Ibid.
 
98
 Grant,  “Paul Kagame: Rwanda’s redeemer or ruthless dictator?”
 
99
 Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 3.
 
100 Ibid., .2 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid., .3  
103
 Author Unknown, “From President to Prison, BBC online, 6 July, 2004, available from ”http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3728807.stm, 
(accessed on 11 September 2015)
 
104 Grant,“Paul Kagame: Rwanda’s redeemer or ruthless dictator?” 
105 Ibid. 
106 Ibid. 
107 Ibid.  
108 Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 5. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Ibid. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Ibid., .6 
115
 Filip Reyntjens, “Constructing the Truth, Dealing with Dissent, Domesticating the World: Governance in Post Genocide Rwanda,” 
African Affairs, Volume 110, Issue 438, (London: Oxford Journals, 2010): 8
 
116
 Jude Murison, “The New Rwanda’: 1994-present,” Forced Migration Online, August 17, 2011, , available from 
http://www.forcedmigration.org/research-resources/expert-guides/rwanda/the-new-rwanda-1994-present, (accessed on August 12, 2015)
 
117 International Crisis Group, “Rwanda at the End of the Transition: A Necessary Political Liberalization,” International Crisis Group  
Working Paper, Africa Report, No.53,13 November, 2002, (Nairobi/Brussels): 5  
223 
 
 
 
 
 
118 Author Unknown, “Political Reform Reaches Last Stage in Rwanda,” IOL News, 20 February 2006, available from 
http://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/political-reform-reaches-last-stage-in-rwanda-1.267079#.VbaMo0LlclI, (accessed on 12 August 2015)
 
119 Author Unknown, “ ‘Game Over’ for Democracy in Rwanda,” Freedom House, 2 June, 2015. Available from 
https://freedomhouse.org/blog/game-over-democracy-rwanda (accessed on 7 November 2015)  
120
 International Crisis Group, “Consensual Democracy in Post Genocide Rwanda: Evaluating the March 2001 District Elections,” 
African Report No. 34, October 9, 2001, 2015, available from http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/rwanda/034-
consensual-democracy-in-post-genocide-rwanda-evaluating-the-march-2001-district-elections.aspx (accessed on August 1, 2015) 
121 International Crisis Group, “Rwanda at the End of the Transition: A Necessary Political Liberalization,” 5. 
122 Ibid. 
123 Ibid. 
124 ibid. 
125 ibid. 
126 Ibid., .6 
127 Ibid. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Ibid. 
130 Ibid., .7 
131 Reyntjens, “Constructing the Truth, Dealing with Dissent, Domesticating the World: Governance in Post Genocide Rwanda,” 29.  
132 International Crisis Group, “Rwanda at the End of the Transition: A Necessary Political Liberalization,” 9. 
133 Ibid. 
134 Reyntjens, “Constructing the Truth, Dealing with Dissent, Domesticating the World: Governance in Post Genocide Rwanda,” 29.  
135 Mcdoom, “Rwanda’s Exit Pathway from Violence: A Strategic Assessment,” 5. 
136 Reyntjens, “Constructing the Truth, Dealing with Dissent, Domesticating the World: Governance in Post Genocide Rwanda,” 29. 
137 Mcdoom, “Rwanda’s Exit Pathway from Violence: A Strategic Assessment,” 5.  
138
 Filip Reyntjens, “Talking or fighting?: Political Evolution in Rwanda and Burundi 1998-1999,” Current African Issues, Issue 21, 
Volume 5, (Nordic Africa Institute, 1999): 7
 
139 Ibid. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Ibid. 
142 Reyntjens, “Talking or fighting: Political evolution in Rwanda and Burundi 1998-1999,” 9.  
143
 United Kingdom: Country Information and Policy Unit- Immigration and Nationality Home Office, “Rwanda Country Report,” April 
2004, available from http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/40a887827.pdf (accessed on 11 september 2015): 10
 
144 Hintjens, “Post-Genocide Identity Politics in Rwanda,”  18. 
145
Reyntens, “Talking or fighting: Political evolution in Rwanda and Burundi 1998-1999,” 9. 
145
 United Kingdom: Country Information and Policy Unit- Immigration and Nationality Home Office, “Rwanda Country Report,”
 
146 Reyntjens, “Constructing the Truth, Dealing with Dissent, Domesticating the World: Governance in Post Genocide Rwanda,”  31. 
147 Ibid. 
148
 Author Unknown, “Rwanda’s Presidential Election: Kagame won, a little too well: Nine years after the genocide, Paul Kagame has 
much to his credit. But not, unfortunately, allowing true democracy,” The Economist, August 28, 2003, available from 
www.economist.com/node/2023062, (accessed on 11 August, 2015)
 
149 Ibid. 
150 Ibid. 
151 Ibid. 
152 Ibid. 
153 Angus Reid, “Rwanda: How President Kagame of Rwanda Rigged the 2003 General Elections,” Global Monitor, 9 August 2010, available 
from http://rwandarwabanyarwanda.over-blog.com/article-rwanda-how-president-kagame-of-rwanda-rigged-the-2003-general-
 
elections-55127374.html, (accessed on 15 August 2015)  
154 Theogene Rudasingwa, “Rwanda’s 2013 Parliamentary Elections: A Post Mortem,” Pazambuka News, 26 September, 2013, available from 
http://www.pambazuka.org/governance/rwandas-2013-parliamentary-elections-post-mortem, (accessed on 15 August 2015)
  
155
 Danielle Beswick, “Democracy, Identity, and the Politics of Exclusion in Post Genocide Rwanda: The Case of the Batwa,” in 
Democratisation in Africa: Challenges and Prospects, eds. Gordon Crawford and Gabrielle Lynch, (New York: Routledge, 2012): 224
 
156 Author Unknown, “Hundreds throng Parliament as term limits debate gets underway,” The New Times, July 14, 2015, available 
fromwww.newtimes.co.rw/section/article/2015-07-14/190606/ (accessed on August 12 2015) 
157 Habumuremyi, “Pluralism of Consensus and Political Inclusion in the Post 1994 Tutsi GenocideRwanda- Part 3” 
158 Ibid.  
159 Will Jones, “Potemkin Pluralism: Why the Rwandan Constitution Needs to Change,” Good Governance Africa, AIF 32: Shaky Foundation, June-
July, 2015. available from http://admin.gga.org/stories/editions/aif-32-shaky-foundations/potemkin-pluralism (accessed on
  
15 August 2015) 
160 Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 40 
161 Jones, “Potemkin Pluralism: Why the Rwandan Constitution Needs to Change” 
162 Ibid. 
163 Ibid. 
164 Ibid. 
165 Ibid.  
166 Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 43. 
167 Ibid. 
168 Ibid., .39 
169 Ibid., .43 
170 Ibid. 
171 Ibid.  
172 Hintjens, Post-Genocide Identity Politics in Rwanda, p.10 
173 Reyntjens, “Talking or fighting: Political evolution in Rwanda and Burundi 1998-1999,” 6. 
174 Ibid., .8 
175 Ibid., .19  
224 
 
 
 
 
 
176 Jones, “Potemkin Pluralism: Why the Rwandan Constitution Needs to Change” 
177 Rudasingwa, “Rwanda’s 2013 Parliamentary Elections: A Post Mortem,” 
178 Ibid. 
179 Ibid. 
180 Ibid. 
181
Golooba-Mutebi et al, “Bilateral Co-Operation and Local Power Dynamics: The Case of Rwanda,” 9. 
182 Ibid., .4 
183 Ibid., .12 
184 Ibid. 
185 Ibid. 
186 Ibid., .4 
187 Ibid., .13 
188 Ibid., .14 
189 Ibid. 
190 Ibid. 
191 Ibid. 
192 Ibid. 
193 Ibid., .15  
194 Hintjens, “Post-Genocide Identity Politics in Rwanda,”  6. 
195 Ibid., .18 
196 Ibid.  
197 Rudasingwa, “Rwanda’s 2013 Parliamentary Elections: A Post Mortem,” 
198 Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 47. 
199 Ibid.  
200 Rudasingwa, “Rwanda’s 2013 Parliamentary Elections: A Post Mortem,” 
201 Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 47 
202
Rudasingwa, “Rwanda’s 2013 Parliamentary Elections: A Post Mortem,” 
203 Ibid. 
204 Author Unknown, “Rwanda: The Political Platform Speeds Up for Change,” Democratiques Unifiees-Rwanda, October 14, 2013, available 
from http://www.fdu-rwanda.com/en/kinyarwanda-urugaga-rwamashyaka-amahoro-ihuriro-rnc-fdu-inkingi-mu-ntambwe-nshya-
 
yo-guhindura-ubutegetsi-buri-mu-rwanda/  (accessed on August 9, 2015) 
205 Ibid. 
206 Ibid. 
207 Ibid. 
208 Ibid. 
209 Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 49. 
210 Ibid. 
211 Garrison, “Victoire Ingabire. Challenging the Official Rwanda Genocide story: At the African Court on Human and People’s Rights,” 
212 Reyntjens, “Constructing the Truth, Dealing with Dissent, Domesticating the World: Governance in Post Genocide Rwanda,”  31. 
213 Ibid.  
214 Author Unknown, “ ‘Game Over’ for Democracy in Rwanda” 
215 Ibid. 
216 Author Unknown, “Hundreds throng Parliament as term limits debate gets underway,” New Times Newspaper, 14 July, 2015, available 
from http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/article/2015-07-14/190606/, (accessed on 7 November 2015)  
217 Author Unknown, “Kagame Allies Seek Vote to Allow him a Third Term,” New Vision, 23 October 2014, available from 
http://www.newvision.co.ug/news/661008-kagame-allies-seek-vote-to-allow-him-a-third-term.html, (accessed on August 4, 2015)
  
218 Author Unknown, “Hundreds throng Parliament as term limits debate gets underway” 
219 Author Unknown, “Kagame Allies Seek Vote to Allow him a Third Term” 
220 Ludovica Laccino, “Rwanda: Changing Constitution to allow Kagame a Third Term ‘Will Undermine Peace and Democracy’,”  
International Business Times, June 17, 2015 available from http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/rwanda -changing-constitution-allow-
president-kagame-third-term-will-undermine-peace-democracy-1506587, (accessed on August 4, 2015) 
221 Ibid.  
222 Author Unknown, “ ‘Game Over’ for Democracy in Rwanda” 
223 Ibid. 
224 Author Unknown, “Rwanda: Who has Kagame been fooling with his elections?,”Harungana Forum, 16 September, 2013. Available from 
http://www.harungana.com/2013/09/rwanda-who-has-kagame-been-fooling-with.html, (accessed on 7 November 2015) 
225 Ibid. 
226 Ibid  
227 Amy Hollyfield, “Rwanda 20 years after…”, Tampabay News, 4 April 2014, available from 
http://www.tampabay.com/news/perspective/rwanda-20-years-after/2173537 (accessed on 7 November 2015)
  
228 Lars Waldorf , “Censorship and Propaganda in Post-Genocide Rwanda,”  in The Media and the Rwanda Genocide, ed. Allan Thompson, 
(London: Pluto Press, 2007): 406 
229
Ibid. 
230
 Reporters Without Borders, “Biggest Rises and Falls in the 2014 Freedom Index,” January 31, 2014, , available 
from http://rsf.org/index2014/en-index2014.php# (accessed on August 1, 2015)
 
231 Waldorf , “Censorship and Propaganda in Post-Genocide Rwanda,” 
232 Ibid. 
233 Ibid., .406-407 
234 Ibid. 
235 Ibid.. 
236 Ibid. 
237 Ibid. 
238 Ibid 
239 Ibid.  
225 
 
 
 
 
 
240 Ibid. 
241 Hollyfield, “Rwanda 20 years after…” 
242 Human Rights Watch, “Rwanda: Silencing Dissent ahead of Elections,” HumanRightsWatch.org, 2 August, 2010, available from 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/08/02/rwanda-silencing-dissent-ahead-elections August 2 2010 (accessed on July18)  
243
 Author Unknown, “Rwanda: Repression Across Borders: Attacks and Threats Against Rwandan Opponents and Critics Abroad,” 
Human Rights Watch, January 2014 available from https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/01/28/rwanda-repression-across-borders, (accessed on 
June 30, 2015) 
244 Ibid. 
245 Human Rights Watch, “Attacks on Freedom of Expression, Association, and Assembly in the run up to Presidential Elections: January-  
July 2010,” Humanrightswatch.org, August 2 2010, available from https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/08/02/rwanda-silencing-dissent-ahead-
elections, (accessed on 18 July 2015) 
246 Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 57. 
247 Ibid. 
248 Ibid., .62 
249 Timothy Longman and Theoneste Rutagengwe, “Memory, Identity and Community in Rwanda,” in My Neighbour, My Enemy: Justice  
and Community in the Aftermath of Mass Atrocity, 
eds. Eric Stover and Harvey M. Weinstein, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004): 167 
250 Ibid.  
251 Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 62. 
252 Ibid. 
253 Ibid. 
254 Ibid. 
255 Golooba-Mutebi et al, “Bilateral Co-Operation and Local Power Dynamics: The Case of Rwanda,” 16. 
256 Ibid. 
257 Ibid., .14 
258 Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 85 
259 Ibid., .83 
260 Ibid., .84 
261 Clark, “After Genocide: Democracy in Rwanda, 20 Years On,” 310. 
262 Ibid., .309 
263 Ibid. 
264
Ibid., .310
 
265 Ibid.  
266 Ibid., .311 
267 Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 85 
268 Ibid.  
269
 Author Unknown, “Slain Rwandan was to testify at genocide court,” CNN, 18 May, 1998, available 
from http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/africa/9805/18/rwanda.death.folo/ (accessed on 9 August 2016)
 
270 Ibid. 
271 Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 86.  
272
 Lara Santoro and Susan Thomson, “Why are Rwandan’s dissapearing?” New York Times, 18 June, 2014. Available from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/18/opinion/why-are-rwandans-disappearing.html?_r=0 (accessed on 9 August, 2016)
 
273 Ibid.  
274 Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 87. 
275
 Sweden Gasasira, “President Kagame uses internet media to harass Rwandan opposition, Umuvugizi: The voice of Rwanda, 23 April, 
2015. Available from http://www.salem-news.com/articles/july212012/rwandan-opposition.php (accessed on 7 August 2016)
 
276 Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 87. 
277 Rene Lemarchand, “Rwandan Genocide Causes” in Modern Genocide: The Definitive Resource and Document, Volume 4: Rwandan Genocide, 
Other Atrocities, and International Law, eds. Paul R. Bartrop and Steven Leonard Jacobs, (California: ABC-CLIO, 2015): 1674
  
278 Author Unknown, “South Africa- Stern Warning to Rwanda,” News24, 12 March, 2014, available from 
http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/South-Africa-stern-warning-to-Rwanda-20140312, (accessed on 19 May 2015)
  
279 Clark, “After Genocide: Democracy in Rwanda, 20 Years On,” 311.  
280 Author Unknown, “ ‘Game Over’ for Democracy in Rwanda” 
281
 Marina Rafti “The Dismantling of the Rwandan Political Opposition in Exile” in L’Afrique Des Grand Lacs Annuaire 2003-2004. eds 
Filip Reytnjens and Stefan Marysse. (Anvers, Belgium: Centre d’etude de la region des Grand Lacs d’Afrique): 22
 
282
 Gabe Jaselow, “20 Years After Genocide: Rwanda prospers but political freedom remains elusive,” VOA News, 9 April, 2014. 
Available from
 
http://www.voanews.com/a/years-after-genocide-rwanda-prospers-but-political-freedom-remains-elusive/1889977.html (accessed on 7 May
 
2016) 
283 Ibid. 
284 Marina Rafti, “ The Rwandan Political Opposition In Exile: A Valid Interlocutor Vis-à-vis?” Institute of Development Policy and 
Management- University of Antwerp, (2004): 3. 
285 Ibid. 
286 Ibid., .12 
287 Ibid. 
288 Ibid.,  .23 
289 Ibid. 
290 Ibid. 
291 Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 11. 
292 Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 13. 
 
Notes on Chapter Four 
 
226 
 
 
 
 
 
1
 Marc Lacey, “A Decade After Massacres, Rwanda Outlaws Ethnicity,” New York Times, April, 9, 2004, available from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/09/world/a-decade-after-massacres-rwanda-outlaws-ethnicity.html (accessed on 2 August 2015)
 
2
 Ernesto Verdeja, “What is Political Reconciliation?,” Mobilising Ideas, February 3, 2014, available from
 
https://mobilisingideas.wordpress.com/2014/02/03/what-is-political-reconciliation/ (accessed on 19 June 2015) 
3
 Ibid.
 
4
 Charles Villa-Vicencio, “Inclusive Justice: The limitations of Trial Justice and Truth Commissions, in
 
 
Pace versus Justice: The Dilemma of Transitional Justice in Africa,” eds. Chandra Lekha Sriram and Suren Pillay, (Kwa-Zulu Natal: 
University of Kwa-Zulu Natal, 2009): 50. 
5
 Ibid.
  
6
 Ibid.
 
7
 Ibid.
 
8
 Ibid.
 
9
Ibid. 
10
 Ibid.
 
11
 Johanna Debari, “Reconciliation in Rwanda: Is it really working?” Metamorphisis, (North Carolina: Council of Public Liberal Arts
 
Colleges, 2004): 1. 
12
 Ibid. 
13 Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda, Amend. IV, 2010, Article 178. Availabe from 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/rw/rw033en.pdf, (access on 19 June 2015)
  
14
 Ibid.
 
15
 Ibid.
  
16
 Ibid.
 
17
 Cori Wielenge, “ ‘Lived’ Identities in Rwanda: Beyond Citizenship?,”African Insight, Vol. 44(1), (Africa Institute South Africa, 
June 2014): 129.
 
18
Ibid. 
19
 Ibid.
 
20
 Ibid.
  
21
 “National Unity and Reconciliation Commission: Rwanda” retreived from
 
http://www.trial-ch.org/en/resources/truth-commissions/africa/rwanda.html (accessed on 19 June 2015) 
 
22
 Frederick Golooba-Mutebi and David Booth, “Bilateral Co-operation and Local Power Dynamics: The Case of Rwanda,” Overseas 
Development Institute, (September, 2013): 13
 
23
 Government of the Republic of Rwanda, “National Unity and Reconciliation Commission: Home Grown Approaches, “ available from
 
http://www.nurc.gov.rw/index.php?id=81, (accessed on 19 June 2015)  
24
 Republic of Rwanda, Ministry of Infrastructure, “Updated version of the National Human Settlement Policy of Rwanda, Kigali,” 
Published on Government of Rwanda website, May, 19, 2009, available from 
http://www.rha.gov.rw/fileadmin/user_upload/Documents/NATIONAL_HUMAN_SETTLMENT_POLICIY_IN_RWANDA.pd 
(accessed on 19 June 2015): 5. 
25
 Ibid.
 
26 Government of the Republic of Rwanda: Nutaionl Unity and Reconciliatin Communision, “Rwanda Reconcilliation Barometer,” (Kigali: 
Government of the Republic of Rwanda, 2010):8. 
27
 Ibid., p.9.
 
28
 “National Unity and Reconciliation Commission: Rwanda”
  
29
 Rodrigue Rwirahira, “At least 92% of Rwandans reconciled, says new survey,” New Times Online Newspaper, January, 28, 2016, 
available from by New Times online newspaper, http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/article/2016-01-28/196536/ (accessed on 13 
June 2016)
  
30
 Filip Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013): 208
 
31
 Ibid., .209
 
32
 Ibid.
  
33
 Rodrigue Rwirahira, “At least 92% of Rwandans reconciled, says new survey.”
 
34
 Ibid.
 
35
 Ibid.
  
36
 Ibid.
 
37
 Ibid.
 
38
 Ibid.
  
39 Ibid. 
40
Ibid.  
41
Insitute for Justice and Reconcilliation, “Evaluation and Impact Assessment of the National Unity and Reconciliation 
Commision (NURC),”(Instiute for Justice and Reconciliation, November 2003): 1 
42
 Ibid.
 
43
 Ibid., .17.
  
44
 Ibid., .10
 
45
 Ibid.
 
46
 Ibid.
  
47
 Helen Hintjens, “Post-Genocide identity politics in Rwanda,” Ethnicities, Vol.8(1), (Los Angeles, London, New Delhi and 
Singapore: Sage Publications, 2008): 7
 
48
 Author Unknown, “Neither Hutu nor Tutsi, just Rwandan:  Rwanda is holding its first election since the genocide five years ago. But the
 
 
government dares not allow much democracy,” The Economist, April 1, 1999, available from 
http://www.economist.com/node/320471 (accessed on 3 November 2015). 
49
 Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 188.
  
50
 Ibid., .187
 
51
 Ibid., .202
 
52
 Hintjens, “Post-Genocide identity politics in Rwanda,” 10.
  
53
 Ibid.
 
 
227 
 
 
 
 
 
54
 Author Unknown, “Two paths out of hatred: Is “tribe” a dirty word?,” The Economist, August 25, 2005, , available 
from, http://www.economist.com/node/4323270 (accessed on 17 October 2015)
  
55
 Lacey, “A Decade After Massacres, Rwanda Outlaws Ethnicity”
  
56
 Debari, “Reconciliation in Rwanda: Is it really working?” 4.
 
57
 Ibid.
 
58
 Ibid.
 
59
 Ibid., .6
 
60
 Ibid.
 
61
 Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 209.
  
62
 Ibid., .267
 
63
 Ibid., .200
 
64
 Ibid.
  
65
 Wielenge, “ ‘Lived’ Identities in Rwanda: Beyond Citizenship?,” 129.
 
66
 Ibid.
 
67
 Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 205.
  
68
 Ibid.
 
69
 Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 202
 
70
 Ibid.
 
71
 Ibid
 
72
 Ibid.
 
73
 Ibid., . 200
  
74
 Debari, “Reconciliation in Rwanda: Is it really working?” 6.
 
75 Ibid. 
76
 Ibid., .7
 
77
 Ibid., .4
 
78 Ibid. 
79
 Ibid., .5
  
80
 Stef Vandeginste, “Justice for Rwanda, Ten Years After: Some Lessons Learned for Transitional Justice,” L’ Africque Des Grands Lacs 
Annuaire (2003-2004): 51.
 
81
 Government of Rwanda, “Justice and Reconciliation,” Published on Government of Rwanda website, available from
 
http://www.gov.rw/about-the-government/justice-reconciliation/ (accessed on 22 June  2015). 
82
 Ibid.
 
83
 Debari, “Reconciliation in Rwanda: Is it really working?” 5.
 
84
 Ibid., .2
 
85
 Ibid.
 
 
86 Phil Clark, The Gacaca Courts, Post-Genocide Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda: Justice without Lawyers, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
 
University Press, 2010):3  
87
 Debari, “Reconciliation in Rwanda: Is it really working?” 2.
 
88
 Laura Sealy, “Rwanda: Has Reconciliation by Legal Means Worked?,”  The Washington Post, April, 8, 2014, available from
 
 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/04/08/rwanda-has-reconciliation-by-legal-means-worked/ (accessed 
on February 4, 2015, available from) 
89
 Ibid.
  
90
 Debari, “Reconciliation in Rwanda: Is it really working?” 5.
 
91
 Ibid.
 
92
 Ibid.
 
 
93
 Clark, The Gacaca Courts, Post-Genocide Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda: Justice without Lawyers, 3.
  
94
 Ibid.
  
95
 Ibid.
 
96
 Debari, “Reconciliation in Rwanda: Is it really working?” 7.
 
97
 Ibid.
  
98
 Hintjens, “Post-Genocide identity politics in Rwanda,” 17.
 
99
 Ibid.
 
100 Debari, “Reconciliation in Rwanda: Is it really working?” 6. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Hintjens, “Post-genocide identity politics in Rwanda,” 17. 
103 Ibid.  
104 Mamdani, When Victims become killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda,271. 
105 Wielenge, “ ‘Lived’ Identities in Rwanda: Beyond Citizenship?,” 128. 
106 Ibid.  
107 Hintjens,“Post-genocide identity politics in Rwanda,” 17. 
108 Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 232. 
109 Ibid.  
110 Ibid., .231 
111 Ibid. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Ibid. 
114
 Chi Mgbako, “Ingando Solidarity Camps: Reconciliation and Political Indoctrination in Post-Genocide Rwanda,” Harvard 
Human Rights Journal / Vol. 18, (2005) Fordham Law Legal Studies Research Paper:202
 
115 Ibid. 
116 Ibid., .205 
117 Ibid.  
118 Debari, Reconciliation in Rwanda: Is it really working? 6.  
228 
 
 
 
 
 
119
 Organization of African Unity Report, “Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide: Report of the Panel of Eminent Personalities to 
Investigate the Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events,” (29 May,2000):57
 
120 Mgbako, Ingando Solidarity Camps: Reconciliation and Political Indoctrination in Post-Genocide Rwanda,209. 
121 Ibid. 
122 Ibid. 
123 Gregoire Duruz, “Speaking History in Present Rwanda: Constrained History Enunciation and Management of  
Conflicting Narratives among Secondary School Students,” Unpublished paper (2012). Available from 
http://www.academia.edu/2915483/Speaking_history_in_present_Rwanda. _Constrained_history_enunciation_and_management_of_conflict 
ing_narratives_among_Secondary_school_students_in_Rwanda (accessed on 9 September 2015): 6 
124 Ibid. 
125 Zoe Flood, “Teaching Difficult Histories: Rwanda’s Post-Genocide Experience,” National Geographic Online Magazine, May, 1, 2014, 
available from http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/04/140429-rwanda-genocide-hutu-tutsi-kigali-curriculum-world/ (accessed
 
on 9 September 2015)  
126
 Suzanne Buckley-Zistel, “Nation, Narration, Unification? The Politics of History Teaching After the Rwandan Genocide,” Journal of 
Genocide Research, Vol. 11, Issues 1, (2009): 42.
 
127 Ibid. 
128 Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 197. 
129 Ibid.  
130 Buckley-Zistel, “Nation, Narration, Unification? The Politics of History Teaching After the Rwandan Genocide,” 42. 
131 Ibid. 
132 ibid. 
133 Ibid. 
134 Ibid., p.40 
135 Ibid. 
136 Ibid. 
137 Government of the Republic of Rwanda,” History: Brief History of Rwanda,”. 
138 Ibid. 
139 Ibid. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda, Amendment IV, 2010. 1.  
142 Hintjens, “Post-genocide identity politics in Rwanda,” 7. 
143
 Fanie du Toit, “Reconciliation and Transitional Justice: The Case of Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts” (Cape Town: Institute for Justice 
and Reconciliation, 2011):9
 
144 Ibid. 
145 Ibid. 
146 Ibid.  
147 Hintjens, “Post-genocide identity politics in Rwanda,” 7. 
148 Ibid. 
149 Jan Vansina, Antecedents to Modern Rwanda: The Nyinginya Kingdom, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2004):197-198 
150 Ibid. 
151 Ibid. 
152
 Duruz, “Speaking History in Present Rwanda: Constrained History Enunciation and Management of Conflicting Narratives 
among Secondary School Students,” 8.
 
153 Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 197. 
154 Ibid. 
155 Wielenga, “Genocide and identity: Stereotyping,‘othering’ and violence in Rwanda,” 5.  
156 Mgbako, “Ingando Solidarity Camps: Reconciliation and Political Indoctrination in Post-Genocide Rwanda” 218 
157 Ibid., p.203 
158 Flood, “Teaching difficult histories: Rwanda’s post-genocide experience”.  
159 Mgbako, “Ingando Solidarity Camps: Reconciliation and Political Indoctrination in Post-Genocide Rwanda” 203. 
160 Buckley-Zistel, “Nation, Narration, Unification? The Politics of History Teaching After the Rwandan Genocide,” 1. 
161 Debari, Reconciliation in Rwanda: Is it really working? 8.  
162
 Susan Thomson, “Re-education for Reconciliation: Particpant Observations on Ingando,” in Reconstructing Rwanda: Statebuilding and 
Human Rights after Mass Violence , eds. Scott Strauss Lars Waldorf , (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2011):333
 
163 Mgbako, Ingando Solidarity Camps: Reconciliation and Political Indoctrination in Post-Genocide Rwanda,p.209  
164 Ibid., p210 
165 Ibid. 
166 Ibid., .212 
167 Ibid. 
168 Ibid. 
169 Ibid. 
170 Ibid. 
171 Ibid. 
172 Ibid., .217 
173 Ibid. 
174 Ibid. 
175 Ibid. 
176 Ibid. 
177 Ibid., .202 
178 Thomson, “Re-education for Reconciliation: Particpant Observations on Ingando,” 331. 
179 Ibid. 
180 Ibid. 
181 Ibid.  
182 Ibid., .336  
229 
 
 
 
 
 
183
 Major General Karenzi Karake, “Military Integration, Disarmament and Demaobilization. Military Integration in Rwanda,”Peace and 
Conflict Management Review, Vol.1, Issue 1, Article 11. (2008): 17
 
184 Thomson, “Re-education for Reconciliation: Particpant Observations on Ingando,” 2. 
185 Ibid. 
186 Thomson, “Re-education for Reconciliation: Particpant Observations on Ingando,” 6. 
187 Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 197.  
188
 Suchitra Vijayan, “Rwanda and the NY Times: On those images by by Pieter Hugo pairing perpetrators and victims of the 1994 
Genocide,” Africa Is a Country, April 25, 2014, available from http://africasacountry.com/2014/04/rwanda-the-genocide-must-live-
on/ (accessed on 4 June 2015)
  
189 Flood, Teaching difficult histories: Rwanda’s post genocide experience: Twenty years on, how does Rwanda learn from its past? 
190 Ibid. 
191 Thomson, “Re-education for Reconciliation: Particpant Observations on Ingando,” 2.  
192 Mamdani, When Victims become killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda, 267. 
193
Ibid., .266
 
194 Chris McGreal, “Rwanda Genocide 20 Years on: ‘We Live with those who Killed our Families. We are told they’re sorry, but are  
they?’,” The Guardian, 12 May, 2013. Available from www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/12/rwanda-genocide-20-years-on, (accessed 
on 7 June 2015)  
195
 Nina Lliza, Rewriting My History as a Rwandan Genocide Survivor, Huffington Post, 3 March, 2014, accessed on 5 November 2014, 
available from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nina-iliza-/rwanda-genocide-april_b_5017341.html
  
195 Thomson, “Re-education for Reconciliation: Particpant Observations on Ingando,” 6. 
196 Lliza, “Rewriting My History as a Rwandan Genocide Survivor” 
197 Ibid.  
198 Clark, The Gacaca Courts, Post-Genocide Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda: Justice without Lawyers, 58.  
199 Ibid.  
200 Lliza, “Rewriting My History as a Rwandan Genocide Survivor” 
201 Thomson, “Re-education for Reconciliation: Particpant Observations on Ingando,” 6. 
202 Jenny Edkins, Trauma and the Memory of Politics, (Cambridge University Press, 2003): 30 
203 Ibid. 
204 Ibid. 
205 Katherine Conway, “The Role of Memory in Post-Genocide Rwanda,” Insight on Conflict Blog, August 23, 2013,  available from 
http://www.insightonconflict.org/2013/08/the-role-of-memory-in-post-genocide-rwanda/ (accessed on 2 September 2016).  
206
 Simran Kaur Chahal, “Appropriating the Past: A Comparative Study of Official Memory Practices in Rwanda and Burundi,” 
(Canada: Simon Frazier University, 2012):12
  
207 Edkins,  Trauma and the Memory of Politics, 31. 
208 208 Chahal, “Appropriating the Past: A Comparative Study of Official Memory Practices in Rwanda and Burundi,” 12. 
209 Conway, “The Role of Memory in Post-Genocide Rwanda” 
210 Ibid. 
211 Ibid. 
212 Ibid.  
213 Rene Lemarchand, “Genocide, Memory and Ethnic Reconciliation in Rwanda,” L’Afrique Des Grand Lacs Annuaire (2006-2007): 27. 
214 Ibid. 
215 Ibid. 
216 Ibid. 
217 Ibid., .28 
218 Buckley-Zistel, “Nation, Narration, Unification? The Politics of History Teaching After the Rwandan Genocide.” 314. 
219 Ibid. 
220 Ibid. 
221 Ibid. 
222 Ibid. 
223 Ibid. 
224 Ibid. 
225 Ibid, 
226 Lemarchand, “Genocide, Memory and Ethnic Reconciliation in Rwanda,” 28. 
227 Edkins,  Trauma and the Memory of Politics, 33 
228 Ibid., .51 
229 Ibid., .52 
230 Ibid.  
231 Michel Foucault, “Society must be Defended”: Lectures at the College de France, 1975-1976, (New York: Picador, 1997): 37 
232 Ibid. 
233 Ibid., .38 
234 Ibid. 
235 Edkins,  Trauma and the Memory of Politics, 52 
236 Ibid. 
237 Ibid., .53 
238 Ibid. 
239 Ibid., .54  
240 Mamdani, When Victims become killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda, 268. 
241
 Jacques Depelchin, Silences in African History: Between the Syndromes of Discovery and Abolition, (Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na 
Nyota Publishers ltd., 2005):28
 
242 Ibid. 
243 Ibid. 
244 Ibid. 
245 Ibid., .29 
 
230 
 
 
 
 
 
246 Mamdani, When Victims become killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda, 268. 
247 Ibid. 
248 Depelchin, Silences in African History: Between the Syndromes of Discovery and Abolition,  31. 
249 Ibid. 
 
Notes on Chapter Five 
 
1
United States of America Agency for International Development, “Country Profile 1- Rwanda: Property Rights and Resources 
Governance,” USAID Land Tenure Programme (2010) available from http://www.usaidlandtenure.net/sites/default/files/country-
profiles/full-reports/USAID_Land_Tenure_Haiti_Profile.pdf (accessed on 11 May 2015): 3. 
2
 Ibid.
  
3
 Filip Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013): 174.
 
4
 Herman Musahara, Birasa Nyamulinda, Claude Bizimana and Theophile Niyonzima, “Land Use Consolidation and Poverty Reduction,” 
(paper presented at “2014 World Bank Conference on Land and Poverty”, Washington DC, March 24-27. 2014): 10.
 
 
5
 Ibid.
 
5
 Ibid.
  
6
 Eugene Rurangwa. “Land Tenure Reform: The Case Study of Rwanda,” (paper presented at the Conference on ‘Land Divided: Land 
and South African Society in 2013, in Comparative Perspective’, University of Cape Town, 24-27 March, 2013): 2.
 
7
 John W. Bruce and Sally Holt, “Land and Conflict Prevention,”Initiative on Quiet Diplomacy: Conflict Prevention Handbook, Series no. 6,
 
August ( 2011): 11. 
8
 Ibid.
 
9
 Zinaida Miller, “Constructing Sustainable Reconciliation: Land, Power, and Transitional Justice in Post-Genocide Rwanda,” (Cape Town:
 
 
Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, 2007) available from http://www.gsdrc.org/document-library/constructing-
sustainable-reconciliation-land-power-and-transitional-justice-in-post-genocide-rwanda/ (accessed on 4 July 2016). 
 
10
 Helen Hintjens, “Post-Genocide identity politics in Rwanda,” Ethnicities, Vol.8(1), (Los Angeles, London, New Delhi and 
Singapore: Sage Publications, 2008): 19.
  
11
 Ibid., .20
  
12
 Ibid.
 
13
 Ibid.
 
14
 Haydee Bangerezako, “The Politics of Indigeneity in Burundi: Land Restitution in Burundi,” The MISR Review, Issue 1, August 2016,
 
(Mumbai: Prodon Enterprises, 2016): 14 
15
 Ibid.
 
16
 Alison des Froges, “Land in Rwanda: Winnowing Out the Chaff,” L’Afriques des Grand Lacs Annuaire 2005-2006, eds Filip Reytnejns
 
and Stefan Maryse, Centre d’etude de la region des Grand Lacs A’frique (Belgique/Paris: L’Harmattan Anvers): 353  
17
 Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda, (New Jersey: Princeton 
Press, 2001): 197.
  
18
 Ibid., .198
 
19
 Bangerezako, “The Politics of Indigeneity in Burundi: Land Restitution in Burundi,” 15.
 
20
 Ibid.
  
21
 Felix Mukwiza Ndahinda, "Indigenousness in Africa: A Contested Legal Framework for Empowerment of ‘Marginalized’ 
Communities, p7
 
22
 Ibid.
  
23
 Herman Musahara and Chris Huggins, “Land Reform, Land Scarcity and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: A case study of Rwanda,” in 
From Ground Up: Land Rights, Conflict and Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa, eds Chris Huggins and Jenny Clover, (African Centre for 
Technology Studies and African Security Analysis Programme of the Institute for Security Studies, 2005): 290.
  
24
 Felix Mukwiza Ndahinda, Indigenousness in Africa: A Contested Legal Framework for Empowerment of ‘Marginalized’ Communities, ( 
New York: Springer, 2011): 215
 
25
 Ibid.
  
26
 Ibid., .223
 
27
 Mamdani, When Victims become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda, 81.
 
28
 Ibid., .80
  
29
 Ibid., .86
 
30
 Ibid.
 
31
 Ibid.
  
32
 Ndahinda, Indigenousness in Africa: A Contested Legal Framework for Empowerment of ‘Marginalized’ Communities, 221.
 
33
 Ibid., .221-222
 
34
 Ibid.
  
35
 Ibid.
 
36
 Ibid.
 
37
 Ibid.
  
38
 Ndahinda, Indigenousness in Africa: A Contested Legal Framework for Empowerment of ‘Marginalized’ Communities, 222.
 
39
 Ibid.
 
40
 Ibid.
  
41
 Ibid.
 
42
 Ibid.
 
43
 Ibid.
  
44
 Musahara et al, “Land Reform, Land Scarcity and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: A case study of Rwanda,” 292.
 
45
 Ibid.
 
46
 Ibid.
  
47
 Mamdani, When Victims become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda, 81.
 
 
231 
 
 
 
 
 
48
 Hanna Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, (Ohio: The World Publishing Company, 1958):125.
 
49
 Ibid.
 
50
 Ibid., .126
  
51
 Ibid., .275
 
52
 Ibid.
 
53
 Ibid.
  
54
 Anthony Court, Hannah Arendt’s Response to the Crisis of her Time, (Amsterdam: Rosenberg Publishers, 2008):102
 
55
 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism,  185.
 
56
 Ibid.
  
57
 Ibid., .129
 
58
 Ibid.
 
59
 Ibid., .130
  
60
 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda, 12
 
61
 Mahmood Mamdani, Making Sense of Political violence in Post-Colonial Africa, Socialist Register, Vol. 39, (2003):133
 
62
 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda,  76.
  
63
 Ibid., .11
 
64
 Ibid., .78
 
65
 Ibid., .79
  
66
 Ibid., .78
 
67
 Catherine Newbury, The Cohesion of Oppression: Clientship and Ethnicity in Rwanda, 1860-1960, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1988): 23.
 
68
 John F. Clark, “Rwanda: Tragic Land of Dual Nationalism,” in After Independence: Making and Protecting the Nation in Postcolonial 
and Postcommunist States, ed. Lowell W. Barrington, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006): 77
 
69
 Ibid.
  
70
 Ibid.
 
71
 Chris Huggins, Land Grabbing and Land Tenure Systems in Post-Genocide Rwanda, in Losing your Land: Dispossession in the Great 
Lakes Region, (eds) Ann Ansom and Thea Hilholst, (Suffolk: James Curry, 2014):143
 
72
 Alison des Forges, Land in Rwanda: Winnowing Out the Chaff,  355.
 
73
 Ibid.
 
74
 Ibid.
  
75
 Herman Musahara , “Improving Tenure Security for the Rural Poor: Rwanda - Country Case Study,” Working Paper no. 7, 
Legal-Empowerment of the Poor (2006): 292.
 
p292
 
76
 Clark, “Rwanda: Tragic Land of Dual Nationalism,” 75.
 
77 des Forges, Land in Rwanda: Winnowing Out the Chaff,  355. 
78
Ibid., .356 
79
 Ibid.
 
80
 Ibid.
 
81
 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda,  269.
 
82
 Jean Bigagaza, Carolyne Abong and Cecile Mukarubuga, “Land Scarcity, Distribution and Conflict in Rwanda,” in Scarcity and Surfeit:
 
The Ecology of Africa’s Conflict, eds. Jeremy Lind and Kathryn Sturman, (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2002): 53 
83
 Ibid.
 
84
 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda, p269
  
85
 des Forges, Land in Rwanda: Winnowing Out the Chaff,  356.
 
86
 Ibid.
 
87
 Ibid.
  
88
 Ibid.
 
89
 Ibid.
 
90
 Clark, “Rwanda: Tragic Land of Dual Nationalism,” 78.
  
91
 Huggins, “Land Grabbing and Land Tenure Systems in Post-Genocide Rwanda, in Losing your Land: Dispossession in the Great 
Lakes Region,” 143.
 
92
 Ibid., p.357
  
93
 Musahara , “Improving Tenure Security for the Rural Poor: Rwanda - Country Case Study,”  295.
 
94 Pamphile Sebahara, “The Creation of Ethnic Divisions in Rwanda,” Voices from Africa, No. 8, Dec (1998) available from 
https://www.un-ngls.org/orf/documents/publications.en/voices.africa/number9/number8/7sebahara.htm, (accessed on 5 May 2016)
  
95
 Ibid.
 
96
Ibid. 
97
 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda,  88.
  
98
 Ibid.
 
99
 Sebahara, “The Creation of Ethnic Divisions in Rwanda”
 
100 Bangerezako, “The Politics of Indigeneity in Burundi: Land Restitution in Burundi,” 20.  
101
 Musahara , “Improving Tenure Security for the Rural Poor: Rwanda - Country Case Study,” 294. 
102
Clark, “Rwanda: Tragic Land of Dual Nationalism,” 76.
 
103 Mahmood Mamdani, When Does a Settler Become a Native? Reflections of the Colonial Roots of Citizenship in Equatorial and South 
Africa . (Text of Inaugural Lecture as A C Jordan Professor of African Studies, University of Cape Town, 13
th
 May, 1998):1 
104 Ibid., .35 
105 Bigagaza et al, “Land Scarcity, Distribution and Conflict in Rwanda,”  53.  
106 Bangerezako, “The Politics of Indigeneity in Burundi: Land Restitution in Burundi,” 20. 
107 Musahara et al. “Land reform, land scarcity and post-conflict reconstruction: A case study of Rwanda,” 295. 
108 Bangerezako, “The Politics of Indigeneity in Burundi: Land Restitution in Burundi,” 20. 
109 Ibid., .20-21 
110 des Forges, Land in Rwanda: Winnowing Out the Chaff, p357 
111 Bigagaza, et al. “Land Scarcity, Distribution and Conflict in Rwanda,” 53. 
112
Clark, “Rwanda: Tragic Land of Dual Nationalism,” 79  
232 
 
 
 
 
 
113 Sebahara, “The Creation of Ethnic Divisions in Rwanda” 
114 Ibid. 
115 Clark, “Rwanda: Tragic Land of Dual Nationalism,” 72-73 
116 Ibid. 
117 Ibid., .75 
118 Ibid. 
119 Ibid., .76 
120 Ibid., .77 
121 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda,  102.  
122 Ibid., .269 
123 Ibid., .101 
124 Clark, “Rwanda: Tragic Land of Dual Nationalism,” 78. 
125 Ibid. 
126 Ibid. 
127 Ibid., .79 
128 Ibid., .85 
129 Ibid. 
130 Ibid., .82  
131 Sebahara, “The Creation of Ethnic Divisions in Rwanda” 
132 Clark, “Rwanda: Tragic Land of Dual Nationalism,” 82. 
133 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda, p275  
134 Ibid., .101 
135 Clark, “Rwanda: Tragic Land of Dual Nationalism,” 89 
136 Ibid., .269  
137 Newbury, The Cohesion of Oppression: Clientship and Ethnicity in Rwanda, 1860-1960, 1. 
138 Ibid. 
139 Jamie Crook, “Promoting Peace and Economic Security in Rwanda Through Fair and Equitable Land Rights,” California Law Review, 
Volume 94, Issue 5, Article 6, (October 2006): 1496  
140
 Huggins, “Land Grabbing and Land Tenure Systems in Post-Genocide Rwanda, in Losing your Land: Dispossession in the Great 
Lakes Region,” 143. 
141
Musahara et al, “ Land reform, land scarcity and post-conflict reconstruction: A case study of Rwanda,” 296. 
142 Crook, “Promoting Peace and Economic Security in Rwanda Through Fair and Economic Land Rights.” 1495. 
143 Ibid., .1496 
144 Ibid. 
145 Ibid. 
146 Clark, “Rwanda: Tragic Land of Dual Nationalism,” 82  
147 Rene Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, (London: Pall Mall, 1970): 112. 
148 Ibid. 
149 Crook, “Promoting Peace and Economic Security in Rwanda Through Fair and Economic Land Rights.” 1487 
150 des Forges, Land in Rwanda: Winnowing Out the Chaff, p357  
151 Ibid., .358 
152 Ibid. 
153 Gilles Toupin, “Kangura no.2 :Rwandan Refugees Struggle to Return Massively to Their Country,” Rwanda File: Primary Sources from 
the Genocide, available from available form http://www.rwandafile.com/Kangura/k02a.html (accessed on 4 November 2015). 
154 Ibid. 
155 Ibid. 
156 Ibid. 
157
 Karol Bordeaux, “Land Conflict and Genocide in Rwanda,” The Electronic Journal of Sustainable Development, Vol. 1, Issue 3, 
Summer (International Policy Press: 2009): 88
 
158 Ibid. 
159 Mamdani, When Victims become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda,  147. 
160 Crook, “Promoting Peace and Economic Security in Rwanda Through Fair and Economic Land Rights,” 1496.  
161 des Forges, Land in Rwanda: Winnowing Out the Chaff,  357. 
162 Ibid 
163 Musuhara et al, “Land reform, land scarcity and post-conflict reconstruction: A case study of Rwanda,” 296.  
164 des Forges, Land in Rwanda: Winnowing Out the Chaff,  357. 
165 Ibid. 
166 Johan Pottier, Re-Imagining Rwanda: Conflict, Survival and Disinformation in the Twentieth Century, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press): 22 
167 Ibid. 
168 Ibid. 
169 Ibid. 
170 Bordeaux, “Land Conflict and Genocide in Rwanda,” 88. 
171 Pottier, Re-Imagining Rwanda: Conflict, Survival and Disinformation in the Twentieth Century, 22. 
172 Ibid. 
173 Ibid. 
174 Ibid., .23  
175 Mamdani, When Victims become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda,  17. 
176 Ibid., .166 
177 Ibid., .33  
178 Ibid., .167 
179 Ibid., .165 
180 Ibid. 
181 Ibid.  
233 
 
 
 
 
 
182 Ibid., .134 
183 Ibid., .167 
184 Ibid.  
185 Ibid., .168 
186 Ibid., .181 
187 Ibid. 
188 Ibid. 
189 Ibid., .175 
190 Ibid  
191
 Remigius Kintu, “The Truth Behind the Rwanda Tragedy,” (Paper Presented at the U.N. Tribunal on Rwanda, Arusha, Tanzania, 
March, 2005): 1
 
192 Ibid., .2 
193 Ibid. 
194 Ibid., .4 
195 Ibid. 
196 Ibid. 
197 Ibid. 
198 Ibid. 
199 Ibid., .5 
200 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda, 156. 
201 Ibid.  
202 Ibid., .155 
203 Ibid. 
204 Kintu, The Truth Behind the Rwanda Tragedy, 5. 
205 Ibid. 
206 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda,  159. 
207 Ibid. 
208 Ibid. 
209
 Saskia van Hoyweghen, “The Urgency of Land and Agrarian Reform in Rwanda,” African Affairs, Vol. 98, Issue 392, (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1999): 353
 
210 Ibid. 
211 Pottier, Re-Imagining Rwanda: Conflict, Survival and Disinformation in the Twentieth Century, 179. 
212 John Bruce, “Drawing a line under the crisis: Reconciling Returnee Land Access and Security in Post-Conflict Rwanda,” HPG Working 
Paper, Overseas Development Institute (June 2007): 1 
213 Ibid. 
214 Lars Waldorf, “Goats and Graves: Reperations in Rwanda’s Community Courts,” in Reparations for Victims of Genocide, War Crimes 
and Crimes against Humanity, eds Carla ferstman, Mariana Goetz and Alan Stephens, (Leiden: Brill-Niljhoff, 2009): 516 
215 Ibid. 
216 Ibid. 
217 Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 166. 
218 Ibid. 
219 Pottier, Re-Imagining Rwanda: Conflict, Survival and Disinformation in the Twentieth Century, 179. 
220 Bruce, “Drawing a line under the crisis: Reconciling Returnee Land Access and Security in Post-Conflict Rwanda,” 1.  
221 Waldorf, “Goats and Graves: Reperations in Rwanda’s Community Courts,” 517. 
222 des Forges, Land in Rwanda: Winnowing Out the Chaff,  359. 
223 Waldorf, “Goats and Graves: Reperations in Rwanda’s Community Courts,” 517.  
224 Pottier, Re-Imagining Rwanda: Conflict, Survival and Disinformation in the Twentieth Century, 187. 
225 Waldorf, “Goats and Graves: Reperations in Rwanda’s Community Courts,” 517 
226 Ibid., .520  
227 Ibid., .522 
228 Ibid. 
229 Catherine Newbury, “High Modernism At the Ground Level: The “Imidugudu Policy” in Rwanda,” in Remaking Rwanda: State-Building 
and Human Rights after Mass Violence, eds. Scott Strauss and Lars Waldorf, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2011): 224. 
230 Ibid. 
231 des Forges, Land in Rwanda: Winnowing Out the Chaff,  354.  
232 Ibid., .361 
233
 Dorothea Hilhorst and Mathijs van Leeuwen, “Emergency and Development: The Case of Imidugundu, Villagisation in 
Rwanda,” Journal of Refugee Studies, 13 (3), (2000):14
 
234 Newbury, “High Modernism At the Ground Level: The “Imidugudu Policy” in Rwanda,” 230. 
235 Ibid. 
236 des Forges, Land in Rwanda: Winnowing Out the Chaff,  361.  
237 Newbury, “High Modernism At the Ground Level: The “Imidugudu Policy” in Rwanda,” 224. 
238 Ibid. 
239 Ibid.  
240 van Hoyweghen, “The Urgency of Land and Agrarian Reform in Rwanda,” 365. 
241 Ibid. 
242 des Forges, Land in Rwanda: Winnowing Out the Chaff,  361. 
243 Ibid. 
244 Ann Ansoms, “Re-engineering Rural Society: The Visions and Ambitions of the Rwandan Elite,”African Affairs, 108: 431 (2009): 295 
245 Ibid.  
246 des Forges, Land in Rwanda: Winnowing Out the Chaff,  361. 
247 Ibid., .360 
248 Ibid.  
249 Ibid., .359  
234 
 
 
 
 
 
250 Ansoms, “Re-engineering Rural Society: The Visions and Ambitions of the Rwandan Elite,” 296. 
251 Ibid. 
252 Musahara et al, “ Land reform, land scarcity and post-conflict reconstruction: A case study of Rwanda,” 282.  
253 des Forges, Land in Rwanda: Winnowing Out the Chaff,  360. 
254 Ibid. 
255 Ibid.  
256 Ibid., .362 
257 Ibid. 
258 Ibid.  
259 Human Rights Watch, Uprooting the Rural Poor in Rwanda, pX. 
260 des Forges, Land in Rwanda: Winnowing Out the Chaff,  362. 
261 Ibid., .363 
262 Ibid. 
263 Newbury, “High Modernism At the Ground Level: The “Imidugudu Policy” in Rwanda,” 230 
264 Ibid  
265
 Chris Huggins, “The Challenges of Land Scarcity and Protracted Social Conflict in Rwanda”, Discussion Paper, African Centre for 
Technology Studies (ACTS), (Nairobi. 2003): 20
 
266 Newbury, “High Modernism At the Ground Level: The “Imidugudu Policy” in Rwanda,” 232 
267 Ibid. 
268 des Forges, Land in Rwanda: Winnowing Out the Chaff,  363. 
269 Ibid.  
270 Newbury, “High Modernism At the Ground Level: The “Imidugudu Policy” in Rwanda,” 232 
271 Ibid. 
272 Ibid.  
273 Huggins, “The Challenges of Land Scarcity and Protracted Social Conflict in Rwanda”,  20 
274 Ibid. 
275 Ibid. 
276 Ibid 
277 Newbury, “High Modernism At the Ground Level: The “Imidugudu Policy” in Rwanda,” 228 
278 Jean de Dieu Dushimana, “Land Tenure Problems and the Rural Youth of Rwanda: The Case of the District of Kamonyi,” (PhD diss., 
University of Witswaterstrand, 2006): 80 
279 Musahara et al, “ Land reform, land scarcity and post-conflict reconstruction: A case study of Rwanda,” 321. 
280 Ibid. 
281 Ibid. 
282 Ibid., .322 
283 des Forges, Land in Rwanda: Winnowing Out the Chaff,  365.  
284 Ibid., p.366 
285 Ibid. 
286 Hintjens, “Post-Genocide identity politics in Rwanda,” 20 
287 Ibid. 
288 Ibid., .21 
289 des Forges, Land in Rwanda: Winnowing Out the Chaff, p.364 
290 Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 176 
291 Ibid. 
292 Ibid. 
293 Ann Ansoms, “Striving for Growth, Bypassing the Poor? A Critical Review of Rwanda’s Rural Sector Policies,” Journal for Modern 
African Studies, 46:1, (2008) : 25 
294 Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 176 
295 Ibid.  
296 Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 177 
297 Musahara et al, “ Land reform, land scarcity and post-conflict reconstruction: A case study of Rwanda,” 317 
298 Ibid. 
299 Ibid. 
300 des Forges, Land in Rwanda: Winnowing Out the Chaff, p.364 
301 Ibid. 
302 Ibid. 
303 Ibid. 
304 Ibid. 
305 Ibid. 
306
 Innocent Gahigana, “The heed to land disputes,” The New Times, August 20, 2007, available 
from http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/article/2007-08-20/809/ (accessed on 8 November 2015)
 
307 Bruce, “Drawing a line under the crisis: Reconciling Returnee land access and security in post-conflict Rwanda,” 10. 
308 Ibid. 
309 International Refugee Rights Initiative, “A Dangerous Impasse: Rwandan Refugees in Uganda, ” Citizenship and Displacement in the 
Great Lakes Region, Working Paper 4. (June, 2010): 32 
310 Ibid. 
311 Ibid., .30 
312 Ibid. 
313 Ibid. 
314 Ibid., .32 
315 Ibid. 
 
Notes on Chapter Six 
 
235 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Clemantine Wamariya and Elizabeth Weil, “Everything is yours, Eveything is not yours,” Matter, 29 June 2015, available from 
https://medium.com/matter/everything-is-yours-everything-is-not-yours-d6f66bd9c6f9#.z7ynvs386 (accessed on 4 November 2015)
 
2
 Patrick Kanyangera,“Conflict in the Great Lakes Region: Root Causes, Dynamics and Effects,” Accord, 5 May 2016, available from 
http://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/conflict-great-lakes-region/ (accessed on 9 August, 2016)
 
3
 Ibid.
 
4
 Ibid.
 
5
 Ibid.
  
6
 Filip Reyntjens, The Great African War:Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996-2006, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009):
 
10.  
7
 Ibid., .11
  
8
 Ibid.
 
9
 Idriss P.A Fofana, “A Crisis of Belonging,” Harvard International Review, 21 March, 2009, available 
from http://hir.harvard.edu/rethinking-financea-crisis-of-belonging/ (accessed on 5 August 2016)
 
10
 Filip Reyntjens, “Briefing: The Second Congo War: More Than A Remake”, African Affairs, Vol. 98.,No. 391, April (1999): 241
 
11
 Ibid.
 
12
 Ibid.
  
13
 Ibid.
 
14
 Ibid.
 
15
 Ibid.
  
16
 Scott Strauss and Lars Waldorf, “Introduction: Seeing Like a Post-Conflict State,” in Remaking Rwanda: State Building and Human 
Rights after Mass Violence, eds. Scott Strauss and Lars Waldorf, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2011): 4
 
17
 Jeffrey Herbst and Greg Mills, “There is No Congo: Why the only way to help Congo is to stop pretending there is,” Foreign Policy, 18
 
March, 2009. Available from  http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/03/18/there-is-no-congo/ (accessed on 14 July, 2016) 
18
 Ibid.
 
19
 Jacques Depelchin, “Congo-Kinshasa: Erasing Congo at the Stroke of a Pen,” AllAfrica.com, 23 April, 2009, available from
 
http://allafrica.com/stories/200904240648.html (accessed on 9 August, 2016) 
20
 Ibid.
 
21
 Kris Berwouts, “Good-neighbours? Rwanda’s strategies to defend its interest in Congo,” African Arguments, 12 July, 2013. Available
 
 
from “http://africanarguments.org/2013/07/12/good-neighbours-rwanda%E2%80%99s-strategies-to-defend-its-interests-in-
congo-%E2%80%93-by-kris-berwouts/ (accessed on 7 August 2016) 
22
 Ibid.
  
23
 Ibid.
 
24
 Ibid.
 
25
 Ibid.
  
26
 Reyntjens, The Great African War:Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996-2006, 2.
 
27
 Sandi Fox, “Report: Rwanda’s Stake in Congo: Understanding Interest to Achieve Peace,” Enough Project, 16 October, 2013, 
available from
 
http://www.enoughproject.org/news/report-rwandas-stake-congo-understanding-interests-achieve-peace, (4 September, 2016)
 
28
 Howard W. French, “Kagame’s Hidden War in the Congo,” The New York Review of Books, 24 September 2009 Issues, available 
from http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2009/09/24/kagames-hidden-war-in-the-congo/, (accessed on 14 September 2016)
 
29
 Berwouts, “Good-neighbours? Rwanda’s strategies to defend its interest in Congo”
  
30
 Depelchin, “Congo-Kinshasa: Erasing Congo at the Stroke of a Pen”
 
31
 Ibid.
 
32
 Ibid.
  
33 Ibid. 
34
Reyntjens, The Great African War:Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996-2006, 4. 
35
 Depelchin, “Congo-Kinshasa: Erasing Congo at the Stroke of a Pen,”
 
36
 Ibid
 
37 Ibid. 
38
 Ibid.
  
38
 Ibid.
 
39
 Ibid.
 
40
 Ibid.
  
41
 Ibid.
 
42 Reyntjens, The Great African War:Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996-2006, 2. 
43
 Ibid., .3
  
44
 Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda, (New Jersey: University 
of Princeton Press, 2001): 18.
 
45
 Ibid., .234
  
46
 Ibid., .235
 
47
 Ibid., .237
 
48
 Ibid.
  
49
 Ibid.
 
50
 Rene Lemarchand, The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009): 9.
 
51
 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda, 236.
  
52
 Ibid., .237
 
53
 Ibid.
 
54
 Ibid.
  
55
 Ibid., .238
 
56
 Ibid., .236
 
57
 Ibid., p.238
  
58
 Ibid.
 
 
236 
 
 
 
 
 
59
 Ibid.
 
60
 Reyntjens, “Briefing: The Second Congo War: More Than A Remake” 242.
 
61
 Ibid.
  
62
 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda, 236.
 
63
Ibid.
 
64
 Ibid., .235
  
65
 Lemarchand, The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa, 9.
 
66
 Ibid.
 
67
 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda, 235-236.
  
68
 Judith Verweijen and Koen Vlassenroot, “Armed mobilisation and the nexus of territory, identity, and authroity: the contested 
territorial aspiration of the Banyamulenge in esatern DR Congo,” Journal of Contemporary African Studies, Vol. 33, No. 2, (2015): 194
 
69
 Ibid.
  
70
 Ibid.
 
71
 Lemarchand, The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa, 10.
 
72
 Ibid., .197
  
73
 Ibid.
 
74
 Ibid.
 
75
 Ibid.
  
76
 Ibid.
 
77
 Verweijen et al, “Armed mobilisation and the nexus of territory, identity, and authroity: the contested territorial aspiration of the 
Banyamulenge in esatern DR Congo,” 197.
 
78
 Ibid.
 
79
 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda,  243.
 
80
 Ibid.
  
81
 Fofana, “A Crisis of Belonging”
 
82
 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda,  243.
 
83
 Ibid.
  
84
 Ibid.
 
85
 Ibid.
 
86
 Ibid.
  
87
 Ibid.
 
88
 Fofana, “A Crisis of Belonging”
 
89
 Lemarchand, The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa, 15.
  
90
 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda, 244.
 
91
 Lemarchand, The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa, 15.
 
92
 Ibid.
  
93
 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda,  244.
 
94
 Fofana, “A Crisis of Belonging”
 
95
 Ibid.
 
96
 Lemarchand, The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa, 16
  
97
 Ibid.
 
98
 Ibid.
 
99
 Ibid.
  
100 Reyntjens, The Great African War:Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996-2006, 43. 
101 Ibid., .42 
102 Lemarchand, The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa, 16. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid., .17 
105 Ibid.  
106
 Mahmood Mamdani, “When Does a Settler Become a Native? Reflections of the Colonial Roots of Citizenship in Equatorial and 
South Africa,” (Text of Inaugural Lecture as A C Jordan Professor of African Studies, University of Cape Town, 13
th
 May, 1998): 4.
 
107 Fofana, “A Crisis of Belonging” 
108 Ibid. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Lemarchand, The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa, 13. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Ibid., .15 
115 Ibid. 
116 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda, 235.  
117 Ibid., .251 
118 Ibid., .235 
119 Fofana, “A Crisis of Belonging”  
120 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda, 255. 
121
Fofana, “A Crisis of Belonging” 
122 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda, 254.  
123 Lemarchand, The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa, 13. 
124 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda, 255. 
125 Strauss et al, “Introduction: Seeing Like a Post-Conflict State,” 4.  
126 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda, 254. 
127 Ibid., .255 
128 Ibid. 
129 Ibid.  
237 
 
 
 
 
 
130 Ibid. 
131
 Verweijen et al, “Armed mobilisation and the nexus of territory, identity, and authroity: the contested territorial aspiration of 
the Banyamulenge in esatern DR Congo,” 199.
 
132 Ibid. 
133 Ibid. 
134 Ibid.  
135 Reyntjens, “Briefing: The Second Congo War: More Than A Remake” 242. 
136 Fofana, “A Crisis of Belonging” 
137 Ibid. 
138 Ibid. 
139 Filip Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013): 110 
140 Ibid.  
141
 Paul Kagame, “The Challenges of Nation- Building in Africa,” (Oppenheimer Lecture at the International Institute of Strategic Studies, 
London, 16 September 2010) available from http://www.iiss.org/en/events/events/archive/2010-c61c/september-cbd6/oppenheimer-
lecture-paul-kagame-5c09, (accessed on 11 June 2016)
  
142 French, “Kagame’s Hidden War in the Congo” 
143 Fofana, “A Crisis of Belonging” 
144 Ibid.  
145 Fofana, “A Crisis of Belonging” 
146 Reyntjens, “Briefing: The Second Congo War: More Than A Remake” 242. 
147 Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 110.  
148
 Johan Pottier, Re-Imagining Rwanda: Conflict, Survival and Disinformation in the Twentieth Century, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002):81.
 
149 Ibid. 
150 Ibid. 
151 Ibid. 
152 Lemarchand, The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa, 17. 
153 Ibid. 
154 Ibid., .11 
155 Ibid.  
156 Reyntjens, “Briefing: The Second Congo War: More Than A Remake” 243. 
157 Ibid. 
158 Ibid. 
159 Ibid. 
160 Fofana, “A Crisis of Belonging” 
161 Reyntjens, “Briefing: The Second Congo War: More Than A Remake” 243. 
162 Ibid. 
163 Ibid. 
164 Ibid., .244 
165 Ibid., .249 
166 Ibid. 
167
 Verweijen et al, “Armed mobilisation and the nexus of territory, identity, and authroity: the contested territorial aspiration of 
the Banyamulenge in esatern DR Congo,” 200.
 
168 Ibid. 
169 Ibid., .201 
170 Ibid. 
171 Ibid. 
172 Fofana, “A Crisis of Belonging” 
173 Ibid.  
174 French, “Kagame’s Hidden War in the Congo” 
175 Reyntjens, “Briefing: The Second Congo War: More Than A Remake” 245. 
176 Fofana, “A Crisis of Belonging”  
177 Lemarchand, The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa, 13. 
178 French, “Kagame’s Hidden War in the Congo” 
179 Ibid. 
180 Ibid. 
181 Ibid. 
182 Ibid.  
183 Reyntjens, The Great African War:Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996-2006, 280. 
184 Ibid., .4 
185 Reyntjens, “Briefing: The Second Congo War: More Than A Remake” 242.  
186 Reyntjens, Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 110 
187 Ibid., .110-111 
188 Ibid., .111 
189
Ibid.
 
190 Ibid. 
191 Ibid. 
192 Ibid. 
193 Ibid. 
194 Ibid., .115 
195 Ibid. 
196 Ibid., .117 
197 Ibid., .122 
198 Ibid.  
238 
 
 
 
 
 
199 Ibid., .123 
200
 Verweijen et al, “Armed mobilisation and the nexus of territory, identity, and authroity: the contested territorial aspiration of 
the Banyamulenge in esatern DR Congo,” 203.
 
201 Fofana, “A Crisis of Belonging” 
202 Ibid. 
203 Ibid. 
204
Ibid.
 
205 Ibid. 
206 Berwouts, “Good-neighbours? Rwanda’s strategies to defend its interest in Congo,”  
207 French, “Kagame’s Hidden War in the Congo” 
208 Ibid. 
209 Ibid. 
210 Ibid. 
211 Fofana, “A Crisis of Belonging” 
212 Ibid. 
213 Ibid. 
214
 Kitenge Fabrice Tunda, “Refugees in the Great Lakes Regions: Challenges to Peacebuilding,” Accord, 5 May, 2016, available from 
http://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/refugees-great-lakes-region/ (accessed on 22 August 2016)
 
215 Ibid 
216 Ibid. 
217 Government of the Republic of Rwanda, “Organic Law, No 30/2008 of 25/07/2008: Relating to Rwandan Nationality,” 
http://citizenshiprightsinafrica.org/docs/Rwanda_Nationality_Law_30-2008_25-Jul-08FR.pdf, (accessed on 15 June 2015) 
218 Ibid. 
219 Ibid.  
220
 Citizenship Rights in Africa Initiative, “Rwanda”, available from http://citizenshiprightsafrica.org/region/rwanda/ (accessed on 3 May 
2016)
 
221 Author Unknown, “Uganda: Rwandan Refugees Still Reluctant to Repatriate,” Integrated Regional Networks, available from 
available from http://www.irinnews.org/report/95072/uganda-rwandan-refugees-still-reluctant-to-repatriate (accessed on 9 August 2015) 
222 Ibid 
223 Yoletta Nyange, “Rwanda’s Refugees Should not be Forced to Return,” Al Jazeera, 30 June 2013, available from 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/06/20136301155211706.html (8 June 2015)  
224
 Emma Kabande, “Rwandan refugees in Uganda: Victims or Pawns,” New Times Newspaper, 10 July, 2010, available 
from www.newtimes.co.rw/section/article/2010-07-10/82091/ (accesses on 9 June 2015)
  
225
 International Refugee Rights Initiative, “A Dangerous Impasse: Rwandan Refugee in Uganda,” Citizenship and Displacement in 
the Great Lakes Region, Working Paper no.4, June (2010), available from www.citizenshiprightsinafrica.org/wp-content-uploads-
10_08_30_dangerous_impasse.pdf, (accessed on 9 June 2015): 1
 
226 Ibid., .2 
227 Ibid. 
228 Ibid. 
229 Ibid. 
230 Ibid. 
231 Ibid. 
232 Ibid. 
233 Ibid., .4 
234 Ibid. 
235 Ibid.  
236 Nyange, “Rwanda’s refugees should not be forced to return,” 
237 Ibid. 
238 Ibid  
239 Author Unknown, “Kagame May Pardon Fugitives if they Return Home,” Igihe News, 10 May 2010, available from 
http://eng.imirasire.com/news/all-around/in-rwanda/article/kagame-may-pardon-fugitives-if. (accessed on 9 June 2015)
  
240 Ibid  
241 Author Unknown, “Uganda: Rwandan Refugees still reluctant to Repatriate” 
242 Ibid. 
243 Citizenship Rights in Africa Initiative, “Rwanda” 
244 Ibid. 
245 Ibid. 
246 Lucy Hovil, “The Return: Dilemmas for Congolese Refugees in Rwanda,”  Open Society Foundation, 9 September 2011, available from 
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/return-dilemmas-congolese-refugees-rwanda, (accessed on 9 June 2015) 
247 Ibid. 
248 Ibid. 
249 Ibid. 
250 Ibid. 
251 Ibid. 
252 Ibid. 
253 Ibid. 
254 Ibid. 
255 Ibid. 
256 Ibid. 
257 Ibid. 
258 Ibid. 
259 Ibid. 
260 Ibid. 
261 Ibid.  
239 
 
 
 
 
 
262
 Said Adejumobi, “Citizenship, Rights and the Problem of Internal Conflicts and Civil Wars in Africa,” African Journal of Political 
Science, Vol 6, No. 2, (2001):77.
  
263 Ibid. 
264 Ibid., .79 
265 Ibid. 
266 Ibid. 
267 Ibid. 
268 Ibid., .80 
269 Ibid. 
270 Ibid. 
271 Ibid. 
272 Ibid. 
273 Ibid., .79 
274 Basil Davidson, The Black Mans Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State, (New York: Three Rivers Press, 1992): 129. 
275 Ibid., .132-133  
276 Adejumobi, “Citizenship, Rights and the Problem of Internal Conflicts and Civil Wars in Africa,” 79. 
277 Mamdani, “When Does a Settler Become a Native? Reflections of the Colonial Roots of Citizenship in Equatorial and South Africa,” 4. 
278 Cori Wielenge, “‘Lived’ Identities in Rwanda: Beyond Citizenship?” African Insight, Vol. 44(1), Africa Institute South Africa, June 
(2014): 132 
279 Ibid. 
280 Ibid. 
281 Ibid . 
282 Ibid. 
283 Ibid. 
284 Ibid. 
285 Ibid. 
286 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda, 275. 
287 Ibid. 
288
 Marina Rafti, “A Perilous Path to Democracy: Political Transition and Authoritarian Consolidation In Rwanda,” Institute 
of Development and Management.Discussion Paper 2008-03, ( November 2007) : 19.
 
289 Ibid. 
290 Ibid. 
291 Ibid. 
292 Ibid. 
293 Ibid. 
294 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda, 276.  
295 Mamdani, “When Does a Settler Become a Native? Reflections of the Colonial Roots of Citizenship in Equatorial and South Africa,”2. 
296
 Verweijen et al, “Armed mobilisation and the nexus of territory, identity, and authroity: the contested territorial aspiration of 
the Banyamulenge in esatern DR Congo,” 203.
 
297 Mamdani, “When Does a Settler Become a Native? Reflections of the Colonial Roots of Citizenship in Equatorial and South Africa,”2. 
298 Ibid., .6 
299 Ibid. 
300 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda, 276  
301
 Helen Hintjens, “Post-Genocide identity politics in Rwanda,” Ethnicities, Vol.8(1). Los Angeles, London, New Delhi and 
Singapore: Sage Publications, (2008): 25
 
302 Ibid. 
303 Ibid. 
304 Ibid. 
305 Ibid. 
306 Ibid. 
307 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda, 263. 
308 Ibid.  
309 Ibid., .280 
310 Ibid., .275 
311 Ibid.  
312 Ibid., .269 
313 Ibid., .280 
314 Ibid., .276 
 
Notes on Conclusion  
1 Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and Genocide in Rwanda, (New Jersey: Princeton 
Press, 2001): 266. 
 
2 Alice Urasaro Karekezi, ““Review of Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide 
in Rwanda,” African Review of Books/ Revue Africaine Des Livres. Vol. 1, No. 1, (October, 2004) 
3 Mamdani, When Victims become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and Genocide in Rwanda, 272. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid., .272-273 
9 Ibid., .273  
10 Ibid. 
 
240 
 
 
 
 
11 Ibid. 
 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid., .276 
15 Ibid., .273 
16 Ibid. 
Bibliography  
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Adams, Elliot. “War Crimes: Were the Nuremburg Tribunals only Victor’s Justice?” Global 
Research: Centre for Research on Globalization. Available from 
http://www.globalresearch.ca/were-the-nuremberg-tribunals-only-victors-justice/5405078 
(accessed on 8 May, 2016) 
 
Adejumobi, Said. “Citizenship, Rights and the Problem of Internal Conflicts and Civil 
Wars in Africa.” African Journal of Political Science. Vol. 6, No. 2 (2001): 77-96 
 
Aluwhalia, Pal. “Specificities: Citizens and Subjects Citizenship, Subjectivity and the Crisis 
of Modernity.” Social Identities. 5:3. Routledge: Taylor and Francis Group. (1999): 313-329 
 
Ansoms, Ann. “Re-engineering Rural Society: The Visions and Ambitions of the 
Rwandan Elite.”African Affairs. 108: 431 (2009): 289-309 
 
Ann, Ansoms. “Striving for Growth, Bypassing the Poor? A Critical Review of Rwanda’s 
Rural Sector Policies.” Journal for Modern African Studies. 46:1, (2008): 1-32 
 
Bangerezako, Haydee. “The Politics of Indigeneity in Burundi: Land Restitution in Burundi.” 
The MISR Review. Issue 1. August 2016. Mumbai: Prodon Enterprises (2016): 12-42 
 
Bass, Gary Jonathon. “Victor’s Justice Versus War Crimes Tribunals.” Centre on Law and 
Globalisation. 2000. Available from 
https://clg.portalxm.com/library/keytext.cfm?keytext_id=51 (accessed May 9, 2016) 
 
Berwouts, Kris. “Good-neighbors? Rwanda’s strategies to defend its interest in Congo.” 
African Arguments. 12 July 2013. Available from 
“http://africanarguments.org/2013/07/12/good-neighbours-rwanda%E2%80%99s-
strategies-to-defend-its-interests-in-congo-%E2%80%93-by-kris-berwouts/ 
 
(accessed on 7 August 2016) 
 
Beswick, Danielle. “Democracy, Identity, and the Politics of Exclusion in Post Genocide 
Rwanda: The Case of the Batwa” in Democratization in Africa: Challenges and Prospects. 
eds. Gordon Crawford and Gabrielle Lynch. New York: Routledge, 2012. 
 
 
 
 
241 
 
 
 
 
 Bigagaza, Jean. Abon, Carolyne. and Mukarubuga, Cecile. “Land Scarcity, Distribution 
and Conflict in Rwanda,” in Scarcity and Surfeit: The Ecology of Africa’s Conflict. eds. 
Jeremy Lind and Kathryn Sturman. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2002. 
 
Booth, Robert. “Does this image make you think of Rwanda?... If so, a British PR firm has 
done its job and many states want a similar makeover.” The Guardian, August 3, 2010, 
available from www.theguardian.com/media/2010/aug./03/London-pr-rwanda-saudi-
arabia, (accessed on July 2, 2015) 
 
Bordeaux, Karol. “Land Conflict and Genocide in Rwanda.” The Electronic Journal of 
Sustainable Development. Vol. 1, Issue 3, Summer. International Policy Press. 2009: 61-73 
 
British Broadcasting Corporation, “Rwanda: The Untold Story.” Film Documentary, 
Released on October 2014. Available from https://vimeo.com/107867605 (accessed on 
5 June 2016) 
 
Bruce, John. W. “Drawing A Line Under the Crisis: Reconciling Returnee Land Access and 
Security in Post-Conflict Rwanda.” HPG Working Paper. Overseas Development Institute 
(June, 2007): 1-39 
 
Bruce, John W. and Holt, Sally. “Land and Conflict Prevention.” Initiative of Quiet 
Diplomacy: Conflict Prevention Handbook. Series no.6. August (2011): 1-144 
 
Buckley-Zistel, Suzanne. “Nation, Narration, Unification? The Politics of History Teaching 
After the Rwandan Genocide.” Journal of Genocide Research. Vol. 11. Issues 1. (2009): 
31-53 
 
Burnett, Jennie E. “Review of Scott Strauss, The Order of Genocide: Race, Power 
and Violence in Rwanda.” Africa Today.Vol. 54, No. 4(Summer, 2008): 116-119 
 
Caryl, Christian. “Africa’s Singapore Dream: Why Rwanda’s President styles himself as the 
heir to Lee Kuan Yew.” Foreign Policy: The Magazine. 2 April, 2015. available from 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/02/africas-singapore-dream-rwanda-kagame-lee-kuan-
yew/ (accessed on 3 November 2015) 
 
Chahal, Simran Kaur. Appropriating the Past: A Comparative Study of Official Memory 
Practices in Rwanda and Burundi. (Canada: Simon Frazer University, 2012) 
 
Chesterman Simon. Just War or Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International 
Law. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. 
 
Citizenship Rights in Africa Initiative. “Rwanda”. Available from 
http://citizenshiprightsafrica.org/region/rwanda/ (accessed on 3 May 2016) 
242 
 
 
 
 
  
Cicero, Marcus Tulluis. “De Officiis”. Translated By Walter Miller. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1913. Available from 
http://www.constitution.org/rom/de_officiis.htm (accessed on 3 May 2016) 
 
Clark, John F. “Rwanda: Tragic Land of Dual Nationalism,” in After Independence: Making 
and Protecting the Nation in Postcolonial and Postcommunist States. ed. Lowell W. 
Barrington. pp77-107. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006. 
 
Clark, Phil. “After Genocide: Democracy in Rwanda, 20 Years On.” Juncture: The Institute 
for Public Policy Research. Vol. 20, Issue 4 (Spring, 2014): 308-311 
 
Clark, Phil. The Gacaca Courts, Post-Genocide Justice and Reconciliation in 
Rwanda: Justice without Lawyers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2010. 
 
Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda, of the 4
th
 Amendment, 2010. Available from 
http://www.parliament.gov.rw/fileadmin/Images2013/Rwandan_Constitution.pdf, (accessed 
on August 1, 2015) 
 
Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda, Amend. IV, 2010, Article 178. Availabe from 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/rw/rw033en.pdf, (access on 3 September 2015) 
 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Approved and 
Proposed for Signature and Ratficiation or Accession by General Assembly resolution 260 
A (III) of 9 December 1948. (Entered into force 12 January 1951, in accordance with Article 
XIII). Available from 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CrimeOfGenocide.aspx (accessed on 7 
June 2016) 
 
Conway,Katherine. “The Role of Memory in Post-Genocide Rwanda.” Insight on Conflict 
Blog. August 23, 2013, available from http://www.insightonconflict.org/2013/08/the-role-of-
memory-in-post-genocide-rwanda/ (accessed on 2 September 2016). 
 
Court, Anthony. Hannah Arendt’s Response to the Crisis of her Time. Amsterdam: 
Rosenberg Publishers. 2008. 
 
Crook, Jamie. “Promoting Peace and Economic Security in Rwanda Through Fair and 
Economic Land Rights.” California Law Review. Volume 94, Issues 5, Article 6. 
(October, 2006): 1487-1535 
 
Davidson, Basil. The Black Mans Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State. New 
York: Three Rivers Press, 1992. 
 
243 
 
 
 
 
 Debari, Johanna. “Reconciliation in Rwanda: Is it really working?” Metamorphosis. 
North Carolina: Council 0f Public Liberal Arts Colleges (2004) 
 
Depelchin, Jacques. “Congo-Kinshasa: Erasing Congo at the Stroke of a Pen.” 
AllAfrica.com. 23 April, 2009. Available from 
http://allafrica.com/stories/200904240648.html, (accessed on 9 August, 2016) 
 
Depelchin, Jacques. Silences in African History: Between the Syndromes of Discovery 
and Abolition. Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota Publishers ltd., 2005. 
 
des Forges, Alison. “Land in Rwanda: Winnowing Out the Chaff.” L’Afriques des 
Grand Lacs Annuaire 2005-2006, eds Filip Reytnejns and Stefan Maryse. 353-371. 
Anvers, Beligum. Centre d’etude de la region des Grand Lacs 
 
des Forges, Alison. and Longman, Timothy. “Legal Responses to Genocide in Rwanda.” 
availabe from http://faculty.vassar.edu/tilongma/justice.html (accessed on 19 February 2015) 
 
des Forges, Alison. Leave None to Tell the Story. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999. 
 
Drumbl, Mark A. “Punishment, Postgenocide: From Guilt to Shame to Civis In Rwanda.”  
New York University Law Review. Vol. 75 (2000): 1221-1326 
 
Duruz, Gregoire. “Speaking History in Present Rwanda: Constrained History Enunciation 
and Management of Conflicting Narratives among Secondary School Students.” 
Unpublished paper (2012). Available from 
http://www.academia.edu/2915483/Speaking_history_in_present_Rwanda._Constrained_hist 
ory_enunciation_and_management_of_conflicting_narratives_among_Secondary_school_stu 
dents_in_Rwanda (accessed on 9 September 2015) 
 
Dushimana, Jean de Dieu “Land Tenure Problems and the Rural Youth of Rwanda: The 
Case of the District of Kamonyi. ”PhD diss., University of Witswaterstrand, 2006. 
 
Ebel, Lieutenant Colonel Wilfred L. “The Amnesty Issue: A historical perspective.” 
Available from http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a531961.pdf (accessed 4 May, 2016) 
 
Edkins, Jenny. Trauma and the Memory of Politics. Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
 
Eiskovits, Nir. “Transitional Justice.” The Stanford Enclopedia of Philosophy. Winter 
Edition. 2014. Available from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/justice-
transitional (accessed on 7 June 2016) 
 
Eltringham, Nigel. Accounting for Horror: Post-genocide Debates in Rwanda. London: Pluto 
Press. 2004. 
244 
 
 
 
 
  
Erlinder, Peter. “The Rwanda Crimes Cover Up: UN Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte confirms the 
cover up,” Global Research: Centre for Research on Globalization. 7 April, 2014. available 
from Global Research 3 September 2009http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-rwanda-war-
crimes-coverup/15037 (accessed on 7 June 2016) 
 
Flood, Zoe. “Teaching Difficult Histories: Rwanda’s Post-Genocide Experience.” 
National Geographic Online Magazine. 1 May 2014. Available from 
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/04/140429-rwanda-genocide-hutu-tutsi-
kigali-curriculum-world/ (accessed on 9 September 2015). 
 
Fofana, Idriss P.A. “A Crisis of Belonging.” Harvard International Review. 21 March, 
2009. available from http://hir.harvard.edu/rethinking-financea-crisis-of-belonging/ , 
(accessed on 5 August 2016) 
 
Foucault, Michael. “Society must be defended”: Lectures at the College de France, 
1975-1976. New York: Picador, 1997. 
 
Fox, Sandi. “Report: Rwanda’s Stake in Congo: Understanding Interest to Achieve Peace.” 
Enough Project. 16 October, 2013. available from 
http://www.enoughproject.org/news/report-rwandas-stake-congo-understanding-interests-
achieve-peace, (4 September, 2016) 
 
French, Howard W.“Kagame’s Hidden War in the Congo.” The New York Review of Books. 
24 September, 2009 Issue. Available from 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2009/09/24/kagames-hidden-war-in-the-congo/, 
(accessed on 14 September 2016) 
 
Fujii, Lee Ann. “A New Model for Studying Mass Murder: The Order of Genocide by Scott 
Strauss”. Genocide Studies and Prevention: An Internatioanl Journal. Vol. 2, Issue 3, 
Article 7. (2007): 265-266. 
 
Fujii, Lee Ann. “The Power of Local Ties: Popular Participation in the Rwandan 
Genocide.” Security Studies. 17. Routledge: Taylor and Francis (2008): 568- 597 
 
Fujii, Lee Ann. “Transforming the moral landscape: the diffusion of a genocidal norm in 
Rwanda”. Journal of Genocide Research. 6(1). Carfax Publishing: Taylor and Francis 
Group (2004): 99-114 
 
Gahigana, Innocent. “The heed to land disputes”. The New Times. August 20, 2007, 
available from http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/article/2007-08-20/809/ (accessed on 8 
November 2015) 
 
 
245 
 
 
 
 
 Garrison, Ann. “Victoire Ingabire. Challenging the Official Rwanda Genocide story: At 
the African Court on Human and People’s Rights.” Global Research. October 28, 2014, 
available on www.globalresearch.ca/victoire-ingabire-challenging-the-official-rwanda-
genocide-story/5410392, (accessed on June23, 2015) 
 
Golooba-Mutebi, Frederick. “Against the Odds: Rwanda, 20 years after- Rwanda has made 
rapid strides in development since 1994.”Aljazeera: Opinion Politics, 12 April, 2014, 
available from http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/04/against-odds-rwanda-20-
years-af-201441292413620474.html (accessed on 14 August 2016) 
 
Golooba-Mutebi, Frederick and Booth, David. “Bilateral Co-operation and Local Power 
Dynamics: The Case of Rwanda”. Overseas Development Institute, (September, 2013): 2-23. 
 
Green, Adam. “Exclusive interview: Paul Kagame.” This is Africa: A Global Perspective. 18 
November 2013. Available from http://www.thisisafricaonline.com/News/Exclusive-
interview-Paul-Kagame, (accessed on 19 August 2015) 
 
Government of the Republic of Rwanda, “History: A Brief History of Rwanda.” Available 
from http://gov.rw/home/history/ (last updated: 2014), (accessed on 16 July 2016) 
 
Government of Rwanda.“Justice and Reconciliation.” Published on Government of 
Rwanda website, available from http://www.gov.rw/about-the-government/justice-
reconciliation/ (accessed on 22 June 2015). 
 
Government of the Republic of Rwanda, “Organic Law, No 30/2008 of 25/07/2008: 
Relating to Rwandan Nationality,” 
http://citizenshiprightsinafrica.org/docs/Rwanda_Nationality_Law_30-2008_25-Jul-
08FR.pdf, (accessed on 15 June 2015) 
 
Government of Rwanda. The 10
th
 National Dialogue to Focus on Achieving Self Reliance. 
13 November, 2014, available from 
http://www.gov.rw/newsdetails2/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=470&cHash=8f09ccda3e55f1b6a6508 
e1f9c42c4f6 (accessed on 16 September, 2015) 
 
Government of the Republic of Rwanda. “National Unity and Reconciliation 
Commission: Home Grown Approaches.” available from 
http://www.nurc.gov.rw/index.php?id=81, (accessed on 19 June 2015) 
 
Gourevitch, Philip. We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our 
families: Stories from Rwanda. Great Britain: Picador, 1999. 
 
Gross, Ayel M.“The Constiution, Reconcilliation and Transition: Lessons from South Africa 
to Israel.” Stanford Journal of Internal Law. 40 (47), (2004): 47-104 
 
246 
 
 
 
 
 Habumuremyi, Pierre Damien. “Pluralism of Consensus and Political Inclusion in the Post 
1994 Tutsi GenocideRwanda- Part 3.” The New Times Newspaper. March 17, 2013, 
available from http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/article/2013-03-17/63927/ (accessed on 
August 12, 2015) 
 
Haspeslagh, Sophie. “Safe Havens in Rwanda: Operation Turquoise”. Available from 
http://www.beyondintractability.org/cic_documents/Safe-Havens-Rwanda.pdf , (accessed 
on 7 June 2016) 
 
Hayman, Rachel. “Funding Fraud? Donors and Democracy in Rwanda” in Remaking 
Rwanda: State building and Human Rights after Mass Violence. eds. Scott Strauss and 
Lars Waldorf. pp118-131. Madison: University of Wisconsin, 2011. 
 
Hayman, Rachel. “Rwanda: Milking the cow? Creating Policy Space in Spite of Aid 
Dependence” in The Politics of Aids: African Strategies for Dealing with Donors. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009. 
 
Hintjens, Helen.“Post-Genocide identity politics in Rwanda.” Ethnicities. Vol.8(1). 
Los Angeles, London, New Delhi and Singapore: Sage Publications, (2008): 5-41 
 
Hintjens, Helen. “Explaining the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda.” The Journal of Modern 
African Studies. 37, 2 (1999): 241-286 
 
Herbst, Jeffrey and Mills, Greg. “There is No Congo: Why the only way to help Congo is to 
stop pretending there is”. Foreign Policy. 18 March, 2009. Available from 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/03/18/there-is-no-congo/ (accessed on 14 July, 2016) 
 
Hilhorst, Dorothy and van Leeuwen, Mathijs. “Emergency and Development: The Case of 
Imidugundu, Villagisation in Rwanda.” Journal of Refugee Studies, 13 (3), (2000):5-48. 
 
Hollyfield, Amy. “Rwanda 20 years after…” Tampabay News. 4 April, 2014. Available 
from http://www.tampabay.com/news/perspective/rwanda-20-years-after/2173537 (accessed 
on 7 November 2015) 
 
Hovil, Lucy. “The Return: Dilemma for Congolese Refugees in Rwanda.” Open Society 
Foundation. 9 September 2011. Available from 
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/return-dilemmas-congolese-refugees-rwanda, 
(accessed on 9 June 2015) 
 
Huggins, Chris. “Land Grabbing and Land Tenure Systems in Post-Genocide Rwanda” in  
Losing your Land: Dispossession in the Great Lakes Region. eds. Ann Ansom and Thea 
Hilhorst. Suffolk: James Curry, 2014. 
 
247 
 
 
 
 
 Human Rights Watch. “Rwanda: Human Rights Development.” Human Rights Watch: 
World Development Report. 1999. available from http://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k/Africa-
08.htm (accessed on 11 March 2014) 
 
Human Rights Watch.“Rwanda: Repression Across Borders: Attacks and Threats Against 
Rwandan Opponents and Critics Abroad.” Human Rights Watch. January, 2014. Available 
from https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/01/28/rwanda-repression-across-borders, (accessed 
on June 30, 2015) 
 
Human Rights Watch. “Attacks on Freedom of Expression, Association, and Assembly in the 
run up to Presidential Elections: January-July 2010.” Human Rights Watch. August 2 2010, 
available from https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/08/02/rwanda-silencing-dissent-ahead-
elections, (accessed on 18 July 2015) 
 
Human Rights Watch. “The Rwandan Genocide: How It was Prepared”. A Human 
Rights Watch Briefing Paper, No.1 (April, 2006) available from 
https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/africa/rwanda0406/4.htm (accessed on 14 
October, 2014) 
 
Human Rights Watch. “Shattered Lives: Sexual Violence during the Rwandan Genocide.” 
Human Rights Watch. 1996. Available from https://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/Rwanda.htm, 
(accessed on 11 November 2015) 
 
International Crisis Group. “Consensual Democracy in Post Genocide Rwanda: Evaluating 
the March 2001 District Elections.” African Report. No. 34, October 9, 2001, 2015, available 
from http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/rwanda/034-consensual-
democracy-in-post-genocide-rwanda-evaluating-the-march-2001-district-elections.aspx 
(accessed on August 1, 2015) 
 
International Crisis Group “Rwanda at the End of the Transition: A Necessary 
Political Liberalization.” International Crisis Group Working Paper. Africa Report, 
No.53, 13 November 2002 (Nairobi/Brussels) 
 
Insitute for Justice and Reconcilliation. “Evaluation and Impact Assessment of the National 
Unity and Reconciliation Commision (NURC).”Instiute for Justice and Reconciliation 
(November 2003): 1-20 
 
International Refugee Rights Initiative. “Shadow of Return: The Dilemmmas of Congolese 
Refugees in Rwanda.” Citizenship and Displacement in the Great Lakes Region Working 
Paper no.6, June 2011. 
 
International Refugee Rights Initiative. “A Dangerous Impasse: Rwandan Refugee in 
Uganda.” Citizenship and Displacement in the Great Lakes Region. Working Paper no.4, 
248 
 
 
 
 
 June 2010. available from www.citizenshiprightsinafrica.org/wp-content-
uploads-10_08_30_dangerous_impasse.pdf, (accessed on 9 June 2015) 
 
Jones, Will. “Potemkin Pluralism: Why the Rwandan Constitution Needs to Change”. Good 
Governance Africa, AIF 32: Shaky Foundation, June-July, 2015. Available from 
http://admin.gga.org/stories/editions/aif-32-shaky-foundations/potemkin-pluralism 
(accessed on 15 August 2015) 
 
Jones, Nicholas A. The Courts of Genocide: Politics and the Rule of Law in Rwanda. Oxon 
and New York: Routledge. 2010. 
 
Kagame, Paul. “The Challenges of Nation- Building in Africa.” Oppenheimer Lecture at 
the International Institute of Strategic Studies, London, 16 September 2010. Available from 
http://www.iiss.org/en/events/events/archive/2010-c61c/september-cbd6/oppenheimer-
lecture-paul-kagame-5c09, (accessed on 11 June 2016) 
 
Kanyangera, Patrick.“Conflict in the Great Lakes Region: Root Causes, Dynamics 
and Effects.” Accord. 5 May 2016. available from http://www.accord.org.za/conflict-
trends/conflict-great-lakes-region/ (accessed on 9 August, 2016) 
 
Karake, Major General Karenzi. “Military Integration, disamament and demobilisation. 
Military Integration in Rwanda.” Peace and Conflict Management Review. Issue 1:Vol. 1, 
Article 11.(2008) 
 
Karekezi, Urusaro Alice. “Review of Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims become 
Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda,” African Review of Books/ 
Revue Africaine Des Livres. Vol. 1, No. 1, (October, 2004): 9-10 
 
Ki-Moon, Ban. “Secretary-General’s Statement to the Inaugral Meeting of Judges of 
the International Criminal Court.” Speech at The Hague, Netherlands. 11 March, 2003, 
Available from http://www.un.org/sg/STATEMENTS/index.asp?nid=280 
 
Kintu, Remigus. “The Truth Behind the Rwanda Tragedy.” Paper Presented at the 
U.N. Tribunal on Rwanda, Arusha, Tanzania. March, 2005. 
 
Kiwuwa, David E. Ethnic Politics and Democratic Transitions in Rwanda. New York: 
Routledge, 2012. 
 
Kritz, Neil. “The Dilemmas of Transitional Justice”. United States Institute of Peace Press. 
Washington D.C. 1995. Available from 
http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace/example/krit3285.htm (accessed on 7 June 2016). 
 
 
249 
 
 
 
 
 Krygier, Martin. “The Hart-Fulled debate in Transitional Societies”.Available from 
https://law.anu.edu.au/sites/all/files/krygier_on_teitel.pdf (accessed on 7 June 2016): 1 
 
Laccino, Ludvico. “Rwanda: Changing Constitution to allow Kagame a Third Term ‘Will 
Undermine Peace and Democracy’.” International Business Times. June 17, 2015 available 
from http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/rwanda-changing-constitution-allow-president-kagame-
third-term-will-undermine-peace-democracy-1506587, (accessed on August 4, 2015) 
 
Lacey, Marc. “A Decade After Massacres, Rwanda Outlaws Ethnicity.” New York Times. 
April, 9, 2004. Available from http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/09/world/a-decade-after-
massacres-rwanda-outlaws-ethnicity.html (accessed on 2 August 2015) 
 
Leebaw, Bronwyn. Judging State-Sponsored Violence, Imagining Political Change. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011 
 
Lemarchand, Rene. The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa. Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2009. 
 
Lemarchand, Rene. “Rwandan Genocide Causes” in Modern Genocide: The Definitive 
Resource and Document, Volume 4: Rwandan Genocide, Other Atrocities , and International 
Law. eds. Paul R. Bartrop and Steven Leonard Jacobs. 1674-1675. California: ABC-CLIO, 
2015. 
 
Lemarchand, Rene. “Genocide, Memory and Ethnic Reconciliation in Rwanda” in L’Afrique 
Des Lacs Annuaire 2006-2007. eds Filip Reytnjens and Stefan Marysse. 23-44. Anvers, 
Belgium: Centre d’etude de la region des Grand Lacs d’Afrique. 
 
Lemarchand, Rene. Rwanda and Burundi. London: Pall Mall Press. 1970. 
 
Lemarchand, Rene, “Review of Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims become Killers: 
Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda,” The Journal of African History. 
Vol. 43, No. 22. University of Cambridge Press (2002): 307-311 
 
Lliza, Nina. “Rewriting My History as a Rwandan Genocide Survivor.” Huffington Post. 3 
March, 2014. Available from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nina-iliza-/rwanda-genocide-
april_b_5017341.html (accessed on 5 November 2014). 
 
Longman, Timothy and Rutagengwe, Theoneste. “Memory, Identity and Community in 
Rwanda” in My Neighbour, My Enemy: Justice and Community in the Aftermath of Mass 
Atrocity. eds. Eric Stover and Harvey M. Weinstein. 162-182. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004. 
 
 
250 
 
 
 
 
 Magnarella, Paul. “Explaining Rwanda’s 1994 Genocide, Review of When Victims 
become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda.” Human Rights and 
Human Welfare. Vol. 2:1. Winter, 2002. 
 
Mamdani, Mahmood. “Beyond Nuremburg: The historical significance of the post-
apartheid transition in South Africa.” Politics and Society. Vol 43 (1), (2015): 61-88 
 
Mamdani, Mahmood.“When Does a Settler Become a Native? Reflections of the 
Colonial Roots of Citizenship in Equatorial and South Africa.” Text of Inaugural Lecture 
as A C Jordan Professor of African Studies, University of Cape Town, 13
th
 May, 1998. 
 
Mamdani, Mahmood. Lessons of Nuremburg and Codesa: Where Do We Go From Here?  
Memorial Day lecture at University of Free State, Bloemfontein, South Africa, 14 July, 2010. 
 
Mamdani, Mahmood. “Making Sense of Political Violence in Post-Colonial Africa”. Socialist 
Register. Vol. 39, (2003): 133-159 
 
Mamdani, Mahmood. “The Question of Justice in Response to Political Violence: Criminal 
or Political?”. Annual Lecture held by University of Sussex: Centre for Conflict and Security 
Research, Sussex, England, 11 May, 2016. Available from 
http://www.sussex.ac.uk/broadcast/read/30277 
 
Mamdani, Mahmood. “In Conversation with Mahmood Mamdani.”Interview by Bhakti 
Shringapure. Warscapes Magazine. 15 July, 2013. Available from 
http://www.warscapes.com/conversations/conversation-mahmood-mamdani (accessed 
7 February, 2015) 
 
Mamdani, Mahmood. When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and 
the Genocide in Rwanda. New Jersey: Princeton Press, 2011. 
 
Mayersen, Deborah. On the Path to Genocide: Armenia and Rwanda Revisited. New York 
and Oxford: Berghahn Books. 2014. 
 
McAuliffe,Padraig. Transitional Justice and the Rule of Law Reconstruction: A Contensious 
Relationship. Oxfordshire and New York: Routledge, 2013 
 
McDoom, Omar Shahubudin. “Rwanda’s Exit Pathway from Violence: A Strategic 
Assessment.” World Development Report: Background Case Study.62054. Washington D.C. 
WorldBank. 2011. 
 
McDoom, Omar. “Review of Scott Strauss, Order of Genocide: Race, Power and War in 
Rwanda.”Book Reviews: The Authors Journal Compilation. Asen/Blackwell 
Publishing(2007): 760-762 
 
251 
 
 
 
 
  
McDoom, Omar “Rwanda’s Ordinary Killers: Interpreting Popular Participation in the 
Rwandan Genocide.” Crisis States Research Programme:DESTIN’s Development 
Research Centre, Working Paper Series no. 1, Working Paper no.77 (2005): 1-27 
 
 
McGreal, Chris. “Rwanda Genocide 20 Years on: ‘We Live with those who killed our 
Families. We are told they’re sorry, but are they?’” The Guardian. 12 May. 2013. Available 
from www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/12/rwanda-genocide-20-years-on, (accessed on 
7 June 2015) 
 
Melvern,Linda. Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide. New York and 
London: Verso. 2004. 
 
Melvern, Linda. A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide. 
London: Zed Books. 2000. 
 
Mettraux, Guenael.“Trial at Nuremburg,” in Routledge Handboook of Intrernational 
Criminal Law. eds. William A. Schabas and Nadia Bernaz, 5-16. Oxin and New York: 
Routledge, 2011. 
 
Mgbako, Chi. “Ingando Solidarity Camps: Reconciliation and Political Indoctrination in 
Post-Genocide Rwanda”. Harvard Human Rights Journal . Vol. 18. Fordham Law Legal 
Studies Research Paper. (2005): 201-224. 
 
Miller, Zinaida. “Constructing Sustainable Reconciliation: Land, Power, and Transitional 
Justice in Post-Genocide Rwanda.” Cape Town: Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, 
 
2007. available from http://www.gsdrc.org/document-library/constructing-sustainable-
reconciliation-land-power-and-transitional-justice-in-post-genocide-rwanda/ (accessed on 
4 July 2016). 
 
Mindzie, Mirelle Affa’a. “Transitional Justice, Democratisation and the Rule of Law,” in  
Peace versus Justice? The Dilemma of Transitional Justice in Africa. eds. Chandra Lekha 
Sriram and Suren Pillay. pp113-134. Kwa-Zaulu Natal: University of Kwa-Zulu Natal 
Press, 2009. 
 
Minear, Richard H. and Michio, Takeyama.“ “The Trial of Mr. Hyde” and Victors’ Justice.”  
The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus. Volume 4., Issue 8, August, 2008. 
 
Moghalu, Kingsley Chiedu.“Prosecute of Pardon? Between Truth Commissions and War 
Crimes Trials,” in Peace versus Justice? The Dilemma of Transitional Justice in Africa. eds. 
Chandra Lekha Sriram and Suren Pillay. pp69-95. Kwa-Zulu Natal: University of Kwa-
Zulu Natal Press, 2009 
 
252 
 
 
 
 
  
Moghalu, Kingsley Chiedu. Global Justice: The Politics of War Crime Trials. Westport: 
Praeger Security International, 2006. 
 
Morris, Virginia, and Scharf, Michael. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. 
Leiden: Bril-Nijhoff. 1997. 
 
Mosley, Alexander. “Just War Theory, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosphy: A Peer-
Reviewed Academic Resource.” Available from http://www.iep.utm.edu/justwar/ (accessed 
on 8 May, 2016) 
 
Mulyana, Yayan GH. “The 1955 Bandung Conference and Present Significance.” The 
Jakarta Post. 29 April, 2011. Available form 
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/04/29/the-1955-bandung-conference-and-
its-present-significance.html (accessed on 4 July 2016) 
 
Munyaneza, James. “Rwanda: Women take 64 seats in Parliament.” New Times 
Newspaper. 19 September 2013. Available from 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201309190110.html, (accessed on August 16, 2015) 
 
Murison, Jude. “The New Rwanda’: 1994-present.” Forced Migration Online. August 
17, 2011. available from http://www.forcedmigration.org/research-resources/expert-
guides/rwanda/the-new-rwanda-1994-present (accessed on August 12, 2015) 
 
Murphy, Tom.“Kagame doesn't like NGO’s, but loves foreign aid.”Humanosphere. 11 
September, 2015, available from http://www.humanosphere.org/world-
politics/2015/09/kagame-doesnt-like-ngos-loves-foreign-aid/ (accessed on 10 August 2016) 
 
Musahara, Herman and Huggins, Chris. “Land Reform, Land Scarcity and Post-Conflict 
Reconstruction: A case study of Rwanda,” in From Ground Up: Land Rights, Conflict and 
Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa. eds Chris Huggins and Jenny Clover. African Centre for 
Technology Studies and African Security Analysis Programme of the Institute for 
Security Studies. 2005. 
 
Musahara, Herman. Nyamulinda, Birasa and Bizimana, Claude. “Land Use Consolidation 
and Poverty Reduction”. Paper presented at the “2014 World Bank Conference on Land 
and Poverty”.Washington DC, March 24-27. 2014. 
 
Mwangi, Wambui. “The International Criminal Court for Rwanda: Reconciling the 
Acquitted” in Peace versus Justice? The Dillemma of Transitional Justice in Africa. eds. 
Chandra Lekha Sriram and Suren Pillay. pp 262-274. Kwa-Zaulu Natal: University of Kwa-
Zulu Natal Press. 2009 
 
253 
 
 
 
 
 Ndahinda,Felix Mukwiza. Indigenousness in Africa: A Contested Legal Framework for 
Empowerment of ‘Marginalized’ Communities. New York: Springer. 2011. 
 
Newbury, Catherine. “High Modernism At the Ground Level: The “Imidugudu Policy” in 
Rwanda” in Remaking Rwanda: State-Building and Human Rights after Mass Violence, 
eds. Scott Strauss and Lars Waldorf. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2011. 
 
Newbury, Catherine. The Cohesion of Oppression: Clientship and Ethnicity in Rwanda, 
1860-1960. New York: Columbia University Press. 1988. 
 
Nyamnjoh, Francis B. “Expectations of Modernity in Africa or Future in the Rear-view 
Mirror?” Review Article, Journal of Southern African Studies. Vol. 27, No. 2 (2001): 
363-379. 
 
Nyange, Yoletta. “Rwanda’s refugees should not be forced to return.” Al Jazeera. 30 June 2013. 
Available from http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/06/20136301155211706.html 
(8 June 2015) 
 
Ocen, Laury L. “Justice and Peace after War: Conceptual Difficulties in the Discourses of 
Transitional and Reform in Postwar Societies”. MISR Review. Issue 1, August (2016): 44-80 
 
Organization of African Unity Report, “Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide: Report of the 
Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding 
Events.”29 May, 2000. 
 
Peskin,Victor. “Victor’s Justice Revisited: Rwandan Patriotic Front Crimes and the 
Prosecutorial Endgame at the ICTR,” in Remaking Rwanda: State-building and Human 
Rights after Mass Violence. eds Scott Strauss and Lars Waldorf. Wisconsin: The University 
of Wisconsin Press. 2011. 
 
Pottier, Johan. Re-Imagining Rwanda: Conflict, Survival and Disinformation in the Late 
Twentieth Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2002. 
 
Prunier, Gerard. The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide 1959-1994. London: Hurst & 
Company. 1995. 
 
Rafti, Marina. “The Rwandan Political Opposition In Exile: A Valid Interlocutor Vis-à-vis?”  
Institute of Development Policy and Management- University of Antwerp. 1-49. 2004. 
 
Rafti, Marina. “A Perilous Path to Democracy: Political Transition and Authoritarian 
Consolodiation in Rwanda.” Institute of Development and Management.Discussion Paper 
2008-03. November 2007. pp1-37. 
 
254 
 
 
 
 
 Rauxloh, Regina E. Negotiated History: The Historical Record in International Criminal Law 
and Plea Bargaining. International Criminal Law Review. Vol. 10. Issue 5 (2010): 739-770 
 
Reid, Angus. “Rwanda: How President Kagame of Rwanda Rigged the 2003 General 
Elections.” Global Monitor. 9 August 2010, available from 
http://rwandarwabanyarwanda.over-blog.com/article-rwanda-how-president-kagame-of-
rwanda-rigged-the-2003-general-elections-55127374.html, (accessed on 15 August 2015) 
 
Republic of Rwanda: Ministry of Infrastructure. “Updated version of the National Human 
Settlement Policy of Rwanda, Kigali”. Published on Government of Rwanda website, May, 19, 
2009, available from 
http://www.rha.gov.rw/fileadmin/user_upload/Documents/NATIONAL_HUMAN_SETTLM 
ENT_POLICIY_IN_RWANDA.pd (accessed on 19 June 2015) 
 
Reyntjens, Filip. “Briefing: The Second Congo War: More Than A Remake”. African Affairs. 
Vol. 98.,No. 391, April (1999): 241-250 
 
Reyntjens, Filip. “Constructing the Truth, Dealing with Dissent, Domesticating the 
World: Governance in Post Genocide Rwanda.” African Affairs. Volume 110. Issue 438. 
London: Oxford Journals. (2010): 1-34 
 
Reyntjens, Filip. The Great African War:Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996-2006. New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 
 
Reyntjens, Filip.“Talking or fighting?: Political Evolution in Rwanda and Burundi 1998-
1999.” Current African Issues. Issue 21, Volume 5. Nordic Africa Institute (1999): 1-27. 
 
Reyntjens, Filip. Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 2013. 
 
Rudasingwa, Theogene. “Rwanda’s 2013 Parliamentary Elections: A Post Mortem,” 
Pazambuka News. 26 September, 2013, available from 
http://www.pambazuka.org/governance/rwandas-2013-parliamentary-elections-post-mortem, 
(accessed on 15 August 2015) 
 
Rurangwa. Eugene. “Land Tenure Reform: The Case Study of Rwanda.” Paper presented 
at the Conference on ‘Land Divided: Land and South African Society in 2013, in 
Comparative Perspective.’ University of Cape Town. 24-27 March. 2013. 
 
Rwirahira, Rodrigue. “At least 92% of Rwandans reconciled, says new survey”. New Times 
Newspaper. January, 28, 2016, available from http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/article/2016-
01-28/196536/ (accessed on 13 June 2016) 
 
255 
 
 
 
 
 Santoro, Lara and Thomson, Susan. “Why are Rwandan’s dissapearing?”. New York 
Times. 18 June, 2014. Available from http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/18/opinion/why-
are-rwandans-disappearing.html?_r=0 (accessed on 9 August, 2016) 
 
S.A.P. “Language in Rwanda: Speak English? Invest here. French need not apply”. The 
Economist. 10 April 2012. Available from available from 
www.economist.com/blogs/johnson/2012/10/language-rwanda (accessed on 9 August 2015) 
 
Scanlon, Helen and Motlafi, Nompumelelo. “Indigenous Justice of Political Instrument? The 
Modern Gacaca Courts of Rwanda” in Peace versus Justice? The Dillemma of Transitional 
Justice in Africa. eds. Chandra Lekha Sriram and Suren Pillay. pp 301-314. Kwa-Zulu Natal: 
University of Kwa-Zulu Natal Press, 2009. 
 
Schabas, William A. “Justice, Democracy and Impunity in Rwanda: Searching for Solutions 
to Impossible Problems”. Criminal Law Forum. Vol. 7 (3), (1996): 523-560 
 
Schabas William A. An Introduction to the Criminal Court. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004. 
 
Sealy, Laura. “Rwanda: Has Reconciliation by Legal Means Worked?” The Washington 
Post. 8 April, 2014. Available from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
cage/wp/2014/04/08/rwanda-has-reconciliation-by-legal-means-worked/ (accessed on 
February 4, 2015, available from) 
 
Sebahara, Pamphile.“The creation of Ethnic Divisions in Rwanda.” Voices from Africa. 
No. 8, Dec. 1998. available from https://www.un-
ngls.org/orf/documents/publications.en/voices.africa/number9/number8/7sebahara.htm 
 
Scorgie, Lindsey. “Rwanda’s Arusha Accords: A missed Opportunity.” 
Undercurrent. Vol.1,No. 1, (2004): 67-76. 
 
Simran Kaur Chahal, “Appropriating the Past: A Comparative Study of Official 
Memory Practices in Rwanda and Burundi”.(Canada: Simon Frazier University, 2012) 
 
Sooka, Yasmin Louise. “The Politics of Transitional Justice” in Peace versus Justice? 
The Dilemma of Transitional Justice in Africa. eds. Chandra Lekha Sriram and Suren 
Pillay. pp21-43. Kwa-Zaulu Natal: University of Kwa-Zulu Natal Press, 2009) 
 
Sriram, Chandra Lekha. “Introduction: Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding,” in Peace 
versus Justice? The Dilemma of Transitional Justice in Africa. eds. Chandra Lekha Sriram 
and Suren Pillay. pp 1- 18. Kwa-Zaulu Natal: University of Kwa-Zulu Natal Press, 2009. 
 
 
256 
 
 
 
 
 Strauss, Scott and Waldorf, Lars. “Introduction: Seeing Like a Post-Conflict State” in 
Remaking Rwanda: State Building and Human Rights after Mass Violence. eds. Scott Strauss 
and Lars Waldorf. 3-24. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2011. 
 
Strauss, Scott. The Order of Genocide: Race, Power and War in Rwanda. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press. 2006 
 
Taku, Chief Charles Akheleke. ICTR: Eternalising the Judicial Genocide Hutu. (Publication 
Unknown, 2009) available from 
http://www.heritagetpirdefense.org/papers/Charles_Taku_ICTR_eternalising_the_judicial_ge 
nocide_of_the_hutu.pdf (accessed on 11 June 2014) 
 
Tanaka, Yuki, McCormack, Timothy L.H. and Simpson, Gerry eds. Beyond Victor’s Justice? 
The Tokyo War Crimes Trial Revisited. Leiden: Brill-Niljoff, 2011. 
 
Teitel, Ruti G. “Transitional Justice in a New Era.” Fordham International Law Journal. 
Vol. 26, Issue 4, Article 2, (2002): 893-906. 
 
Teitel, Ruti G. Transitional Justice. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. 
 
Thomson, Susan. “Re-education for Reconciliation: Particpant Observations on Ingando,” in  
Reconstructing Rwanda: Statebuilding and Human Rights after Mass Violence , eds. Scott 
Strauss Lars Waldorf: pp331-339. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2011. 
 
Toupin,Giles. “Kangura no.2 :Rwandan Refugees Struggle to Return Massively to Their 
Country.” Rwanda File: Primary Sources from the Genocide. Available from available 
form http://www.rwandafile.com/Kangura/k02a.html (accessed on 4 November 2015). 
 
Tunda, Kitenge Fabrice. “Refugees in the Great Lakes Regions: Challenges to 
Peacebuilding.” Accord. 5 May, 2016. available from http://www.accord.org.za/conflict-
trends/refugees-great-lakes-region/ (accessed on 22 August 2016) 
 
United Kingdom: Country Information and Policy Unit- Immigration and Nationality Home 
Office. “Rwanda Country Report.” April 2004. Available from 
http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/40a887827.pdf (accessed on 11 september 2015) 
 
United Nations Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunal. “The ICTR in Brief”. 
Available from http://unictr.unmict.org/en/tribunal (accessed on 7 June 2016). 
 
United States of America Agency for International Development. “Country Profile 1-
Rwanda: Property Rights and Resources Governance.” USAID Land Tenure Programme. 
2010. Available from http://www.usaidlandtenure.net/sites/default/files/country-
profiles/full-reports/USAID_Land_Tenure_Haiti_Profile.pdf (accessed on 11 May 2015) 
 
257 
 
 
 
 
  
Uvin, Peter. “Difficult Choices in the New Post-Conflict Agenda: The International 
Community in Rwanda after the Genocide.” Third World Quarterly. 22:2. (2001):177-189 
 
Uvin, Peter. “Review of Killing Neighbors: Webs of Violence in Rwanda by Lee Ann Fujii.”  
Book Reviews: Comparative Politics, Perspectives on Politics. Vol. 7, No. 4 (2009): 982-983. 
 
Vandeginste, Stef. “Justice for Rwanda, Ten Years After: Some Lessons Learned 
for Transitional Justice.” L’ Africque Des Grands Lacs Annuaire (2003-2004): 1-14. 
 
Vandeneycken, Arlette. “Reconciliation and Justice in Africa, a Review of Mahmood 
Mamdani, When Victims become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in 
Rwanda,” Published on H-Africa. May, 2004. Available from https://networks.h-
net.org/node/28765/reviews/32839/vandeneycken-mamdani-when-victims-become-killers-
colonialism-nativism (accessed on 11 November 2015) 
 
Van Hoyweghen, Saskia. “Review of Mahmood Mamdani, 2001, When Victims become 
Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda.” Review of African Political 
Economy. ROAPE Publications, (2001): 481-484. 
 
van Hoyweghen, Saskia .“The Urgency of Land and Agrarian Reform in Rwanda.” 
African Affairs. Vol. 98, Issue 392. London: Oxford University Press, (1999): 353-372 
 
Vansina, Jan. Antecedents to Modern Rwanda: The Nyinginya Kingdom. Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 2004. 
 
Verdeja, Ernesto. “What is Political Reconciliation?” Mobilizing Ideas. February 3, 2014, 
available from https://mobilisingideas.wordpress.com/2014/02/03/what-is-political-
reconciliation/ (accessed on 19 June 2015) 
 
Verwimp, Phillip. Peasants in Power: The Political Economy of Development and Genocide 
in Rwanda. Netherlands: Springer Press, 2013. 
 
Vijayan, Suchitra. “Rwanda and the NY Times: On those images by by Pieter Hugo pairing 
perpetrators and victims of the 1994 Genocide”. Africa Is a Country. April 25, 2014, 
available from http://africasacountry.com/2014/04/rwanda-the-genocide-must-live-on/ 
(accessed on 4 June 2015) 
 
Villa-Vicencio, Charles. “Inclusive Justice: The limitations of Trial Justice and Truth 
Commissions” in Peace versus Justice: The Dilemma of Transitional Justice in Africa. eds. 
Chandra Lekha Sriram and Suren Pillay. pp44- 68. Kwa-Zulu Natal: University of Kwa-
Zulu Natal, 2009. 
 
258 
 
 
 
 
 Verweijen, Judith and Vlassenroot, Koen. “Armed mobilisation and the nexus of territory, 
identity, and authroity: the contested territorial aspiration of the Banyamulenge in esatern DR 
Congo.” Journal of Contemporary African Studies. Vol. 33, No. 2. (2015):191-212 
 
Waldorf, Lars. “Censorship and Propaganda in Post-Genocide Rwanda” in The Media and the 
Rwanda Genocide. ed. Allan Thompson, pp404-416. London: Pluto Press, 2007. 
16
 
 
Human Rights Watch. “Rwanda: Silencing Dissent ahead of Elections.” Human Rights 
Watch. 2 August, 2010. Available from https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/08/02/rwanda-
silencing-dissent-ahead-elections August 2 2010 (accessed on July18) 
 
Waldorf, Lars. “Goats and Graves: Reparations in Rwanda’s Community Courts” in  
Reparations for Victims of Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity. eds Carla 
ferstman, Mariana Goetz and Alan Stephens, pp 515- 540. Leiden: Brill-Niljhoff, 2009 
 
Waldorf, Lars.“ “Thinking Big”: Rwanda’s Post-Genocide Politics.” E-International 
Relations. 30 April, 2014, available from http://www.e-ir.info/2014/04/30/thinking-big-
rwandas-post-genocide-politics/APR 30 2014 accessed on (5 July 2016) 
 
Waldorf, Lars. “A Mere Pretense of Justice: Complimentarity, Sham Trials, and Victor’s 
Justice at the Rwanda Tribunal.” Fordham International Law Journal. Vol 33, Issue 4 (3), 
(2011): 1221-1277 
 
Waldorf, Lars. “Mass Justice for Mass Atrocity: Transitional Justice and Illiberal 
Peace-Building in Rwanda.” PhD thesis, National University of Ireland (2013) 
 
Wamariya, Clemantine and Well, Elizabeth. “Everything is yours, Eveything is not 
yours.” Matter. 29 June 2015, available from https://medium.com/matter/everything-is-
yours-everything-is-not-yours-d6f66bd9c6f9#.z7ynvs386 (accessed on 4 November 2015) 
 
Wielenge, Cori.“ ‘Lived’ Identities in Rwanda: Beyond Citizenship?.” African Insight. 
Vol. 44(1), (Africa Institute South Africa, June 2014): 122-136 
 
Winter, Stephen. “Towards a Unified Theory for Transitional Justice.” The 
International Journal of Transitional Justice. Vol. 7, (2013): 224-244 
 
Woodrow Wilson’s International Centre for Scholars. “Book Release: Killing 
Neighbours: Webs of Violence in Rwanda, In Conversation with Lee-Ann Fujii.”.23 
September, 2009. Audio-Video available from https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/book-
release-webs-violence-rwanda-conversation-lee-ann-fujii (accessed on 3 August 2016). 
 
Author Unknown. “A day in the marshes”. Rwandan Stories. Available from 
http://www.rwandanstories.org/genocide/marshes.html (accessed on 11 November 2015) 
259 
 
 
 
 
  
Author Unknown, “Africa’s Singapore?: A country with a bloody history seeks prosperity 
by becoming business-friendly.” The Economist. 25 February, 2012. available from, 
http://www.economist.com/node/21548263, (accessed on 3 November 2015) 
 
Author Unknown.“From President to Prison.” BBC online. 6 July, 2004. Available from 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3728807.stm (accessed on 11 September 2015) 
 
Author Unknown. “ ‘Game Over’ for Democracy in Rwanda.” Freedom House. 2 June, 
2015. Available from https://freedomhouse.org/blog/game-over-democracy-rwanda 
(accessed on 7 November 2015) 
 
Author Unknown. “Hundreds throng Parliament as term limits debate gets underway.” 
New Times Newspaper. 14 July, 2015. Available from 
http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/article/2015-07-14/190606/, (accessed on 7 November 
2015) 
 
Author Unknown.“Kagame Allies Seek Vote to Allow him a Third Term.” New Vision. 23 
October 2014, available from http://www.newvision.co.ug/news/661008-kagame-allies-seek-
vote-to-allow-him-a-third-term.html, (accessed on August 4, 2015) 
 
Author Unknown. “Kagame May Pardon Fugitives if they Return Home”. Igihe News. 
10 May 2010. Available from http://eng.imirasire.com/news/all-around/in-
rwanda/article/kagame-may-pardon-fugitives-if. (Accessed on 9 June 2015) 
 
Author Unknown, “Neither Hutu nor Tutsi, just Rwandan: Rwanda is holding its first 
election since the genocide five years ago. But the government dares not allow much 
democracy.” The Economist. April 1, 1999, available from 
http://www.economist.com/node/320471 (accessed on 3 November 2015) 
 
Author Unknown. “Political Reform Reaches Last Stage in Rwanda” IOL News. February 
20, 2006. available from http://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/political-reform-reaches-last-
stage-in-rwanda-1.267079#.VbaMo0LlclI, (accessed on 12 August 2015) 
 
Author Unknown “Rwanda: France Opens Rwanda Genocide Archives.” Radio France 
Internationale. 8 April, 2015. Available on 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201504081275.html (accessed on 1 August , 2015) 
 
Author Unknown.“Rwanda: The Political Platform Speeds Up for Change.” Democratiques 
Unifiees-Rwanda. October 14, 2013. Available from http://www.fdu-
rwanda.com/en/kinyarwanda-urugaga-rwamashyaka-amahoro-ihuriro-rnc-fdu-inkingi-mu-
ntambwe-nshya-yo-guhindura-ubutegetsi-buri-mu-rwanda/ (accessed on August 9, 2015) 
 
260 
 
 
 
 
  
Author Unknown, “Rwanda: Who has Kagame been fooling with his elections?” Harungana 
Forum. 16 September, 2013. Available from http://www.harungana.com/2013/09/rwanda-
who-has-kagame-been-fooling-with.html, (accessed on 7 November 2015) 
 
Author Unknown. “Rwanda opposition sues over exclusion of French language.” 9 December 
2014. Available from http://www.expatica.com/fr/news/country-news/Rwanda-opposition-
sues-over-exclusion-of-French-language_442155.html, (accessed on August 2, 2015) 
 
Author Unknown, “Rwanda’s Presidential Election: Kagame won, a little too well: 
Nine years after the genocide, Paul Kagame has much to his credit. But not, 
unfortunately, allowing true democracy.” The Economist. August 28, 2003, available 
from www.economist.com/node/2023062, (accessed on 11 August, 2015) 
 
Author Unknown. “Slain Rwandan was to testify at genocide court,” CNN, 18 May, 1998, 
available from http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/africa/9805/18/rwanda.death.folo/ 
(accessed on 9 August 2016) 
 
Author Unknown. “Two paths out of hatred: Is “tribe” a dirty word?”. The Economist. 
August 25, 2005. available from http://www.economist.com/node/4323270 (accessed on 17 
October 2015) 
 
Author Unknown. “Uganda: Rwandan Refugees still reluctant to Repatriate.” Integrated 
Regional Information Networks. Available from 
http://www.irinnews.org/report/95072/uganda-rwandan-refugees-still-reluctant-to-repatriate 
(accessed on 9 August 2015) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
261 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Please Note: Scott Strauss “The Order of Genocide: Race, Power and War in Rwanda” 
has been referenced according to a downloaded Kindle copy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
262 
 
 
 
 
